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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses the relation between demonology and sovereignty in apocalyptic 
and spiritual warfare discourses in contemporary American evangelical conservatism. 
Employing a poststructuralist hermeneutical framework drawn from Jacques Derrida 
and Michel de Certeau, it assesses selected texts published between 2008 and 2013 
which construct specific threats to what the authors view as the legitimate telic orders 
of being, or ‘orthotaxies’. I analyse how these orthotaxies operate as sovereignty 
claims, positing ownership of the future as temporal, ideological and geopolitical 
territory within various theopolitics of identity that juxtapose a singular ‘authentic’ 
self against a multiplicity of others coded as demonic. Orthotaxic sovereignty claims 
are thus predicated on strategies of (de)legitimation reliant upon demonic others 
which contest and continually haunt those claims through (an) orthotaxy’s structural 
dependency on them as self-consolidating others. My thesis focuses on three such 
demonological others as constructed in thematically-related texts: ‘Islam’, ‘Jezebel’, 
and ‘Transhumanism’. Each of the case studies traces a distinct relationship between 
theopolitical sovereignty and its demonic other. Those of ‘Islam’ figure a discourse of 
competing unity, constructing an uncanny other so (un)like the self which embodies 
in abject form the order the writers crave. Those of ‘Jezebel’ belie a terror of process, 
flow and (in)stability that exposes the absence of a stable, singular sovereign. Those 
of ‘Transhumanism’ reveal a structure of secularised metamorphosis that threatens to 
rewrite the (in)evitable telos of God’s sovereign role in history. By situating these 
others in the context of a genealogy of the political implementation of demonology 
and of a reification of American ‘authenticity’ both during and after the Cold War, my 
thesis explores the structural relationship between theopolitical conceptions of 
sovereignty and a demonic other which both guarantees and subverts that sovereignty 
through the mechanisms of its exclusion.
 4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... 3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... 4 
CONVENTIONS AND ORTHOGRAPHY ................................................................................. 7 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................... 8 
INTRODUCTION: DEMONOLOGY IN A TIME OF TERROR ............................... 9 
A POLITICAL DEMONOLOGY .......................................................................................... 13 
A Case for Demonology ............................................................................................ 14 
Contingencies (A Question of Good) ........................................................................ 19 
(SPIRITUAL) WARFARE IN A TIME OF TERROR ................................................................ 22 
And There Was (Cold) War in Heaven ..................................................................... 23 
Three Faces of Orthotaxy .......................................................................................... 26 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ............................................................................................ 31 
PART I: A DESCENTION ............................................................................................. 34 
CHAPTER 1. DELINEATING DEVIATION, ARTICULATING ABSENCE: 
DEMONOLOGY IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE—A GENEALOGICAL 
REVIEW .......................................................................................................................... 35 
STATECRAFT AND WITCHCRAFT: PERVERTING THE PROPER, 1320–1634 ....................... 37 
Darkness and Silence: Recent Scholarship on Demonologies of Witchcraft ............ 39 
Statecraft and Witchcraft, Centres and Peripheries ................................................. 43 
The Devastating Syllogism ........................................................................................ 46 
A PROTEAN POST-ENLIGHTENMENT .............................................................................. 48 
Architect of Evil to Archetype of Rebellion: Satanisms, Romantic and Symbolic .... 49 
(In)Visible Ubiquity: Conspiracy Theory—Night Science, Hermetic History .......... 52 
INTO ‘THE “SENSELESS” MAZE’ ..................................................................................... 56 
CHAPTER 2. I WILL (NOT) SERVE: THE DEMONIC AND THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF SOVEREIGNTY ..................................................................... 58 
THE (IN)DIVISIBILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY ........................................................................ 62 
A Sovereignty Is Born ................................................................................................ 62 
Sovereign Limits I: The Self(-Otherness) .................................................................. 64 
Sovereign Limits II: Origins and Borders ................................................................. 68 
The Prescriptive Phantasm ....................................................................................... 71 
THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE SOVEREIGN’S ENVIOUS DUTY ................................... 75 
Antepolitics and Antipolitics ..................................................................................... 76 
The Imitation God ..................................................................................................... 79 
The Counterfeit Kingdom .......................................................................................... 81 
THE BEAST, THE SOVEREIGN ......................................................................................... 84 
In Want of a Foe ........................................................................................................ 85 
Making Truth at the Limits of the Lie ........................................................................ 89 
The (Im)Possibility of Reigning in Hell .................................................................... 93 
CHAPTER 3. CITIZENS OF PARADISE: NEOCONSERVATISM, 
EVANGELICALISM, AND THE THEOPOLITICS OF IDENTITY ....................... 96 
PARADISE HAS WALLS: SOVEREIGNTY AND CIVIL RELIGION ....................................... 100 
 5 
(Re)Making Histories .............................................................................................. 100 
Apocalyptic Substrates ............................................................................................ 102 
NEOCONSERVATISM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EVIL .................................................... 105 
Nativity Scene .......................................................................................................... 105 
Shifting Strategies of Self-Consolidation ................................................................ 108 
CAPITALIST, CHRISTIAN, AMERICAN ............................................................................ 110 
Constructing (A Need for) Normality ...................................................................... 111 
Dispensation(s) ....................................................................................................... 115 
Fission and Fusion .................................................................................................. 118 
OWNING THE FUTURE—A THEOLOGICO-GEOPOLITICS OF IDENTITY ........................... 122 
Future Territories .................................................................................................... 122 
Zone of Peace (House of War) ................................................................................ 124 
One America ............................................................................................................ 127 
PART II: PRESENT DARKNESSES .......................................................................... 129 
CHAPTER 4. THE IS AND THE OUGHT: POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE 
OTHER GLOBALISATION ........................................................................................ 130 
CONSPIRACISM, ANTISEMITISM, AND THE CHIMERA OF ISLAM ..................................... 133 
The Twinned Trees of Antisemitism and Islamophobia .......................................... 134 
The Chimera of ‘Islam’ ........................................................................................... 137 
THE INASSIMILABLE FOREIGNNESS OF ISLAM .............................................................. 140 
A Brotherhood of Alterity ........................................................................................ 141 
Sacred Seditions ...................................................................................................... 144 
Blood, Faith, and Soil ............................................................................................. 147 
The Racial Contract ................................................................................................ 150 
ISRAEL AND THE THEOPOLITICS OF PROJECTION .......................................................... 152 
The Disavowed Centre ............................................................................................ 153 
The Instrumentalisation of Antisemitism ................................................................. 156 
THE OTHER(’S) GLOBALISATION: ‘ISLAM’ AS ‘OTHER SELF’ ....................................... 159 
The Revenge of History ........................................................................................... 160 
The Coming Caliphate: Self/Other—Other Self ...................................................... 163 
CHAPTER 5. ‘WHERE IS THE PRINCE?’: THE JEZEBEL SPIRIT AND THE 
OWNERSHIP OF ABSENCE ...................................................................................... 167 
THE CONTESTED TERRITORIES OF SPIRITUAL WARFARE .............................................. 173 
Mapping the Battlefields ......................................................................................... 174 
The Site of Ownership ............................................................................................. 176 
WOMAN, FOREIGNER, IDOLATER: JEZEBEL’S TRIPLE ALTERITY .................................. 179 
Genderless Spirit and Spirit of Genderlessness ...................................................... 179 
The Absence of (Hetero)Normativity ...................................................................... 181 
Jezebel’s Tools ........................................................................................................ 184 
WITCHCRAFT, POWER, AND (IL)LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY ........................................... 187 
A Practice of Spiritual Subversion .......................................................................... 188 
Christendom America Must Be Defended ............................................................... 190 
JEZEBEL-BABYLON: ABSENT, MULTIPLE ..................................................................... 192 
The Mistress of Kingdoms ....................................................................................... 194 
Absence the Body .................................................................................................... 197 
Her Counterfeit Bride ............................................................................................. 200 
Mestlet, Mestlet ....................................................................................................... 202 
 6 
CHAPTER 6. (P)REDESTINATIONS: (TRANS)HUMANISM AND THE 
ORIGINS OF EMERGENCE ...................................................................................... 204 
TECHNOLOGIES OF THE END ........................................................................................ 208 
Authentic Fakery ..................................................................................................... 209 
Transhumanism and its Demon(ologist)s ................................................................ 212 
AS THE DAYS OF NOAH WILL HAVE BEEN .................................................................. 216 
Semblances of Futures Past .................................................................................... 217 
A Sovereign Simulacrum ......................................................................................... 220 
The Crucible ............................................................................................................ 223 
Origins of Emergency ............................................................................................. 227 
(HUMAN) NATURE AND THE INSTAURATION OF SOVEREIGNTY .................................... 228 
The Slow March (Back) to Paradise ....................................................................... 229 
Dark Mirrors ........................................................................................................... 232 
The True False Dawn .............................................................................................. 235 
PART III: DESCENTION (REDUX) .......................................................................... 237 
CHAPTER 7. THE COUNTERFEIT GODS: SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS 
DEMONOLOGIES—IMITATIONS AND ITERATIONS ....................................... 238 
ROGUE LEVIATHANS: ORTHOTAXY AND ITS HETEROLOGIES ........................................ 240 
The (Anti)Christic Imitation .................................................................................... 241 
Selfhood (In)Divisible ............................................................................................. 244 
Popular Sovereignty and its Demons ...................................................................... 246 
A DEVIL IS HAUNTING HEAVEN: IPSEITY, ITERABILITY, IRRUPTION ............................. 250 
The Hauntological Demonic ................................................................................... 250 
That Which Comes (Once, Once Again) ................................................................. 252 
The Counterfeit Gods .............................................................................................. 256 
CODA: OWNING THE FUTURE ............................................................................... 258 
FRAGILE CERTAINTIES ................................................................................................. 259 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS ................................................................................................... 261 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 263 
PRIMARY SOURCES ...................................................................................................... 263 
SECONDARY SOURCES ................................................................................................. 272 
 
 7 
CONVENTIONS AND ORTHOGRAPHY 
This thesis utilises a variant of the Harvard referencing style. All direct quotations are 
cited within the text using the format (Name Date: Page). When no page is present, as 
in the case of online sources such as blog entries and newspaper columns, the lack of 
a page range is indicated by the abbreviation n.p. These texts are included in the 
Bibliography under the author(s)’s names and include links and access dates. Online 
sources, predominantly news articles, which are referenced but not quoted are placed 
in footnotes, with links and dates included, at the relevant junctures. These works are 
not listed separately under the Bibliography. Classical works, such as Paradise Lost, 
are cited in-text using the convention (Book.Line), but are included in the 
Bibliography under the author’s name and the date of the consulted translation or 
edition rather than the original publication date. 
 
All Bible verses, unless otherwise marked or included as part of direct quotations, are 
taken from the New King James Version (NKJV). This version was selected because 
it was the one most commonly (if not universally) employed by the texts analysed in 
this thesis. All verses cited in-text follow the convention ‘Book Chapter:Verse’: for 
example, Ephesians 6:12. If placed in parentheses, the Book is normally abbreviated: 
for example, ‘(Eph. 6:12).’ 
 
The Bibliography includes all works, cited and uncited, which have been consulted in 
the process of writing this thesis.  Sources marked ‘primary’ are works around which 
the case studies have been oriented and of shared milieux, including spiritual warfare 
manuals, conspiracist works, and neoconservative reflections. Other works are listed 
as secondary sources. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Demonology in a Time of Terror 
  
‘In the panicked aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United 
States,’ write Mark Safford and Peter Kennedy, ‘government officials, politicians, 
columnists, and other opinion leaders declared the start of a whole new and 
threatening era facing the nation and indeed the entire world’ (2009: 5). This new era, 
they elaborate, was declared to be defined by a clash of civilisations between radical 
Islam, on the one hand, and nations aligned with ‘Western values’ of liberal 
democracy and the free market on the other. Moreover, this clash would be the glass 
through which all global discord would be seen (darkly).  
Safford and Kennedy gesture here to a certain politico-cultural rhetoric that 
followed the attacks. Joseph Nye, founder of neoliberal International Relations theory, 
compared the event to a ‘flash of lightning on a summer evening’, revealing a 
landscape already transformed by the closing decades of the twentieth century, and of 
which US analysts and policy makers had remained ignorant (in Morgan 2009: 2). 
Paraphrasing Jacques Derrida, Giovanna Borradori called the attacks ‘[possibly] the 
implosive finale of the Cold War, killed by its own convolutions and contradictions’ 
(2003: 150), while French philosopher Alain Badiou remarked that they had the ‘fin 
de siècle resonance’ of another century (2005: 106) and architectural theorist 
Benjamin Flowers reflected that, for many, the event ‘heralded the fracturing of a 
formerly comprehensible world’ (2009: 149). Whether seen as a revelatory moment, 
the culmination of an old era or origin of a new one, however, ‘9/11’—as it came to 
be known—has had a lasting cultural, political, religious, legal, and economic impact. 
The ‘name-date became a slogan’, notes Marc Redfield, ‘a blank little scar around 
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which nationalist energies could be marshalled’ (2009: 1). 9/11 announced the crisis 
of a nation and (before long) the measures seemingly needed to resolve it. The Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) it inaugurated has been a—maybe the—defining paradigm 
(political, social, military, philosophical) of the early twenty-first century. A war 
without conceivable end, waged as a territorial conflict against an enemy unbounded 
by territory, the GWOT provoked a reconsideration of political ideas of sovereignty, 
the nation-state, security, and states of exception, and marked the explosive re-entry 
of an awareness of religion into the public sphere. A decade after Fukuyama 
proclaimed the end of history and the advent of the millennial kingdom of (neo)liberal 
democratic capitalism (1992), 9/11 perhaps signalled a form of what liberation 
theologian Daniel Bell calls ‘the refusal to cease suffering’ (2001)—a declaration (not 
always, as here, of catastrophic violence, but perhaps always catastrophic) that others 
remain outside the kingdom’s gates. Or, phrased less (or anti-) apocalyptically, that 
‘history was not finished with us yet’ (Cavanaugh and Scott 2004: 1). 
Taking our ‘time of terror’ as its temporal locus, this thesis is concerned with 
questions of sovereignty, apocalypse, and, above all, demonology, and the relations 
that might be shown to run between these ‘theologico-political’ concepts. This thesis 
is in conversation with the scholarly corpus, one that has expanded rapidly since 9/11, 
called political theology. Defined rather too narrowly by William Cavanaugh and 
Peter Scott as ‘the analysis and criticism of political arrangements (including cultural-
psychological, social and economic aspects) from the perspective of differing 
interpretations of God’s ways in the world’ (ibid.), political theology might also be 
broadly figured as the interrogation of the continued presence, however obscure, of 
the theological in the political. As Hent de Vries explains, the field names on one 
hand ‘the scientia of the elusive and absolute that governs and often unconsciously 
drives and inspires, or destabilizes and terrorizes, the public domain (the ‘theologico-
political’)’, and on the other ‘the name and description of the many diverse forms in 
which this “empty” notion or open dimension can become dogmatically fixated, 
socially reified, and aesthetically fetishized’ (2006: 46). Political theology, as I 
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employ it here, therefore aims to interrogate both the theological undercurrents that 
condition the political sphere and the idol- and idealisations of these undercurrents.1 
The undercurrent this thesis explores is, to cite Derrida, the ‘theologeme’ of 
sovereignty (2004: 110), which he defines as of ‘ontotheological origin, more or less 
secularized in one place, and purely theological and non-secularized in another’ 
(2003: 111), and as grounded in a logic of ipseity; that is, of sameness, of identity as 
sameness (2004: 12). However, while this thesis is about sovereignty it is not (only) 
about the sovereign qua sovereign, but about the alterities that frame, constitute, and 
infiltrate its ipseity. If the sovereign can be seen as the centre of the theopolitics of the 
polis, then this thesis is about those who must wait in the wilderness outside the gates; 
indeed, whose very presence within the gates would transfigure the inside into outside 
(city to wilderness, sovereign to Beast), whose outopia is figured as the condition of 
eutopia’s possibility. In his seminars on the death penalty, Derrida claims that the 
state is at its most sovereign, and appeals most to its claims (however disavowed) of 
universality, when it decrees death, when it condemns and damns, but also when it 
pardons, when by an imitation of divine grace it lifts that damnation (2014: 3, 138–
148). But how does this latter act relate to those structurally denied the possibility of 
pardon? Those who, in Thomas Aquinas’ words, cannot (or will not) hope for grace, 
since they ‘sin regarding everything they choose, since the force of their first choice 
abides in their every choice’ (DM Q16.A5.A/2003: 472)? That is, for those whose 
first act of dissent and descent reverberates throughout history—those constructed as 
attempting at every juncture to twist history from its course by force or seduction? 
I am speaking here of the constitutive theologico-political figure of the demon, 
denied any claims to sovereignty but bequeathed just enough autonomy to oppose it. 
This thesis explores the discursive construction of the demon in relation to the 
theologeme of sovereignty within contemporary demonologies. It treats this ‘demon’ 
as a literary/theological figure, not a reality, and ‘demonology’ as a discursive 
structure—defined, after Michel Foucault, as a set of cultural, linguistic, and 
                                                
1 Much contemporary political theology takes point from Carl Schmitt’s 1922 Political Theology, 
specifically his famous dictum that the ‘central concepts of modern state theory are all secularized 
theological concepts’ (2005: 36). In this thesis, I use ‘theologico-political’ and ‘theopolitical’ to refer to 
these ‘ontotheological’ structures underwriting modern politics. When I refer to ‘theopolitical 
sovereignty’ or a ‘theologico-political concept of sovereignty’, I aim to highlight how political 
sovereignty is a significant element of a Christian theological genealogy. 
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ideological (and here theological) practices that systematically construct the object(s) 
of which it speaks (2002 [1989]: 49–51). By adopting a discursive methodology, this 
thesis aims to analyse, to cite Stuart Hall, the ‘effects and consequences of 
representation…not only how language and representation produce meaning, but how 
the knowledge which a particular discourse produces connects with power, regulates 
conduct, makes up or constructs identities and subjectivities’ (1997: 6). What does it 
mean, however, to approach the figure of the demon, and the -ology that describes 
and prescribes it, through a discursive methodology? 
In his defence of scholarly engagement with religious demonologies, past and 
present, Bruce Lincoln defines demonology broadly as ‘an unflinching attempt to 
name, comprehend, and defend against all that threatens, frightens, and harms us’, one 
that often encapsulates a variety of rubrics: ‘bacteriology, epidemiology, toxicology, 
teratology, criminology, Marxism, psychoanalysis, and others’ (2012: 31). Utilising a 
discursive methodology leads me to concentrate on the effects and consequences of 
this ‘unflinching attempt’, paying close attention to the (theo)politics of this naming, 
comprehension of, and defence against, demonological threat. Mastery begins, 
Jacques Derrida reminds us, with ‘the power of naming, of imposing and legitimating 
appellations’ (1998: 39). What does it mean to name a demon, and to name someone 
or something as demonic? What structures does this naming impose? What 
potentialities does it attempt to strip, successfully or otherwise? This thesis explores 
these questions in the context of certain aspects of far-right American Protestantism, 
the ‘Christian Right’, particularly (if not exclusively) in the form of the eschatological 
evangelical discourse known as spiritual warfare, a discourse I elaborate below.2 
By adopting this discursive methodology, and by juxtaposing the demon to the 
structures of divine sovereignty, this thesis bears similarities to Sara Ahmed’s recent 
Willful Subjects (2014). In this work, Ahmed builds an archive of the wilful subject as 
the one constructed as opposing the sovereign will, arguing that the sovereign might 
                                                
2 I would acknowledge here as a UK-based researcher studying America that there is a tendency to 
displace certain issues across the Atlantic: to gesture to the US’s on-going problems of racial violence 
and conservative hyper-religiosity as an alibi. This thesis has an American focus because it is there that 
the demonologies I wanted to study were most concretised, tying closely and overtly into theopolitical 
discourses of (popular) sovereignty and neo-colonial discursive territorialisation. The European and 
UK contexts have their own demonologies that hinge on different (if equally theopolitical) structures: 
the sacredness of a public sphere shorn of real difference and a stringent disavowal of (the continued 
impact of) its colonial past, to list but two. 
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be defined as ‘the right to determine whose wills are the willful wills’. Sovereign is he 
who decides on the excluded. Conversely, however, ‘rebellion against tyranny might 
involve those named as willful renaming the sovereign will as willful will, the 
sovereign as tyrant’ (2014: 136). The strategy of naming a ruler as in contravention of 
proper order—as demonic (or) tyrant—has long been a tactic of counter-cultural 
apocalyptic movements (Horsley 2010; Zamora 1989). There have also been cases of 
‘self-demonisation’, however—of adopting the mantle of demonised or demonic in 
opposition of allegedly sacred order. The most visible of these self-demonisations is 
found in the literary and intellectual currents of Romantic or symbolic Satanism that 
sprung from a deliberate misprision—a wilful reading—of Milton’s Paradise Lost 
(Craciun 2003; Faxneld 2013a, 2014; Schock 2003). My thesis offers a similar type of 
counter-reading: it reads the works analysed against themselves, deconstructing their 
‘demonologico-political’ constructions of demons in order to excavate their 
relationships to specific socio-religio-political structures. It explores the discursive 
structures of demonology as tied by opposition to equally discursive constructions of 
sovereignty and sovereign will. It attempts what might be called, with an irony 
characteristic of the Devil, a political demonology. 
A POLITICAL DEMONOLOGY 
As I define it, political demonology engages in political theology via the discursive 
figure of the demon, and interrogates the concepts that the demon figures: lies (truth), 
evil (good), sin (virtue), death (life), deviation (normality), and counterfeit (real), to 
name only the most prevalent. I include the contrasting terms in parentheses since, in 
many ways, the demon cannot be discursively thought outside of these oppositional 
relationships; outside its relation of alterity to an ipseity it cannot be. As this thesis 
explores, however, neither can sovereignty itself be thought outside of these structural 
oppositions. I might therefore add duality/multiplicity (unity), absence (presence), and 
other (self). ‘Unity rests in God, duality (le binaire) in Satan,’ wrote Huguenot poet 
Guillaume du Bartas (1544–1590) (in S. Clark 1997: 80). Or, in the words of literary 
scholar Neil Forsyth, ‘Satan’s name…defines a being who can only be contingent: as 
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the adversary, he can only be the function of another, not an independent entity’ 
(1989: 4). A political demonology aims to explore these binary oppositions, this 
inherent, intranscendable condition of contingency, as it manifests in a (post-)secular 
political present. To appropriate and transform de Vries’ words it would be both a 
‘scientia’ of the binary oppositions listed above as they govern and (consciously or 
unconsciously) drive and inspire, destabilise and terrorise the public domain (the 
‘demonologico-political’) and also the project of naming and describing the diverse 
ways that the structures of this ‘“empty” notion’ become dogmatically fixated, 
socially reified, aesthetically fetishised. Alternatively, to rather bluntly invert 
Cavanaugh and Scott, political demonology would be ‘the analysis and criticism of 
political arrangements (including cultural-psychological, social and economic 
aspects) from the perspective of differing interpretations of [Satan’s] ways in the 
world.’ 
A Case for Demonology 
However, why demons? Why demonology? Why political demonology, specifically? 
Surely demonology was, as Bruce Lincoln notes, ‘conclusively discredited in the 
European Enlightenment…drained of all but antiquarian interest’ (2009: 45)? Surely 
to engage with it at all might contaminate me with its foolishness, or—‘a less magical 
construction of the same dynamic’ (ibid.)—potentially damage my reputation? To 
speak with seriousness of ‘Satan’s ways in the world’, even at a distance, is perhaps to 
invite ridicule or academic perdition. In his 2009 article on the Zoroastrian demon 
Cēšmag, later reworked as chapter four of Gods and Demons, Priests and Scholars 
(2012), Lincoln argues that this understanding of demonology leads to an 
impoverished understanding of religion generally, since ‘some of the most serious 
issues of ethics, cosmology, anthropology, and soteriology were—and still are—
regularly engaged via demonology’ (ibid.).3 The millennium had seen a boom of 
                                                
3 While Lincoln’s article is on Zoroastrian demonology he is referring here to ‘demonology’ broadly. 
He notes, for example, that despite the rise in studies of European demonology, there has been little 
study done on ‘Iranian and other non-Western demonologies’ (2009: 45). As noble as Lincoln’s aim is, 
I would dispute the possibility or even desirability of locating ‘demonology’ beyond a Western, even 
Western Christian, context. While many scholars have identified a Zoroastrian or Mesopotamian 
precursors to (Judaeo-)Christian apocalypse and demonologies (Clifford 2000; Cohn 1995, 2004; 
Forsyth 1989; Hultgård 2000; Kreyenbroek 2002), and while no origin is ever pure, the Christian 
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scholarly works on apocalyptic religiosities, most of which dealt in some manner with 
constructions of Satan or Antichrist, but works focusing on demonology were mostly 
centred on late medieval and early modern Europe. 
The years since, however, have marked a shift. Since the beginning of 2014 
several major monographs have been published addressing the continued socio-
cultural relevance of demonic symbolism and demonological paradigms. These 
include Erin Runions’ The Babylon Complex (2014), a nuanced analysis of the 
theopolitics of the Biblical figure of Babylon in contemporary America, Per Faxneld’s 
Satanic Feminism (2014), which dissects nineteenth-century uses of demonic imagery 
as religio-political protest in the context of the early women’s liberation movement, 
and Philip Almond’s The Devil (2014), which charts a history of Satan until the 
Enlightenment through the lens of the ‘demonic paradox’—his function as both God’s 
enforcer and enemy. This surge of interest seems only to be increasing. The first half 
of 2015 has seen the publication of further works, each wrestling with the theoretical 
implications of demonologies. The English translation of Simona Forti’s 2012 Il 
nuovi demoni, New Demons (2015), draws on Arendtian and Foucauldian thought to 
construct a new model of understanding evil as inextricable from systems of 
power/knowledge and the mechanics of their transgression. Virginia Krause’s 
Witchcraft, Demonology, and Confession in Early Modern France (2015) utilises a 
localised study of the witch trials and their demonologies to explore the discursive 
construction of truth through concepts of sight and sightlessness, silence and speech. 
Finally, Sean McCloud’s American Possessions (2015) analyses contemporary 
American spiritual warfare by exploring its ideological links to dominant neoliberal 
paradigms of thought, including individualism and self-help rhetoric (see also Buc 
2015; Orlov 2015).4  
                                                                                                                                      
demon is, in my view, a figuration of evil that specifically forms in the context of Christian 
ontotheology and history, a hybrid figure that draws not only on Zoroastrian dualism and ‘Near Eastern 
combat myths’, but also a Neo-Platonic philosophy that configures it as ontological-moral absence and 
a Hebrew monotheism that subordinates it within a hierarchy of power under an omnipotent deity. This 
is only its origin (one origin), and discounts the complex permutations of the demon’s historical 
figuration, one genealogy of which I explore in Chapters One and Two, below. The Christian demon is 
a unique construct of its genealogy, and thus whether it is desirable or even possible to speak of 
‘demonology’ or ‘demonologies’ in the trans-temporal and cross-cultural fashion used by Lincoln is 
dubious. 
4 It should be noted that the majority of the research for this thesis had been conducted at the time of 
these works’ publications, and while they contributed to the concluding theorisation of this project 
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One reason for demonology would thus be that it seems demons are becoming 
a hot topic, not just as a subject of antiquarian interests but as a discursive force that 
not only encodes a depth of complexity in its historical manifestations (Almond, 
Faxneld, Krause) but still influences the present (Forti, McCloud, Runions). However, 
even within this surge of appreciation there is an absence that I believe necessitates 
what I am calling ‘political demonology’: the genealogical links joining structures of 
demonology to contemporary paradigms of demonisation (more or less secularised in 
places, theological and non-secularised in others). Rhetorical practices of 
demonisation became a topic of political analysis during the Cold War, particularly 
within the context of McCarthyism, and have been remarked on often since 9/11, 
notably in the context of the demonisation of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Saddam 
Hussein, or political Islam broadly.  
Few studies have actually wrestled with the relationship of this demonisation 
to demonology in anything but vague terms, though there are notable exceptions. 
Indeed, ideas of ‘political demonology’ as demonisation have a history in political 
analysis. Michael Rogin popularized the term in Ronald Reagan: The Movie, and 
Other Episodes in Political Demonology (1987), in which he explores its ‘realist’ and 
‘symbolist’ traditions and attempts to reconcile them. The realist tradition, as he 
identifies it, points to the utilisation of demonic imagery to mobilise support against 
political enemies (internal or external) but ignores the distortive aspects of the 
imagery used. The symbolist, by contrast, recognises the distortive aspects but ignores 
the underlying material causes. This political demonology sits at the heart of modern 
conspiracy theories and their (more or less valid) refutations. Uniting realist and 
symbolist perspectives, Rogin identifies a psychological core of political demonology 
in a double movement of dread and desire: the ‘oscillation between a fear of the 
breakdown of all difference and a desire for merger’ (1987: 280).5 Rogin here uses 
‘political demonology’ to describe structures of demonisation in the political sphere, 
and gives it a psycho-sexual (un)conscious. While an important forebear to this study, 
however, I do not aim (solely) to analyse these political demonisations or their 
                                                                                                                                      
many of my conclusions were reached independently. This is especially true regarding the works of 
Runions and McCloud, whose works overlap the most with this thesis. 
5 For a recent, ‘localised’, study of this same structure in the demonic image of Babylon, see Runions 
(2014). 
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potential psychoanalytic causes. Some studies closer to my research focus emerge 
after 9/11. Joshua Gunn’s ‘The Rhetoric of Exorcism’ (2004) analysed post-9/11 
politics through the lens of exorcism, and of the War on Terror as a form of infinite 
exorcism that must work tirelessly against the demons of global politics. While he 
does link political rhetoric to Protestant practices of deliverance, however, Gunn does 
not link his observations to political theology or a secularisation of religious concepts. 
Other scholars analysing political demonology have also made structural observations 
without genealogically tying them to former demonologies or attempting to analyse 
underlying binarisations. Tom de Luca and John Buell have noted that, whether aimed 
at a culture, group, or individual, demonisation relies upon ‘imputation of moral or 
spiritual failure, or deviance, or extreme incompetence (that is, moral failure for 
having illicitly assumed leadership)’ (2005: 7). Stanley Cohen’s seminal 1972 study 
of the Mods and Rockers, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (2002) bequeathed the 
influential idea of ‘folk devils’ as ‘visible reminders of what we should not be’ (ibid.: 
2) to later scholarship (Flinders 2012a, 2012b; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009; Lentini 
2015). While these authors link (societal) devils to deviation, however, they do not 
examine these as part of broader matrices of (secularised) demonological concepts or 
how such ideas relate to theologico-political ideas of sovereignty or teleology (see 
also Denike 2003: 16; Juergensmeyer 2003: 185–6; Knight 2007: 94). In a different 
vein, Peter Berghoff (2009) analyses political evil and the capacity to talk publically 
of ‘evil’ after the Enlightenment discrediting of demonology, elaborating on the ways 
evil often takes its form according to the systems it opposes. While important, his 
argument is broad in scope and at times unnuanced. The most relevant part of his 
article to this study is his analysis of demonic others in ‘instituted society’ (society 
built around institutional bodies) which take the form either of outer enemy or internal 
discord. Berghoff seems to hold that this form of evil is unique to instituted society, 
however, by situating this understanding of evil into a theologico-political genealogy 
of sovereignty, my thesis explores the ‘institutional’ idea of evil as perhaps the core 
feature of ‘evil’ with regards to the historical and contemporary discursive structures 
of demonology.  
Imputations of evil or deviation as evil in political demonologies arise from 
specific genealogical associations that these authors do not analyse, and is interwoven 
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with a range of related demonologico-political concepts. Earlier, I cited Sara Ahmed’s 
Willful Subjects, her archive of those individuals (fictional and actual) who do not fit, 
whose very existence or being is coded as not fitting, who are made to fit or unmade 
because they cannot or will not fit. There is a genealogy here not only represented by 
historical alignments of Satan or demons with Jews (Kleg 1993: 98; Wistrich 2003), 
or black people (Brakke 2001; Verkerk 2001), or women (Denike 2003), but in an 
endurance of demonologico-political concepts—absence, deviation, counterfeiture—
that code contemporary patterns of prejudice. One example is the ‘demonologic’ of 
counterfeiture that partly underwrites the concept of racial passing as discussed by 
Harryette Mullen in her brilliant article ‘Optic White’ (1994: 80–2): 
Racism reifies whiteness to the extent that it is known or presumed to be 
unmixed with blackness. ‘Pure’ whiteness is imagined as something that is 
both external and internal, while the white complexion of the mulatto, 
quadroon, or octoroon is imagined as something superficial, only skin 
deep, the black blood passing on to the body an inherited impurity. ‘Pure’ 
whiteness has actual value, like legal tender, while the white-skinned 
African-American is like a counterfeit bill that is passed into circulation, 
but may be withdrawn at any point if discovered to be bogus. The 
inherited whiteness is a kind of capital, which may yield the dividend of 
freedom…The logic of passing is intrinsic in the logic of slavery, which 
defines the black as a facsimile or counterfeit of the white in order to deny 
the rights and privileges of whiteness. 
Counterfeit whiteness, like counterfeit money, passes for a value it does not possess 
and, by doing so, threatens, justifies, and deconstructs the allegedly ‘intrinsic’ value 
of the thing it counterfeits. As Derrida writes, and a point to which I will return 
throughout this thesis, a counterfeit is not just something false but a falsity capable of 
masquerading convincingly as a truth, and so destabilises all discourse about ‘truth’ 
since one cannot be certain if one is dealing with a truth or just a simulacrum (1992: 
170). 
Ahmed (2015: n.p.) has recently discussed Mullen’s work in which she links 
counterfeiture to two contemporary social demons: the asylum seeker and welfare 
recipient.  
[T]hose who claim asylum are assumed to be bogus, to be passing their 
way into the nation through fraud, unless they demonstrate otherwise…In 
these instances passing is understood as a deliberate willful act of fraud; a 
way of falsely receiving benefits. The welfare recipient and the asylum 
seeker are both passing figures in this sense. You have to demonstrate that 
you are not passing for what you are not (that you are what you claim you 
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are) in order to take up residence within a nation or to receive any 
benefits. 
This passing figure, counterfeiter and counterfeit both, troubles a system that excludes 
it yet serves as the reason for that system’s legitimacy: the system exists to guard 
against the passing figure, but that figure’s semblance of ipseity reveals the unstable 
logic of that guarding. Passing is a discourse of gates, of passing through gates that 
should remain closed: counterfeiture as seeming-without-being, even without-
Being—demonological absence is both moral and ontological. To demonise the 
welfare recipient or asylum seeker here is to construct them as counterfeit, and at the 
core of the demonologico-political idea of the counterfeit is an assumption of 
ontological absence. This absence is inextricable from deviation. As I explore in this 
thesis, the demon—and the demonised—becomes absence via deviation from a proper 
order. Their claims lack truth—they lack truth; their claims lack substance—they lack 
substance; they are not what they claim—they are not.6 
 How does this structure of counterfeiture relate to the theopolitics of that most 
infamous of demonological counterfeitures—the apocalyptic ‘counterfeit world order’ 
(Boyer 2000: 175) of Antichrist? How would this counterfeit kingdom, masked in a 
semblance of sovereign ipseity, reinforce and undermine the legitimacy and truth of 
its original and successor? And how might the combination of ‘near-perfect imitation 
and essential difference’ (Buc 2015: 15) figured in the demonological counterfeit 
itself reflect the genealogy of theopolitical sovereignty itself, its own processes of 
repetition and reinscription? These are the questions this thesis addresses as it 
explores the contingencies that stretch between sovereignty and its others. 
Contingencies (A Question of Good) 
From this brief outline of political demonology, several features of what my project 
does and does not attempt to do begin to emerge. For example, while it is about 
demons, it is not an exploration of the question or nature of evil. Or rather, it is not an 
exploration of evil outside of its structural relationship to what is constructed as good. 
                                                
6 A similar construction operates in contemporary demonisations of Muslims, in which, after the initial 
construction of ‘Good’ (secularised) and ‘Bad’ (radicalised) Muslims outlined by Mahmood Mamdani 
(2002), the former are constructed as counterfeits, radicals passing for moderates (see Chapter Four, 
below). 
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This differentiates it from many older scholarly works on demonology or the figure of 
Satan, which frame their studies in terms of human attempts to wrestle with the 
existence of evil: as the ‘attempt to name, comprehend, and defend against all that 
threatens, frightens, and harms us’ (Lincoln 2012: 31). Probably the main scholarly 
work on demonology, Jeffrey Burton Russell’s multi-volume history of the Devil 
from pre-Christian times to the twentieth century (1977–1986), frames itself as 
exploring the human attempt to explain the reality of radical evil, defined as the harm 
deliberately inflicted on/by sentient beings (1977: 17) of which the Devil is the ‘best-
known symbol’ (1986: 17). Neil Forsyth’s The Old Enemy (1989) avoids the question 
of evil by focusing on Satan as a narrative character locked in an adversarial role from 
which he cannot be extricated. This shift in analysis from radical evil to radical 
contingency was notably influential on Stuart Clark’s magisterial study of the 
European witchcraft persecutions Thinking with Demons (1997), one of the seminal 
texts of the millennial re-evaluation of early modern demonology, aspects of which I 
discuss in Chapter One. 
 The middle ground between existential evil and narrative contingency is often 
walked by ‘biographies’ of Satan, which, while analysing his mutations in shifting 
cultural-political circumstances, frame their genealogies around a symbolic continuity 
of ‘evil’ that psychologically returns us to him (Almond 2014; Kelly 2006; Maxwell-
Stuart 2009). A similar trajectory is reflected in scholarship that addresses historical 
identifications of Antichrist, such as works by Robert Fuller (1994), Bernard McGinn 
(2000), and Kevin Hughes (2005). While all these works are attuned to changes in 
Western Christian societies that provoked discursive transformations of demonology 
in response to circumstance, they assume that it is the experience of evil which returns 
us to Satan and his cohorts. We continue to discursively utilise the Devil since he 
speaks to our lived experiences. These are, above all, secularised histories: they 
assume demonic unreality a priori and therefore construct psychological or 
materialist reasons for his discursive endurance. 
This is not to argue that demons exist—though the protagonists of this thesis 
certainly believe they do—but rather that belief in demons exists and this belief is able 
to inspire and drive action on its own terms. This formula resides at the heart of much 
of the millennial witchcraft scholarship, and has been encapsulated recently by 
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Philippe Buc. Commenting on the Devil’s structural function as the ‘theological 
principle for both similarity and alterity, for both near-perfect imitation and essential 
difference’, Buc (2015: 15–16) relays that scholars will often adopt the stance that 
Satan’s theologico-political role arises from society’s need to construct or dissolve 
sites of difference or ambiguity (sometimes violently). He continues: 
In this family of hypotheses, Christianity postulates the Devil either 
because it needs to account for otherness and ambiguity or because it 
needs to generate otherness and dissolve ambiguity. But a scholar who 
does not reduce religious ideas to social processes should propose the 
obverse: The theological postulate of the existence of Satan—ape of God 
yet total other to God—nurtures an acute attentiveness to otherness and 
ambiguity and fosters extremely violent reactions to them…Is belief in 
Satan (and the literal demonizing of other humans) a hypostasis of 
difference (or of its mimesis)? Or is belief in Satan the cause of the manic 
scrutiny of difference (or of mimesis)? (ibid.)   
I do not try to resolve Buc’s question in this thesis, but take it as a guide. This thesis 
does not try to pathologise or otherwise reduce the demonologically-coded anxieties 
of the examined authors to be the result of personal or social neuroses. At the same 
time I do not take these anxieties at face value, but deconstruct them in the context of 
their structural reliance on their demonological others. Demonology, like the demons 
it names, is radically contingent. It encodes the anxieties and prejudices of its 
contexts, articulating them through its demonologico-political discursive inheritance. 
My thesis unpicks these discursive structures, taking as its starting point not that 
demonisation is occurring but rather who or what is being demonised, and how the 
demonisation of this who or what encodes the demonologico-political conceptualities 
of its genealogy and how this relates to figurations of sovereign order. As such, it 
does not address demonology with respect to its coding of a human experience of evil, 
but rather of the naming of evil—with what or who is marked as ‘evil’, with those 
whose outopia is discursively constructed as the condition of eutopia’s possibility. 
I am not arguing that demonology cannot be used to explore the experience of 
‘evil’ or to doubt the existence of horrific violences of which the label ‘evil’ might be 
appropriately applied. While these are important considerations, my thesis is oriented 
towards the analysis of ‘evil’, or more specifically with the ‘demon’ as signifier of 
‘evil’, as part of a discursive formation operating in a specific context—the post-9/11 
American Christian Right, and specifically the ‘spiritual warfare’ milieu. In both its 
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perspective and its contextual focus, this thesis shares a position with that taken by 
Erin Runions and Sean McCloud. Both analyse religio-cultural motifs of demons in 
contemporary America with regards to their relationships to questions of globalisation 
and the changing politics of gender and sexual identity (Runions 2014) and the 
(in)separability of the neoliberalist individual from effects of (familial, national) 
history and wider social and institutional structures (McCloud 2015).7 As these works 
testify, the naming of ‘evil’ in demonological discourses often ties into existing 
cultural anxieties which, rather than reacting to a perennial human experience of evil 
and adopting different clothing, respond in complex and multifaceted ways to specific 
societal attitudes and anxieties, often encoding highly contextual ideologies. At the 
same time, however, the demon—and its figuration of contingency—has a history. 
While I do not hold that the enduring relevance of Satan or demons stems from 
human experiences of (radical, political, metaphysical) evil, they still endure as 
symbolic representations of ‘evil’. The Devil and demons occupy a (post-)Christian 
genealogy of the figuration of evil which gives it its religio-politico-cultural potency. 
The first part of this thesis explores selected aspects of this genealogy. The second 
explores political demonology in the context of the demonologies found in the more 
vociferous parts of the American Christian Right. It is to this milieu that I now turn. 
(SPIRITUAL) WARFARE IN A TIME OF TERROR 
The post-9/11 era, Michael Barkun notes, produced a cultural fixation on invisible 
dangers, ‘dangers thought to be posed by invisible adversaries who might wield 
invisible weapons’ (2011: 141). The terrorist, occluded in plain sight with hidden 
bombs and bio-chemical weapons, is the most visible of these invisible foes. The 
                                                
7 Runions’ and McCloud’s works are perhaps the best examples of explorations of the figuration of 
demons in relation to specific ideological constructs in contemporary American society. While there is 
a long line of scholarship addressing the history and transformations of American apocalyptic belief 
since World War II (Boyer 1992; Fuller 1994; O'Leary 1995; Wójcik 1997) and the rise of the 
Christian Right (Bivins 2003, 2008; Flippen 2011; Lahr 2007; Miller 2009, 2014; D.K. Williams 
2010a), many of these works analyse the phenomenon in relation to specific socio-cultural events (e.g. 
Communism, Cold War geopolitics, the ‘culture wars’) rather than analysing the way texts and 
movements encode specific ideological structures. Molly Worthen (2013) breaks with this trend by 
analysing the relationship of American evangelicalism to ideas of the secular and of secularism on the 
level of ideological (in)compatibility. 
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illegal immigrant is another—harbinger of crime, covertly traversing borders that 
‘should’ be stable. There has also been a fixation on pandemics, silently transmitted, 
brought from foreign places and/or unleashed by terrorists. In conspiracy subcultures, 
the drama of the attacks created surges in theories of shadowy organisations shaping 
civilisation from behind the scenes (Barkun 2013). Collectively, these disparate 
fixations trace patterns of ‘pollution and defilement’ (Barkun 2011: 83). The terrorist, 
the illegal alien, the criminal: ‘potential defilers who bring impurities into what was a 
previously unsullied community’ (ibid.: 85). Like impurities, they require 
purification. Like demons, they require exorcism.  
 The figure of the demon represents one of the oldest and most paradigmatic of 
(in)visible enemies, genealogically intersecting with both the stranger and disease. As 
David Brakke outlines, early Christian monks would journey into the wilderness to 
battle the invisible forces of evil with their minds and spirits, and any capitulations 
they made would become written on their bodies (2006: 17). Sometimes, these 
demons became visible—as Ethiopians, for example, their melanistic skin marking 
their demonic natures (Brakke 2001, 2006: 157–181). The demon was invisible, but 
became visible in the figure of the other or the marks of its defilement left on the self. 
By resisting its temptations, the self could be tempered into a model of divine unity—
the monakhós, or ‘single one’, the monk (Brakke 2006: 5). The scenario Brakke 
outlines here is taken from third and fourth century Egyptian Christianity, however its 
thematic constructs closely reflect the concerns of the writers analysed in this thesis. 
These spiritual warriors also battle invisible demons made visible as the other, 
striving to preserve or reassert an essential spiritual unity—of the self, the Church, the 
nation—against the machinations of demonic deviation. However, even if they draw 
on similar scriptures and similar struggles of sacred unity against demonic 
differentiation, the ideological substrates and contexts of these struggles reconfigure 
their projects. The battlefield here is not the demon-infested Egyptian desert, but the 
no-less-demonised urban and suburban spaces of modern America. 
And There Was (Cold) War in Heaven 
While motifs of divine warriors battling demons is not a recent motif in Christianity, 
the specific configuration of beliefs and practices termed ‘spiritual warfare’ emerged 
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in 1940s Pentecostalism, spreading from there to other evangelical and charismatic 
Christianities.8 While not intrinsically apocalyptic in orientation, in the US spiritual 
warfare adopted an explicitly apocalyptic configuration in its ‘Third Wave’, 
beginning around the end of the Cold War, when several major figures within the 
movement decided that the end-times were drawing closer. I detail this ‘Third Wave’ 
in Chapter Five, however it is useful to outline spiritual warfare’s core features here, 
since these features underwrite many of the cultural anxieties explored in earlier parts 
of this thesis. 
Discourses of spiritual warfare construct a worldview in which spiritual and 
material worlds act as intertwined battlefields in a cosmic struggle for the human soul, 
an apocalyptic paradigm in which ‘Satan has amassed an army of evil spirits that he is 
using to attack and demonize humans in an effort to win their souls for hell’ 
(McCloud 2013: 170). The language and ideas used in spiritual warfare are often 
highly militaristic and territorial, and manifest in both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
variants. The external discourse of spiritual warfare is bound to a neo-colonial 
missionary project joined to civil religious notions of America as a saviour nation, 
aimed at breaking the last, great metaphysical ‘strongholds’ of demonic power in the 
‘10/40 horizon’—the space between the tenth and fortieth parallels where Christianity 
was weakest: North Africa, the Middle East, India, China, and Japan, among others 
(Holvast 2009: xiii, 286). By contrast, the ‘internal’ discourse is centred on the US 
itself, in which satanic forces work, like subversive insurgents, to undermine ‘Real 
America’ and its sacred mission. The development of ‘anti-Christian’ paradigms of 
thought and being—advances in gay and lesbian rights, abortion rights, multireligious 
and multicultural paradigms (especially syncretistic New Age ideas), and the rapid 
march of a globalisation that fractures US identity across the world as much as it 
expands its power—has caused proponents of spiritual warfare to project the idea of 
                                                
8 Surprisingly, there has been little scholarship produced specifically on American spiritual warfare, as 
opposed to as part of broader twentieth-century Christian apocalypticisms (Barkun 2013; Gribben 
2011). Until Sean McCloud’s American Possessions (2015), the main works on the topic were Rene 
Holvast’s historical analysis of the phenomenon, Spiritual Mapping in the United States and Argentina, 
1989–2005: A Geography of Fear (2009), and Graham Russell Smith’s as-yet-unpublished PhD thesis 
‘The Church Militant: A Study of “Spiritual Warfare” in the Anglican Charismatic Renewal’ (2011). In 
addition to these are smaller studies focusing on elements like haunting (McCloud 2013), the 
usefulness of the term (Warren 2012), or the usage of scriptural figures like Jezebel (Stark and 
Deventer 2009). 
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an enemy grander and more unified than the individual struggles. As René Holvast 
summarises: ‘The threat could not be human—it came from behind the scenes, from 
Satan and his forces’ (ibid.: 289). 
Holvast links the development of spiritual warfare to both the geopolitics and 
rhetoric of the Cold War and to enduring paradigms of American ‘civil religion’.9 Yet 
while Holvast explicitly states that prominent spiritual warfare paradigms ‘shared 
[their] graphic conceptualizing of evil with [their] surrounding culture and politics’, 
he limits these conceptualisations to rhetoric; that ‘Graphic terms like the evil empire, 
the axis of evil…remind the reader of the notions of ancient Apocalyptic dualism’ 
(ibid.: 289). Considering the context in which spiritual warfare emerged, this analysis 
appears lacklustre. Like the Cold War geopolitics in which it grew, Cold War spiritual 
warfare was grounded in a binarisation of global territory. The war between angels 
and demons, God and Satan, mimicked the terrestrial battle between the Christian US 
and atheistic Soviet Union. A fixation on the ‘10/40 horizon’ might seem at odds with 
this reading, however such regions were of high strategic importance and, in the case 
of the Middle East, sites of contestation between the superpowers. In a sense, these 
nations adopt the character of what Sean McCloud calls ‘spatial limbos’—‘interstitial 
and contested no-man’s lands’ where demons manifest through the sins of history 
(2015: 51). Or, more directly, that these nations have become demonised—a word that 
in this context has another meaning beyond its popular one. In spiritual warfare, a 
demonised person or institution is one that has been afflicted and/or influenced by 
demons. The possibility (and actuality) of this affliction/influence can arise as a result 
of a variety of factors, including personal sins, familial inheritance, and traumas both 
personal and/or geographical/historical, all of which open persons, objects, or places 
to demonic infiltration (McCloud 2015).  
This demonisation is, of course, double: spiritual demonisation modifies the 
demonised’s behaviour in ways that lead to their social demonisation. They are 
usually those coded as not fitting: they are rebellious, prideful, deviant, wilful people 
who do not accept their place. Whether this lack of acceptance is manifested in their 
domination to or over others is often not a factor (different demons might be involved, 
but both are equally demonised). Both manifest as deviation from a prescribed socio-
                                                
9 I consider both in depth in Chapter Three. 
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spiritual reality and are healed by re-aligning themselves with that reality. In 
concluding his study of Anglican Charismatic spiritual warfare, Graham Russell 
Smith writes that, within spiritual warfare discourses, ‘The nature of evil is 
“rebellion”; concepts of “nothingness” and “negation” whilst helpful are inadequate 
in describing the essence of evil, which is centred around a willful opposition to 
God’s rule’ (2011: 346). Here, Smith highlights three key features: the relationship of 
evil to negation, which ties into historical associations of evil as privation of good, the 
inadequacy of this privation theory in favour of one of active opposition, and that this 
opposition is first and foremost an opposition to sovereignty.10 
This is a relationship I will chart throughout the case studies examined in this 
thesis. While the form of rebellion alters, it is always figured as wilful deviation from 
a proper order of being. This proper order, centred on the image of a sovereign deity, 
is social, political, spiritual, personal, spatial and temporal. It is, in short, a total order. 
Spiritual warfare demonologies therefore construct a vision not solely of orthodoxy or 
orthopraxy, of proper belief or proper praxis, but with what I will term ‘orthotaxy’—a 
‘correct order’ or ‘arrangement’ of society, the individual, and history itself, any 
perceived deviation from which must be rectified lest reality collapse. This orthotaxy 
has specific features, however, which must be explored. 
Three Faces of Orthotaxy 
The geopolitics of spiritual warfare sketched above would represent a (re)figuration of 
the external discourse, but there is also the internal discourse that perceives a demonic 
hand operating behind the scenes in contemporary America and with which this thesis 
is mainly concerned. While being part of the same paradigm, this internalisation 
requires a different approach. Where the ‘10/40 horizon’ encoded a neo-colonial logic 
of the salvific civilising mission, the internal discourse can be construed as a 
                                                
10 The most enduring form of the ‘privation theory’ of evil comes from Augustine of Hippo. While my 
thesis does not address privation theory its core features underlie many of my case studies, primarily its 
conflation of goodness with being. As Dietmar Wyrwa summarises, ‘everything that is is good…every 
being, every creation, is made according to God’s creation plan’ (2004: 126–7). This conflation links 
directly to its opposite, of evil with absence, and absence with deviation. As Charles Mathewes notes, 
evil is both the deviation of the cosmos from originary goodness and the sinful deviation of humanity 
from its originary nature in the imago Dei, resulting in ‘a distorted, misoriented, false imitation of what 
the human should be’ (2004: 6–7): sinful human as counterfeit human. 
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discourse of uncanny counter-colonisation: the carving out of interstitial sites of 
contestation in the heart of a homeland that should remain secure. These threats, these 
demons, threaten to distort (or perhaps fulfil) the sacred mission of the United States. 
As such, they must be identified and exorcised. At the heart of this demonological 
desire for identification and excision, however, resides a vision of proper order that 
must be maintained or restored—it is this vision of order that I term orthotaxy, and it 
is this concept, its key features, and its relation to spiritual warfare discourses that I 
will enumerate here.  
I designate orthotaxy as defined primarily by three core features of discursive 
self-construction: integrity, incontestability, and inevitability. That is to say that it 
constructs itself as unified and whole, as the ground of legitimacy (and so beyond 
legitimate critique), and as teleological omega point of the historical process. The 
concept of orthotaxy, as I define it, is closely aligned with theologico-political 
concepts of sovereignty as (in)divisible ground of earthly order, whose role is to guide 
its subjects towards specific (benevolent) ends. While it is aligned with sovereignty, 
however, it is not identical to it: orthotaxy refers primarily to a discursive structure of 
‘proper order’. The sovereign may be the central peg or lynchpin of this discursive 
structure, but the idea of orthotaxy encapsulates the broader web of socio-politico-
spiritual relations that surround it. Conceptually, orthotaxy shifts focus from the 
sovereign as singular figure to the structures of order dependant on that sovereign, 
and on which it too depends. 
Orthotaxic order as manifested in the spiritual warfare discourses analysed in 
this thesis is at once spatial and temporal, social and personal, material and spiritual. 
Moreover, deviation within any of these spheres can infest and distort the others. One 
of orthotaxy’s central features is therefore, like the demonologies it envisions, its 
contingency, constructed through networks of parallels and metonymies. The most 
widespread form of this in spiritual warfare discourses is the interconnection of the 
material and spiritual worlds, discussed above. A central example of this, discussed in 
Chapter Five and Six, is the fixation in certain forms of spiritual warfare on the body. 
This body is at once the human body (physical, mental, spiritual) and the social body 
of the community, nation, or church, and alterations to the former—for example, 
through ‘illicit’ sexual activity or technological modification—are seen as impacting 
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the latter, fragmenting the completion and cohesion of society as a whole. This 
contravention also works in reverse: demonic social-spiritual forces contravene the 
individual’s physical, mental, and spiritual integrity. This discourse leads to a fixation 
on stable borders—of the body, community, or nation—which must be maintained or 
restored.  
Orthotaxy thus posits itself (ideally) as integral—complete, unblemished—
and contravention of this integrity as necessitating purification. This posited integrity 
is tied to orthotaxy’s posited incontestability. It is the proper order of things. As 
Preston King outlines in his critique of sovereignty, the ideological construction of 
order ‘is intimately associated with the attempt to defend particular orders, not on the 
grounds that they are preferable to others, but on the grounds that there is an Order in 
se which trumps all other forms of moral concern’ (2013: xv–xvi). An orthotaxy 
manifests as the quintessence of this structure. It constructs itself as ‘Order in se’—a 
timeless, proper way of being, constituted a priori—and competing systems of being 
or believing as the end of moral and ontological reality. This is not due to 
inconsistencies in these competing systems that might contravene them, but because 
of their deviation (real or imagined) from the orthotaxic system: since orthotaxy is 
legitimate a priori, competing systems are a priori illegitimate. 
The construction of orthotaxy as timeless truth and of deviation as absence of 
legitimacy also manifests as a constructed absence of futurity: deviant systems of 
being are constructed as having no future. This ties into orthotaxy’s third core feature, 
one closely entwined with spiritual warfare’s fixation on apocalyptic eschatology: its 
inevitability. Not solely a ‘correct order’ of space and society, orthotaxy is also a 
‘correct order’ of time, one that is linear and teleological. In secular varieties, this 
belief might manifest in terms of Fukuyama’s end of history. Within spiritual warfare 
discourses, this telos relies on concepts of God’s sovereign control over history. Since 
history is under the control of a sovereign agent constructed as aligned with the 
spiritual warriors, the victory of their paradigm is assured. In the works of the 
warriors themselves, this inevitable victory is closely associated with forms of 
typological exegesis.  
Typological or figural thinking is a specific form of scriptural exegesis that 
blossomed in medieval Christianity. Phrased neutrally, typology constructs a relation 
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of (pre)figuration and fulfilment between the events of the Old and New Testaments. 
As Erich Auerbach summarises in his 1944 essay ‘Figura’, ‘The Old Testament, both 
as a whole and in its more important details, is a concrete historical prefiguration of 
the Gospel’. Adam and Moses, for example, are constructed as prefigurations of 
Christ, who fulfils their figures, and the heavenly New Jerusalem fulfils the figure of 
the old, terrestrial Jerusalem. One thing this typological structure accomplished was 
that it made both ‘old’ and ‘new’ fundamentally historical constructs—there is never 
a new, as such—something Auerbach contrasts to what he saw as the ‘modern’ view 
of history (in Biddick 2013: 5):  
whereas in the modern view the event is always self-sufficient and secure, 
in the figural interpretation the fact is subordinated to an interpretation 
which is fully secured to begin with: the event is enacted according to the 
ideal model which is a prototype situated in the future and thus far only 
promised. 
This construction of history extended beyond the scripture, however. In the words of 
Richard Topping, through typology ‘extra-biblical life and events were held together 
with the Old Testament as incomplete figures,’ which while meaningful and real, 
stood in ‘tensive relation’ to their fulfilment ‘in the story of Jesus or in the universal 
story from creation to eschaton, of which it was the effectually shaping masterpiece’ 
(2007: 131).  
The structures of typology are inextricable from ideas of God as sovereign 
arbiter of history. As theologian Sidney Greidanus clarifies, while allegorical readings 
of scripture draw thematic links between passages and events, typology ‘is limited to 
discovering specific analogies along the axis of God’s acts in redemptive history’ and 
without the foundation of God’s sovereign direction of the historical process cannot 
exist (1999: 249). Its retroactive structure, moving ‘from New Testament fulfillment 
to the past type’ (ibid.: 252), reveals in the words of Georges A. Barrois ‘the 
progression of Sacred History toward its telos,’ a ‘sphere of divine economy in which 
man and the cosmos progress under the guidance of God towards eternal salvation’ 
(in ibid.: 255). ‘Old Testament’ persons and events are reinscribed as figures of their 
New Testament counterparts, who become not (only) a repetition but the advent of an 
archetype-yet-to-be. Kathleen Biddick (2013) in her recent psychoanalytic exploration 
of the mechanisms of typology in medieval Christianity, notes that typological 
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exegesis is predicated on the supercession of Christianity over Judaism, the Church 
over Israel, which continually erased the persistence of Jewish people in the exegetes’ 
present. The typological structure historicises in order to efface the continued 
existence of a past that has supposedly been overcome. This has a key relationship to 
the demonologies the spiritual warriors examined below construct: their demons have 
always-already been defeated, and not just in terms of a general defeat effected by 
Christ’s victory over death on the cross, but in specific prefigurations in the Hebrew 
Bible: the triumph of Israel over its gentile neighbours (Chapter Four), Elijah’s battle 
with and Jehu’s triumph over Jezebel (Chapter Five) and the end of all flesh wrought 
by the Flood (Chapter Six). As exorcism works by reminding the demon its defeat has 
already occurred, the spiritual warriors assuage anxieties about present darknesses by 
reminding themselves that the sun has already risen. 
However, the demons are not so eager to listen, and these demons are legion. 
Like the spiritual warfare milieu itself, the satanic hand they see behind contemporary 
life has many forms. My case studies, which run from political Islam to the politics of 
gender and sexual identity to trans/posthumanist technoscience and seem almost 
jarringly disparate, have been selected to signal this diversity while also conveying 
significant discursive similarities. No matter their differences these groups are coded 
through the hermeneutic of political demonology. They are all manifestations of 
Satan’s ways in the world, serving to distort the indistortable order of creation. These 
groups are demonised, figuratively and actually, but they are demonised in different 
ways. Each sketches a distinct but similarly mutually-constitutive relationship to the 
divine order it is seen as striving to defeat and the theologico-political sovereignty 
they oppose. To pre-empt my conclusions, demonologies of political Islam construct a 
discourse of competing unity, an uncanny other so (un)like the self which threatens to 
replace sovereign order with an abject simulacrum. Those of gender and sexuality 
articulate anxieties of process, flow, and (in)stability that expose the sovereign as 
always-already absent. Those of transhumanism, meanwhile, wrestle with the relation 
of the religious (the Christian) to those processes of secularisation that are its 
progeny, its heirs and/or usurpers. They sketch different oppositions to the orthotaxic 
structure of God’s rule. They contest its right to rule, dissolve its thresholds, and 
reconfigure its ends. In doing so, they reveal the dependency of that construction of 
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sovereign orthotaxy upon its others: its need for enemies to give form to its structural 
instabilities. It is these instabilities that this thesis deconstructs. 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The body of this thesis has three parts and seven chapters. Part I (Chapters One 
through Three) is more theoretical and explores a genealogy of Christian demonology 
through its figuration of absence/deviation, its relationship to theopolitical 
sovereignty, and lays out the present socio-political context. Part II (Chapters Four 
through Six) explores the case studies. Part III (Chapter Seven and a brief Coda) 
concludes the thesis by tying the textual explorations of Part II back into the 
theorisations of Part I. 
 Taking point from Smith’s definition of the nature of evil as deviation from 
God’s rule, Chapter One conducts a genealogical analysis of the current scholarship 
on demonology through a focus on its relationship to theopolitical deviation. It looks 
at two key periods about which scholarship on Christian demonology has been 
produced. Firstly, the European witch-hunts (c.1400–1700) in which demonology is 
formally instituted and demons reconstructed as an active threat to Christendom, and 
demonological witchcraft is constructed as the ultimate other to (legitimate) political 
order. Secondly, reconfigurations that follow the European Enlightenment, 
manifesting both in the symbolic appropriations of Satan by Romantic and modern 
emancipatory projects as a rejection of pre-existing hierarchies, and also in the 
emergence of ‘world satanic conspiracies’ like the Illuminati, the Palladist hoax, and 
‘Jewish conspiracy’, which have a strong influence (both structurally and directly) on 
contemporary apocalyptic demonologies.  
Chapter Two focuses on the relationship of demonology to the theologico-
political structures of sovereignty. It explores the radical contingency of the sovereign 
and the demons that oppose it by analysing two classical theorists of sovereignty, Jean 
Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, both of whom construct demonology in opposition to 
their visions of legitimate sovereign order. Framing this exploration through the lens 
of Jacques Derrida’s analysis of the interconnectedness of the figures of the sovereign 
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and the beast, one above and one beneath the law, author and other, it investigates the 
dependency of sovereignty upon its figuration of others that ceaselessly contest its 
self-constructed incontestability. 
Chapter Three moves these theoretical and genealogical analyses forward into 
the recent past in order to lay out the socio-political context of the case studies. After 
exploring the central tenets of American ‘civil religion’, the chapter focuses on the 
development of neoconservatism and evangelicalism in the crucible of the Cold War, 
analysing their shared construction of a notion of authentic American identity via 
opposition to both international and domestic others. This construction of authenticity 
aimed to rejuvenate Real America through a return to a ‘Judaeo-Christian morality’ 
from which it had deviated, and carried forward from the Cold War and post-Cold 
War period into the present, mutating as the fall of the Soviet Union generated a need 
to create or concentrate on new self-consolidating others: feminists, gay and lesbian 
people, Muslims, etcetera. 
 Chapter Four through Six constitute the case studies. Chapter Four analyses 
contemporary demonisations of (political) Islam. It surveys both religious apocalyptic 
and secular texts in order to explore shared demonologico-political structures. 
Analysing underlying similarities with the antisemitic ‘Jewish conspiracy’, the 
chapter explores the rise of conspiracies of the Muslim infiltration of America as 
figured in ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ and ‘Obama-as-secret-Muslim’ discourses, and links 
these to a rising ‘Muslim Antichrist’ discourse in which the nation of Israel is 
configured as a projection of Western purity whose contamination by an Islamic other 
must be prevented. Through analysing the shared features of these conspiracies and 
apocalyptic prophecies, I explore a pervasive obsession with shari’a as the totalitarian 
‘heart’ of Islam, and via this of the figuration of Islam not (only) as ‘other to a self’ 
but as ‘an-other self’—a diabolical model of stability and monolithic unity that 
threatens to replace the authors’ vision of order with an uncanny semblance. 
 Chapter Five shifts fully to religious texts, analysing the recurrent figure of 
Jezebel in spiritual warfare as the demonological representations of shifting norms in 
gender and sexuality, and as embodiments of ‘witchcraft’ as a system of thought 
antithetical to God’s own. The chapter draws on a broad survey of contemporary 
spiritual warfare texts that focus on Jezebel, ultimately centring on texts by two 
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‘media ministers’, Landon Schott and Jennifer LeClaire, who exemplify the pervasive 
trends of the genre. Analysing Jezebel’s ‘triple alterity’ as woman, foreigner, and 
idolater, the chapter unpicks the underlying conflation of multiplicity with absence in 
opposition to a stable, present, phallic taxon it continually disrupts. 
 Last of the case studies, Chapter Six analyses a subset of spiritual warfare 
discourse focused on trans/posthumanist technoscience. Drawing on a number of 
works in this milieu, it concentrates on the voluminous oeuvre of Thomas Horn, a 
particularly prominent member whose works represent the most cohesive synthesis of 
its concerns. Analysing Horns’ and others’ construction of technological advancement 
as having the potential to efface the imago Dei within humanity and replace it with a 
demonic counterfeit, the chapter deconstructs Horn’s and others’ fixation on concepts 
of (divine) origin and destiny, manifested in a typological fixation on the days of 
Noah and its apocalyptic return, and on images of America as a conspiracist vehicle 
of demonic domination. Through exploring this fixation on origin and destiny through 
the lens of transhumanism’s own genealogical links to earlier Christian soteriologies 
of earthly perfectibility, I unpack these anti-transhumanist apocalypticisms as 
revealing the instability of the authors’ own visions of inevitable predestination. 
Chapter Seven unites the observations made in the case studies with the 
theoretical explorations of Part I. Returning to concepts of deviation and 
counterfeiture, it explores the case studies through recourse to Derrida’s analyses of 
ipseity and iterability. Sketching a model of sovereignty as the indivisible heart of 
orthotaxy that is unavoidably, constitutively divided as it reinscribes itself in different 
political forms—passing from God to king to state to people—it reveals the 
demonological counterfeit order to be the disavowed heart of sovereignty, which 
reveals orthotaxy to itself be the counterfeit order it projects. Indeed, like 9/11 to the 
Cold War, the demonic counterfeit of sovereignty might be the implosive finale of the 
theologico-political concept of sovereignty itself, killed by its own convolutions and 
contradictions.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Delineating Deviation, Articulating Absence 
Demonology in History and Literature—A Genealogical Review 
Why could we not at least try to walk through the 
‘senseless’ maze of this folly called demonology, which 
posits the presence of a paradoxical ‘other,’ at once 
radically different from us and so close and similar to 
us, an enemy that finds in our minds its primary and 
most abhorred interlocutor?  
— Armando Maggi (2001: 3) 
Graham Smith summarised the nature of evil in spiritual warfare discourses as 
rebellion: ‘concepts of “nothingness” and “negation” whilst helpful are inadequate in 
describing the essence of evil, which is centred around a willful opposition to God’s 
rule’ (2011: 346). Demonological evil is thus inextricably structural, defined by wilful 
opposition to divine order, to God’s sovereign will. In my Introduction, I discussed 
this divine order under a conceptual rubric of orthotaxy. Often (if not always) 
explicitly theological, I outlined orthotaxy as sovereign in claims and teleological in 
orientation. It constructs an order of reality (figured as Order in se) grounded upon 
ideas of a ‘straight’ or ‘correct’ ‘arrangement’ of being(s) inextricably tied to a 
teleological structure of history, structures that can only be posited through the 
construction of its others: the crooked, the deviant, the counterfeit. 
This idea of proper order manifests on several interlocking levels that this 
thesis explores, including not just ‘cosmic’ order but in specific societal arrangements 
and the integrity of physical bodies. In an orthotaxic framework, deviation from or 
disruption of this order is seen as aberrant and dangerous, and must be eliminated to 
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guarantee the health, security, and continued existence of a body—social, personal, 
spiritual. As the heart of this self-constitutive other, the demon is fundamental to 
orthotaxy’s construction. In the following chapter I attend to the demon’s relation to 
orthotaxy in connection to the theopolitical genealogy of sovereignty. In this chapter, 
I explore the discursive figuration of the demon through the lens of absence/deviation 
as analysed—if not always in these terms—in the existing scholarship on 
demonology. Through doing so, this chapter traces a relationship between these 
concepts as tied to the construction of demonological evil as rebellion against the 
sovereign will. As the demon is the one that is constructed as that which wilfully 
deviates from orthotaxy, it becomes coded as that which must be ended for 
orthotaxy’s maintenance or (re)assertion. Demonology identifies and categorises this 
demon to facilitate its elimination. 
By examining prior scholarship around Christian demonology, this chapter 
seeks to outline themes and structural relations that are genealogically important for 
this thesis’ contemporary contextual focus. It explores these across two sections. The 
first analyses scholarship on demonology centred on late medieval/early modern 
European witchcraft and its persecution (c.1400–1700 CE). It concentrates on the idea 
of the witch as religio-political dissident aligned with demonic powers. The second 
explores reinscriptions of demonology after its Enlightenment ‘discrediting’, 
including the rise of conspiracist discourses and the polyvalent reconfiguration of the 
Devil in post-Miltonic discourses of Romantic and symbolic Satanisms. I focus on 
these periods for specific reasons. The former (the witch-hunts) contains the formal 
institutionalisation of demonology within the Catholic Church, and the rise of the 
nation-state and ideas of political sovereignty—political concepts closely related to 
the territorial dynamics and ideological constructions of witchcraft and its 
persecution.1 In the discourse around the witch-hunts, demons and their human agents 
                                                
1 It is, of course, possible to identify the origin of demonology in earlier periods, and its formal 
institution draws on these formulations. I have chosen not to primarily due to priorities of scope, since 
addressing a complete genealogy of demonology as relating not only to early Christianity but pre-
Christian formulations in Jewish apocalypticism and Near Eastern combat myths requires more space 
than this thesis allows. Two of the more detailed recent studies of the development of Christian 
demonological figures from early Jewish apocalypticism are Lambertus Lietaert Peerbolte’s The 
Antecedents of Antichrist (1996) and Andrei Orlov’s Dark Mirrors (2011). Some works dealing with 
the development of Jewish apocalypticism include those by John Joseph Collins (1984, 1998), James 
VanderKam (2000; VanderKam and Adler 1996), and, more recently, Richard Horsley (2010). 
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are constructed as networks of traitorous heretics wilfully working to distort God’s 
creation. Notions of human-demonic alliance, as well as witchcraft as a practice of 
subversion (sexual, spiritual, political), are prominent features of the contemporary 
American demonologies examined in later chapters, and the majority of scholarship 
exploring these topics focuses on the European witch-hunts. The latter (post-
Enlightenment) section addresses reconfigurations of demonology after it is, in 
Lincoln’s words, ‘conclusively discredited’ (2009: 45). These reconfigurations set a 
stage for several recurrent ideas in contemporary American demonologies that are 
genealogically related to those formulated in the witch-hunts, including alignments of 
Satan with scientific rationalism and emancipatory political projects (positively and 
negatively construed), and the rise of conspiracy theories that posit occult networks 
working to commandeer society for nefarious ends. Exploring scholarship on these 
topics thus constitutes necessary groundwork for the present study. 
STATECRAFT AND WITCHCRAFT: PERVERTING THE PROPER, 1320–1634 
The period of European history correlating to the witchcraft persecutions is usually 
seen as 1400–1700, growing from the mid-late fifteenth century—with the publication 
of several meticulous witchcraft handbooks and technical treatises—and reaching its 
violent apogee in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These ‘witch-hunts’, which 
overlapped with but were not identical to the persecution of Christian heretics in 
earlier centuries, resulted in the trial and execution of significant numbers of women 
and men for crimes of apostasy and black magic, religious crimes that became 
increasingly aligned with political treason (Boureau 2006: 72; Levack 2006: 66). 
Approximately eighty percent of accused witches were women (Breuer 2009: 138; 
Klaits 1985: 52; Stephens 2002: 3), though percentages vary by date and region. 
Joseph Klaits notes that in parts of sixteenth-century England, Switzerland, and (what 
is now) Belgium, women accounted for over nine-of-ten victims (1985: 52), while 
Valerie Kivelson highlights that in seventeenth-century Muscovite Russia seven-of-
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ten accused witches were in fact men (2001: 75). The large female-over-male ratio, 
however, was the norm in both Central and Western Europe (Broedel 2003: 167).2 
 The European witch-hunts arose from a number of interlocking societal 
factors, including both popular practices, regional and national politics, and 
ecclesiastical and theological discourses. I concentrate primarily on the theological 
discourses since it is in these that demonology is foregrounded. It is impossible to 
truly separate these discourses, however. While Frans Ilkka Mäyrä, for example, has 
divided demonological discourses into two variants, (i) scholastic, theological and 
academic considerations of scriptural sources, and (ii) quotidian demonology 
including folktales and local superstitions (1999: 23–52), such a division bears little 
resemblance to how demonologies have historically operated. Indeed, they often 
emerge through attempts to reconcile these variants. As Hans Peter Broedel’s The 
Malleus Maleficarum and the Construction of Witchcraft (2003) and Michael Bailey's 
study of reformist theologian Johannes Nider, Battling Demons (2003: 141), explore, 
a key task of witchcraft theologians was to reinscribe popular beliefs and practices in 
Christian theological paradigms. This frequently entailed a demonologisation of 
practices, including folk magic, charms, and healing, that in popular contexts were not 
necessarily seen as demonic prior to their recoding by these ‘elite’ discourses and 
subsequent dissemination through practices such as preaching. This interaction is 
important in understanding the socio-cultural operations of demonology, revealing the 
unstable pliability of pre-existing theological frameworks: reacting to external factors, 
the structures of demonology mutated in response and redeployed those alien factors 
in service to its hermeneutic. This movement of reaction and reinscription, however, 
reveals the underlying instabilities of those demonological discourses. 
                                                
2 The reasons for this ratio are multiple and have been analysed in accordance with both theological-
clerical and social factors. Several scholars note the often-violently misogynistic language utilised in 
the witch-hunting manuals, hinging on alignments of women with demologico-political concepts of 
physicality and deceit (S. Clark 1997: 136–53; 2001; Llewellyn Barstow 2001; Stephens 2002). The 
Malleus, perhaps the most infamous text, notes that women are ‘more given to fleshly lusts’ than men, 
as can be discerned from their ‘many acts of carnal filthiness’ (2007: 75). Meanwhile, French jurist 
Jean Bodin’s On the Demon-Mania of Witches (1580) refers to women’s ‘bestial appetite’ (1995: 169) 
and ‘impotent nature’ which ‘burns with an incredible appetite for vengeance’ (ibid.: 200), and James 
VI/I’s Demonology contains a digression noting that Satan is ‘friendlier with that sex’ since Eve’s 
temptation, accounting for why ‘twenty women [are] given to that craft’ for each man (2011: 128). 
Other scholars have highlighted the lived reality, such as how traditional ‘women’s work’ like cooking, 
healing and midwifery made women more susceptible to accusations (Levack 2006: 141–65), and how 
it played into fears of women’s (and peasants’ generally) social mobility (Brauner 1995: 42). 
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Darkness and Silence: Recent Scholarship on Demonologies of Witchcraft 
While a large body of scholarship on the witch-hunts had been produced in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, the millennium saw the publication of several high-
profile monographs analysing early modern witchcraft demonologies. Alongside the 
studies by Broedel and Bailey, these included Stuart Clark’s monumental Thinking 
with Demons (1997), the English translation of Michel de Certeau’s The Possession at 
Loudun (2000), Armando Maggi’s Satan’s Rhetoric (2001), Walter Stephens’ Demon 
Lovers (2002), Charles Zika’s Exorcising Our Demons (2003), and Lyndal Roper’s 
Witch Craze (2004). These were later joined by the English translation of Alain 
Boureau’s 2004 Satan the Heretic (2006), Maggi’s In the Company of Demons 
(2008), Laura Stokes’ Demons of Urban Reform (2011), and, just recently, Virginia 
Krause’s Witchcraft, Demonology, and Confession in Early Modern France (2015), 
among others (Goodare 2013; Levack 2006, 2013; Pearl 1999; Rowlands 2003, 2009; 
Thurston 2007; Waite 2003, 2007). While several of these texts integrate aspects of 
discourse analysis (S. Clark 1997; Krause 2015; Maggi 2001; Stephens 2002), most 
of these works are localised histories of persecutions. All, however, explore 
discursive commonalities in witchcraft theologies broadly and the ways localised 
incidents fit into and exceeded both those theological discourses and modern 
scholarly consensuses regarding the persecutions and their position in European 
history. 
 Although (in)famously codified in the 1487 Malleus Maleficarum, the 
discursive foundations of the construction of the witch began much earlier. Stokes 
(2011) explores antecedents in trials and theological demonology already present by 
the 1440s, however, both Boureau (2006) and Isabel Iribarren (2007) have traced the 
fixation on the satanic pact, which I return to below, to a 1320 consultation on the 
heretical status of black magic organised by Pope John XXII. This consultation laid 
the doctrinal foundations for the reformulation of black magic—heretofore a matter 
largely of personal imprudence—as a species of heretical societal contagion. This 
reclassification was noteworthy and possessed far-reaching consequences. As 
Iribarren (2007: 40) details, John XII’s proposition to establish magical practice as 
heretical 
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signified a rupture with centuries of Christian tradition whereby heresy, as 
an error in the faith, was a matter of intellectual choice (haeresis) with no 
immediate relation to practice. Black magic and the performance of pagan 
rituals, on the other hand, were normally divorced from their religious 
context and did not necessarily result in doctrinal error. Indeed, the ancient 
Church had sought to minimize the importance of such practices. 
The blurring of lines between heretical belief and magical praxis laid the foundations 
for the witch-hunts, forming significant parts for the doctrinal grounding of Kramer’s 
Malleus (Boureau 2006: 64; Iribarren 2007: 41). It opened up heresy as something 
that could exceed the mind of heretics and be potentially imposed on others: ‘the 
victims and accomplices of the evil work were no longer…the little old credulous 
ones,’ Boureau writes, ‘but all human beings in their fragile and porous constitution 
and in their openness to the supernatural’ (2006: 201). 
 While this doctrinal shift laid the theoretical foundation, however, the figure 
of the ‘witch’ as locus of this ‘fragile and porous’ condition emerged later, becoming 
gradually reified throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Ultimately, she—for 
the witch was a highly feminised image of evil—embodied a relatively fixed set of 
attributes, which Stokes terms the ‘witch doctrine’ (2011: 10). The central features of 
this doctrine were 
the idea of the diabolic witch [as one] who had forged a pact with the 
Devil and sealed it with her flesh, who flew through the night to the 
witches’ Sabbath, was the sworn enemy of ordinary society, and together 
with an invisible legion of other witches exercised her undying malice 
through individual acts of evil magic (ibid.). 
The parts of this doctrine that I wish to concentrate on are the first, third, and fourth: 
the witch as satanic pact-holder, enemy of societal order, who works in collusion with 
others through operations of demonic magic. Bailey summarises this model pithily as 
the idea of ‘a secret cultic army organized by Satan and wholly in his service’ that 
was ‘a threat to the entire Christian faith’ (2003: 119). Noting the discursive 
construction of the witch through its opposition to (true) Christianity, Clark (1997: 9) 
clarifies this relation via recourse to Forsyth’s understanding of Satan’s narrative 
function:  
Witchcraft was construed dialectically in terms of what it was not; what 
was significant about it was not its substance but the system of oppositions 
that it established and fulfilled. The witch—like Satan himself—could 
only be a contingent being, always “a function of another, not an 
independent entity.” 
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The ‘witch’ is therefore discursively created as a demonological other to the true 
community of Christianity, one whose invisibility was a constitutive part of its 
threat—indeed, for all their conflicts in the wake of the Reformation, Catholics and 
Protestants accused fellow members of their confessions of witchcraft more than each 
other (Bailey 2003: 146; Levack 2006: 109–33). The witch was a counterfeit (passing 
for) Christian, and witchcraft discursively embodied an ‘anti-religion’, a parody of 
(true) Christianity that paradoxically testified to the truth of the very thing it parodied. 
Clark (1997: 84–5) points to this structural inversion by juxtaposing the structures of 
belief and practice that witchcraft was seen as reversing: 
The demonic pact was obviously parasitic on baptism, and the agreement 
it enshrined on God’s covenant with the Church…The demonic mark 
could be construed as an imitation of circumcision…the sign of the 
cross…[or] the holy stigmata. The magic arts copied providential 
powers…[And it] was often argued that demonic possession was modelled 
on the incarnation, with the devil attempting to debase humanity, as much 
as Christ had elevated it, by clothing himself in its form. 
This inversion was absolute: ‘Witchcraft had all the appearance of a proper religion 
but in reality it was religion perverted. And since genuine religion was, in theory, a 
total experience, so its demonic copy was all-embracing’ (ibid.: 82): a counterfeit 
totality. 
The performance of black magic (maleficium) was central to how witches 
were constructed as opposing public order. Bailey notes that this active element 
differentiated witches from other heresies whose errors were mainly of belief: the 
witch, as a sworn agent of Satan, actively worked to undermine Christendom and her 
practising of maleficium made her substantively more threatening (2003: 142–3). 
Maleficium could manifest in several forms, including crop failure, strange weather 
conditions, death or illness (ibid.: 137). The relationship between witchcraft and other 
heresies—those of Waldensians, Beghards, Hussites, among others—is complex.3 
While it was common in some regions to equate specific heretical movements with 
witches, and witchcraft was a heresy, its discursively constructed relationship to 
maleficium coded it as an active force of societal destabilisation as opposed to an 
                                                
3 The nature of and relationship between heretical movements is complicated and not directly relevant 
to this thesis. For further information on the changing role of heresies see Hunter, Laursen and 
Nederman’s edited collection Heresy in Transition (2005). Most works on early modern witchcraft 
discourses will entail some analysis of the points of joining and deviation between witchcraft and 
heresy; see especially Bailey (2003) and Waite (2003). 
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error of belief that might be recanted (ibid.: 129). Witchcraft was not just a heresy, 
but also marked participation in a hidden network operating within Christendom to 
orchestrate its downfall. It was a heretical contagion, the witch was its vector, and its 
victims could be infected irrespective of personal beliefs. 
The hiddenness of witchcraft is a core element, and is the focus of Stephens’ 
Demon Lovers (2002), and, recently, Virginia Krause’s Witchcraft, Demonology, and 
Confession (2015). Building on observations of her earlier work that ‘a silent or 
otherwise resistant person’—that is, in Ahmedian terms, a wilful subject—‘is [often 
seen as] even more guilty than a defendant who confesses easily’ (2003: 333), Krause 
explores the ‘science of the night’ of early modern French demonology, in which 
demonological truths were coded as always obscured and mostly invisible to the 
demonologists, ‘who cannot directly witness the sabbat, who cannot observe with 
their own eyes the witch’s evil deeds of her secret interactions with demons during 
the night, the time when the devil moves more freely among us’ (2015: 48). 
Witchcraft was ‘a crime committed in the darkness of an impenetrable night’ which 
could not, demonologists insisted, ‘be rooted out without recourse to exceptional 
measure’ (ibid.). This lack of visibility, Krause claims, leads to an ‘auricular regime’ 
of confession or testimony as solidifying the reality of demons: hearing supplants 
vision as empirical evidence of truth. Stephens takes a similar line, but designates 
touch as the guarantor of demonological reality. Focusing on the idea of the ‘demon 
lover’ in clerical treatises and trial records, Stephens frames the often-lurid detail with 
which the witch-hunters documented the women’s sexual relations with demons as 
marking not only their own prurience but revealing an underlying anxiety regarding 
the existence of demons and, through demons, of God—for there could be no surer 
proof of a ‘divinity that shapes our ends’ than demonic opposition to that divinity 
(2002: 346).4 For Stephens, this underlying anxiety leads to fixation on proving 
demonic corporeality, present most dramatically in the demon lover but also in acts 
like the physical desecration of the sacramental host (ibid.: 210). At best, however, 
                                                
4 There are issues with Stephens’ work regarding his downplaying of the role of misogyny as having a 
role in the persecutions, which often seems to undermine his own argument. Judging by Stephens’ own 
understandings of misogyny as outlined in his introduction (2002: 1–12), this dismissal seems to stem 
from a misunderstanding that misogyny is always an active attitude and not an underlying mentality: 
that is, that for misogyny to be a major factor it must have been an active motive of the witch-hunters, 
rather than an attitude uncritically derived from their religio-cultural contexts.  
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these reasonings could only cling to the double negation that demons were not not 
existent (ibid.: 355).5 
The ‘hiddenness’ of witchcraft discourses point to the structural relationship 
posited by Clark that testifies to its existence as a self-consolidating other. This is not 
to say that the witch-hunters, theologians and jurists did not fear the reality of demons 
and their human agents—that witchcraft was not believed to be true—but rather that 
witchcraft served a discursive function by justifying the very structures that hunted it 
and the (theo)logics that underlay them. The posited existence of heretical networks 
of demonological witchcraft legitimised the hierarchies that existed to thwart them, 
yet by their dissimulation served to undermine those structures. This structural nature 
of demonic witchcraft also relates to another strand of witchcraft scholarship that sees 
the discourse as having a formative role in the rise of the nation-state. 
Statecraft and Witchcraft, Centres and Peripheries 
The concept of heretical networks of demonic agents (‘witches’) whose allegiance to 
Satan meant they worked to divert God’s creation ties into scholarship on the relation 
between the witch-hunts and the rise of the nation-state. This connection emerged in 
witchcraft scholarship during the 1980s, notably with the work of Scottish sociologist 
Christina Larner (1984: 79–91; 2000 [1981]). The connection between the nascent 
state to the witch-hunts is also explored by Joseph Klaits, who notes the rise of state 
torture as a form of control (1985: 151). Certain specifics notwithstanding, this 
position has become relatively uncontroversial. Witchcraft was tried predominantly in 
secular courts as a secular crime, overlapping or even conflated with conspiracy or 
treason (Levack 2006: 88), and as Valerie Kivelson notes, the idea that ‘witches 
served as convenient targets for establishing the authority and jurisdiction of the 
growing nation-states in the early modern period’ is now part of scholarly consensus 
(2001: 79)—albeit not necessarily as the core factor in the persecutions. Wolfgang 
Behringer (1997) importantly notes in his study of Bavarian witch-hunts that 
                                                
5 Related, but perhaps at times opposed, to these analyses are Armando Maggi’s explorations of the 
figuration of demonic bodies in Renaissance Italy in In the Company of Demons (2008). In this text, 
Maggi explores how demonic form was understood as metaphor—since demons were believed to be 
made of air, lacking physical form, the quasi-bodies they manifested were understood as akin to 
linguistic signs intended to convey meaning. 
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persecutions tended only to proliferate when the authorities and populace aligned, 
often prompted by phenomena like recurrent famine, harsh climatic conditions, or the 
spread of disease. In response to such events, to appropriate Michel de Certeau’s 
words about the trial of Urbain Grandier after the 1634 possessions at Loudun: ‘In 
order to create the cohesion of a cosmos, a divided and troubled society created a 
“deviant” and sacrificed him to itself’ (2000: 191). 
Brian Levack (1996) identifies four main threads in scholarship relating the 
witch-hunts to the rise of the nation-state: (1) the centralisation of royal/state 
authority, which leads to an attack on localism or particularism, (2) the officialisation 
of judicial power and its enhancement by inquisitorial torture methods, (3) state 
efforts to reform society into a ‘godly community’ via the ‘acculturation of the rural’ 
by a centralised, hierarchical authority, and (4) the growing separation of church and 
state, for which witchcraft-as-treason became a key area of cooperation between the 
bodies. While all of these are important to the analysis of the politics of demonology, 
the last requires specific attention. As Levack (ibid.: 98) summarises:  
[T]he crime of witchcraft was often viewed as treason against God on the 
one hand and an act of rebellion against the state on the other. The 
identification of secular and religious crime was deliberate: the state 
prosecuted witches…in order to legitimise new regimes through the 
pursuit of religious dissidents.  
This idea of treason-political-and-spiritual was frequently figured through discourses 
of the satanic pact, constructed as an inversion of both baptism and the Eucharist 
(Boureau 2006: 61–2; S. Clark 1997: 83). In addition to desecrating sacraments, 
however, it was also a twisted reflection of feudal oaths of fealty, in which the Devil 
adopted the position of ‘liege lord’ providing protection to those under him (Boureau 
2006: 67–92). This relationship was somewhat ironic, Russell notes, since the Devil’s 
original crime had been rebellion against his own (1986: 169). 
One narrative that could be constructed is that of the imposition of centralised 
state authority over networks of rebellious heretics; however, reality was more 
complicated. Levack, for example, has noted that the main forces in the persecution of 
witches were not centralised authorities but local ones—they sought sanction from 
central authorities but were not their direct agents; indeed, central powers often 
hampered their efforts more than abetting them (2006: 85–90). Robert Thurston, 
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however, argues that one of the primary reasons for this hampering was—alongside 
the growth of elite scepticism—that as the witch-hunts grew more erratic, requiring 
increasing judicial time and expense, they began to disrupt regional governance 
(2007: 269). Relatedly, Johannes Dillinger has argued that the cementing of the 
nation-state was actually enacted partly through cessation of the hunts, arguing that 
‘the territorial state’s larger principle of spatial order conquered the communal 
concentration on local space’ (2009: 199). He continues (ibid.): 
The witch hunts, as serious abuses of the judiciary, provoked a reaction 
from the territorial sovereign. The trials became obvious and convenient 
targets for criticism. Thus…the witch hunts themselves did not serve as a 
vehicle for a policy of acculturation or indoctrination on the part of the 
religious and secular authorities. Rather, the apparatus of central 
government gained significant ground by controlling, limiting, and finally 
ending the witch hunts.  
In this reading, the state’s consolidation eventually came through the suppression of 
the hunts rather than the witches. An event that codifies this transition was the 1634 
possession at Loudun, France, expertly analysed by Michel de Certeau (2000). 
Centring on the possession of a group of Ursuline nuns and ending with the execution 
of the priest Urbain Grandier—the ‘sorcerer’—Loudun served as a battlefield for 
three competing discourses—exorcists trying to reassert the laws of traditional 
demonology, doctors hoping to prove the truth of the discourse of medicine as an 
explanation for possession, and the juridical authority of the French state seeking to 
cement its power over what it saw as rebellious regional authorities. The victor, to 
appropriate Bruce Lincoln’s words on Darius the Great, would have ‘the opportunity 
to assert the “truth”…that is, to control the historical record’ (2007: 9). 
Nonetheless, while local authorities enacted the most vehement hunts, the 
discourse of demonological witchcraft originated from the upper echelons of 
society—via the reconfiguration of popular belief and praxis through the framework 
of established theology, which was then disseminated back to the populace, notably 
via preaching (Levack 2006: 109–30, 178). As I will explore in the following chapter, 
in the (theo)political theories of Bodin and Hobbes, the demonological witch is 
opposed to the singular authority of the sovereign, threatening to undermine him. That 
the centralised state might have been instrumental in ending the witch-hunts does not 
undermine the theological and narrative structuration of demonological witchcraft as 
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other to an authentic Christian community figured as archetype of the body politic. 
The increasing erraticism of the hunts can also be construed as an effect of the witch’s 
(in)visibility: the ‘science of the night’ could not pierce the darkness, evoking greater 
fear and necessitating greater inquisition. Cynthia Eller and Elizabeth Reis note that 
witchcraft persecutions often arose from the need to restore an idealised status quo 
with neatly demarcated social boundaries (1998: 792), and this may be partially true. 
However, the witch’s inscrutable darkness meant that those boundaries could never be 
made stable: the counterfeit could always be present, occulted amongst true believers. 
The Devastating Syllogism 
The concept of witches as heretical networks aiming to pervert God’s creation 
remained a feature of European life until the seventeenth century, though it waxed 
and waned in popularity. Yet the idea of Satan as capable of diverting proper history 
remains. Writing on contemporary discourses of demons, Christopher Partridge, notes 
that ‘Individual events and disturbances experienced on the plane of history are, on 
the one hand, understood as particularised demonic activity and, on the other, are 
projected into eternity, being fundamentally related to cosmic principalities and 
powers and the satanic attempt to thwart God’s ultimate, salvific purpose’ (2006: 13). 
Constructions of political-spiritual thwarting tie into one final work on early 
modern demonology that requires commentary: Armando Maggi’s Satan’s Rhetoric 
(2001). Maggi’s text explores the theological figuration of demonic speech as a ‘silent 
idiom of solitude and devastation’ that works psychically to recall humanity to our 
shared status as pariah, ‘our existence as perennial exiles’ from paradise (2001: 2, 
255). Demons spoke into the mind, and their recalling of our exile led to alienation 
and depression. Maggi’s work blends history, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology in 
order to explore the repercussions of demonic language, which was differentiated 
from that of angels due to its ability to distort moral-ontological order. While angelic 
communication relied on direct and unambiguous relaying of the divine will, demons 
spoke language in its material ambiguity, only with world-changing or world-ending 
repercussions. The devil, Maggi elaborates, devours humankind by means of acolytes 
who ‘with words deny the true God’—a collective mode of linguistic expression that 
threatens to dissolve and consume legitimate order. This demonic ‘devouring idiom’  
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is predicated upon a fundamental premise: to speak the devil’s language is 
as well as means to devour the creation (men’s bodies and souls, their 
cattle). The good angels’ language is a nonlanguage in that its speakers 
simply voice the Divinity’s will by means of human signifying sounds. 
The devil’s language is spoken by three categories of speakers: the devils 
themselves, the witches (along with sodomites and Jews), and those 
human beings who have been corrupted/devoured by this very language 
(ibid.: 24–5).6 
Maggi notes a key distinction between speakers: the devil and witches were ‘native 
speakers’ of this idiom, whereas the merely corrupted were not (ibid.), a relation that 
constructs ontological differences between people. There are those who by either 
nature or conscious affiliation distort and destroy God’s creation, and those that are 
victims of this distortion. However, without human interpellators the Devil ‘cannot 
fulfill his devastating syllogism’—his idiom is ‘first and foremost a social 
occurrence’—and to ‘complete his syllogism,’ Maggi notes, ‘the devil may need the 
support of his disciples, witches, magicians, sodomites, heretics, and Jews’ (ibid.: 26, 
233). The ‘language of Satan…is a fire that devours both its listeners and its speakers’ 
(ibid.), and to be a ‘native speaker’ of Satan’s rhetoric is to speak the silent inferno 
that threatens to consume all of creation as ‘God’s rule’. That is, as orthotaxy.  
Mastery begins with the power of naming. As this section outlines, the name 
‘witch’ (and discursively related designators like ‘sodomite’ or ‘Jew’) constructed the 
named as part of a demonic conspiracy aimed at destroying Christianity from within. 
In order to safeguard Christianity—to secure the health, safety and continued 
existence of the body, personal, political, social, spiritual—the witch (and the Jew) 
had to be destroyed. The discourses of demonology presume a correct course, for the 
individual and history, which demons aim to distort or destroy. In demonological 
witchcraft discourses they gain human agents to assist this project—to complete the 
‘devastating syllogism’ that destroys creation through the denial of its creator. These 
are themes that, strikingly, recur in the case studies I undertake below, despite their 
temporal and geographical distance from the witchcraft persecutions. My analysis of 
these contemporary demonologies draws on frameworks and observations developed 
in the recent scholarly evaluations of witchcraft demonologies I have examined here, 
                                                
6 In the early modern context ‘sodomy’ did not just refer to homosexuality but also to a large number 
of perceived sexual deviances, including bestiality, ‘unnatural’ intercourse between men and women, 
and even by analogy a host of non-sexual sins (Stokes 2011: 154–73). 
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by situating them within their ideological matrices and teasing out their connections 
to other socio-cultural fantasies and fears. Before this, however, I will explore the 
scholarship that outlines shifts in demonology that occurred beyond the witch-hunts. 
Notions of occult networks of satanic allies continued to have resonance beyond the 
hunts, and the European Enlightenment brought more revolutionary reconfigurations 
of the demonological tradition. 
A PROTEAN POST-ENLIGHTENMENT 
The history of demonology after the European Enlightenment marks either its 
irrelevancy or its radical transformation. When Charles Baudelaire had a preacher 
proclaim in ‘The Generous Gambler’ (1869) that ‘one of the devil’s best ruses is to 
persuade you that he doesn’t exist’ (1970: 61), he points toward this ambiguity. Philip 
Almond’s new biography of Satan, for example, ends at the Enlightenment, which he 
claims saw Satan and his legions ‘effectively eliminated’ from ‘liberal’ Christianities 
(2014: 221) only to return in filmic form in 1973 with The Exorcist—part of a popular 
re-engagement with the supernatural that continues today (ibid.: xiii–xiv). However, 
there is a life between these poles, painted with fiction and polyvalent appropriations. 
While, as Lincoln (2009: 45; 2012: 31) and others (Minerva 2001: 374–77; Schock 
2003: 12–17) accurately claim, demonology was increasingly discredited by 
rationalist critiques of religion, its mainline marginalisation heralded new beginnings.  
There are two threads to post-Enlightenment demonology that are inextricable 
from its politicality. The first is its more-traditional use as symbol of worldly evil, 
closely linked to the early modern witch-networks, which recurs in both ‘traditional’ 
apocalyptic religiosities and growing paradigms of ‘conspiracy theory’ (Barkun 2013; 
Boyer 1992; Landes 2011). The second is a legacy of symbolic appropriation of 
satanic imagery as religio-political protest. This latter trajectory mostly stems from 
Romantic (mis)readings of John Milton’s Paradise Lost (Bloom 2005; Forsyth 2003; 
Schock 2003; Wolfson 2004), but also encompasses esoteric groups like Theosophy, 
Decadent movements, and projects of socialism and women’s liberation throughout 
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the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Faxneld 2012, 2013a, 2014).7 It would be 
inaccurate to view these trends as wholly separate, however—they condition one 
another in complex, multifaceted patterns of collusion and competition. Later parts of 
this thesis unpack this dynamic of interrelation and interpellation, and my discussion 
here will thus serve to highlight in preliminary form some of its core features and 
historical progression by outlining prior scholarship on these topics. 
Architect of Evil to Archetype of Rebellion: Satanisms, Romantic and Symbolic 
One of the earliest and most prominent religio-political appropriations of Satan takes 
place in the phenomenon that has been termed ‘Romantic Satanism’, a movement that 
mainly arose in England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Taking point 
from reconfigurations of Milton’s portrayal of Satan in Paradise Lost, this intellectual 
milieu appropriated the Devil as an ally and symbol of self-identification against what 
it saw as an oppressive monolithic system. Susan Wolfson (2004: 120) summarises 
the phenomenon as a  
line of sympathy that refused to see the Satan of Paradise Lost only, or 
even, as the architect of evil. Many Romantic-era readers...saw in Satan’s 
language a poetry of imaginative, principled critique, subjective anguish, 
exile, and alienation: in sum, modern consciousness. 
In Romantic Satanism, the Devil’s negative qualities are, while not wholly minimised, 
increasingly paired with noble ones. Shelley listed his ‘taints of ambition, envy, 
revenge, and a desire for personal aggrandisement’ alongside his ‘courage and 
majesty and firm and patient opposition to omnipotent force’ (in Schock 2003: 39), 
while William Hazlitt described Satan as a figure ‘gigantic, irregular, portentous, 
uneasy, and disturbed—but dazzling in its faded splendour, the clouded ruins of a 
god’ (in ibid.: 10). Peter Schock (2003: 39) makes the uncertainty of Satan’s new 
conceptualisation clear: 
While Satan is re-envisioned as the image of expanding human 
consciousness and desire, rebelling against oppression and limitation, he 
also comes into view as a fallen figure who loses Paradise in an attempt to 
locate the divine source within, whose rebelliousness may turn tyrannical 
                                                
7 This latter trajectory continues today, not merely in fictional form but in the actual creation of 
‘Satanist’ religious groups founded around principles of ‘autonomy, antinomianism, and liberation’ 
(Petersen 2014: 400). This thesis does not address these movements, but academic analyses can be 
found in the edited volumes by Petersen (2009) and Faxneld and Petersen (2013). 
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and revengeful in his authoritarian reign in hell...[He] emerges as an 
unstable figure: in many contexts he appears as an heroic apotheosis of 
human consciousness and libertarian desire, while in others he constitutes 
the dark double of Prometheus. 
The reconception occurred fairly quickly after Paradise Lost’s publication. As Per 
Faxneld notes, Milton had been an active republican pamphleteer during the civil war 
and Oliver Cromwell’s private secretary; this ‘soon lead to speculation whether 
Satan’s rebellion against God…was perhaps an allegory for the republican uprising 
against the king’ (2012: 529). This heroising of Satan was not commonplace, 
however—if employed politically, Satan was more often used in traditional symbolic 
strategies of demonisation. It did, however, leave a legacy in literary and popular 
culture (Craciun 2003; Faxneld 2014; Forsyth 2003; O'Donnell 2015a; Schock 2003), 
one recent expression of which is Philip Pullman’s bestselling His Dark Materials 
trilogy (1995–2000). 
Exhibited mainly in works of English Romanticism, most infamously those of 
Blake, Byron, Shelley, Wollstonecraft, and Wordsworth (Craciun 2003; Schock 
2003), as well as on mainland Europe in those of Carducci, Baudelaire, Michelet, de 
Vigny, and Sand (Faxneld 2013a, 2013b; Luijk 2013), the discourse of Romantic 
Satanism recast the fallen angel from hubristic traitor to revolutionary hero. While 
many Enlightenment thinkers outright rejected the Devil as a part of dogmatic 
religion, Romantic Satanism appropriated and adapted aspects of his Christian mythic 
use to fit into new religio-political agendas aimed at challenging the status quo 
(Faxneld 2013a; Luijk 2013). As such, Satan was transformed into a polyvalent 
symbol whose functions extended beyond his authorship of evil and ranged from 
explorations of, in the words of Peter Schock, ‘metaphysical rebellion, ethical 
transvaluation, and political revolution; to dramatizing human psychology [and] 
producing such literary effect as irony or satire’ (1992: 507). Van Luijk refers to this 
new face of the Devil as the ‘archetypal embodiment of rebellion’ (2013: 45). 
 The definitive work on this milieu is Schock’s Romantic Satanism (2003), 
which traces the gradual alterations in cultural attitudes to Satan’s depiction and 
characterisation—one of the most striking being changes to engravings for Paradise 
Lost itself, in which the Devil progressively loses bestial traits like bat-wings or 
cloven hooves in favour of a portrayal as fully- or mostly-human, often as a muscular 
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blond male (ibid.: 26–34).8 Alongside various analyses of the apocalyptic and 
demonic imagery used by the Romantics (Ahearn 1996; Bloom 2005; Craciun 2003; 
Forsyth 2003), Schock has recently been joined by others analysing religio-political 
deployments of ‘symbolic Satanism’ in post-Enlightenment Europe (Faxneld 2012, 
2013a, 2014; Häll 2013; Luijk 2013). Building on earlier work by Adriana Craciun 
(2003) and Valentin Boss (1991), Per Faxneld sits in the vanguard of this new 
scholarship, with his monumental Satanic Feminism (2014) and related articles (2012, 
2013a) exploring strategic uses of satanic symbolism in esoteric and political 
discourses of women’s liberation and other socialist movements during the nineteenth 
century. Such discourses often relied on a counter-reading of the Biblical text, 
reinscribing images for new purposes—Eve’s role in the fall became a positive 
political injunction and the witch was reconfigured as a ‘proto-suffragette ancestress’, 
her black masses symbolic protests against patriarchal power; meanwhile, Satan and 
the related topoi of the demon lover became reinscribed as allies against religious 
patriarchal oppression, and sometimes Satan was refigured as woman to complete the 
gesture of symbolic opposition (2014: 663–7). A similar deployment was made in 
other radical political circles, such as socialist or anarchist writers like Godwin, 
Bakunin, and Proudhon, who used Satan as a symbol of opposition to the old orders. 
In ways, we see in these Biblical counter-readings the realisation of the fears of 
demonological witchcraft—the actual emergence of ‘heretical networks’ dedicated to 
an end to ‘legitimate’ order. While the usage of Satan was symbolic, ironic and 
deliberately provocative rather than an expression of faith, the symbolism had a clear 
ideological aim. As Romans 13:1–2 reads, ‘For there is no authority except from God, 
and the authorities that exist are appointed by God. Therefore whoever resists the 
authority resists the ordinance of God, and those who resist will bring judgment on 
themselves’. And, as Faxneld quips, ‘who would logically be the great adversary of 
God’s ordinance? Satan, of course’ (2013a: 553). 
Reinscriptions of Satan as righteous revolutionary ran alongside demonisation 
by authorities, using the same satanic imagery in more typical fashion to name social 
                                                
8 That the Devil’s humanisation was visually marked by his Europeanisation is noteworthy given the 
figure’s historical impositions onto the marginalised. As the Devil becomes less ‘evil’ he thus also 
becomes increasingly white and archetypally masculine. 
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evil. However, as governments became more secularised such ‘symbolic Satanism’ 
became less of a public concern—and accordingly lost some of its rhetorical impact 
(Faxneld 2014: 670). Even groups that had formerly used satanic imagery phased it 
out as they drew close to real political power (Faxneld 2013a). Condemnation became 
increasingly concentrated to more conservative circles. Nonetheless, while the steady 
vanishment of demonology from mainline theology allowed its reinscription as a sign 
able to signify both good and evil, for conservative Christians who looked at society 
and saw the erosion of authentic religion it perhaps marked something different—that 
Satan’s greatest trick really had been convincing the world he didn’t exist. This lead 
to new structures of critique of the social order, perhaps a reinscription of the ‘science 
of the night’ identified by Krause: a fixation on hidden forces whose existence could 
be uncovered by careful, inquisitorial excavation. 
(In)Visible Ubiquity: Conspiracy Theory—Night Science, Hermetic History  
In his article on ‘Satanism’ in the 1908 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, E. 
Sidney Hartland (1908) describes two types of Satanists: a ‘mad cult’ of ‘scattered 
associations or isolated persons’, worshipping Satan as fallen archangel and enemy of 
God, and ‘Luciferians and Palladists’, a group that worshipped Lucifer as the god of 
light and which ultimately was founded on a ‘dualistic philosophy and was a sort of 
topsy-turvy Christianity’ (ibid.: 203). Both types are alleged to be present in Europe 
and America in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, but it is the latter—the 
Palladists—with which Hartland’s article is concerned. Revealed by a dissenting ex-
conspirator ‘Leo Taxil’ and his associates in 1887, the Palladium—a globe-spanning 
Masonic-Satanist conspiracy—gripped the French imagination. Hartland reports that 
several high-profile members of the Catholic Church blessed a campaign against the 
conspiracy. The conspiracy’s attraction in Catholic circles was aided by the earlier 
1884 encyclical by Pope Leo XIII, Humanum genus, which had accused Masons of 
working to establish the Kingdom of Satan (Korey 1995: 63), and in 1896 the city of 
Trent hosted an Antimasonic Conference to give the ‘final blow to Freemasonry and 
Protestantism’ (Hartland 1908: 205). As it reached fever pitch, however, the Palladist 
conspiracy came to an abrupt end. Later in 1896, Taxil revealed the whole thing as a 
hoax. Ultimately, he thanked the Catholic press and bishops for the assistance they 
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had given him in organising ‘the finest mystification of all, which was the crown of 
his career’ (ibid.: 206).  
The Palladium was therefore shown to be an elaborate, decade-long hoax. 
However, the cultural force of its vision of hidden, satanic order was neither new nor 
did it fade away. Over a century earlier, the Order of the Illuminati—a short-lived late 
eighteenth-century Bavarian secret society dedicated to spreading the secular, 
rationalistic ideas of the Enlightenment—had passed into popular myth as hub of 
conspiratorial attempts to undermine Christendom. Outlawed and suppressed in 1784, 
the Illuminati adopted a similar cultural position to demonological witches. As Jeffrey 
Pasley (2003: 336) outlines:  
the embattled defenders of church and king came to see the Illuminati as 
both representatives of, and the prime movers behind, all the insidious 
forces of innovation, free thought, and revolution that seemed to threaten 
their world.  
The first totalising Illuminati conspiracies were outlined by French Jesuit Augustin 
Barruel and University of Edinburgh scientist John Robison in 1797 and 1798, 
respectively (Waterman 2005: 17). Both posited the Illuminati’s hand in the French 
Revolution, and warned that their next target was America—leading to a full-blown 
Illuminati panic in New England in 1798, in which both texts were often cited (Pasley 
2003: 337–8). The idea of demonic Illuminati in the US was popularised by Timothy 
Dwight, one of the period’s most influential preachers and president of Yale College, 
who identified the Illuminati as responsible for both the French Revolution and the 
spread of Deism (Poole 2009: 25).  
Whether more or less satanic, the Illuminati had immense cultural longevity. 
As scholars of conspiracy theory like Michael Barkun (2013) and Peter Knight (2008) 
detail, the Illuminati became a mainstay of post-1960s conspiracy culture. While not 
always linked (explicitly) to Satan, they still operate as an enduring cultural symbol of 
the nefarious, shadowy organisation working to bring the world under control, a topos 
now almost omnipresent in conspiracy subcultures (Barkun 2013: 136–9). The 
Illuminati’s ‘history’ in the nineteenth-century is less clear, however, and the role of 
the Palladium in perhaps resurrecting popular ideas of demonic conspiracy has not 
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been examined.9 More attention has understandably been paid to the 1903 antisemitic 
forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Like the encyclical of Leo XIII, the 
Protocols posited a global ‘Jewish-Masonic’ conspiracy for world domination, 
becoming a key text in twentieth-century antisemitic discourses in both the West and 
Muslim world (D. Cook 2005; Filiu 2011; Korey 1995; Webman 2010). 
There are a number of features of this conspiracist discourse that are relevant. 
First, like in forms of Romantic Satanism, Illuminati conspiracies closely linked their 
images of Satan to secular opposition to religion. Second, conspiracies were construed 
as transnational, encompassing the French Revolution and American colonial politics, 
among others. These early conspiracy theories served as a hermeneutical framework 
by which individuals like Robison, Barruel, and Dwight could rationalise the growing 
popularity and political power of secular or ‘weak’ religious paradigms. Given these 
features, it is maybe unsurprising that a significant part of late-twentieth and twenty-
first century millenarian or apocalyptic beliefs have significant conspiracist elements. 
Addressing conspiracism has accordingly become a core facet of studies of twentieth-
century apocalyptic beliefs (Fuller 1994; O'Leary 1995; Wójcik 1996, 1997). 
Conspiracism is not identical to apocalypticism, however, although it bears familial 
resemblances. These two discourses, especially in the information age, feed off and 
into one another, a relationship expertly charted by political theorist Michael Barkun 
(1986, 1994, 2000, 2003, 2013).10  
The core structural similarity between conspiracy theory (even in more secular 
forms) and apocalypticism lies in its attempt to discern the nature and working of evil 
(Barkun 2013; Fenster 2008: 197–232; O'Leary 1995; Wójcik 1997). Citing Stephen 
O’Leary, Barkun (2013: 3) writes: 
At their broadest, conspiracy theories ‘view history as controlled by 
massive, demonic forces.’ The locus of this evil lies outside the true 
community, in some ‘Other, defined as foreign or barbarian, though 
often…disguised as innocent and upright.’ The result is a worldview 
characterized by a sharp division between the realms of good and evil. 
                                                
9 There is a general dearth of scholarship on the Palladist hoax, although it has recently gained some 
scholarly attention by David Harvey (2008) and Robert Ziegler (2012: 50–73). 
10 Other prominent scholars of conspiracy theory include Mark Fenster (2008), Timothy Melley (2000, 
2008), Jack Bratich (2008), Lance deHaven-Smith (2013; deHaven-Smith and Witt 2012), and Peter 
Knight (2000, 2003, 2008). 
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While apocalyptic beliefs are often complex (and not always coherent) composites of 
scriptural exegeses and contemporary political realities, conspiracy theories tend to be 
more overtly syncretistic, drawing not just on classical apocalyptic texts but also on 
ideas adapted from New Age spiritualities, ‘ufology’, alternative histories, and even 
texts from other living religions (Barkun 2013; Partridge 2004). Many texts analysed 
in this thesis rest in this milieu, which Barkun has characterised as utilising a model 
of Levi-Straussian bricolage to blend ‘stigmatised knowledges’—knowledge hidden 
from and/or disbelieved by mainstream society (2013: 15–38). The discernment of 
these occult knowledges becomes crucial to conspiracy believers; it both gives sense 
to a senseless world and permits a ground for opposition to that world (Fenster 2008: 
141).  
Brian Bennett has juxtaposed providential and conspiratorial views of history 
in describing both as ‘hermetic histories’ that are fundamentally divinatory in nature, 
trafficking in ‘recondite signs’ that call for interpretation. Yet while providentialism 
‘seeks the “hand of God” in historical events both big and small’, conspiracism 
represents an ‘inverted providentiality’ that reveals not God’s hand, but the ‘hidden 
hand’ (2007: 175–6). This hidden hand is often posited as demonic in nature, whether 
figuratively or actually. Its workings must be investigated with inquisitorial precision, 
exposed and unravelled. Bennett concludes that providentialism and conspiracism are 
both historical discourses with a clear this-worldly focus, even if their histories are 
outward signs of unseen forces (ibid.: 198–9). However, while he is correct, this does 
not take into account the full nature of conspiracism’s ‘inverted providentiality’. In 
more religious conspiracism like those analysed in this thesis, methods often resemble 
prophecy exegesis, but conspiracists augment or even supplant scriptural sources with 
a focus on the interrogation of this-worldly phenomena: secret societies, historical and 
contemporary events, and (pseudo-)scientific theories are woven into hermeneutical 
frameworks for interpreting the historical process. By removing the external agent of 
history, conspiracism places itself wholly inside the immanent frame of secular order 
(see C. Taylor 2007). This immanence also frames ostensibly providential histories, 
like those I explore below. Even when God is still invoked, conspiracism’s ‘secular’ 
focus tends to diminish his potentiality. The recondite signs the religious conspiracist 
interprets point more to demonic action within history than a divine hand beyond it. 
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History becomes not the gradual unfolding of divine presence but of the absence of 
that presence: counterfeit history to a true teleology increasing differed and deferred. 
INTO ‘THE “SENSELESS” MAZE’ 
Hybrids of secular and religious, conspiracist discourses might be construed as heirs 
of early modern witchcraft discourses. At least, they replicate particular key features: 
(i) a fixation on occlusion only discernible by inquisitorial methods, and (ii) a positing 
of diabolic networks of conspirators working (in)visibly to end society as we know it. 
Their efforts to synthesise stigmatised knowledges, mass media, political speeches 
and world events (past and present) into a ‘hermetic history’ are not dissimilar from 
how witch-hunters attempted to integrate popular magic and folk traditions into pre-
existing theological frameworks. Both craft theologico-political narratives in order to 
fit what does or will not fit into their conceptions of an ordered cosmos. Both use a 
‘science of the night’ to discern the obscure(d) and stop the ‘devastating syllogism’ 
that will devour creation. There is a crucial difference, however. While witches were 
thought to undermine the structures of society from its fringes, diabolical conspirators 
are themselves the architects of society and determine its structures. This belief often 
leads to the adoption of a millenarian or apocalyptic perspective. As Barkun remarks, 
given the choice is between ‘the despair of the virtuous weak, condemned to fighting 
rearguard actions’ that do little more than delay the inevitable, and ‘the hope of the 
millennialist who may appear weak at the moment but is confident of ultimate 
triumph’ the latter’s appeal is unsurprising (2013: 233). Either way, the conspiracist is 
reconfigured as noble heretic, battling to reassert truth in a world led astray, to 
unravel the illusions that mask the diabolical substrate of contemporary civilisation 
and (thereby) return to a pristine social order. 
This final dualism—of a whole and holy individual against satanic society—is 
one of the central themes I explore in this thesis. It gestures to reconfigurations of 
sovereign order I unpack in the following chapters. In this chapter, I have surveyed 
the contemporary literature on demonology that explores the coding of demonological 
evil as ‘deviation’ from ‘God’s rule’. This chapter has focused on the figuration of 
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demonic deviation through the scholarship around the European witch-hunts, in which 
demons and their human allies were construed as striving to destroy Christian 
civilisation, and on the mutations of post-Enlightenment demonologies, in which that 
deviation becomes both a position of protest against that Christian civilisation and the 
hidden hand orchestrating its drift from its ordained trajectory. In these discourses, 
those (believed to be) siding with the demon are coded as choosing otherwise than the 
sovereign will, becoming wilful agents striving for the end of orthotaxy. However, the 
framework of religious conspiracism reinscribes the demonological networks that rose 
to the fore during the witchcraft persecutions. No longer did rogue individuals trouble 
the boundaries of the sacred political order—rather, a rogue political order troubled 
the boundaries of the sacred individual, whose theopolitical duty became the taming 
of this rogue leviathan—the restoration of an ‘ought’ over an ‘is’.  
It is the theopolitics of this attempted restoration—the demons it summons in 
order to exorcise—that my thesis explores, as it continues to tread the paths of ‘the 
“senseless” maze of this folly called demonology’ (Maggi 2001: 3). To do so requires 
a winding back from our current time, however, in order to focus fully on the 
sovereign will, the ‘rule’ of ‘God’s rule’. The following chapter explores this core 
element of orthotaxy. It does so by exploring two classical theorists of (theo)political 
sovereignty, Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, and their constructions of demonology 
as ultimate other to (all, true) political order.
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CHAPTER TWO 
I Will (Not) Serve 
The Demonic and the Architecture of Sovereignty 
Of all the many examples of failed ideological 
interpellation, the fall of the devil is undoubtedly the 
most extreme. Created to be the greatest of all angels, 
Satan instead turns against God, thereby becoming the 
figure of ultimate evil…[T]he divine performative that 
calls the devil into being has a concrete effect, but 
apparently not even God is in full control of the 
consequences of his performative acts. In fact, the bad 
subjects here have the opportunity to act in ways that 
influence the shape of the given order: in this case, 
causing the fall of humanity and triggering the 
Incarnation. 
— Adam Kotsko (2008: 209, 224) 
The persona of the Miltonic Satan is often encapsulated in the Latin phrase non 
serviam: ‘I will not serve’. Figured as a statement of autonomy and (thus also) of 
sovereignty, Georges Bataille calls it ‘the motto of the devil’ (in Connor 2014: 167): 
the ‘desire to accede to authentic being, to the sovereignty without which an 
individual or an action have no value in themselves, but are merely useful’ (1998: 
120). The statement, notes Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘marks not merely a personal revolt 
against God, but a revolt against the concept of an ordained and unchangeable 
hierarchy’; yet it also contains a paradox, for Satan ‘both has to and cannot reject this 
hierarchy: the only alternative to service is monarchy; but monarchy implies the 
hierarchy which revolt rejects’ (1998: 97). This chapter explores this paradox as 
related to the relation between sovereignty and its demonological other. Curiously, the 
phrase non serviam does not appear in Paradise Lost. It is often used to thematically 
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summarise the (in)famous statement, ‘better to reign in hell, than serve in heaven’ 
(I.263), embodying the spirit of Satan’s monologue. It does, however, appear in the 
Vulgate translation of Jeremiah 2:20, which laments Israel’s apostasy and allegorises 
wayward Israelites as a wild vine grown out of control, prostituting themselves before 
idols and rejecting the Lord.1  
 In its biblical context, ‘non serviam’ is thus not the declaration of a being’s 
autonomy but an erroneous, hubristic attitude projected onto an errant subject as part 
of a litany of condemnations. It refers not to a revolutionary archangel but to humans 
who have foolishly rejected the rule of their sovereign god. As a Vulgate translation 
later (mis)attributed to Satan, ‘non serviam’ shares similarities with ‘Lucifer’, which 
originates from the Vulgate rendition of Isaiah 14:12: ‘How you are fallen from 
heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! How you are cut down to the ground, you who 
weakened the nations!’ The referent of this verse as the Devil, however, was already 
present in the writings of Origen, Augustine and John Cassian (Wilken et al. 2007: 
175). Interpreting Isaiah 14:12 as a description of the Devil’s exile from paradise thus 
sits in a broader genealogy of scriptural exegesis. In contrast, non serviam lacks such 
theological standardisation, mostly being associated with post-Miltonic literature or 
contemporary religious texts. Indeed, texts that employ it as metonym for the satanic 
spirit seem unaware of its Vulgate ‘roots’ or original context—or, at least, make no 
reference to it. 
 My interest regarding non serviam, however, is less the accuracy or origins of 
the phrase than its application and the ideological concepts that have filtered through 
it. These include the symbolic Satanisms discussed above, merging ideas of demonic 
opposition to ‘proper’ order with an emancipatory politics oriented at challenging and 
overturning that very order. As Schock outlines, this reconceptualisation coalesced 
via an array of factors ranging from concerns with ‘scriptural myth, religious and 
secular authority’ to more concrete fears resulting from ‘the political and social 
instability’ of the French Revolution and its aftermath (2003: 12). Ruben van Luijk 
holds that while Satan’s rebellion was traditionally figured as one of ‘proud, unlawful 
insurrection’ against divine authority, the philosophes and French Revolution gave the 
                                                
1 ‘A saeculo confregisti iugum meum; rupisti vincula mea, et dixisti, “Non serviam”’ (Kinney 2012: 
288).  
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idea of insurrection a new, positive meaning for many European intellectuals, one 
which then became transferred to the figure of Satan (2013: 45). The reality was less 
simple. Far from being solely celebrated, overturning established order provoked 
significant anxiety among the European intellectual milieu (Schulman 2013). This 
ambivalence and anxiety was reflected in figurations of Satan, who was employed to 
articulate a range of theopolitical concepts. Questions about the nature and function of 
autonomy and sovereignty were one set of such concepts. As analysed above, one 
prominent figuration of the demon and its human allies (and the demonological evil 
they are constructed as embodying) is through ideas of deviation from a proper order, 
which I have termed orthotaxy. The witchcraft demonologies of the European witch-
hunts provided clear examples of this structural relationship, in which clerical and 
theological writings constructed the idea of an occult network of diabolic others 
working to destroy authentic order. In this chapter, I will revisit parts of this discourse 
regarding classical theories of sovereign power.  
Satan’s post-Enlightenment reconstructions are also relevant here. The Devil’s 
increasingly polyvalent appropriations transfigured him into a symbol able not only of 
demonising opponents but of being used as a symbol of righteous rebellion against 
systems of power that masked themselves in the rhetorics of unassailable truth—
‘radicals demonized themselves so to speak, in order to demonstrate their complete 
rejection of the Christian establishment’ (Faxneld 2013a: 530). This duality expresses 
the malleability of the demonic as a symbol, able to be cast as both a status quo made 
corrupt and the other threatening that status quo from outside. I examine this duality 
closely below. It sits at the heart of demonology’s serpentine relationship to ideas of 
both autonomy and sovereignty. In the previous chapter I outlined a genealogy of 
demonology’s relationship to socio-cultural order, and this chapter continues that 
trajectory through analysis of its relation(s) to theopolitical notions of sovereignty. As 
I shall show over the course of this chapter, the demon’s malleability in relation to 
sovereign power manifests in two different but interrelated forms as sovereignty’s 
constitutive other. Firstly, it can operate as an exterior and anterior other, a demonic 
‘paganism’ preceding the civilising impulse of Christianity, and continuing only 
outside its borders. This is the demonic as nature, which is both past and periphery, 
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and its manifestation in the writings of Thomas Hobbes is the focus of section two.2 
Related to this form, however, is another characterised as internal rather than external 
to (a certain kind of) sovereignty. As sovereign power (in, for example, the state) 
shifts further from its supposedly divine origins, the demonic mutates and adopts the 
form of a system that sets itself up as a substitute rather than an extension of God’s 
authority. It becomes not (just) a threatening foreign influence but a corruption that 
ultimately manifests as a counterfeit order that attempts to efface and replace 
legitimate sovereign power. Working with this rough schema, we might posit two 
distinct but overlapping relations between the demonological other and theopolitical 
sovereignty: (i) the demonic as (state of) nature, and (ii) the demonic as systemic 
counterfeit. Going forth, I will refer to these as the ‘natural demonic’ and ‘counterfeit 
demonic’. This chapter explores this demonological duality and how it intersects, 
undermines, supplants, and reinforces theologico-political ideas of sovereignty. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first analyses the construction 
of sovereign indivisibility in early political philosophy, notably the work of French 
jurist Jean Bodin, and how this indivisibility is primarily prescriptive rather than 
descriptive. The second analyses the works of Thomas Hobbes, primarily Leviathan 
(1651, rev. 1668), whose notion of sovereignty as guarding against an 
ante/antipolitical state of nature via mimesis of the divine might paradoxically 
transform it into the demonic force it exists to thwart. Drawing on the relationship of 
the state to the state of nature, the third section analyses the discursive figure of the 
demon via Jacques Derrida’s exploration of the relationship(s) between the beast and 
the sovereign, two conceptual figures defined through exclusion from normative 
order. The juxtaposition between these figures permits a richer analysis of the 
counterfeit demonic—of the beast as sovereign or rather the sovereign as Beast (with 
accompanying apocalyptic connotations).  
                                                
2 The four classical theorists of political sovereignty are usually given as Bodin, Hobbes, Rousseau and 
Austin (King 2013: xxii–xxiii). Of these, this chapter concentrates mainly on the first two, since these 
are the two who concentrate substantially on demonology. Frederick Garber (1982: 33–62) explores 
Rousseau’s conceptualisation of personal autonomy in dialogue with Milton’s Satan, and so a 
demonological engagement with Rousseau is also possible. 
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THE (IN)DIVISIBILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY 
The genealogy of (European) political notions of sovereignty can arguably be traced 
to Jean Bodin (1530–96), who, as Julian Franklin notes, was first to formulate the idea 
of the indivisibility of sovereign power (in Bodin 1992: xiii).3 This philosophico-
political legacy reaches down through the history of European philosophical and 
political thought, through Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmidt, Giorgio Agamben, Derrida, 
and beyond. The assumption of the indivisibility of sovereign power bears a 
(theo)logic of ‘absolute identity’ (Bates 2012: 4), and a certain kind of solitariness, a 
singularity unfettered by the Law that is its creature. The sovereign is thus conceived 
as both undivided in itself and yet divided from the world. Bodin (1992: 92) 
elaborates on the duties of this indivisible author(ity):  
The first prerogative of sovereignty is to give the law to subjects. But who 
will be the subjects and who will obey if they also have the power to make 
law? And who will be able to make law if he is himself constrained to 
receive it from those to whom he gives it? 
This question of ‘who’ is sovereign and (thus) ‘who’ are subjects has resonance both 
in contemporary global politics and the theological frame within which demonology 
operates. With regards to Bodin, this question links directly to demonology, and to the 
‘anti-religion’ of witchcraft as ultimate other to political order. In order to understand 
his ideas of sovereign power, it is necessary to examine his context and legacy. 
A Sovereignty Is Born 
Bodin’s work has been singularly influential in the history of political philosophy. 
Initially trained in the Carmelite Order, Bodin left the order around 1550, turning to 
the study of law. He began practicing law in Paris around 1562—the year of the 
outbreak of the French Wars of Religion (Bodin 1992: ix–xii; 1995: 9–31). This 
period of protracted civil disorder, in which Catholics and Calvinists vied for political 
authority, constituted the backdrop to Bodin’s oeuvre. As Jonathan Pearl notes, 
‘religious propaganda and political infighting went on ceaselessly. Each group 
accused its enemies of being in league with the Devil, and of committing the worst 
                                                
3 ‘Sovereignty’ here refers specifically to European politico-philosophical constructions of the concept. 
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crimes imaginable against the state, God, and the true church’ (in Bodin 1995: 13). 
The exact influence of this milieu on Bodin is impossible to determine. Pearl has 
linked Bodin’s absolutism to his experience of the Wars as often held in check by 
‘strong’ rulers like Henry II (ibid.: 10), although this is speculative. What can be 
verified, however, is how Bodin’s public stances and his theories became constructed 
in political history. Bodin identified as Catholic but did not align himself with the 
Catholic League, instead occupying a centrist position known as politique—‘The 
politiques held that disunity and violence were destroying France, and the only cure 
for the troubles was a strong and respected monarchy’ (ibid.). This stance, alongside 
Bodin’s famous 1576 Six Books of the Commonwealth—‘the first modern study of the 
state’—and the model of religious tolerance found in his unpublished Colloquium of 
the Seven, contributed to an idea of Bodin as a ‘man of modernity’ (ibid.: 11). This 
apparent modernity, however, was seemingly at odds with the vehement intolerance 
portrayed in his 1580 On the Demon-Mania of Witches. In Chapter One, I analysed 
parts of the relation of early modern witchcraft demonologies to the rise of the nation-
state. As a figure at a key juncture of this shared genealogy, Bodin, and specifically 
his ideas of sovereignty, should be viewed as part of this cultural milieu. 
Bodin’s idea of sovereign power is singular, monarchical, and patriarchal—
there is one ruler, masculine and indivisible. Preston King has noted that Bodin held 
any other form of government to be ‘seriously defective’ (2013: xxiv), and Yvonne 
Sherwood has termed the exegetical tradition of reading the Bible as supportive of 
absolute patriarchal and monarchistic power the ‘Bodinian Bible’ (2008: 322): a Bible 
in which ‘Monarchy, theocracy, and paternity are united in the holy trinity of God, 
father and king (2012: 318).4 The solitary sovereign was formed in the image of God 
and accordingly partook in the same principle of singular truth: ‘Just as God, the great 
sovereign, cannot make a God equal to Himself’, Bodin writes, ‘so we can say that 
the prince, whom we have taken as the image of God, cannot make a subject equal to 
himself without annihilation of his power’ (1992: 50). The concept framed here is the 
                                                
4 Sherwood opposes this Bible, also called the Patriarchal/Monarchist Bible, to the Liberal or Lockean 
Bible, which reads the Bible as supportive of liberalist rights and values (2012: 303–332). This Bible, 
which is often vague and mutable in its pronouncements, is the version deployed by many 
contemproary politicians, such as George Bush (Sherwood 2006), Tony Blair, and David Cameron. 
The Bible read by the subjects of this thesis can be seen as a curious hybrid of these Bibles, pining for 
patriarchal absolutism through a framework of liberal rights. 
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‘classical doctrine’ of sovereignty, which posits the concentration of power at a 
central point—power that must be ‘absolute, total, illimitable and indivisible’ (King 
2013: xxii). Neil Walker (2013: 20) juxtaposes this concept to older forms of political 
authority, writing that 
as distinct from the overlapping and interlocking pattern of influence 
among dynastically sovereign, imperial, clerical, feudal, and other forms 
that were characteristic of medieval authority, modern sovereignty denotes 
the finality, comprehensive remit, and indivisibility of the ruling power 
within a territory. It follows that that modern sovereignty’s interior and 
exterior dimensions become closely mutually conditioned and enabled. 
For the monopolistic authority of a State within its territory to be achieved 
and maintained, recognition from other polities and their commitment to 
non-interference was necessary. Equally, for States to exercise their 
external sovereignty as actors capable of entering into international legal 
commitments, the indivisibility and finality of their internal authority was 
required. 
I return to certain features of this description below. For now, it is necessary to note 
the central idea of this sovereignty, namely that it is a territorial space that is 
controlled and defined by a central, singular authority (the sovereign). As Paul 
Friedland notes, this conception of sovereign power encodes a notion of the ‘radiation 
of sovereign will from the center to the periphery’ (2002: 49).  
Sovereign Limits I: The Self(-Otherness) 
The singular sovereign and his territory are interrelated: both are assumed to adopt a 
characteristic of unitariness that marks them as absolute within themselves, and this 
unitariness is needed to conceive of the sovereign as possessing determinative power 
(R.J. Joyce 2013: 62). Derrida identifies this core aspect of sovereign power as 
ipseity, writing that ‘Before any sovereignty of the state, of the nation-state, of the 
monarch, or, in democracy, of the people, ipseity names a principle of legitimate 
sovereignty, the accredited or recognised supremacy of a power or a force’ (2004: 11–
12). Ipseity, for Derrida, marks the principle of the self-same—the recognition of 
those like oneself—and through this the power, authority and proprietary possession 
that comes with the codification of that one-self. It privileges oneness and processes 
that lead toward oneness, processes that always inscribe a relationship of violence. He 
writes elsewhere (1995a: 78): 
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As soon as there is the One, there is murder, wounding, traumatism. The 
One guards against/keeps some of the other. It protects itself from the 
other, but, in the movement of this jealous violence, it comprises in itself, 
thus guarding it, the self-otherness or self-difference (the difference from 
within oneself) which makes it One…At once, at the same time, but in a 
same time that is out of joint, the One forgets to remember itself to itself, 
it keeps and erases the archive of this injustice that it is. Of this violence 
that it does. The One makes itself violence. It violates and does violence to 
itself but it also institutes itself as violence. It becomes what it is, the very 
violence—that it does to itself. Self-determination as violence. 
For Derrida, therefore, by (necessarily) disavowing its self-difference ipseity inscribes 
and institutes itself as violence. Through grounding itself in an indivisible identity, 
sovereignty places itself (yet must simultaneously deny this placement) in relation to 
that which divides it: its own self-otherness. This self-otherness must thus be guarded 
against, denied, and excluded in order to preserve the phantasmatic nature of ipseity’s 
indivisibility. It should be noted here that, politically, sovereignty is not identical to 
governance: governance can be divided, whereas sovereignty—the principle of unity 
on which that governance is grounded—cannot be (Loughlin 2013: 39). Sovereignty 
is grounded on the principle of ipseity, and any division of ipseity negates the unity 
on which it operates. Summarising from the brief description above, classical notions 
of sovereignty construct a conceptual and territorial unity determined by a similarly 
singular authority (even if the instantiation of that authority is divided). There can be 
other sovereigns in this system, but each is absolute in his dominion, which is 
figuratively impregnable. Sovereignty and its sovereign territoriality are configured as 
(mutually) indivisible. Indeed: ‘Any limit on sovereignty eradicates it, any division of 
sovereignty destroys it’ (ibid.). However, if Derrida is correct, then this sovereignty 
was always-already divided by the processes of its own self-constitution. I will return 
to this below. 
 Sovereignty’s determinative power within its territory ties closely into Bodin’s 
concept of the commonwealth (république), the definition of which is the primary 
concern of his Six Books, and which he defines as ‘the rightly ordered government of 
a number of families, and of those things which are their common concern, by a 
sovereign power’ (in Zoller 2008: 69). However, this ‘common concern’ is notably 
teleological—the commonwealth is oriented towards a specific end: ‘true felicity’, 
defined as a state of earthly perfection figured as the ‘sovereign good…in general, 
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and of each of its citizens in particular’ achieved by the pursuit of natural and divine 
law, a law made manifest by cultivation of ‘the intellective and contemplative 
virtues’: prudence (differentiating good from evil), knowledge (differentiating truth 
from falsehood), and faith (differentiating piety from impiety) (Weinert 2007: 347). 
Analysing the theological basis of Bodin’s theory of the commonwealth, Elizabeth 
Zoller notes that, for Bodin, the ‘ideal of the modern State is a secularized Church’ 
(Zoller 2008: 70). 
This ideal of the state as secular Church and the theologico-political teleology 
of sovereignty relate to Bodin’s notions of religious tolerance. As Saba Mahmood 
(2006: 324) notes, modern European secularism is often seen as stemming in part 
from ideas of religious tolerance formulated in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, in response to the European Wars of Religion (see also W. 
Brown 2008; C. Taylor 1998). I will turn to this origin story below, however Bodin’s 
theory of tolerance is intimately linked to ideas of him as a ‘man of modernity’ who 
helped pave the way out of medieval darkness. This theory, expounded mainly in the 
Colloquium (2010), is based around notions of harmony and plays out as a dialogue 
between seven men of different faiths—a Calvinist, Muslim, Lutheran, Roman 
Catholic, Jew, and sceptic.5 Marion Leathers Kuntz summarises that the text’s view as 
‘not relativistic, exclusive, or disinterested’ but involving ‘a warm acceptance’ based 
on ‘civility and respect, common ground, and the many facets of truth’: for Bodin, 
truth was the fundamental ground of all legitimate religions (1998: 126). Tolerance is 
extended to those who share in ipseity, those like one-self, who share in a mutual love 
of the singularity and sovereignty of truth. 
Yet there is a constitutive other who lies outside this enlightened tolerance: the 
witch. As discussed above, demonological witchcraft was discursively configured as 
an ‘anti-religion’, a diabolic inversion of true (Christian) faith. Bodin’s Demon-Mania 
adheres to this model. Witchcraft was a ‘crime of divine and human treason’ (1995: 
200). As Maggi noted that the vocal denial of God constituted part of the ‘devastating 
                                                
5 That these individuals are men is noteworthy. Rebecca May Wilkin (2008: 53–96) explores the highly 
gendered nature of Bodin’s theories of sovereignty, noting that Bodin’s hatred of (predominantly 
female) witches fits into his theory of state elaborated in the Six Books, where he describes the proper 
and properly hierarchical structure of the family as mirroring an ordered commonwealth (see Bodin 
1992: 92). Wilkin concludes that, for Bodin, ‘Rule by women leads to the annihilation of the state, 
while women’s knowledge of the occult heralds the decadence of the moral universe’ (2008: 74–5). 
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syllogism’ of demonic action, Bodin highlights the ‘first occupation’ of witches as 
their denial ‘of God and all religion’ (ibid.: 204). This denial of ‘all religion’, does not 
only include the formal faiths of the later Colloquium, but also superstitions, and ties 
to a renunciation of morality and law generally. He writes: 
[T]he most detestable witches are those who renounce God, and His 
service; or if they do not worship God, but have some superstitious 
religion, renounce that, in order to give themselves to the Devil, by 
express agreement. For there is no religion so superstitious that it does not 
restrain men in some way within the confines of the law of nature: to obey 
fathers and mothers, and magistrates, and also to avoid doing harm to 
anyone (ibid.: 112). 
Bodin here connects obedience to one’s parents and formal law with the laws of 
nature. He also differentiates demonological witchcraft from mere superstition, which 
for him has some value as a system of order. Satan, meanwhile, ‘wants to tear from 
the hearts of men all fear of committing offense’ (ibid.), yet the ways in which he 
does this appear less as anarchy and more as an opposing order.  
Bodin relates that human–demonic alliances are made by tacit or express 
agreement, and sometimes sealed on the person’s flesh (but only if Satan is unsure of 
their loyalty, the absence of a mark here being the clearest mark of guilt), and he 
speaks of these transactions as a transfer of ‘fealty’ and agreement of a ‘mutual 
contract’ (ibid.: 112–13). Witchcraft was a crime against the ‘majesty of God’, worse 
even than idolatry because, while the latter required only that one ‘bow down’ to the 
idol, witchcraft included active prayer and invocation to Satan (ibid.: 203–5). For 
Bodin then, the lawlessness of witchcraft seemed to manifest not as an absence but an 
inversion of law, or rather of the overturning of established systems of law—parental, 
magistratical—in favour of new (dangerous, illegitimate) allegiances. 
Kuntz argues that Bodin’s hatred of witchcraft stemmed from the idea that, 
while demons derived power from God, witches and magicians had consciously allied 
with Satan, whose primary goal was to destroy God’s works (in Bodin 2010: xxxiii–
xxxvii). This seems to be borne out in his writings, in which the verbal or written 
allegiance to Satan marks the ‘most detestable’ of witches. Ideas of conscious 
allegiance are important to the politicisation of witchcraft and the demonologies 
constructed by both Bodin and Hobbes. As Julio Caro Baroja has written, while in the 
early sixteenth century there were attempts to reduce magical events to natural or 
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psychological causes, one repercussion was that greater attention began to be paid to 
issues of allegiance: ‘“mania” turns into “latria”: the supreme worship that is due only 
to God is given to the Evil One, in a sacrilegious and abominable manner, and is 
given to him directly, unequivocally’ (2001: 35). Witchcraft was a demonological 
counterfeit of ‘all religion’, premised on a denial of God’s majesty and of the human 
sovereignty that is its earthly replica. This act of ‘divine and human treason’ was thus 
predicated on an attempt to overturn all moral and political order. However, the true 
danger of witches was their decision to consciously will other to the sovereign will. 
They signed themselves to an-other way of being and believing inimical to an order 
envisioned as order as such. 
Sovereign Limits II: Origins and Borders 
The witch thus served as a figure of the contestation of sovereign indivisibility, and 
had to be eliminated in order to secure that indivisibility. Yet if sovereignty was 
indivisible, how could this indivisibility be threatened? The answer lies in the way 
sovereignty has operated as a prescriptive rather than purely descriptive concept, and 
also relates to why it has fallen out of political fashion in the contemporary era. As 
David Bates notes, in a post-Cold War world defined more and more by transnational 
cultural and economic flows, porous national boundaries and global media 
communications, the indivisibility of sovereign will is viewed as increasingly at odds 
with ‘modern (and postmodern) notions of plurality and essential fragmentation’ 
(2012: 4; see also Kalmo and Skinner 2010b). Yet sovereignty endures as a political 
idea and national ideal: it provides a ‘powerful and sustained logic of reproduction in 
global political relations’ (Walker 2013: 21). Moreover, as Bodin’s sovereignty was 
based on theological principles, these principles still exert their influence on modern 
theopolitical demonologies. Many of the demonological discourses examined in later 
chapters of this thesis involve both the glorification of singular patriarchal authority 
and an attempt to cultivate ‘the intellective and contemplative virtues’—the capacity 
to differentiate good, truth, and piety from evil, falsehood, and impiety, in the creation 
of an authentic, godly community centred on that authority. The reasons behind the 
contemporary political critique of sovereignty, however, expose problems inherent in 
the concept, many of which are illuminating to the demonologies analysed below. 
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One of the most common narratives of the development of political 
sovereignty is that the classical model of sovereignty became instituted at the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War (Philpott 1997), which (re-
)established the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (whose region, his religion) as a 
guiding principle of state sovereignty. This principle, which dictated that the ruler of a 
region determined its religious affiliation, was first formulated in the 1555 Peace of 
Augsburg (Krasner 1999: 79). Organised between Catholics and Lutherans in a 
Reformation-torn Holy Roman Empire, the Peace dictated that the territories ruled by 
Catholics would remain Catholic and those ruled by members of the Augsburg 
Confession (Lutherans) would remain Lutheran. The peace ultimately did little, 
however. As Daniel Philpott comments, ‘the emperor and the princes continued to 
contest faith through arms, culminating in the Thirty Years’ War beginning in 1618. 
Until princes were authoritative over religion, and the Holy Roman Emperor impotent 
over it, a system of sovereign states would not exist’ (1997: 29). This transition, 
generally speaking, occurred in the treaties of Westphalia, when Calvinists were also 
extended the rights of cuius regio and it became a grounding principle of the new 
international order. It was also noticeably limited: the German princely states were 
forced to revert to their religious affiliations in 1624 and given clear responsibilities to 
exercise religious toleration (Glanville 2014: 52). According to this narrative, as well 
as Bodin, this new post-Westphalian system owed itself to Hugo Grotius—his The 
Rights of War and Peace, written in 1625, described, as Philpott suggests, ‘a world of 
internally and externally sovereign monarchs, united only by a natural law, which, he 
argued, was valid even if there was no God’ (1997: 30). 
 The primacy of Westphalia in the narrativisation of state sovereignty has been 
challenged by recent scholarship, including that of Stephen Krasner (1999, 2010) and, 
recently, Luke Glanville (2014).6 Glanville has noted that certain assigned traits of 
sovereignty, such as nonintervention and the autonomous recognition and self-
                                                
6 This challenge has been counter-challenged by, among others, Daniel Philpott (2000), who rescues a 
more nuanced ‘Westphalia-as-origin’ narrative through reinscribing it as a result of ideas and material 
circumstances brought about by the Reformation. He successfully represents Westphalia as a 
consolidation of Reformation (re)figurations of political sovereignty by encoding a division between 
spiritual and temporal authority. This position is complimentary rather than oppositional to the one 
advanced here, however, since within this framework the proper order of society (while secularised) is 
still ordained by God. 
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governance of territories, are actually not present in the Westphalian treaties, and the 
formative nature of the event is mostly a nineteenth and twentieth-century projection 
(2014: 49–56). There are, however, aspects of religio-political order instituted at 
Westphalia, the most crucial of which is the conceptual bond between sovereignty and 
freedom of religion. Additionally, while he challenges the International Relations 
theory origin myth of Westphalia, Glanville also links the concept of sovereignty as 
articulated in an international order to theological principles (ibid.: 58–9):  
Sovereignty, granted by God, implied solemn responsibilities under him 
for which rulers would be held to account…[and] in relations between 
states, sovereignty did not simply imply a supposed ‘traditional’ right to 
nonintervention. Rather, it implied a right to wage (just) war and it 
entailed enforceable obligations. It was widely agreed that a sovereign 
could be forcibly held to account by neighboring states for tyrannical and 
oppressive violations of the natural law, even if the subjects themselves 
could not rightfully resist their sovereign. 
Several other scholars (Baranger 2010; Elden 2009; Krasner 1999, 2010; Piirimäe 
2010) have corroborated this view, noting that, while held as indivisible, sovereignty 
was in a sense always-already divided. Its territorial borders were always open to 
transgression and its legitimacy contingent on recognition by its peers, undermining 
its claims to indivisible authority and control. The transnational cultural, economic, 
and migratory flows that are seen today as contravening the sovereign territory of the 
nation-state therefore, in fact, simply make clearer issues that were always present. 
However, Glanville’s critique of the Westphalian origin myth and articulation of the 
rights and limitations of the emergent ‘sovereign state’ system highlight several 
important features. Firstly, while ideas of sovereign indivisibility are fundamental to 
classical theories of sovereign power, this indivisibility was never truly actualised—it 
is, as Derrida notes, mainly a fictional or phantasmatic concept (2009: 32–62).  
More importantly, however, is its role in what might be termed the ‘godly 
community’—the idea that sovereignty was bequeathed on states so long as they 
obeyed certain precepts, and could be stripped upon violation of these. These two 
ideas are conceptually linked—sovereignty is granted on the basis of the adherence to 
a natural law that is God-given, bestowed by the sovereign God as the precondition of 
rule. The articulation of the limits of this law formulates the precepts of a political 
soteriology that locates territories according to a dichotomy of good and evil, blessed 
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and damned, compliant with or defiant of natural law (itself a mirror of divine law). 
These precepts are important to the case studies examined later in this thesis, in which 
the mythic nature of sovereign indivisibility and the realisation of its fragmentation in 
modernity become significant for their political demonologies. In the narratives of 
these texts, the reassertion of a unitary, hierarchical relationship of (divine, principally 
masculine) power over and against a plurality of fractured, heterogeneous (demonic, 
frequently feminine) powers usually occupies centre stage. While sovereign unity was 
never grounded in reality, the perception of its breakdown into a multiplicity of 
competing legitimacies (and the possible victory of those seen as antithetical to that 
unity) leads to an anxiety that provokes an attempted reconstruction of ultimately 
phantasmatic sovereignty: the reassertion of an allegedly primordial orthotaxy over 
and against a plurality of Others. The ‘fictional’ quality of sovereign indivisibility, 
therefore, should not cause us to underestimate its importance or potency as a relio-
political ideal(isation). 
The Prescriptive Phantasm 
The idea of sovereignty is a marker not necessarily (only) of description but (also) of 
prescription, of a strategy of desire. As Martti Koskenniemi discusses, sovereignty 
always straddles the divide between these scriptions, between an ‘is’ and an ‘ought’. 
He clarifies that sovereignty ‘is neither a historical nor a sociological fact but part of a 
political vocabulary whose point is not to register aspects of the world but to achieve 
them: to preserve or change a status quo, to support or oppose particular contestants’ 
(2010: 232). The projection of this concept (re)presents the desire for a specific 
(theopolitical) state of affairs characterised by the myth of its own indivisibility, that 
of a territory liberated from the instability of its borders and an author whose claims 
to authority are not dependant on acceptance by its subjects. As Preston King writes 
in his comparative exploration of Bodin and Hobbes, sovereignty names a ‘cluster of 
rules’ formulated as the essential and necessary ground of order, but this order is an 
order clothing itself as the necessary and timeless ground of order as such (2013: xv–
xvi). Sovereignty thus demarcates the boundaries of a specific (religious and political) 
vision, one which through the act of demarcation necessarily becomes exclusionary. 
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As Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner remark, ‘any claim as to what sovereignty is can 
[therefore] also be read as a claim as to what it is not’ (2010a: 11).  
 But what, and where, is sovereignty not? What are its limit and its other? For 
Bodin the other of sovereignty was ultimately the witch, who operated to destabilise 
sovereign power through the mechanisms of a rejection of allegiance—the denial of 
God’s majesty and adherence to its Other. Bodin claims that sovereignty constituted 
the ‘absolute and perpetual power’ of the commonwealth, his model of the rightly-
organised society (1992: 1). Bodin’s theories of theopolitical order, of ‘rightly-
organised society’, present a force that is absolute, perpetual and hierarchical, whose 
being is built around the capacity of the sovereign to create law as the structure that 
governs relations between subjects and between those subjects and the sovereign 
(God, monarch, government, constitution). Sovereignty might thus be said to operate 
as a movement of unification and ordering, which posits itself as unified and ordered 
a priori.  
The alleged indivisibility of this orthotaxic principle constitutes the blueprint 
for its constitutive function: a holistic, total unification of societal relations through 
the creating of law. Denis Baranger (2010) argues that, at least since the sixteenth 
century, European ideas of sovereignty have acted as both site and symbol for an 
aggregation of power and authority that would otherwise be (seen as) fragmented. 
Mariia Federova also remarks on this symbolic aggregation, albeit in relation to what 
she sees as the difference between sovereignty as construed in the medieval period 
and the form it takes in early modernity. She elaborates:  
The sovereignty of the medieval ruler was practically one-dimensional: he 
was a judge–king, free only in the adoption of final judicial rulings. In 
domestic political affairs he was bound by obligations to his vassals, in 
foreign affairs by the political might of the church. The king of the 
modern state, as the embodiment of state sovereignty, was no longer 
merely a judge but, above all, a legislator and a creator of political and 
legal norms. Here, in other words, state power itself changes its form. The 
judge–king represents the static character of the res publica christiana, 
while the legislator–king represents the dynamic character of society in the 
modern era (2011: 32). 
While the distinction Federova draws here is enlightening with regards to perception 
of sovereign power, it seems to fall into the fallacy of believing the ties that bind 
sovereignty in the modern era are less constricting, or more absent, when compared to 
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earlier historical periods. The sovereignty of the modern state, albeit not confined by 
the political power of the church, is still constrained by other international powers 
(and by the structure of the social contract itself; see below). Its actions and policies 
will be weighed by other sovereign powers, and may be found wanting.7 
Bodin offers a formulation of sovereignty as beyond the law which it creates; 
it is a mimic of God, who is outside the constraints of the natural laws that he made to 
govern the world (and while God obeys those rules, he has the right to suspend them 
in the moment of exception: the miracle). The modern idea of sovereignty, however, 
reflects a sovereignty that is contingent, a pawn of laws not of its own devising: a 
lesser sovereign at the mercy of far greater powers, and so perhaps (by classical 
definitions) not a sovereign at all. I explore this contingency throughout this thesis, 
but the issue is worth briefly raising here as one part of a conceptual genealogy of 
sovereignty in the West. It highlights a hierarchisation of sovereign powers either 
absent in earlier philosophico-political discussions, or raised solely in relation to the 
theological principle of the absolute sovereignty of God, of whom the earthly Prince, 
no matter how powerful, is a mere representative, lieutenant, or imperfect, temporal 
substitute (Skinner 2010). In reference to this latter hierarchy of power, Bodin writes 
that ‘he is absolutely sovereign...who does not recognise anything higher than him 
after God’ (in Baranger 2010: 49). With the nominal removal of the divine as 
guarantor of legitimacy from the international community of sovereign states, new 
measures and frameworks of legitimacy become necessary.8  
This necessity is tied closely to questions of the particular and the universal, as 
well as to the dilemma of secular eschatological structures (like Marxism, whose 
                                                
7 A clear contemporary example of this can be discerned in the rhetoric and practice surrounding 
‘rogue states’, where the assignation of the category ‘rogue state’ is always enacted within the context 
of a power differential. As Derrida elaborates, ‘it is the most powerful sovereign states which, making 
international right and bending it to their interests, propose and in fact produce limitations on the 
sovereignty of the weakest states, sometimes…going so far as to violate or not the international right 
they have helped institute and, in so doing, to violate the institutions of that international right, all the 
while accusing the weaker states of not respecting international rights and of being rogue states… like 
those animals said to be “rogue” animals, which don’t even bend to the law of their own animal 
society’ (2009: 209). Not all sovereignties are equal, which necessarily troubles the entire concept at its 
foundation, at the foundation of autonomy and ipseity, the porosity of selfhood in the face of the other. 
8 This dilemma is the problem constitutive of modernity broadly, out of which many projects of 
emancipation are born and which thus mirror its founding paradox in that it constitutes itself as a 
radical break from a previous state of being that it both requires as the ground from which to emerge 
and in another sense creates through its act of differentiation—for there to be a ‘premodern’ there must 
first be a modern. 
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classless society in fact mimics those utopian religious structures it disavows). 
Ernesto Laclau argues that within Christian paradigms a ‘logic of incarnation’ links 
particular mortal actors to the universal, with God serving as the mediator to facilitate 
the manifestation of the universal in the particular. For Laclau, Christ is the paradigm 
of this structure, but it is present whenever a person is constructed as fulfilling a 
cosmic function with regard to God’s plan for the world. The appointed monarch is an 
example of this, since he or she embodies universal principles in their particularity 
through God’s appointment. Those embodied principles, however, are ultimately 
external to creation (as there is no authority higher than God). Once the external 
guarantor of universality is removed, the source of universality has to arise internally 
to the world, and in a manner that is accessible to human reason and rationality, 
transparent rather than opaque like the hidden motivations of divinity (Laclau 1996: 
23–5). Laclau uses the example of the ‘universal class’ of the proletariat in Marxist 
thought as one attempt to navigate the latter, arguing that it merely replicates the 
ostensibly-abandoned theologic of incarnation (ibid.: 24–34). Within the structures of 
international relations particular laws and norms (such as human rights) become 
transfigured into shadows of the universal, approximations of principles that may be 
able to serve as the suddenly-godless ground of a new order. In the case of the rogue 
state, for example, the state is seen as in breach of this new universal. It is rogue, 
outlaw, and has reverted in some sense to that state of nature, like beasts, which rest at 
the constitutive limit of the law, thus forfeiting any protection that law gives. 
 The logic of incarnation, as universalised particular or particularised universal, 
orients itself around questions of orthotaxy and the circumscription of sovereign 
boundaries. In Bodin’s formulation, the sovereign’s sovereignty is derived through his 
appointment by and mimetic relation to God, who is absolute sovereign. States in an 
international order have their legal sovereignty dependent on the desires of the bodies 
and states who control the regulations of that order, the particulars that have been 
universalised as markers of an entirely worldly orthotaxy (which is not only a ‘proper’ 
hierarchy of being(s), but the teleology for which that hierarchy supposedly exists). In 
the following section, I analyse a form of the creation of geographies of sovereignty, 
both ideological and literal, that sits at the origins of European political sovereignty: 
the division between civil society—the political state or commonwealth—and the 
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state of nature, which is its temporal-spatial, moral and ontological limit. I focus 
specifically on the state of nature formulated by Thomas Hobbes, who, unlike Bodin, 
deals with demonology not as an anti-political reality but as a phantasmatic delusion.9 
This phantasm is intimately related to sovereignty as the other that the sovereign must 
guard against lest it lapse into the ante/antipolitical state of nature or civil unrest. 
However, this sovereignty carries the possibility of its own demonologisation: while it 
guards against the natural demonic it may itself be a counterfeit of the very god it 
apparently serves. This analysis then helps frame a broader discussion of the space 
between the beast (as sub-political) and sovereign (as supra-political) outlined by 
Derrida, which feeds into the eschatological horizon that is itself the absolute (the 
final, the absolving and dissolving) limit of the demonic—and of sovereignty itself. 
THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE SOVEREIGN’S ENVIOUS DUTY 
In early discourses of Christian demonology, the wilderness is a site of contestation. 
As Christ found, the Devil waits for us in the wilderness (Matt. 4:1–11; Mark 1:12–
13; Luke 4:1–13), and this biblical narrative became extrapolated into a paradigm. 
Writing on early Christian ascetic practices, Judith Adler (2006: 24–5) notes that an 
understanding of the wilderness as a place of both spiritual epiphany and demonic 
temptation became amplified in early monastic writing, which asserted ‘that demons, 
weakened by the advance of Christianity, fled to the desert…to concentrate their 
forces.’ By travelling into the wilderness, monks engaged these demons—a cluster of 
errant spirits and yet-unvanquished pagan gods—in hand-to-hand combat as ‘militant 
                                                
9 The state of nature also features prominently in the social contract theory of Rousseau, in which it 
adopts significantly different features. Both narrate the emergence of political humanity from nature, 
but while in order to make ‘citizens desire the state, Hobbes demonized a state called nature’ (Rogin 
1987: 299), for Rousseau the contract is a fall from grace: nature is a state of nomadic contentment not 
violent precarity, and civilisation disrupts this harmonious prepolitical and presocial order. Also, while 
Hobbes constructs a vision of a ‘Christian Commonwealth’ against a demonic other, for Rousseau this 
is oxymoronic, since ‘a society of true christians would no longer be a society of men’ (1997: 148); 
Christians are spiritually-oriented, and their nation is ‘not of this world’, further, by ‘being perfect, 
[this society] would lack cohesion; its very perfection would be its fatal vice’ (ibid.). For Rousseau, 
nature is prelapsarian. For Hobbes, it is fallen creation. While both work from a model of Christian 
(anti)politics that demonise the alternative to their preferred order, since the case studies of this thesis 
are oriented towards the construction of a perfected society, Hobbes’s vision of proper civilisation and 
its demonological other(s) is the one most relevant to this thesis, and thus the one I concentrate on.  
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missionaries on religious frontiers’ (ibid.). David Brakke (2006) has examined this 
conflict in depth, analysing the discursive creation of the monk—the monakhós or 
‘single one’, tempered into integrated personhood—via its inextricable relationship to 
the other it combatted: the demons of the wilderness, chimerical entities able to 
appear as animal, human, or angel—‘products, agents, and symbols of the diversity 
and separation that resulted from the fall, as opposed to the uniformity and unity in 
which the monk originated and to which he seeks to return’ (ibid.: 17). 
 Alignments of the demon with diversity and the Christian spiritual warrior 
with unity, and the tempering of the latter through combat with the former, are themes 
I revisit over the course of this thesis. While separated by millennia, contemporary 
American spiritual warfare discourses often draw on the same scriptural citations and 
ideas as these monastic discourses, although the sites of contestation have notably 
become urban rather than wilderness, or rather urban-as-wilderness—when Beast 
becomes sovereign, city becomes wilderness (I develop this formula below). Such 
discourses also orient themselves toward similar ends, taming such wilderness spaces 
and integrating the individual in service to God. In this section I want to explore a 
different but related ideological construction of wilderness useful for elucidating 
contemporary conservative evangelical demonologies: the alleged emergence of the 
political state (and humanity-as-political) out of a ‘state of nature’ and what this state 
of nature is coded as representing. In this section, I analyse this narrative of political 
emergence in the works of Thomas Hobbes. I examine the core elements of Hobbes’s 
theorisation of the state of nature and how civil society is created out of that state 
through the bringing-into-being of the sovereign. By doing so, I examine how Hobbes 
construes the earthly sovereign, the leviathan of state, as a ‘mortal god’, one who both 
elevates humanity from its original state of chaotic violence and acts as a bulwark 
against ‘demonological’ beliefs of counterfeit truth that threaten to return humanity to 
that state—a counterfeit the sovereign may itself be in danger of becoming. 
Antepolitics and Antipolitics 
Peter Steinberger argues that Hobbes (and Rousseau, albeit differently) constructs the 
body politic—the body of the state or commonwealth—as having been formed out of 
the state of nature by a collective act of will. For each, the fundamental distinction of 
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politics is that between a natural, pre-political (but not necessarily pre-social) 
situation and civil society (2008: 596). For Hobbes, civil society and the sovereign 
who is its head and governing principle are a creation of the social contract itself. 
Steinberger proceeds to describe the contractual break with the state of nature as a 
double creation:  
[W]e should say that the contractors actually create two quite distinct 
entities, though presumably they do so simultaneously. First, they create a 
commonwealth, a body politic, a state; and second, they create, in the 
process, a sovereign entity of some kind that functions as the soul or 
active agent of the commonwealth (ibid.: 598–9). 
Like Bodin’s vision, Hobbes’s image of the sovereign was also absolute, unlimited, 
indivisible, and perpetual (King 2013: xii). The fashion of its creation, however, is 
quite different: the sovereign is not appointed from above but authored from below. 
The Hobbesian sovereign is a ‘Feigned’ or ‘Artificial person’, the agential force of the 
commonwealth who possesses no natural being of its own, but is created by the social 
contract (1996: 111).10 It exists as a representative of the general will that birthed it. 
This does not weaken its authority, however, but in many ways strengthens it. As I 
elaborate below, while authored by his subjects, the sovereign is in no way beholden 
to them, and indeed infractions of his purpose are coded only as sins against God—
the subject cedes his or her rights at the moment of authorship. A general will authors 
a sovereign will, which subsumes both that general will and particular wills. Like 
Bodin’s, Hobbes’s sovereign is the source (and force) of the law—while he seems to 
eschew the more overtly theological tendencies of Bodin in favour of a popular origin 
to sovereignty, the sovereign’s main function is still guiding its subjects in accordance 
with a natural law derived from God. The subjects themselves are construed as the 
authorising force of the sovereign through a collective creation, but after this creation 
they are subordinates to it. 
For Hobbes, the leviathan is authored to overcome the precarity of humanity’s 
state in nature, in which—in his (in)famous dictum—‘the life of man [is] solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short’ (1996: 89). Hobbes’s political philosophy is often 
                                                
10 My analysis is drawn mainly from Leviathan, in which Hobbes deals with demonology most 
thoroughly. I supplement this with On the Citizen regarding his broader political theories. The edition 
of Leviathan used is the 1996 version edited by Richard Tuck, and the edition of On the Citizen is the 
1998 version edited by Tuck and Michael Silverthorne, both published by Cambridge University Press. 
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thought to derive from his experiences with the English Civil War (1642–51). While 
it is difficult to prove direct correlation, several scholars (Bobbio 1993: 43; Melzer 
2012: 181; Vaughan 2007: 55) have noted that concepts of civil war frequently elide 
into those of nature and, while never fully identical, consistently reflect one another. 
Sara Melzer summarises the underlying fear of Hobbes’s theories as the idea that ‘The 
most civilized of human beings could slip back down the evolutionary continuum to 
their former beastlike state of nature’ (2012: 181). The Hobbesian state of nature is 
not just antepolitical but also ‘antipolitical’ (Bobbio 1993: 42)—it returns when 
politics fails.11 
Ideas of the antipolitical (and its elision into the antepolitical) are important 
for Hobbesian demonology, as well as his differing understandings of freedom in civil 
society versus the state of nature. While freedom in the state of nature is constrained 
by natural impediments alone, freedom in civil society is constrained also by the law 
created by the sovereign. For Hobbes, when entering into the social contract—the 
collective authoring of the sovereign by/as the general will—a person divests 
‘himselfe [sic] of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the 
same thing’ (1996: 190). Civil laws exist, for Hobbes, in order to ‘limit the naturall 
liberty of particular men, in such a manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one 
another’ (ibid.: 315). Moreover, this limit is born ‘from feare of some evill 
consequence’ (ibid.: 192) resulting from the breaking of the contracts and promises 
that condition the law as the relationship between the sovereign and its subjects. This 
function of the sovereign as creator of law, and the delimiting of boundaries within 
which the subject may freely operate, requires analysis. Perhaps the starkest 
illustration of the relationship is in Hobbes’s treatment of the liberty of the subject to 
disobey. Hobbes details several possible negotiations between sovereign and subject 
in considerable depth in Leviathan, but one is most crucial—only when ‘our refusall 
to obey, frustrates the End for which the Sovereignty was ordained; then there is no 
Liberty to refuse’ (1996: 269). The particular will is thus subsumed into the general; 
                                                
11 While nature is part of humanity’s collective prepolitical history, it is part of their localised present 
in Hobbes’s image of America—in which ‘savage people’ are organised only into ‘small Families, the 
concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government; and live at this day in that brutish 
manner’ (1996: 89). Nature was thus instantiated in Hobbes’s present as a colonised/colonisable 
periphery. Both Aravamudan (2009) and Moloney (2011) have explored the importance of colonialist 
paradigms to his thought through his constructed projection of America as in the state of nature. 
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dissent is possible unless it thwarts the purpose for which sovereignty was created: the 
security of the people (Zagorin 2009: 86). That is, preventing the slippage of 
humanity (back) into animality—the preservation of (political, moral, ontological) 
order. Functionally, however, this stricture removes the possibility of meaningful 
dissent. Anything that challenges the actions or disagrees with the purpose of the 
sovereign will is coded as attempting to thwart its purpose—even when such actions 
are ineffectual. This is exhibited in a brief mention of witches early in Leviathan, in 
which Hobbes writes (1996: 18),  
I think not that their witchcraft is any reall power; but yet they are justly 
punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can do such mischiefe, 
joyned with the purpose to do it if they can: their trade being neerer to a 
new Religion, than to a Craft or Science.  
Thus, while witches lacked ‘reall power’, the fact of their heretical believing is itself 
seen as a threat to legitimate order and therefore ‘justly punished’. Hobbes’s fixation 
on the threat of false belief systems forms the basis of his treatment of demonology, a 
treatment that underlines a fatal flaw in his construction of sovereignty itself. 
The Imitation God 
Unlike Bodin’s, Hobbes’s sovereign is not a straightforward regent of God. 
Nevertheless, his function as the guarantor of legitimate order mimics theological 
precepts. Hobbes’s sovereign replicates many of the features of Bodin’s, noticeably in 
his absolutism, perpetuity, and prescriptions of indivisibility. In The Two Gods of 
Leviathan, A.P. Martinich (1992: 336) explores the theological motifs in Hobbes’s 
work, identifying three core similarities between the ‘mortal god’ of the state and the 
‘immortal god’ he imitates: 
Hobbes held that the civil state is a mortal god, who serves under the 
immortal God. The civil state imitates God in three crucial respects. First, 
the civil state has overwhelming power to control its citizens. Second, it 
has no obligations to its citizens, even though they have obligations to it. 
Third, the civil state saves people from the imminent death lurking in the 
state of nature, just as God supposedly saves people from the death of sin.  
Martinich is broadly accurate in this assessment, though it should be noted that the 
state has perhaps one obligation to its subjects—the fulfilment of the salvific purpose 
it was authored for: Martinich’s third commonality. For Hobbes, the leviathan of state 
is authored as a protector, bequeathing law to its subjects as a way of guarding against 
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the anarchy of the ante/antipolitical that lies beyond its spatial and temporal 
boundaries. However, the sovereign has no specific obligations to subjects beyond its 
fulfilment of its sovereign purpose. The second part of this clause, the obligations of 
the citizenry to the state, however, ties into a potential fourth similarity: the subject’s 
duty of virtue. 
In the later Behemoth, Hobbes explicitly ties notions of personal virtue to 
obedience to the state, writing that: ‘The virtue of the subject is comprehended wholly 
in obedience to the laws of the commonwealth…nothing is injustice or iniquity, 
otherwise, than it is against the law’ (in Schulman 2011: 30). This transfer of morality 
from the divine to the artificial person gives the state a quasi-soteriological function 
beyond saving the individual from nature: the individual’s soul becomes tied to the 
structures of the mortal god, the new wellspring of sovereign law, which dictates the 
division of the good from the evil, the sacred from the profane. I noted previously that 
for Bodin, the sovereign’s purpose was to guide the polity toward felicity—an earthly 
perfection arising from cultivating prudence, knowledge, and faith (Weinert 2007: 
34–7). Hobbes’s sovereign has a similar function—indeed, Zoller terms his and 
Bodin’s visions both ‘ideal[s] of the modern State [as] a secularized Church’ (2008: 
70)—but its relationship to God is less straightforward. The leviathan was bound, for 
Hobbes, to obey God-given natural law, which Zagorin notes as a ‘genuine and 
significant moral limit’ on its absolutism (2009: 95). Yet while Hobbes acknowledges 
that a sovereign might pursue actions that contravene this limit, which is ‘a breach of 
trust’, its subjects do not have a right to resist it—‘because they have authorised all 
his actions, and [so] made them their own’ (1996: 172). This does not mean the 
sovereign is unaccountable; it is accountable to God (ultimately) but not its subjects. 
Due to the distant role played by the divine, Alex Schulman interprets the god 
of Leviathan in a deist light, as a God ‘radically divested of content’ with the 
exception of its existence as prime mover and uncaused cause, whose existence is 
necessary as a grounding principle for the system to function. For Schulman (2011: 
25–6), this God is required only  
as a recognized and orderly starting point, from which the sense of both 
the natural law and empiricist approaches can be derived: natural law, 
because the universe is created rather than accidental, and thus a priori 
endowed with some sort of order, and empiricist approaches, because the 
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creator has given humans the reason with which to figure out that order 
from the ground up. 
Schulman, however, undervalues how Hobbes’s leviathan adopts the characteristics of 
the sovereign God as its replica, and how this act of mimicry reproduces theological 
structures within sovereignty. A mortal god is still a god, and the foundation of an 
orthotaxic soteriology. Interpreting the God of Leviathan as ‘radically divested of 
content’ also causes one to overlook the importance of Hobbes’s engagement with 
what he calls ‘demonology’—an idolatrous practice that, by elevating phantasmatic 
artifice over truth, threatens the downfall of order. While Hobbes (unlike Bodin) 
discounts the existence of actual demons and constructs them as mere figments of 
imagination, the threat these figments pose to the integrity of the sovereign body is 
quite real, and real in a fashion that replicates pre-existing demonological structures. 
Moreover, it gestures to a founding instability in Hobbesian sovereignty itself, 
through which it elides into the very demonological structures it exists to oppose. 
The Counterfeit Kingdom 
The eschatological horizon of the sovereign’s purpose, while temporally distant, is a 
crucial feature of its condition of possibility. For Hobbes, the purpose of the sovereign 
is the maintenance of moral order, which will become eternalised at time’s end, when 
the chosen will be given eternal life in God’s Kingdom and the wicked will burn in 
eternal fire (1996: 306–20). The leviathan is thus simultaneously a simulacrum and 
(in some ways) a precursor of the thing it simulates. This ties into Hobbes’s 
engagement with demonology in the fourth section of Leviathan, ‘Of the Kingdome 
of Darknesse’ (1996: 417–82). For Hobbes, demonology is a relic Christianity 
inherited from paganism, without any true scriptural basis. It is ultimately 
synonymous with idolatry, itself synonymous with a practice of misunderstanding the 
nature of reality and taking representations for the thing itself, a ‘fabulous Doctrine 
concerning Daemons, which are but Idols, or Phantasms of the braine, without any 
reall nature of their own, distinct from humane fancy’ (ibid.: 418). The political 
system that arises from demonology—‘the Kingdome of Darknesse’—is a 
‘Confederacy of Deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this present world, 
endeavour by dark, and erroneous Doctrines to extinguish in them the Light, both of 
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Nature, and of the Gospell. And so to dis-prepare them for the Kingdome of God to 
come (ibid.: 416–7; italics in original).12 Hobbes directed his critique of demonology 
mainly at ‘false’ religious leaders (like the Pope) but also generally at Catholics, 
Presbyterians and other dissenting Protestants, who by identifying themselves with a 
higher truth promoted civil disorder by disrupting the authority of the sovereign as 
guarantor of civilisation (ibid.: 474–6). The sovereign wards against the deceptive 
phantasms of this demonology by guiding its subjects in accordance with God’s law. 
As Michael Krom summarises, so long as there exists a power that teaches 
demonological doctrines ‘and uses [related] practices to assert its power over men, 
they no longer are capable of being used by the sovereign for the purposes of 
promoting peace’ (2011: 159). 
The purpose of the sovereign is to guard against demonological teachings that 
lead to civil unrest and the slippage of humanity into its ante/antipolitical state. Both 
James Martel (2007: 107–34) and Christopher Pye (1984) have noted, however, that 
Hobbes’s sovereign may itself be demonological, even the ‘epitome of demonology’ 
(Martel 2007: 112). For Martel, the sovereign’s demonological nature manifests in the 
ambiguity of the boundary Hobbes draws between idolatry and proper worship. The 
latter is not solely an act of veneration but an appreciation of things as they are, using 
our discernment to read the world accurately. Martel uses the example of the king’s 
stool—while the stool is a symbol of the sovereign’s power that power does not reside 
in the stool but in the sovereign. To offer veneration to the king is rightful worship (of 
the civil variety), to offer it to the stool is idolatry, it mistakes a representation of the 
thing for the thing itself. However, an issue arises for Martel in that knowing whether 
a worshipper is idolatrous or not is impossible to discern by external signs (ibid.: 120–
2). The division between idol and proper is therefore unstable and given to elision. 
Meanwhile, for Pye the sovereign’s demonological potential manifests in its relation 
to spectacle. He analyses the sovereign as unifying its subjects through its image via a 
theatrical construction of visible power which can provoke awe and terror, exploring 
                                                
12 This capacity for deception forms the basis of one of Locke’s brief engagements with Satan in An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke calls on Satan’s capacity to deceive as an argument 
against basing faith on miracles—since Satan ‘can transform himself into an Angel of Light. And they 
who are led by this Son of the Morning are as fully satisfied of this illumination, i.e. are so strongly 
persuaded, that they are enlightened by the Spirit of God, as any who is so’ (XIX.13/1999: 700–1). 
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how this coding of sovereign presence is in many ways indistinguishable from the 
trickery of idolatrous priests Hobbes is so eager to oppose. The ease with which true 
sovereignty segues into demonological counterfeit highlights the constructed nature of 
its truth—that it is an order constructed as Order as such, a particular masquerading 
as a universal. 
As argued above, sovereignty itself is always-already an enforced illusion or 
prescriptive phantasm. Even within the remit of its purpose in Hobbes, however, the 
sovereign is both ‘a representative who…mirrors and mediates between contracting 
citizens’ and ‘an independent figure whose imposed force alone can tie men to their 
contracts’ (Pye 1984: 96). The sovereign sketches out a tautological relationship to its 
own sovereignty. It is produced by the very sovereignty it embodies and subsequently 
imposes in order to defy its dissolution. Additionally, since the sovereign possesses a 
will capable of defying the theological precepts on which it is created, the sovereign 
may come to hubristically replace the very God it allegedly represents, deviating from 
natural/divine law for its own demonic purposes. Authored to guard against a natural 
demonic, the sovereign becomes a counterfeit demonic. It will not serve either the 
contracting citizens or the divine order. In curious fashion, this possibility may be 
hinted at by the very title of Leviathan itself. In Christian demonologies, and for 
Bodin, Leviathan is often a synonym for evil or even Satan (Evrigenis 2014: 127; 
Tralau 2010a), and in 1589 Jesuit demonologist Peter Binsfeld named Leviathan as 
the demon governing the sin of envy (2013: 105). Envy is intimately bound to ideas 
of imitation, specifically to an imitation that seeks to deny and supplant its original 
(Brennan 2000: 160). While Hobbes linked his title choice to the Book of Job (1996: 
220–1) the coincidence is noteworthy, and I return to the theopolitical implications of 
Leviathan’s title in the final chapter of this thesis.13 Even if, as Derrida remarks, the 
formulation of the state in Bodin and Hobbes marks the ‘possibility of a Christian 
foundation of politics’ (2009: 52–3), the idea that the leviathan may go rogue or have 
gone rogue (or, indeed, have always been rogue) in its duty to the sovereign deity it 
                                                
13 Kim Ian Parker (2007) notes that while early Christian commentators associated the sea monster 
with Satan, by Hobbes’s time philologists had come to reinterpret ‘leviathan’ as a metaphor for society, 
based on a reading of the Hebrew consonants l-w-h as meaning ‘joining together’. Jacques Bouduc, a 
philologist whose work Hobbes might have known via his friend Marin Marsene, wrote that the term 
was used for kings because ‘of the way in which the inhabitants and subjects of the whole kingdom are 
gathered together in an ordered way’ (in ibid.: 433). 
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imitates is a possibility that reoccurs throughout the texts analysed in Chapters Four 
through Six. It figures a structural undecidability haunting any attempt to distinguish 
definitively between the sovereign and its demonological counterfeit. 
THE BEAST, THE SOVEREIGN 
The political theories of Hobbes shed light on the theopolitical constitution of the 
demonic other in relation to the sovereign (here figured as God, and through God the 
monarch and the state encoded on theological principles). On one level, the demon 
serves as the constitutive other to the sovereign, marking the outside that it defines 
and against which it is defined. This demonological other is coded as atavistic—it is 
antepolitical, a chaotic image of the state of nature, and also antipolitical, but 
antipolitical as antepolitical—the demonologies that threaten the true sovereign and 
the Christian commonwealth it forms are impure relics of its pagan past. The demon 
is thus sovereignty’s other spatially and temporally—defined as periphery to a centre 
and past to a present (and future). However, while sovereignty’s other, this demon is 
not strictly speaking ‘nonsovereign’—if nonsovereignty is even possible. To draw on 
Derrida (2009: 76):  
In a certain sense, there is no contrary of sovereignty, even if there are 
things other than sovereignty…the choice is not between sovereignty and 
nonsovereignty, but among several forms of partings, partitions, divisions, 
conditions that come along to broach a sovereignty that is always 
supposed to be indivisible and unconditional.  
The relationship between Hobbesian demonology and Hobbesian sovereign illustrates 
this problematic, as the concepts slip into one another until the distinction between a 
‘true’ and a ‘counterfeit’ sovereign becomes impossible to discern without God acting 
as eschatological arbiter. In this section, I explore this interrelation of sovereign and 
demon through the hermeneutical lens of Derrida’s exploration of the relationship of 
beast and sovereign. By doing so, I resituate sovereignty’s demonological foundation 
as constitutive. 
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In Want of a Foe 
In the case studies examined later in this thesis, the discursive figure of the demon 
operates as the illegitimate other to a God constructed as seat of legitimate authority 
and power. This conception of ‘demonological evil’ is important to the theological 
origins of secular concepts of sovereign power, fragments of which I have outlined 
here. As noted above, the earthly sovereign (ruler or state, individual or collective) is 
figured as an extension or mimic of divine authority through adherence to the duties 
or guiding principles God bequeaths it (such as natural law). The commonwealth acts 
as a surrogate deity bringing illumination and moral guidance to its subjects, uniting 
them through a prescriptive phantasm of community that operates (in principle) 
teleologically. Ties between God and sovereign state are complex, and accordingly so 
are those between the state and God’s other—the demon.  
The construction of the sovereign as simulacrum of divinity, with the power 
both to create and to stand above the law, implicitly but unintentionally opens it to 
accusations of demonological alignment once the law deviates from the ‘God-given’ 
and begins to chart another path. In post-Enlightenment reformulations by Romantic 
Satanists and other advocates of symbolic Satanism, the Devil’s adversarial relation to 
divine authority developed new valences once rejection of that authority became a 
political project, but this is mainly a moral reversal. God is still aligned with the state 
in this scenario, but the discourse has shifted so it is God and the status quo that are 
constructed as enemies to life and liberty. The demonification of the mortal god might 
be better seen in conspiracist frameworks that hold that the state’s authority has been 
corrupted into the service of demonic power, and which use eschatological paradigms 
to galvanise opposition to this corruption. The texts explored below draw heavily on 
the latter view. For adherents of these scenarios, the state, like Lucifer, has broken 
from the ‘divine’ authority that granted it legitimacy. It is the representation usurping 
the thing itself, and so must be opposed by agents of legitimate order. However, as 
my examination of Hobbes revealed, the possibility of the sovereign becoming its 
other may in fact be an intrinsic aspect of its being. 
What can be discerned in the dualistic conflicts around state power—‘godly’ 
state versus ‘satanic’ rebels, ‘godly’ rebels versus ‘satanic’ state—is a conflict of 
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universals, competing orders each constructed as Order in se, as orthotaxy. However, 
while there may in fact be a plurality of orders (competing ideologies of economics, 
frameworks of ethics, national interests), within the narrative of the eschatological 
horizon there are two alone: the agents of divine order and those opposing it.14 As 
Koskienniemi clarifies, sovereignty is in part a prescriptive idea working to manifest 
what it thinks the world is or ought to be—‘to preserve or change a status quo, to 
support or oppose particular contestants’ (2010: 232). This makes the creation of an 
enemy central to the nature of a sovereignty claim, and indeed to the political 
generally—something Derrida notes and that Carl Schmitt made a precondition of the 
political as such. ‘The political presupposes the enemy,’ Derrida writes, ‘the 
possibility of war, the evil nature of man…and in the tradition of Hobbes, this theory 
of politics implies the evil tendencies of a man who is essentially afraid and who asks 
the state to protect him’, though he also notes that at least for Schmitt this enemy must 
be treated within the remit of the law, and not like a beast (2009: 73–4).  
Laclau notes a similar relation, although does not name it as such. In ‘Beyond 
Emancipation’, he depicts a scenario in which a hypothetical national minority will 
construct all antagonistic forces as ‘equivalent threats to its identity’, an equivalence 
that identifies in such forces a commonality that is necessarily negative. They will be 
defined mainly through their opposition to the identity of the group, regardless of 
distinguishing features (1996: 14). This construction of commonality relates to a 
homogenising tendency in many of the religious apocalypticisms I explore below.15 
As I will explore, such apocalypticisms treat ostensibly differentiated groups (which, 
while they might be at odds among themselves, are all antithetical to the orthotaxic 
structure asserted by the group(s) in question) as manifestations of a universal 
                                                
14 The totalising aspects of apocalyptic discourse, which polarise all global relations into the kingdoms 
of light and darkness, is perhaps one reason it lends itself to syncretic blends with contemporary 
conspiracy theories, a defining feature of which is that the world is governed wholly by design rather 
than randomness; nothing happens by accident, nothing is as it seems, and everything is connected 
(Barkun 2003: 3). 
15 Through treating these disparate texts as part of a broader framework I have, of course, imposed my 
own apocalyptic homogenisation upon a series of disparate groups, individuals, and positions. While I 
focus on significant discursive similarities regarding their constitutive demonologies, there are several 
key differences in position between (most obviously, their selection of constitutive foes) and within the 
case studies on topics likes the destiny of the US, support for Israel, the relative danger of secularism or 
Islamism, the benevolence or malevolence of government institutions, and others. I analyse them 
together to draw attention to these differences while also tracing the underlying structural fixations in 
our ‘time of terror’. 
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negativity (that is, of demonic forces). While advocates of apocalyptic paradigms are 
not always national or religious minorities, and those analysed in this thesis are far 
from being so, Laclau’s analogy is useful due to the self-construction of such groups 
as oppressed minorities of true believers assailed by all-encompassing forces of 
darkness—a commonplace feature of contemporary American evangelicals (Miller 
2014). These forces—whose material instantiations are differentiated internally and 
externally, even opposed to one another—are all constructed as branches of a many-
limbed but otherwise unified demonic assault on the orthotaxic structure of reality. 
The existence of an enemy as a pre-condition of the political, however, is 
something worth exploring further. It unveils another breach in the indivisibility of 
sovereignty through sovereignty’s structural relationship to the thing it is not, which 
determines its limits. Schmitt’s enemy is a human and political enemy, one already 
coded into the sphere of the political and its ideologies of sovereignty, autonomy, and 
territory. While Derrida cites Schmitt’s assertion that the enemy must be treated 
within the remit of the law, Derrida is acutely aware that it is what lies outside the law 
that is truly determinate of the law. The sovereign is one such limit—the one who 
creates and sits above the law, and has the right to suspend the law in the political 
state of exception, or theologically as the miracle, the sovereign decision of divine 
intervention. The other limit that Derrida identifies—which is also to say the limit that 
is the other—is that of the beast, the outlaw, or the rogue: ‘It is always a matter of the 
law and of placing the other outside of the law. The law (nomos) is always determined 
from the place of some wolf’ (2009: 96). 
Derrida connects the ‘beast’ explicitly to the demonic only on a few occasions. 
The first is in Rogues, during a discussion of the ‘rogue state’ in which he relates that 
during the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein was referred to as the ‘beast of Baghdad’. 
He remarks that this ‘beast is not simply an animal but the very incarnation of evil, of 
the satanic, the diabolical, the demonic—a beast of the Apocalypse’ (2004: 97). The 
other reference occurs during a discussion of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions. 
Derrida explores a divide Rousseau implies between ‘Christians and philosophers’ on 
the one hand, and ‘beasts and wolves’ on the other, as if to be the former is to cease to 
be the latter, equating the accusation of Rousseau’s being an ‘outlaw’ (in French loup-
garou, a werewolf) to the position of an ‘Antichrist’ (2009: 99–100). While there are 
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few explicit references, however, the discursive alignment of the beast and the demon 
can be teased from Derrida’s analyses of the beast and the sovereign. As I have 
explored above, the demonic and its human allies (‘witches’, ‘sodomites’, ‘Jews’) 
form the constitutive outside to orthotaxy and the sovereignty at its heart. For Bodin, 
the demonic witch was other to all religio-political order. For Hobbes, civilisation was 
birthed by a quasi-secularised covenant leading humanity out of a demonic wilderness 
that continually threatens to encroach, tempting humans from rightful worship into a 
phantasmatic idolatry. For both, the demonological other marks the limit of Order in 
se—the moment it slip into chaos, but, at times, a chaos itself hauntingly alike to the 
order it supposedly denies. 
When I connect my discussions of the demonic explicitly to Derrida’s analysis 
of the figure of the beast, I do not mean (only) to infer those places where the 
demonic adopts bestial traits (as in depictions of demons with animalistic attributes) 
or is explicitly depicted as some species of beast, but to a broader idea of the beast as 
‘outlaw’, as outside the law yet simultaneously constituted by and constitutive of it. 
As what resides at the limit of the law, the outlaw or rogue is in some fashion 
constitutive of the law. As Derrida rightly notes, the outlaw qua outlaw only exists 
because of that law against and outside of which it resides. The outlaw exists within 
the bind of an exclusion/inclusion, excluded from a law that defines its very existence 
and without which it could not exist. The demon is constructed in a similar fashion: it 
is defined by its opposition to God. Theologically, however, the relationship is more 
complex. Due to the totality of divine omnipotence and the preordained structure of 
history, nowhere is completely outside the law, and so the demon is forced to operate 
within a system it can neither escape nor overcome, but only wilfully struggle against. 
The eschatological horizon of this totality—the moment when the sovereign God ends 
the historical process by annulling all possibility of being or believing otherwise—is 
often the conceptual limit appealed to by the authors of the texts examined later. 
Believing the societies they live in as often irredeemably corrupted, they construct 
narratives in which it ‘can only be saved by divine intervention’ (Barkun 2010: 131). 
When the Beast becomes sovereign, city becomes wilderness—to be cultivated, 
tamed, fought against in order to reinforce the singularity of a being forever called 
into question. 
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There are several interrelated points that can be discerned from this 
discussion. Firstly, the demon’s relationship vis-à-vis sovereignty is analogous to the 
beast or outlaw. The sovereign creates the law, not just a set of laws but an 
orthotaxy—a ‘proper’ arrangement of beings in relation to one another and to a 
teleological purpose. Both the sovereign and the demon occupy an ‘outside’ to this 
orthotaxy, defining its conceptual limits but also being defined by it. Without a law to 
be outlaw to, the demon as demon does not exist as such. Secondly, however, the 
discursive figure of the demon does not merely passively define this limit but actively 
strives to disrupt it, and in doing so troubles the very structures that unsuccessfully 
attempt to encapsulate it. The nature of this structure differs somewhat depending on 
the sovereign. For the sovereign God, this structure is the preordained and total 
structure of history, over which he acts as sole agent. The earthly sovereign exists as a 
rod for this structure of historical ordinance, using its power to organise its subjects in 
accordance with God’s prescriptions for moral action and (thereby) toward an 
eschatological end and the untroubled and untroubleable orthotaxy it inaugurates. 
Finally, the demon’s active opposition to teleological order gestures to a kind of 
autonomy vis-à-vis the law, but this autonomy is theologically complicated. Because 
the historical process has only a single agent—God, as absolute sovereign—demonic 
‘agency’ only arises as an anachronistic corruption, resurgences of something ancient 
and superseded (and therefore always-already invalidated). These concepts ultimately 
coalesce around what I earlier referred to as the duality of the demonic, in its ability to 
be both the natural demonic, an originary chaos that defines sovereignty’s boundaries 
temporally and spatially, and the counterfeit demonic, which cloaks itself in the 
semblance of orthotaxy and may, under certain circumstances, be able to efface the 
original, thereby becoming in some sense true or a truth. 
Making Truth at the Limits of the Lie  
As I discussed in the preceding chapter, the figure of the demon is structurally denied 
the capacity to create. Nonetheless, the demon serves a constitutive function with 
regards to the systems that exclude it. Its exclusion is a (co-)creation, constituting the 
ground of the system’s discursive construction. The demon operates via the co-option 
and corruption of these systems, notably religious ones, and this section explores the 
 90 
demonic’s structural capacity to corrupt but not create truth as related to its 
theological construction as a force of the ‘lie’. Identifications of the demonic force 
with a form of cosmic deceit predate Christianity (Lincoln 2007, 2009) but are 
manifested within it as privation theory—the idea of the demon as manifesting an/as 
ontological and moral absence. While this absence always had a political component, 
this component became violently instantiated in the European witch-hunts, in which 
the witch was figured as ‘anti-religious’ dissident, whose alleged adherence to God’s 
Other threatened the unity and unificatory potentiality of (theo)political sovereignty. 
 Alignment of the demon with ‘the lie’—with lies, deceit, and falsehood as not 
merely moral but fundamentally ontological principles—directly relates to what I 
earlier termed the ‘counterfeit demonic’, the demonic as a (perhaps unrecognisable) 
replica of the system it opposes. As Derrida explains it, a lie ‘has no sense and the 
interdiction that institutes its concept would be unthinkable’ without the ‘sacral 
horizon’ of truth: outside truth, it is ‘impossible to condemn or even to determine that 
there is a lie’ (2002b: 39). As a periphery is always determined from the centre, a lie 
is always determined from the position of a truth or at least a discourse of truth. This 
means that the lie is constructed as necessarily subordinate and, like the demon it is 
theologically aligned with, unable to create on its own terms. Lie qua lie cannot found 
a structure, or at least not a universal structure. Gilles Deleuze also remarks on this, 
noting that ‘the lie cannot be thought as formally universal without contradiction, 
since it at least implies people who believe in it, and who, in believing in it, are not 
lying’ (2008a: x).  
Deleuze here raises two key points, the inability of the lie qua lie to be thought 
of as universal, and the connection between ‘a lie’ as an idea and the performative act 
of lying. In ‘History of the Lie: A Prolegomena’ (2002b: 28–70) Derrida is careful to 
highlight the unethical nature of lying as act of conscious deception. He emphasises 
intentionality, setting lie apart from error and other types of nontruth, claiming that 
there is not ‘a lie’ but ‘a lying’. Thus, its reverse is not strictly truth (whose antithesis 
is falsity) but rather veracity or veridiction: truth-speaking. This veridiction, however, 
is also highly contingent and performative. Relating the performativity of veridiction 
to the creation of geopolitical borders and the legitimacy of sovereign states, Derrida 
(ibid.: 51) writes: 
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When performatives succeed, they produce a truth whose power 
sometimes imposes itself forever: the location of a boundary, the 
installation of a state are always acts of performative violence that, if the 
conditions of the international community permit it, create the law, 
whether durably or not, where there was none or no longer any law, where 
the law did not yet impose itself or else was not yet strong enough. In 
creating the law, this performative violence—which is neither legal nor 
illegal—creates what is then held to be legal truth, the dominant and 
juridically incontestable public truth. [Where are the ‘true’ boundaries 
now] in ex-Yugoslavia…or in Chechnya…in Israel, [or] Zaire? Who tells 
the truth and who lies in these areas? For better and for worse, this 
performative dimension makes the truth…It therefore imprints its 
irreducible historical dimension on both veracity and the lie. 
Derrida does not explore the theopolitical concept of the demon in this ‘History of the 
Lie’—oddly, perhaps, since his brief reflections on the demonic beast in the contexts 
of Saddam Hussein or Rousseau are highly attentive to the construction and enforcing 
of borders (social, political, moral, theological). His commentary is nevertheless 
illuminating. In discourses of apocalyptic eschatology ‘truth’ and ‘lie’ refer not (only) 
to performative acts but (also) to ontological conditions of reality. Yet the division 
between these discourses is enacted by such performative acts, dividing individuals 
and groups into camps of light and darkness, good and evil.  
As we saw with Bodin and again with Hobbes, the concept of the sovereign 
will is inextricable from its determination of sacred truth from demonological falsity. 
The sovereign is constructed as the guarantor of truth in opposition to the lies spoken 
and embodied by its demonological other(s). Sovereignty inscribes a boundary by its 
coming-into-existence that attempts to demarcate an indelible division between itself 
and an-other. Yet, as Derrida writes elsewhere, ‘As soon as truth is a limit or has 
limits, its own…truth would be a certain relation to what terminates or determines it’, 
and this demarcation of boundaries creates truth’s relation to its own transgression; it 
is constituted by the possibility of its contravention (1993: 2, 11). The sovereign thus 
creates its other (here, the demonic) at the moment of creation—the Devil ‘sins from 
the beginning’ (I John 3:8), after all—but once in existence the demonic constitutes 
the limits of its sovereign maker, defining it by its own wilful exclusion. This is most 
clearly illustrated above in my discussion of Hobbesian demonology, which threatens 
the integrity of legitimate sovereignty by existing as the antipolitical approximation of 
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its own political order: a ‘counterfeit world order’, to borrow Paul Boyer’s phrase for 
the end-times empire of Antichrist (2000: 175). 
 This relationship between the counterfeit and the thing it counterfeits gestures 
to a liminality that is also figured in the idea of lying as a performative speech act, 
especially when analysed in the context of demonology. The concept that lying is an 
act of intentional deception, false testimony that is not necessarily factually false but 
that is intended to deceive, means one can technically lie while speaking (parts of) the 
truth (Derrida 2002b: 31). The lie is not always falsity, but can be an appropriation 
and subversion of truths.16 Further, attempts to align truth with stability or eternity—
as is usually the case with apocalyptic eschatologies—are problematised once we 
account, following Derrida, that while the classical philosophical definition of truth 
might be the ‘indefinite survival of the “stable”,’ there is no reason why a lie or its 
desired effect might not remain undetected unto infinity (ibid.: 68). The (often 
disavowed) realisation of this possibility occupies many of the spiritual warfare and 
apocalyptic texts examined later in this thesis, necessitating narratives of the 
proximity of the end of history. Faced with the idea that what they construe as ‘the 
lie’ might (im)possibly become an enduring but also necessarily contingent truth—
and thus maybe signal the contingency of truth in general—the texts’ authors posit the 
imminence of an end to contingency as such, brought forth by a sovereign act that 
ends time and change and welcomes the immutability of an eternalised orthotaxy. 
However, this (im)possibility, as I will show in later chapters, continually haunts their 
narratives, even—or perhaps especially—when they fail to acknowledge it. As de 
Certeau poignantly notes, ‘All stability rests on unstable balances that are disturbed 
by every intervention intended to reinforce them…The need for certainty is also the 
admission of the fear of losing it’ (2000: 2, 113). 
                                                
16 Michel de Certeau discusses this hybridity of truth and falsehood explicitly in relation to the demon 
in The Possession at Loudun (2000). Analysing the 1634 Loudun possessions, de Certeau discusses the 
subversive appropriation of language within the context of the exorcists’ attempts to coerce (the 
demons possessing) the Ursuline nuns to testify in accordance with established demonological lore. 
Drawing on Aquinas, he remarks that ‘one must not believe the demon even if he says true things’, and 
categorises the demon as the ‘sphinx of a truth mixed with lies’ (2000: 148). 
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The (Im)Possibility of Reigning in Hell 
The law is always determined from the place of some demon (to appropriate and alter 
Derrida’s phrase). This demon is the periphery that constitutes and is constituted by 
the centre, bound in a structural necessity without which it loses all meaning, but it is 
also a counterfeit centre which attempts to infiltrate, subvert, and ultimately usurp the 
true centre. It is both the anarchic freedom of the antepolitical and the counterfeit 
(anti)political state. The structural potential for the demonic counterfeit to replace the 
original is one of the underlying structural conflicts I will explore in my case studies. 
In response to this counterfeit, the writers I analyse appeal to an absolute, 
metaphysical arbiter of truth (God) that finds its fulfilment at the end of history and in 
the prophetic structure of time, which is always-already determined sub specie 
aeternitatis. Thus, while the demonological other might gain control over the physical 
or even spiritual world, its sovereignty is always a sovereignty of the pseudos, of the 
lie—a pseudo-sovereignty predestined to end (like all mortal sovereignties) at a time 
appointed by a power greater than it: God, true sovereign and agent of history. Due to 
the discursive construction of an eschatological horizon that forecloses on (all 
possibility of) its rebellion, the demonological other is structurally prevented from 
creating its own laws, its truth in the form of an enduring stability. The Satan of 
Paradise Lost might declare that it is better to reign in hell than serve in heaven, but 
his non serviam will have always-already been a hollow claim born out of wilfulness.  
Therefore, to a certain degree—and within the broader theological paradigm 
of which demonology is a-part—there has never been any alternative for the demon 
but to serve. Even its rebellion is, in a sense, accounted for by the very structure it 
rebels against because that structure is the totality of history and the agent that 
controls it. The dilemma MacIntyre noted regarding the political mission of Milton’s 
Satan, that he ‘both has to and cannot reject’ the hierarchy of his origin (2003: 97), 
indicates a larger problematic regarding the discursive construction of demonological 
rebellion against sovereign power (whether god, king, state, or citizen). The ‘demon’ 
only has meaning insofar as it exists in a discursive totality it opposes, cannot escape 
from, and is preordained to fail at overcoming. However, the demonological other 
continues to be threatening to sovereign order. It continues to return, perhaps even 
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seemingly triumph, thus necessitating the sovereign’s apocalyptic intervention. As 
Derrida reminds us, ‘the choice is not between sovereignty and nonsovereignty, but 
among several forms of partings, partitions, divisions’ (2009: 76). In the ontological 
and moral order of apocalypticism, the ‘lie’ is always a designation that comes from 
the outside. It is always the marker of an other to a site of truth, it cannot be thought 
as universal as lie. Thus, it must become transfigured into an other truth. This possible 
impossibility is conditional upon an already-existing instability in the structure of 
sovereign order, however. Namely, that sovereignty was always-already divided and 
divisible. The demon is a creation—and constitutive co-creator—of that self-division, 
manifesting as the embodiment of its instabilities. Demonological forces manifest as 
agents of temptation and deviation from what is constructed as the proper hierarchy of 
being, but this temptation is also, crucially, the staking of a sovereign counter-claim. I 
will explore this counter-claim as it plays out in a number of distinct but interrelated 
ways over the following chapters, each one sketching its own relationship to notions 
of sovereign indivisibility and revealing, in their own way, its intrinsic divisibility. 
What is at stake here, and in the case studies analysed in the coming chapters, 
is the nature of sovereign (in)divisibility, its denial and its prescriptions. While coded 
as sovereignty’s other and denied the capacity to reign on a structural level, 
demonological others continually stake counter-claims that threaten to undermine the 
legitimacy of orthotaxy’s self-proclaimed singularity. The discourses examined in this 
thesis are, for the most part, explicitly theological, but this explicitly theological 
structure is not the only one that is problematised. Rather, any structure that asserts a 
mythic unity to the sovereign will will always be troubled by the things it excludes yet 
simultaneously requires to define itself—by its demons. These demons will continue 
to trouble sovereignty’s claims to indivisibility because they are constitutive of those 
claims and the necessity of those claims. Their discourses signal transferences of 
‘fealty’, agreements of ‘mutual contract’ beyond a divine covenant. 
In the face of these counter-claims, which are multiple within and between one 
another, the authors examined in coming chapters reassert the teleological structure of 
history as final arbiter of truth. By doing so, they attempt to reduce these other claims 
to demonic heresies that will end not only in failure but in perdition. They are 
enemies not of an order but of Order in se. Their speech is Satan’s speech, which as 
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Maggi discussed, threatens to devour both speakers and listeners like fire (2001: 233). 
To save creation, Satan’s ‘devastating syllogism’ must not be allowed completion. 
His human agents must be stifled, and this stifling is not just an abstraction. Like the 
early modern witches, the demonological others named in the texts examined below 
are real groups, individuals, nations, and cultures: Muslims who refuse to surrender 
all that makes them Muslim (Chapter Four), gay, lesbian and transgender people, and 
all women and men who will not adhere to prescribed gender roles (Chapter Five), 
and those who through science and technology dare to question the boundaries of the 
‘human’ (Chapter Six). The existence of these groups is constructed within the texts I 
examine as disrupting the orthotaxic structure of creation; for the preservation of that 
structure, they must be excluded and eliminated. 
In this chapter and the first, I have conducted an exploration of the 
relationship of the demonological other through interrelated aspects of its constructed 
opposition to orthotaxy: deviation, sovereignty, and (sovereign) creation. My analysis 
lays the groundwork for an exploration of more contemporary demonic others, more 
present darknesses, which constitute the body of this thesis. The following chapter 
deals with the confluence of events and ideologies that lead to the context in which 
these present darknesses are constructed. While the authors I analyse below code their 
struggle as part of the timeless battlefield of sovereign God against the demonic foe, 
their writings arise from several interrelated theologico-political contexts: American 
Exceptionalism and other hallmarks of American civil religion, the geopolitics of the 
Cold War and the conditions of its end, the evolution of evangelical politics and the 
Christian Right, the cultural logic of late capitalism and, most recently, the War on 
Terror and the discourse of rogue states that both preceded and suffuses it. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
Citizens of Paradise 
Neoconservatism, Evangelicalism, and the Theopolitics of Identity 
 
In Paradise Lost, heaven and the Divine have a fixity and 
serene stasis that contrasts sharply with the restlessness 
and frenetic bustle of hell and with the volatility of 
Satan…Satan’s Protean habit of suddenly altering his 
appearance expresses more than a tactical need for 
disguises. It attests deep anxiety about continuity itself; 
it manifests demonic rejection of the idea of permanence 
figured in heaven. 
— John S. Tanner (1992: 136) 
In Book IV of Paradise Lost, Satan comes to Eden. Initially, he prowls about its 
walls. Eventually tiring of circumambulation, he bounds over them like a ‘prowling 
wolf’ (IV.183). This is not his only bestial modality, however. As Tanner analyses, 
Satan’s state in paradise is protean. He shifts between animal forms: a cormorant, an 
unnamed quadruped grazer, a toad, and the infamous serpent (1992: 136). In a place 
he does not belong, Satan passes as those that do. For Tanner, these transmutations 
are not just tactical but express the internal force of his non-belonging and suggest 
Satan’s fitful mutability reflects anxiety over the celestial continuity he rejects. Yet it 
is paradise whose continuity is threatened by the trespassing of this passing figure. 
Satan traverses its borders, adopts the semblance of its occupants, unfixing its fixity. 
His dissent will occasion the descent. 
 As the preceding chapters explored, the demonic is the constitutive outside of 
orthotaxy. It marks the site of what should not be—a deviation from proper order 
resulting in both moral and ontological absence. By doing so the demonic constitutes 
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and contests the orthotaxic structure, placing an order constructed as timeless and a 
priori ordered and unified in relation to its (im)possible transgression. Not merely 
excluded, the demon threatens sovereign ipseity through its exclusion by defining its 
spatio-temporal, moral, and ontological limits—borders necessarily transgressed by 
their conditions of possibility. In the proceeding chapters, I examine the mechanisms 
of this transgression and contestation. In this chapter, I will explore the construction 
of the order that these demonological others (are constructed to) contest: a model of 
unitary, immutable, and authentic identity that dictates who—unlike Satan—is 
permitted to be a citizen of paradise. This construction of legitimate identity (of 
legitimate citizenship) I analyse is an American one. While it has a long genealogy, it 
emerges in its contemporary form in a specific historical context: the crucible of the 
Cold War and the conditions of its aftermath. Analysing this timeframe, I explore the 
cultural discourses that lead to the construction of a sovereign ipseity, an ideal(ised) 
citizen—upholder of traditional (religious, generally Christian) morals, hard-working 
capitalist, independent, patriotic, and usually white, male and heterosexual—through 
the construction of demonological others—gay, lesbian, and feminist activists, 
socialists, and welfare-leaches (often identified with lower-class African-Americans). 
Like Satan in Eden, these others are constructed as threats to paradise’s continuity. 
Their dissent—political, moral, ontotheological—is seen as heralding descent. 
 I orient my analysis of the emergence of this identity around the geo- and 
theo-political event of singularity that neoconservative thinker Charles Krauthammer 
called the ‘unipolar moment’—that moment at the end of the Cold War when the 
United States found itself as sole world superpower. The apparent dawn of an era 
which would be governed by ‘American strength and will—the strength and will to 
lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being 
prepared to enforce it’ (Krauthammer in Adib-Moghaddam 2011: 204). Centred on 
this singularity, I chart the interrelated development of two ideological trajectories: 
neoconservatism and right-wing evangelicalism.1 While it might at first appear odd to 
analyse these ideological movements side by side, they share a number of distinctive 
commonalities and geo/theopolitical trajectories. Religion—or at least religious 
                                                
1 This thesis does not focus on the evangelical left, though it is an important factor in the evolution of 
American identity. For recent studies of this movement, see Swartz (2012a, 2012b) and Lee (2013). 
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morality and language—constituted a core part of the neoconservative ideological 
framework. Moreover, as Gary Dorrien outlines, early neoconservatives were 
‘repulsed’ by ‘the ascension of antiwar activism, feminism, and moralistic idealism’ 
in the Democratic party, believing it had ‘sold out’ patriotic and anticommunist 
liberalism in favour of a ‘politics of guilt-breeding, anti-interventionist, anti-American 
idealism’ (2004: 7), a utopianism neoconservative godfather Irving Kristol identified 
as ‘the main source of all evil in the world’ (in Beinart 2010: 208). This socio-
political stance was mirrored by conservative evangelicalism, which during and after 
the Cold War also sought a return to what it perceived as ‘traditional’ values (Boyer 
1992). The movements worked from shared grounding principles toward a similar 
end: the moral/spiritual regeneration of America through the wholesale rejection of 
liberationist projects, equal distribution of wealth, and a ‘corrupted’ academy.  
By analysing the ways that neoconservatism and evangelicalism constructed 
themselves in the domestic and international arena, I chart the gradual solidification 
of a specific construction of American authenticity that is reified, reinforced, and 
replicated in the texts I analyse in subsequent chapters. The unity and characteristics 
of this identity are necessarily reliant upon a legion of demonised self-consolidating 
others, which draw on the specificity of the historical moments examined here and on 
the generalised paradigm of the demonic other to sovereignty I discussed in Chapter 
Two. Similarly to the paradigm I assessed there, these others are made manifest as 
aberrations in an orthotaxy, deviations from an authentic order of being that is also a 
teleo-eschatology. In turn, this discussion will lay the contextual groundwork for the 
case studies analysed in proceeding chapters.  
This context is one conditioned by what William Connolly (2008) terms the 
‘evangelical-capitalist resonance machine’, a religio-politico-economic assemblage of 
rampant capitalism, evangelical Christianity and providential history which creates 
‘affinities of spirituality’ across creedal divides. It has multiple elements, including 
news media, sermons, investment priorities, state policies, and practices of 
consumption. Each amplifies the others, not (always) through direct causal relations 
but rather by ‘energized complexities of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement’ 
(ibid.: 40). The (theo)logic of this machine, already operational, is then filtered 
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through the prism of the 2000–2008 Bush administration: a period in which, in Simon 
Dalby’s words (2010: 99), the world became figured as one  
of danger, of threats to political order and Christianity itself, of decadent 
liberal politics in danger of appeasing threats, Islamic or otherwise…[A 
world of] insecurities and struggles to overcome numerous evils, perpetual 
geographies of danger requiring vigilance.  
The mechanisms of the resonance machine and the events of this recent history—the 
Cold War, culture wars, discourse of rogue states, 9/11 and the global war that 
followed it—are also joined by other, mythic and/or historic, constructions: biblical 
narratives past and to come, and historic events, like the settling and/or independence 
of the US, that adopt symbolic power sometimes eclipsing their Biblical counterparts. 
This last cluster of ideologies comprises what has been called American civil religion. 
Taken together, these theologico-political assemblages create the soil from which the 
construction of a vision of authentic and singular identity emerges. 
 In order to interrogate the development of this authenticity I analyse several 
historical moments that can be divided around the unipolar moment. On the far side of 
the Cold War, these include the development of neoconservative ideology as an 
economic model that also sought the re-moralisation of American society and the 
increased politicisation of the Protestant evangelical movement. By analysing these 
movements, I chart the construction of an idea of American authenticity around the 
two pillars of Capitalism and Religion (primarily Protestant Christianity) as one half 
of a binary opposition with the construction of the Soviet Union as a demonic, 
communistic other. I then examine how these movements adjusted to the end of the 
Cold War, particularly the removal of their central demonological other, Communist 
Russia, in relation to which much of their identities had been forged. In my analysis, I 
investigate how this readjustment manifested through attempts to safeguard American 
dominance abroad—to preserve the unipolarity of its new world order in the face of 
increasing globalisation and transnational flow—and to reinforce a monolithic culture 
domestically in response changing social norms. Before addressing these moments 
directly, however, it is necessary to explore American civil religion, which links these 
historical developments to a discursive genealogy of messianic identity construction. 
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PARADISE HAS WALLS: SOVEREIGNTY AND CIVIL RELIGION 
In order to contextualise the construction of (the) American identity that I will be 
examining it is necessary to explore American civil religion. It is possible to tie the 
politically-conservative, religiously-fundamentalist construction of authenticity that I 
analyse into what Gilles Kepel referred to in the mid-nineties as ‘the revenge of God’ 
(1994)—a resurgence of (fundamentalist) religiosity just when religion had allegedly 
vanished from the public sphere. However, to do so would be to omit or downplay the 
way that the interplay of religious and secular belief has conditioned negotiations of 
American identity since its settlement. As elsewhere, the rise to political prominence 
of particular religio-political ideologies in the US is closely tied to a perceived failure 
of the secular state to constitute, as José Casanova suggests, ‘the quasi-transcendental 
site of human flourishing’, as per the ideologies of secularisation (2011: 57). This 
need to re-establish a ‘site of human-flourishing’ where none is seen to exist occupies 
a large part of my analysis below, but it does not occur in a vacuum. The rise of both 
neoconservatism and evangelicalism in the forms they took would not have been 
possible without the preexistence of ‘civil religion’: that melding of religious imagery 
and doctrine with secular national politicking that has played a key role through much 
of US history, bound both to ideas of American Exceptionalism and to distinctly-
American evolutions in Christian eschatology, such as the ‘Rapture’. 
(Re)Making Histories 
Robert Bellah coined the term ‘American civil religion’ in his seminal 1967 article 
‘Civil Religion in America’. Bellah did not offer a comprehensive definition of the 
phenomenon, but analysed a variety of American cultural practices in light of their 
unity in a shared religio-political tradition that had its focus on the nation, arguing that 
it constituted 
a genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent religious reality as 
seen in or, one could almost say, as revealed through the experience of the 
American people…the American civil religion is not the worship of the 
American nation but an understanding of the American experience in the 
light of ultimate and universal reality (1974: 33, 39–40).  
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Since Bellah, numerous scholars have offered working definitions of what is meant by 
‘civil religion’. John Coleman defines it as ‘the religious dimension of the polity’ and 
‘the set of beliefs, rites, and symbols which relates a man’s role as citizen and his 
society’s place in space, time, and history to the conditions of ultimate existence and 
meaning’ (J.A. Coleman 1970: 67, 70). Gail Gehrig frames it more succinctly as ‘the 
religious symbol system which relates the citizen’s role and American society’s place 
in space, time, and history to the conditions of ultimate existence and meaning’ (1981: 
18). Nicholas Demerath and Rhys Williams note that civil religion ‘denotes a religion 
of the nation, a non-sectarian faith that has as its sacred symbols those of polity and 
national history’ (1985: 154), and Marcela Cristi, expanding the term beyond its 
limited applicability to the US, notes that civil religions ‘sacralize certain aspects of 
civic life by means of public rituals and collective ceremonies’ (2001: 3). Recently, 
Rhys Williams summarises the phenomenon as one ‘composed of understandings and 
practices that treat the socio-political collectivity as having sacred dimensions and 
finds both its collective identity and its history religiously meaningful’ (2013: 240). 
Adopting a primarily political reading, Niels Reeh summarises civil religion as a 
state’s collective remembrance and obliteration of its own history, which defines its 
national character via the artefacts it chooses to commemorate or to efface: ‘It is a 
continuous cultural construction…The definition of America, what is American and 
what is not, is created through a contested interpretation of history’ (2009: 90). 
 Thus, while civil religion is often considered a source of American ideological 
unity, it is often fractured in itself. Cristi and Dawson have noted that both Christian 
and Utilitarian ideologies coexist inside it, and are usually not fully reconciled (2007). 
Both Martin Marty (1974) and Robert Wuthnow (1988) posit competing forms of 
civil religion, one ‘prophetic and critical’, the other a celebratory quasi-religious 
nationalism. Despite such internal differences, civil religion operates primarily as a 
legitimising device in American civil life: a discursive structure that allows religio-
political actors to site themselves in traditions of shared symbolism and deploy such 
symbolism for specific religio-political ends. These ends are figured in accordance 
with always-already contested visions of America’s past, present and future. Such 
contestation, however, should not blind us to power differentials in the designation of 
authentic histories.  
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Often framed in terms of a championing of ‘American values’ such as 
personal freedom, religious and ethnic pluralism, and capitalism (sometimes placed 
under the auspices of personal freedom, but often considered its own value), civil 
religion’s construction(s) of what is authentically American also functions as a 
normalising force that necessarily constructs a model of those persons and groups in 
whom or which such authenticity is instantiated. Reeh discusses this in terms of the 
active construction of the ‘We’ of ‘We, the People’, a declaration he compares to an 
Austinian speech act in that it constructs the identity of the speaker (here, the nation) 
internally and externally, within America itself and as a projection to other nations 
(2009: 79). This ‘we’ necessitates a ‘them’. Williams has discussed this communal 
self-other division in relation to the War on Terror and the election of Barack Obama 
as President, noting that civil religion often hinges on ideas of religion and race that 
encode an idea of American authenticity as white and Christian. This construct, he 
holds, is at odds with scholarship that stresses the idea of civil religion as promoting a 
tolerant, pluralistic worldview (2013). However, Williams’ assessment fails to take 
into account the ways that the image of America as tolerant and pluralist is reliant on 
its opposition to nations and cultures construed as less tolerant and less pluralist, and 
(whether explicitly or implicitly) less white and less Christian. 
Apocalyptic Substrates 
This coding of race and religion as constituent of ‘authentic’ national identity, 
particularly since the events of 9/11 reveal prominent areas of American civil religion, 
including whether America is—or ought to be—a ‘Christian’ country. As historian 
Eric Foner notes, the high level of religious faith in America combined with its 
‘religious roots’ in the enduring discourse of the pilgrim fathers leads to a propensity 
for Americans to code their enemies in the language of cosmic struggle, not merely as 
two opponents in a conflict but as embodiments of ‘good’ (America) and ‘evil’ (its 
enemies). Linked to this is a notion stemming both from civil religion and (more 
recently) from the ideologies of the Cold War, in which America is figured as the ‘last 
best hope of liberty’ that recasts its enemies as the foes of freedom itself (in Asad 
2003: 7).  
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This notion has particular consequences in the wake of the ‘unipolar moment’ 
that I examine later in this chapter, the moment after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
when the United States found itself as sole regnant superpower. America in this 
scenario becomes both totalised—its reach is ostensibly global—and simultaneously 
isolated—it is the sole bastion of power: the US attempts to maintain its undivided 
sovereignty while fragmenting that same sovereignty across the globe. Erin Runions 
comments on the US’s propensity to filter all global relations through itself, noting 
that even in a contemporary world of transnational flow and the fragmentation of 
national sovereignty, the US tends to figure these processes only through the prism of 
its own ‘sovereignty and superiority’ (2014: 5). Drawing on Wendy Brown, she notes 
that the US  
theatrically maintains a sense of bordered cohesion, through military walls 
and homeland security. Although the nation demands the immigration and 
cheap labor provided by globalization, it polices movement and tries at 
least to look as if it is fortified against the deterritorializations and political 
breakdown in national sovereignty (ibid.).  
This narrative creates a phantasmatic construction of a walled enclosure—a paradise 
in its etymological sense (Oles 2015: 40). The creation of this American paradise is 
inextricable from a discourse of sovereignty. In Brown’s words, within this walled 
enclosure ideas of sovereignty, national as well as theological, become ‘the source, 
condition, and protector of civic life’ (2010: 58). Reeh points to this understanding by 
defining civil religion as a ‘state mythology that simultaneously defines and 
legitimises the sovereignty of the American state internally as well as externally’ 
(2009: 93), and Runions contends that ‘It is this loss of superior sovereignty within a 
global economy that produces moral panic, fuelling a messianic pursuit of war, 
certainty, religion, and sexual regulation’ (2014: 6). The building of walls (whether 
actual or metaphoric) around a construction of the ‘true community’ creates the very 
need to police those walls, guarding against the other beyond its walls. Arguably, it is 
the act of building that creates such others. Such others threaten to infiltrate the 
boundaries of sovereignty much as Satan did the stable continuities of Eden. 
 This imaginary of the walled enclosure, of America as paradise, feeds into the 
civil religious notions of the US as the beacon of freedom, a ‘light unto all nations’, 
which fuels the pursuit of a global dominance grounded on Christo-American values. 
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This ties closely into both Christian messianism and to a secular-liberal discourse of 
reason that focuses on the expansion of an enlightened centre into a dark periphery. 
Theologian Catherine Keller has argued that an ‘apocalyptic unconscious’ operates 
within the field of US imperialism, which she calls a ‘messianic imperialism’. This 
unconscious justifies extreme violence as a safeguard against a number of others: 
‘barbarians’, ‘terrorists’, ‘infidels’, and ‘unbelievers’ (2005: 37–8) who are construed 
as radically alien to what are discursively constructed as ‘authentic’ American values 
(capitalism, democracy, heterosexuality).2 Runions notes that when such messianism 
becomes infused into ostensibly secular politics they create an ‘affective theological 
force field’ which raises the stakes on decision making and infuses such decisions 
with a spiritual import that galvanises support (2014: 19).  
These trends parallel my earlier analysis of the demonic other to sovereignty, 
in which the demonic constitutes the excluded other to an orthotaxic structure that 
attempts to create or maintain both an order and the telos of that order. Influenced by 
the ideological struggles of the Cold War and the capitalist triumphalism of its end, 
the demonological discourses I examine in the following chapters embed themselves 
in a specific Christo-capitalistic orthotaxic structure that utilises the language of evil 
and of the demon—figural or literal—to discursively construct the self-consolidating 
others of that orthotaxy, those who wait beyond the walls of what they hold America 
is or ought to be. However, as suggested, this is or this ought is a product of histories 
that have been adopted and adapted for specific purposes. The following sections 
chart a genealogy of the is/ought formula I examine in the remainder of this thesis. 
                                                
2 In some ways, this model also infiltrates secular liberal models of violence. Talal Asad has drawn on 
Margaret Canovan in his discussion of the (perhaps) paradoxical violence of liberalism (as opposed to 
illiberal regimes) as a conflict between light and dark: ‘It is the violence of universalizing reason 
itself’, he writes. ‘For to make an enlightened space, the liberal must continually attack the darkness of 
the outside world that threatens to overwhelm that space’ (2003: 59). He elaborates on this violence of 
reason elsewhere, noting that ‘[r]eason requires that false things be either proscribed and eliminated, or 
transcribed and re-sited as objects to be seen, heard, and touched by the properly educated senses’ 
(ibid. 35). 
 105 
NEOCONSERVATISM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF EVIL 
In 1960 the theologian Reinhold Neibuhr wrote that ‘we [America] are embattled with 
a foe who embodies all the evils of a demonic religion’ (2005: 21). This statement 
embodies many of the sentiments that abounded during the Cold War, and gestures 
toward its apocalyptic dimensions: Ronald Reagan’s binarisation of a ‘free world’ 
against an ‘evil empire’, a formula which blended religio-ethical motifs and militant 
patriotism (Chernus 2012), and the distinctly secular apocalypticism arising from 
nuclear proliferation and the strategic logic of ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD), 
among others (Lahr 2007; Weigert 1988; Wójcik 1996). It was also the period that 
saw both the birth of the neoconservative movement and the rise of the Christian 
evangelical right, two movements whose ideologies—at times disparate, at others 
united—are particularly important for understanding the framework in which 
contemporary American spiritual warfare discourses operate. While these movements 
reacted to similar events, institutions and ideologies, and converged on several crucial 
issues regarding domestic and foreign policy, they were mostly distinct trajectories in 
the American public and political spheres. The rise of the evangelical right will be 
considered directly below. This section focuses on the growth of neoconservatism in 
the Cold War. Neoconservatism, as argued by Majia Holmer Nadesan, differs from 
other neoliberal economics in its desire to institute a parallel re-moralisation of 
society by using ‘Judeo-Christian’ ethics ‘to combat moral decline and economic 
malefaction’ (2008: 141). These ethics, at least initially, were often severed from the 
theological contexts of their traditions, adopting the guise of a ‘traditional’, ‘natural’ 
morality rather than as part of specific religio-historical frameworks. 
Nativity Scene 
The story told by the founding figures of neoconservatism is that the movement 
originated in the 1960s, among a group of disaffected liberal, primarily-Jewish 
intellectuals in New York, who coalesced around opposition to sixties counterculture 
and the realignment of political liberalism with the expansion of the welfare system 
under President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and Great Society programmes. 
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While they were in favour of state intervention in some aspects, they believed the 
expansion of the welfare state created a culture of dependency which ‘corrupted the 
souls of its recipients’ (Kristol in Nadesan 2008: 40). Thus, while issues of foreign 
policy were present from the early days of neoconservatism, the focus was mainly 
domestic.3 The shift from this focus to one oriented around the interventionist foreign 
policy of the George H. W. Bush government is part of the neoconservative story, tied 
to the Cold War and its end. Some scholars have contended that the shifts that 
characterise neoconservative thought make it impossible to discuss ‘neoconservatism’ 
as a singular ideology, only of ‘neoconservatives’ who shared certain intellectual 
commonalities (Dorrien 2004). Justin Vaïsse, in an attempt to circumvent this issue, 
splits the movement into three distinct ‘ages’ characterised by particular positions and 
personalities, with the focus on foreign policy emerging during the second, in the late 
1970s and 1980s, with the establishment of the Committee for the Present Danger and 
beginning-takeover of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in 1976, and the 1981 
election of President Reagan which first brought them into a position of prominent 
political power (2010: 149-219). While Vaïsse’s dispensational model has flaws (for 
example, it fails to consider the role of the ‘culture wars’ in the domestic sphere both 
during and after the Cold War, which he acknowledges but does not analyse in detail), 
I find it useful since it emphasises both continuity and rupture in the neoconservative 
paradigm. His third age, which begins with the maturation of neoconservative thought 
in the mid-1990s, is considered later. My focus here will be on the first and second. 
The ‘godfather of neoconservatism’ is usually given as Irving Kristol (M.S. 
Joyce 1995: 68). One of the original group, Kristol was a key player in constructing a 
neoconservative network through its first and second ages and cofounder (with Daniel 
Bell) of the journal The Public Interest (1965–2002), which served as a platform for 
neoconservative critique of ‘liberal missteps’ in the realms of ‘social programs, 
                                                
3 It is common to refer to neoconservatives as a ‘movement’. However there are several issues with 
considering it as such, the first primarily being its lack of a formal organisational body with which it 
might readily be identified. As Dorrien elaborates, neoconservatives lack a core ‘creed or self-
referential organisations’ and in many ways constitutes ‘more of an impulse or current of thought than 
a self-referring movement; Kristol aptly calls it a “persuasion.”’ (2004: 16). However, he continues ‘it 
has spawned and taken over so many institutes, think tanks, and magazines, and wielded so much 
influence in national Republican politics, that movement language is unavoidable’ (ibid.). It is thus 
possible to consider neoconservatism a ‘movement’ sensu lato, as a current of thought that assimilates 
disparate individuals, rather than as a structural organisation or ‘movement’ sensu stricto. 
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affirmative action, and the culture wars’ (Vaïsse 2010: 5, 203). In 1976, Kristol was 
the first of the neoconservatives to join the AEI, the institution which would become a 
bastion of neoconservative thought in its third age. He was also the first to make the 
transition from the Democrat to the Republican Party. Two other prominent figures 
were Norman Podhoretz, who became editor of the Jewish Commentary Magazine in 
1960, increasingly turning it into a mouthpiece for neoconservative ideology, and 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, who served as ambassador to the UN under Reagan until 1985 and 
is strongly associated with the ideology regarding the irreversibility of totalitarianism 
and the need for strategic support of authoritarian regimes against the Soviet Union 
(Abrams 2010; Goldfarb 1991).  
For Kirkpatrick, the ideological praxis of totalitarianism was bound up in 
distortions of reality and the devotion of those distortions to the image of a ‘higher 
truth’ embodied by the totalitarian state. Drawing on Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn, she saw 
the Soviet system as being subsumed by ‘the lie’, a self-perpetuating strategy of 
deception and self-deception powered by violence (1988: 102). Kirkpatrick believed 
lies and violence to be intimately joined, and that the self-perpetuating form they took 
within Soviet totalitarianism made the regime impervious to internal transformation. 
Indeed, this dedication to the thesis of Soviet totalitarianism was one of the defining 
features of neoconservative discourse during the Cold War. The USSR was not, 
argued Podhoretz, ‘a nation-state like any other’ but ‘a radically different idea about 
how to organise social, political, and economic life on this earth’, an idea inimical to 
Western public and political life (in Drolet 2011: 44–5). This belief led them to 
condemn any action which could be seen as legitimising the ‘Soviet threat’ as both 
strategically and morally erroneous. The USSR was a political entity unlike any other: 
monolithic, immune to internal change and devoted to an aggressively expansionist 
project against which any compromise was weakness. It was thus that the idea of the 
Soviet Union became a self-consolidating other to neoconservative ideology, a Soviet 
Union which existed apart from and even against the actual geopolitical power of that 
name. 
 108 
Shifting Strategies of Self-Consolidation 
The neoconservatives held onto the thesis of irreversibility long after it had ceased to 
be fashionable, or indeed functional (Goldfarb 1991: 15). This is especially visible in 
their attitudes toward glasnost, the move towards informational transparency within 
the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-late 1980s. Following Kirkpatrick’s 
thesis regarding ‘the lie’, Podhoretz and other neoconservative writers in Commentary 
painted Gorbachev as a ‘cunning Leninist’ who had ‘seduced America’ into ‘lowering 
its guard’ (Dorrien 2004: 12): glasnost was not freedom of information, but a 
technique to implant propaganda into Western minds by making the USSR appear 
more open, and so further corrupt those officials and diplomats who persisted in the 
belief that the Soviet Union was just a state like any-other. Since it was incapable of 
change, it could not be changing: there had to be another, more sinister reason. As 
Nathan Abrams astutely observes, ‘Commentary perceived Soviet reforms not as a 
sign that it was changing, but rather that it was becoming more invincible’ (2010: 
223). Perhaps naturally, as a result of their myopic focus on Soviet totalitarianism 
none of the neoconservatives foresaw its collapse because that collapse came from 
within. To them, the dissolution of the Soviet bloc in the autumn of 1989 was 
‘exhilarating, confounding, and deflating all at once’ (Dorrien 2004: 13). In a last 
effort to circumvent the embarrassing revelation that the USSR had fallen from 
internal pressures, Podhoretz exalted Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as ‘apostles of 
victory’ over Communism, heralding them as a return to the spirit and traditions of 
‘genuine [pre-Great Society] liberalism’ and laying the honours for Soviet defeat at 
the feet of Reagan’s ‘visionary leadership’, and was still claiming such as late as 1999 
(Abrams 2010: 248-9). 
 In contrast to Podhoretz, neoconservatives like Kristol and Kirkpatrick called 
for a return to a more pragmatic realism (Dorrien 2004: 69). In 1989, Francis 
Fukuyama published his essay ‘The End of History?’ in Kristol’s new journal, The 
National Interest (1985–2002), which announced the end of the era of ideology and 
the triumph of liberal-capitalist democracy as the state-system vindicated by history 
(Abrams 2010: 256). Indeed, many neoconservatives felt that history had legitimised 
their views, a perspective made clear not simply in their triumphalism but in the 
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obituaries written during the 1990s by some of the movement’s key members. 
Podhoretz wrote that neoconservatism ‘no longer exist[ed]’ as a distinct phenomenon 
needing its own name, Kristol argued that it ‘was a generational phenomena’ which 
had now become wholly integrated into a ‘more comprehensive conservatism’, while 
Seymour Lipsett remarked that the word had ‘lost its meaning’ (in Vaïsse 2010: 220). 
The era of ideology was over. Yet these notes of victory hint at the degree to which 
Communism had been the neoconservatives’ self-consolidating other. The movement 
had been defined through its opposition to an enemy that no longer existed, and had 
thus lost its driving impetus (and necessitated mutations, explored below). Yet while 
neoconservatism may have been one of the last movements that relied on a purely 
ideological reading of the USSR, it was far from the only one to draw—explicitly or 
implicitly—upon that mutually-consolidating self-other binary. David Campbell, in 
Writing Security, examines how American foreign policy towards the USSR was part 
of a politics of identity, and that the crisis in the international system which emerged 
in the Cold War’s wake was very much a crisis of representation. He writes (1992: 
195): 
In the West, the cold war was an ensemble of practices in which an 
interpretation of danger crystallised around objectifications of communism 
and the Soviet Union. In replicating both the structural and narrative 
qualities of earlier articulations of danger (vis-à-vis other ‘others’), enmity 
towards communism and the Soviet Union functioned as a code for the 
inscription of the multiple boundaries between the ‘civilized’ and the 
‘barbaric,’ the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological.’ In consequence…the 
figuration of difference as otherness in the cold war rendered a contingent 
identity (‘the West,’ ‘America,’ et al.) secure. Containment was thus more 
than a historically specific Foreign Policy strategy...[it was] a strategy 
associated with a logic of identity whereby the ethical powers of 
segregation that make up foreign policy constitute the identity of the agent 
in whose name they operate, and give rise to a geography of evil.  
The creation of geographies of evil should be a piece of international rhetoric familiar 
to us since the start of the War on Terror; it is a logic which pervaded much of the 
post-Cold War period within the discourse of ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’ states as quasi-states 
antithetical to international order. Its paradigmatic employment during the Cold War 
was Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ speech of March 8th 1983, at a time when his government 
was still influenced by neoconservatives like Kirkpatrick. 
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 The utilisation of ‘evil’ as a conceptual category in foreign relations points to 
the mechanisms of a political demonology. We can see the logic of this perspective at 
work in the neoconservative attitudes to the Soviet Union, that it was not ‘a state like 
any other’ but a demonological structure founded on a self-perpetuating ‘lie’—a new 
form of socio-political organisation inimical to Western order—and that glasnost and 
perestroika were just an illusion of reform designed to open the West up to attack. As 
the Soviet Union collapsed we see to what extent this demonological otherness was a 
construct of neoconservative discourse itself. The Soviet Union was the demonic 
other to (neoconservative) American sovereignty. Neoconservatism used the policies 
and actions of the USSR to legitimise their ideological stance. When Reagan moved 
toward rapprochement with Gorbachev in the late 1980s, this ideology was reinforced 
rather than undermined: the Soviets had succeeded in duping the West, any internal 
discourse of reform was deception—change could only come from without, by means 
of containment and opposition. The demon would not exorcise itself. Until it did. 
 With the removal of their demonological other in 1989, the neoconservatives 
were forced to search elsewhere. The holy hunt had to continue. Later sections of this 
chapter investigate this reformulation of demonic alterities after ‘history’s unipolar 
moment’, particularly in the culture wars of the 1990s and the restructuring of foreign 
policy. This quest for new demons to kill, however, is deeply tied to the religious 
impulse in neoconservative ideology. Understanding this impulse is crucial not simply 
for understanding the evangelical influence on the 2000–2008 Bush presidency and 
the concurrent Global War on Terror, but also for appreciating the more subtle ways 
the rhetoric and mentalities of the Cold War and post-Cold-War periods were 
inflected by specific religious paradigms. These ideological paradigms taken together 
construct a particular model of civil religion that codes an image of the authentic 
American that survives to the present. 
CAPITALIST, CHRISTIAN, AMERICAN 
As noted earlier, religion—or at least religious morality—constituted a dominant part 
of neoconservative thought. Neoconservatives are sometimes identified as wanting to 
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undermine church-state separation, but this is not wholly accurate. Neoconservatives 
tended to view America as on the road to a moral bankruptcy characterised by a 
‘culture of appeasement’ consumed by liberal guilt, anti-patriotic sentiment, feminism 
and gay rights.4 The religion they sought (and seek) to integrate into the state 
apparatus was more aligned with ethical paradigms than theological ones: belief came 
second to praxis. As noted above, neoconservatism deploys ‘Judeo-Christian’ morals 
to rejuvenate fallen society (Nadesan 2008: 141). This theo-moralistic tendency can 
be seen in the strategic alliances Podhoretz tried to create with Jerry Falwell’s Moral 
Majority, and other religious right organisations in the post-Cold-War ‘culture wars’, 
as well as a variety of other theopolitical constellations. These ‘culture wars’ marked 
a period of internalisation for neoconservative criticism. With its primary external foil 
gone it searched for a new other, and in doing so began to return to the domestically-
oriented, anti-New-Left focus of its origins. It also showed a shift in neoconservatism 
toward a more mainstream conservatism, occasioning the epitaphs and obituaries 
described above. The same might be said of the evangelical right. The religious right 
had long been associated with the paleoconservatives of the Old Right as one of its 
core demographics, but—much as the neoconservatives did—right-wing evangelists 
rose to politico-cultural prominence during the Cold War. This cultural shift crafted 
the core mechanisms of the evangelical-capitalist assemblage. 
Constructing (A Need for) Normality 
The term ‘culture wars’ is a calque from the German Kulturkampf, referring originally 
to the 1871–78 campaign by Otto von Bismarck against the influence of the Catholic 
Church within the German Empire. It is often used in English to refer to similar 
conflicts over morality and values within a society. The term in its English form was 
used to refer to the religious right’s campaign against what they perceived as the 
subversive, indecent and blasphemous works of liberal artists and academics during 
the Reagan Presidency. The term was then reintroduced in the early 1990s with James 
                                                
4 Podhoretz once wrote in a piece about the antiwar movement that ‘homosexuals’ opposed war out of 
a ‘lust’ for ‘helpless, good-looking boys’ (in Dorrien 2004: 11). Commentary under Podhoretz’s 
editorship became a bastion of criticism against feminism and gay rights, featuring numerous articles 
riling against same-sex couples and holding that AIDS was a ‘gay’ disease caused by ‘anal sex and 
needle sharing’ (Abrams 2010: 213). 
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Davison Hunter’s Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (1991), in which he 
argues that American society had drawn itself up along two opposing ideological 
fronts, characterised primarily by attitudes to abortion, homosexuality, recreational 
drug use, gun politics, privacy, censorship, and church-state separation. The reignition 
of the culture wars in the 1990s is strongly associated with the Republican politician 
and political commentator Pat Buchanan, who argued that America was embroiled in 
a religious war over its very soul. In 1992, in opposition to Bill and Hilary Clinton, he 
argued against ‘abortion on demand, a litmus test for the Supreme Court, homosexual 
rights, discrimination against religious schools, [and] women in combat’, stating that 
such change was ‘not the kind of change America wants...not the kind of change 
America needs. And…not the kind of change we can tolerate in a nation that we still 
call God’s country’ (1992: n.p.). 
Podhoretz was one of the first neoconservatives to enter the culture wars. 
Alongside Midge Dector and other neoconservatives, he composed various articles in 
Commentary attacking political correctness and the liberal domination of academia 
driven by a ‘nihilist onslaught of deconstruction.’ Attempting to recall the Manichean 
simplicity of the Cold War, writers in Commentary proclaimed that the last bastion of 
Marxism was the university, and there—in a place ‘contaminated with foreign and 
“totalitarian modes of thinking,” antithetical to the Western tradition’—free speech 
had died (Abrams 2010: 258). Appalled by environmentalism, sexual liberation, anti-
capitalism and multiculturalism, Podhoretz and his allied neoconservatives believed 
political correctness to be resurrecting the atrocities of the Great Society programs 
they had combated in the 1960s. Leon Kass framed the debate as a battle between 
‘Sodom and Gomorrah and Middletown,’ between ‘the values of the Bible and the 
values of the mass media,’ which posed the greatest challenge to American unity 
since the Civil War (in ibid.: 263). In 1993, following the election of Bill Clinton, 
Irving Kristol wrote in The National Interest that: 
There is no ‘after the Cold War’ for me. So far from having ended, my 
Cold War has increased in intensity, as sector after sector has been 
ruthlessly corrupted by the liberal ethos. Now that the other Cold War is 
over, the real Cold War has begun. We are far less prepared for this Cold 
War, far more vulnerable to the enemy, than was the case with our 
victorious war against a global Communist threat (in Friedman 2005: 
185). 
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Other neoconservatives such as James Q. Wilson, Gertrude Himmelfarb and Allan 
Bloom joined the waging of this ‘real Cold War’, unleashing vitriolic critiques of the 
university, New Age spirituality and the moral degeneration of society (Friedman 
2005: 199).  
As noted earlier, in their views of the domestic sphere neoconservatives and 
evangelicals were closer to one another than to mainline conservatives (Friedman 
2005: 208). Neoconservative opposition to the welfare state often utilised language 
which discussed a degradation of the souls of recipients, and, as discussed by Lahr 
(2007), the capitalist work ethic had been increasingly integrated into an ‘American 
identity’ during the Cold War as part of a counter-image constructed to ward against 
its godless, communist foe. To an extent, neoconservatives and the evangelical right 
were speaking the same tongue. They worked from partly-shared grounding principles 
toward the moral-spiritual regeneration of America conceived through a rejection of 
emancipatory politics, the distribution of wealth, and the liberalised academy. This 
discourse bears witness to the fragmentation and intensification of the discourse of an 
authentic American citizen through its differentiation from its others. In the Cold War 
this other had manifested mainly as the communist infiltrator of McCarthyism. It was 
an external other, albeit one who could trespass on the ground of the self. However, as 
Kristol’s words clarify, the new foe was even more nebulous and devastating. It had 
gained control over the education system and other cultural institutions. Whereas the 
battle before had been to safeguard America from an external foe, this new mission 
was to save the nation from itself. 
Constructions of heteronormativity, gender, and race played a central role in 
the post-Cold War (re)construction of an Unamerican American, ones that resurface 
violently in both the discourse of rogue states and the Global War on Terror. Nathan 
Abrams discusses these issues in depth in his critique of Podhoretz and Commentary 
Magazine (2010), as does Murray Friedman, albeit in a manner more sympathetic to 
the neoconservative perspective (2005). Projects like Affirmative Action aimed at 
balancing racial equality enraged neoconservatives, who believed that such policies 
undermined the meritocratic ideal of American society and were unconstitutional. 
This had been an enduring topic of neoconservative criticism since 1975, when 
Nathan Glazer published Affirmative Discrimination. Podhoretz’s editorship of 
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Commentary also saw a decline in African-American contributors compared to its 
previous history under Elliot Cohen, and while it presented a veneer of support for the 
Civil Rights movement, Abrams observes that the majority of essays published were 
from white political scientists, historians, sociologists and psychologists, with scant 
attention given to voices within the African-American community itself (2010: 61–2). 
Indeed, Podhoretz himself was demonstrably anti-integration, writing that white 
feelings for black Americans were ‘twisted and sick’ and that their ‘abstract support’ 
for Civil Rights would ‘not stand the test of a direct confrontation’ (in ibid.: 64). 
Later, under the Reagan administration, neoconservatives like Kristol, Podhoretz, 
Glazer, Elliot Abrams and Carl Gershman provided the ideological basis for a ‘civil-
rights retreat’ by adopting a blame-the-victim mentality regarding African-American 
poverty, and frequently drew on images of black anti-Semitism in order to push the 
Jewish community away from civil rights support, despite these views being marginal 
(ibid.: 190). The former attitude has been aptly classified by Nathan Abrams as ‘social 
Darwinist laissez-faire racism’ (ibid.: 261). Further, in 1994 neoconservatives Charles 
Murray and Richard Hernnstein published The Bell Curve, which linked intelligence, 
genetics and race in order to argue that Hispanics and blacks naturally had lower IQs 
and therefore achieved less than whites. While widely disdained, Commentary not 
only gave the work a favourable (if not uncritical) review but even provided Murray 
with space to defend his views, a move which Michael Lind remarks as granting the 
text a veneer of credibility, presenting ‘opponents of pseudo-scientific racism [as] 
nothing more than liberals frightened of daring scholarship’ (1996: 207). 
Commentary also adopted a strong stance against feminism, declaring it a 
‘coercive movement towards androgyny’, terminology revealing a threatened 
masculinity, and portrayed feminists as ‘egomaniacal anarchists’ undermining the 
family (Abrams 2010: 104–5). This is similar logic to that used against the gay rights 
movement, which was also accused of undermining the legitimacy of the family. 
Podhoretz wrote: 
My position on gay rights has to do with my fear of the rise and spread of 
tendencies in this society and in this culture which undermine in a very 
drastic way the possibility of maintaining the family as the key institution 
of our society, and of raising our children and our grandchildren in a 
context which makes it possible for them to live and take their place in the 
natural chain of the generations (in Dershowitz 1991: 202–3). 
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In Podhoretz’s words we can perceive the crystallisation of certain features key to the 
neoconservative critique shared with the evangelical right: a focus on the traditional 
nuclear family as the purveyor of authentic culture (undermined by feminist 
‘androgyny’, LGBT rights, abortion and other practices), and a mentality by which 
American neoliberal capitalism is seen as conveying the tools for self-determination 
and success. For neoconservatives like Podhoretz, the authentic American is a 
member of a heteronormative family instilled with the traditional values of capitalist 
success, conservative morality, and extreme patriotism; the ‘liberal ethos’ which 
‘ruthlessly corrupted’ ‘sector after sector’ (Kristol) in the wake of the Cold War was a 
direct challenge to this authenticity. The systems erected by liberationist movements 
embodied in the tainted university sector pushed socialist and anti-patriotic agendas 
responsible for separating Americans from what they should be, from a pure ‘idea of 
the American.’ The construction of this ‘idea’ of the American is closely tied up with 
the contested history of civil religion, as well as a more explicit history of the 
American prophetic history. As discussed above, scholars like Marty and Wuthnow 
posited competing forms of civil religion. Rather than being oppositional, however, it 
is better to see these as sides of the selfsame discourse that critiques America as it is 
while appealing to a celebratory notion of what it ought to be. 
Dispensation(s) 
America has a long and intricate history of engagement with prophetic ideas and 
traditions, especially apocalyptic ones. Some of the earliest European colonists saw it 
as a place to build New Jerusalem, a belief that persisted throughout the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. A form of ‘civic millennialism’ was prevalent in antebellum 
America, embodied first in groups like the Millerites and later in individuals like 
Timothy Dwight and Samuel Davies Baldwin (Boyer 1992: 80–112). Dwight, whom I 
discussed in Chapter One regarding his crucial role in the Illuminati-panic of the late 
eighteenth-century, proclaimed in his 1776 Valedictory Address at Yale University 
that history would end with America: ‘the Empire of North-America [would] be the 
last on Earth’ and it would also be the ‘most glorious’ (in Stein 1984: 290). This 
specific millennial sentiment is encoded in forms of American civil religion. 
However, while the ‘evangelical-capitalist resonance machine’ I am analysing has 
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roots in civil religion, it is a machine born in the specificity of the Cold War. In this 
section, while I will reference some earlier traditions—such as the dispensationalism 
of John Nelson Darby (1800–1882) and doctrines like the Rapture—my focus here 
will be on right-wing evangelicalism during and after the Cold War. 
 As Paul Boyer makes clear, the term ‘evangelicalism’ refer to a specific subset 
of American Protestant Christianity, and is sometimes known as ‘fundamentalism’ 
(1992: 3). Much like neoconservatism, this subset of American Protestantism rose to 
prominence during the 1970s in response to liberal social policies, Cold War political 
binarisation, and the new perils of the atomic age. Unlike neoconservatives, however, 
evangelicals adapted these external events to their preexisting religious frameworks, 
ones that were often apocalyptic in outlook and rooted in the dispensational model of 
history popularised by Darby in the mid-nineteenth century (Boyer 1992; Lahr 2007; 
Wojcik 1997). Associated with a large number of evangelical figures, including Hal 
Lindsey, Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, Kenneth Copeland, Tim and Beverly LaHaye, 
and Jack van Impe, among others, Wojcik defines its common traits as ‘biblical 
literalism and inerrancy, supernaturalism, support for conservative political causes, 
and [a] condemnation of communism, secularism, science, and ecumenism’ (1997: 
34). While these are accurate descriptors, what truly defines dispensationalist doctrine 
is its model of history.  
The term dispensatio has a long theological genealogy. As Sherwood (2008) 
outlines, it refers both to ‘a system of management (law and order) and the 
exception’, and ‘describes a system of management, regulation, and economy’ that is 
dispensed from the divine, for example the dispensation of law and the dispensation 
of mercy that supersedes it with the advent of Christ. Sherwood relates the latter event 
to the sovereign exception, noting that it means that ‘the supersession of the letter of 
the law [is] (paradoxically) the most perfect fulfilment’ of it, and gestures to the 
relation of the exception to the system of order in that ‘only the one who makes the 
law can dispense with the law’ (ibid.: 320). Ideas of dispensation are thus intimately 
tied to concepts of sovereignty, and of God as sovereign arbiter of history. For Darby, 
however, the passage between dispensations could be predicted and plotted by means 
of biblical prophecy, and, in his vision, were bookended by specific historic events: 
the next dispensation would begin with the Rapture, after which secular time rapidly 
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winds down to its foregone conclusion. Darby, however, evaded the rigid dating that 
had confounded the Millerites, among others, and by placing history in the hands of 
the sovereign dispenser, his dispensationalism pushed back against liberal English and 
American interpretations of scripture that challenged its divine inspiration, and found 
fertile soil in the laissez-faire ideologies that abounded in nineteenth-century America 
(Boyer 1992: 86–90; Wójcik 1997: 21–36).  
Darby’s teachings became particularly influential in North America through 
the Bible Conference movement, begun by ‘conservative, soul-saving evangelical 
Protestants’ in 1875 to create a forum for doctrinal orthodoxy (Utzinger 2006: 118). 
While the content of his model is less relevant than the form it took in the writings of 
the individuals and movements considered shortly, one aspect that does bear mention 
is his notion of the Church as predicated on a concept of divine unity set against the 
evil of the world. Darby wrote that: ‘Evil exists. The world is lying in wickedness, 
and the God of unity is the Holy God. Separation, therefore, from evil, becomes the 
necessary and sole basis and principle…of unity; for He can have no union with evil’ 
(in Utzinger 2006: 117). The Church was meant to replicate this unity, ‘in one place 
[representing] the whole and [acting] in its name’ (in ibid.). As Michael Utzinger 
notes, while Darby’s position might seem ‘theologically cogent’, in reality it led to 
further division, with his own Plymouth Brethren becoming fractured in his lifetime 
over ‘who would be welcomed at the communion table, the very symbol of Christian 
community’ (2006: 117–118). This specific element presages a trend in dispensational 
millenniallism to divide through the ideological promotion of unity, dividing people 
between an authentic community and an exterior world coded as fundamentally evil. 
This theme recurs throughout the proceeding case studies in varying ways, and recalls 
the relation between sovereignty and its demonic other: the inextricable link between 
sovereign indivisibility and that which conditions its internal and external limits, thus 
dividing it. 
Dispensational prophecy continued to circulate through the nineteenth century 
but exploded from the beginning of World War I, with many elderly propheticians 
updating their aging works in line with new events, not only surrounding the wars but 
also regarding developments in technology. As nineteenth-century writers had found 
railways coded in the Bible, twentieth-century writers found air travel and television 
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(Boyer 1992: 106–7). Following World War II and the onset of the Cold War 
evangelicalism began to adapt its dispensational model for a new context—the atomic 
age—which also provoked a return to analyses of Christian apocalyptic beyond the 
prophetic subculture. Angela Lahr details the gradual fusion of ideational constructs 
in America in this period, in which Christianity, eschatology (secular and religious), 
and nationalistic anticommunism became the structures through which ‘evangelicals 
adapted millenarian thought to a Cold War world’, enabling the subculture to utilise 
‘prophetic politics to renegotiate their national identity’ (2007: 4). This renegotiation 
was a crucial component of the developing resonance machine. 
Fission and Fusion 
Like the propheticians before them, evangelicals like Jerry Falwell, Billy Graham, 
and Pat Robertson capitalised on the instability of the Cold War by presenting current 
events as foretold in scriptures, overlaying a veneer of order and sensibility onto a 
culture wracked by existential anxiety: atomic bombs were God’s pre-ordained 
method of destruction, Russia was the Gog of Revelation 20 and would invade Israel 
during the end-times, and the Antichrist would rise as head of the newly-formed UN 
(Boyer 1992). The USSR was identified as fulfilling an explicitly religious demonic 
role in history, rather than the (theo)political one it served for the neoconservatives. A 
paradigm coalesced wherein a nationalism composed of equal-parts capitalism and 
Christianity became America’s counter and remedy to ‘godless communism’. As Lahr 
(2007: 199–200) elaborates: 
Anticommunism fit in well with the dispensational timeline. It provided a 
‘villainous’ foe and a ‘righteous’ cause. Anticommunists feared a situation 
so dire it justified an arms race of weapons capable of destroying the 
earth. This corresponded strikingly to premillennialists’ expectations and 
matched biblical references of annihilation by fire. The book of Revelation 
draws a firm line between good and evil. The demonization of the ‘other,’ 
long familiar to evangelicals, helped them to comprehend the dichotomies 
established during the Cold War that closely paralleled those of their own 
belief system. 
Evangelicalism found in the Soviet Union the same kind of self-consolidating other as 
neoconservatism had, and as it found its pre-existing paradigms readily adaptable to a 
Cold War geopolitical climate, its ideologies proliferated through several bestselling 
books, the most infamous of which was Hal Lindsey’s 1970 Late, Great Planet Earth.  
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Known as the ‘father of the modern prophecy movement’ (Wojcik 1997: 37), 
Lindsey merged strategic terminology like popular slang with his readings of biblical 
prophecy to construct a dramatic and, above all, digestible narrative of ‘World War 
III’—his term for Armageddon—narrating with palpable excitement the deaths of 
millions in the forthcoming apocalypse. In a period where secular forecasts of the 
future were steeped in dread, Lindsey injected the end with vivacity and purpose. 
Indeed, as Michael Barkun (in Boyer 1992: 128) astutely remarks,  
As the exclamation points march forward, it becomes clear that Lindsey 
finds these prospects enormously attractive. His prose pants on with 
scarcely a word of sympathy for the hundreds of millions killed or 
maimed. For him, the tribulation is grand, cosmic theatre, the ultimate 
Hollywood spectacle.  
While his dramatising of the apocalypse was received poorly among many preachers 
and established theologians, Lindsey’s vision gained enormous currency in the 
popular market, selling more than any other nonfiction book in the whole of the 
1970s, having thirty-six printings by 1981 and an excess of twenty-million copies sold 
by the mid-1990s (Boyer 2003: 537; O'Leary 2000: 421). Others followed Lindsey, 
adapting Biblical apocalyptic imagery to then-contemporary technologies and politics 
while still claiming scriptural inerrancy. A poignant passage by prophetician Maxwell 
Coder (in Boyer 1992: 134) reinterprets the Hebrew language as one of ‘word-
pictures’ in order to translate scriptural imagery into the language of nuclear warfare: 
Hebrew is a language of word pictures…The word for ‘arrow’ means a 
piercing missile, and the word for ‘bow’ means a launching device for 
such a missile…If we use the word pictures instead of what was meant in 
ancient times, [Ezek. 39:3] translates, ‘And I will smite thy launcher out of 
thy left hand, and will cause thy missiles to fall out of thy right 
hand’…The word pictures can describe modern weapons just as accurately 
as they described those in use twenty-five hundred years ago. 
This specific pattern and practice of interpretation enabled evangelical beliefs to 
acquire space in popular consciousness by appearing to provide timeless answers to 
contemporary questions in a manner that fit neatly into pre-existing cultural and 
geopolitical binarisations. 
One of the most prominent organisations to take advantage of this space was 
the Moral Majority. An aspect of America’s Christian Right, the Moral Majority was 
a voter mobilisation and lobbying organisation founded in 1979 by Baptist preacher 
and televangelist Jerry Falwell in response to the liberalisation of American culture 
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(D.K. Williams 2010a: 160–185; 2010b). Its founding was explicitly tactical: several 
social conservatives on the New Right hoped to utilise the popular appeal of Falwell 
and his dispensationalism to energise conservative politics. Daniel Williams notes that 
the New Right tried to convince Falwell by expanding his fundamentalist protestant 
network to conservative Catholics and Jews as well as Protestants, he would be able 
to create a ‘moral majority’ of Americans ‘who would vote for conservative causes if 
Falwell could reach them with the New Right message’ (2010a: 174). The 
organisation claimed rapid growth: it reported to have registered four million 
Republican voters for the 1980 election (Diamond 1998: 67; Liebman 1983: 55) and 
claimed seven million members by 1983 (Gallaher 2015: 433). Reality may have been 
less radiant: the four million may have been closer to two million (D.K. Williams 
2012: 45), and Carolyn Gallaher has indicated that at its height in the 1980s roughly 
‘750,000 people received the copies of the [Moral Majority’s] newspaper’ and ‘its 
direct-mail solicitations returned an average of only 10,000 contributions’ (2015: 
433). Regardless, the organisation gained traction in the political arena, managing to 
push the Republican Party further to the right on social issues, particularly on abortion 
and gay and lesbian rights, as well as giving strong evangelical support to Reagan’s 
election campaign (Miller 2014; D.K. Williams 2010a: 186–211). 
Entry into mainstream politics also somewhat tempered the prophetic bent of 
dispensationalists like Falwell and Robertson. While both maintained the inevitability 
of nuclear destruction as Lindsey had, they began to clarify and condition their claims 
in order to adapt to the political arena, often giving more place to human agency. In 
1983, for example, Falwell endorsed the idea that the nuclear judgement would only 
follow after the Millennium as a way of God clearing the deck to make way for the 
New Heaven and New Earth, going further to suggest that Washington had a duty ‘to 
negotiate for peace with the Soviet Union and other nations’ and that ‘we have a 
human responsibility to do all we can to seek sensible arms controls’ (in Boyer 1992: 
137–8). Robertson’s temperances were similar, oriented around his 1988 bid for the 
US Presidency. In 1985 he declared openly that he no longer anticipated nuclear war 
as a forthcoming aspect of God’s plan: ‘God doesn’t want to incinerate the world,’ he 
claimed: Armageddon ‘is an act of God Almighty that has nothing to do with human 
abilities’ (in ibid.: 138). Boyer has noted that Robertson’s concessions stretch back to 
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his 1982 book The Secret Kingdom, which advocated a dominion theology that urged 
Christians to assume their God-intended authority, power, and dominion over the 
Earth (ibid.: 139). Both Falwell’s and Robertson’s shifts brought them more in 
accordance with postmillennial apocalypticisms than the premillennialism of 
traditional dispensationalism, revealing a tension that emerges when premillennialists 
attempted to enact change in a world their beliefs technically do not account for. This 
tension is one that re-emerges in the case studies of later chapters, as writers in this 
vein attempt to skirt the line between prophesying an inevitable future and enjoining a 
call to action on the part of their readers. 
 The Moral Majority continued to gain in stride until backing Robertson as the 
1988 Republican presidential candidate, an endeavour that ended in abject failure. It 
was officially brought to an end by Falwell in 1989, but by then had already gained a 
foothold in the political scene and exerted an influence on conservative politics that 
would endure to the present day (Diamond 1998; Miller 2014; D.K. Williams 2010a). 
Later lobbying organisations such as Robertson’s Christian Coalition and the success 
of dispensationalist fiction like Tim LaHaye’s bestselling Left Behind built on the 
Majority’s socio-political capital and the success of Lindsey’s bestseller. As the 
USSR faded as an opponent they oriented their theopolitics towards different 
domestic and foreign targets. Regarding the former, conservative evangelicals drew 
on the same theologico-political structures utilised to oppose communism and began 
to rearticulate them for use against secular America (Lahr 2007: 200). The latter also 
took advantage of preexisting theopolitical constructs, notably the primacy of Israel in 
the evangelical worldview. Unlike neoconservatives, for whom the USSR served as a 
self-consolidating other for America itself, for many evangelicals Russia’s primary 
function had been as the Gog of Revelation 20, who would invade Israel as part of the 
apocalyptic drama. Israel’s precarious position among its Arab neighbours left ample 
room for other interpretations. As the geopolitics changed, so too did the theopolitics. 
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OWNING THE FUTURE—A THEOLOGICO-GEOPOLITICS OF IDENTITY 
Both neoconservatism and evangelicalism underwent significant ideological shifts in 
the post-Cold War period. As the American/Russian binary opposition dissolved, both 
movements were forced to adjust their worldviews in search of new others, leading to 
strategic alliances around shared ideological poles. The conservatism that emerged 
from the crucible of the Cold War, however, was one that had been shaped by both 
neoconservative ideas and the evangelical movement, laying the groundwork for what 
was to come. One of the key elements of this new conservatism was a disillusionment 
with America itself, a perceived gulf between reality as it was and how they held it 
should be. In their narratives of authenticity and their focus on the institutions of the 
family and education, we can discern an emphasis on notions of temporality within 
neoconservative Cold-War discourse. 
Future Territories 
What is at stake in all of these narratives is ‘the future’, an idea that mimics aspects of 
evangelical discourses for which the future is simultaneously fixed and yet always the 
province of contestation. Kirkpatrick argued for the strategic backing of (allegedly) 
reformable authoritarian regimes against the (allegedly) irreversible totalitarianism of 
the USSR, because she believed that once the latter had triumphed there would be 
nothing beyond it, no future outside of that system. Similarly, in the culture wars the 
neoconservatives were fighting over which vision of America should determine the 
future—the authentic, traditional soul of ‘true’ America or the inauthentic, socialist 
soullessness of the liberationist counterculture.  
Irving Kristol once wrote that in an age ruled by competing ideologies the 
‘key question’ is ‘who owns the future?’ (1983: 263). We have seen this key question 
articulated in both domestic and foreign fields of conflict, each articulating a 
sovereign claim of ownership over this product and place, this territory, ‘the future’. 
Constructing the future as a contested territory, however, introduces spatial and 
temporal dynamisms. The neoconservative narrative builds a concept of an authentic 
nation, spatially-bound, and the role of that nation in both a historical (temporal) 
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project and a globalised world. Such a narrative hinges on the creation of models of 
identity and alterity, of an authentic community and those excluded from it (Gupta 
and Ferguson 1997: 13)—here, communists, feminists, gays and lesbians, the new 
left, and the poor. Who gets to own the future? What does it mean to own it, to 
determine what it means in itself—this future? Conversely—since, as Michel de 
Certeau reminds us, the ‘need for certainty is also the admission of the fear of losing 
it’ (2000: 113)—what does it mean to lose that (right to) ownership? During the Cold 
War, competition over the future was between two powers—Capitalism and 
Communism, the US and USSR—a bipolarity that conditioned both geopolitics and 
theopolitics. However, even after its apparent victory, the US found its claims to 
ownership still uncertain, haunted by the possibility of loss. Attempts to secure its 
place in the future played out in dramatic and far-reaching ways following the end of 
the Cold War, both discursively and materially. One of the foremost of such attempts 
can be discerned in the discourse surrounding the 1991 Gulf War.  
In 1991, then-neoconservative Charles Krauthammer coined ‘unipolarity’ in 
his Foreign Affairs article ‘The Unipolar Moment’, informing the international system 
that order would be restored by ‘American strength and will—the strength and will to 
lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being 
prepared to enforce it’ (in Adib-Moghaddam 2011: 204). Arshin Adib-Moghaddam 
(2011: 204–206) has made the point that this claim was, in a sense, instantiated in the 
1991 Gulf War: by receiving support from the international legitimising body of the 
UN, the US was able to enter into a legally-justified—and thus ‘just’—war. In being 
legitimised and argued for not solely from a moral standpoint but a legal one, the 
resulting (legal-ideological) success of the war can be construed as legitimising the 
unipolar moment: America made a claim to act on behalf of the international system 
and that system confirmed the claim. With specific regard to the neoconservatives, he 
writes elsewhere that: 
As liberal analysts were caught in the euphoria of a new era of global 
peace and prosperity, neo-conservatives warned stridently of new risks 
and challenges, criticising the decline in US military spending and the 
neglect of President Reagan’s missile defence system. Hence, by attacking 
Kuwait, Saddam Hussain unconsciously provided for the opportunity to 
invent new ‘others’, ‘we’ have to combat: rogue states, Islamic 
fundamentalists, Arab fanatics, and so on…In strategic terms, the ‘neo-
conservative Weltanschauung’ assumes that unipolarity had eliminated the 
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determinations of Cold War balance of power calculations, allowing for 
the redefinition of world- and Persian Gulf politics along US interests. The 
end of bipolarity and systemically legitimated penetration of the region by 
US forces were seen as reason enough to take a rather more offensive 
posture towards regional challengers (2006: 92–4). 
Adib-Moghaddam links the development of this ‘more offensive posture’ directly to a 
politics of identity, specifically to the ‘increasing prominence of a unilateral identity 
as the preferred self-perception of the post-Cold War US state’ (ibid.: 94). This is not 
to say that there were not other competing narratives—to present US self-identity as 
monolithic and undifferentiated would be erroneous—just that this narrative became 
especially influential (ibid.; see also Dorrien 2004: 70; Vaïsse 2010: 222–3). 
While Adib-Moghaddam does not do so, I would argue that this narrative of 
monolithic identity as one aspect of a plural and complicated politics of national 
identity is part of wider discourses of civil religion. As Reeh observed, civil religion 
operates as a state’s collective remembrance-obliteration of its own history, a process 
which defines its national character via those artefacts it chooses to commemorate or 
efface: ‘The definition of America, what is American and what is not, is created 
through a contested interpretation of history’ (2009: 90). It is thus only natural that the 
neoconservative attempts to portray the heart or essence of America could only truly 
occur against a backdrop of the always-already fragmented nature of that essence. As 
such, I would situate the advocacy of unilateral action in the post-Cold War era as one 
facet of a broader theologico-geopolitics of identity. 
Zone of Peace (House of War) 
Another push for US unilateral action came in 1992 in the form of a leaked draft 
entitled ‘Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994–1999’ (DPG), devised 
under the supervision of a prominent ‘third age’ neoconservative—Paul Wolfowitz, 
then-Undersecretary of Policy at the US Defense Department, and later-Deputy 
Defense Secretary under George W. Bush. The DPG put forward the proposal that the 
US should retain the ‘pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those 
wrongs’ which could affect the US and its allies, or ‘unsettle international relations’. 
Moreover, if collective action could not be orchestrated, the US should be ‘postured 
to act independently’ (in George 1993: 297). The document caused an uproar, which 
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prompted several revisions that conceded more in terminology than in policy 
direction: a more multilateral language was used though the ideological direction 
remained oriented towards asserting dominance. In 1993, Dick Cheney—later Vice-
President under George W. Bush—published another version under a modified title 
(‘Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy’). The document put 
forward the goal of preventing the rise of any rival power comparable to the Soviet 
Union through creating and maintaining a ‘zone of peace’ characterised by neoliberal 
democracies, thus precluding the rise of dominant regional powers (1993: 2-6). 
These documents display ideological precursors that would come to the fore 
after the ‘great divide’ of 9/11 (Vaïsse 2010: 225), and whose goals would become 
formalised in the publications and institutions set up by the neoconservatives during 
the mid-late 1990s, such as Bill Kristol’s Weekly Standard and the Project for a New 
American Century (PNAC). Later during the 2004 Gulf War, Robert Kagan (2004: 3) 
pointed to the ideological mindset behind this unilateralism while simultaneously 
placing America and Europe into different conceptual spheres regarding legality and 
force. 
On the all-important question of power—the efficacy of power, the 
morality of power, the desirability of power—American and European 
perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power…it is 
moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and 
transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical 
paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel 
Kant's ‘perpetual peace.' Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in 
history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where 
international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the 
defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and 
use of military might. 
This view is embodied in the claims that Paul Kahn has recently made regarding the 
perception and role of (popular) sovereignty in the American system. Kahn resorts to 
an oft-times essentialist reading of American historical consciousness, drawing on a 
narrative of revolution in order to present its (in his view) unique understanding of the 
‘popular sovereign,’ whose sovereignty is perceived as under threat from the system 
of rules and norms crystallised in international law (2011). Kahn’s thesis here reflects 
the tension between a globalised socio-economic system and the allegedly-continued 
primacy of nation-state actors built on a model of Westphalian sovereignty. His model 
of American consciousness is more problematic and essentialist, however he succeeds 
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in capturing a model of sovereignty figured prominently in the evangelical-capitalist 
assemblage and its articulations of American Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny.5  
The conflict between a diffusion of power and the primacy of sovereign 
nation-state impacts not solely an American desire for continuing geopolitical 
dominance but also the enduring dispensationalist theopolitics regarding its 
predestined role. Despite ideas akin to the neoconservatives of the nation’s ‘moral 
drift’, the US is often constructed as being of specific import regarding world 
evangelism (Oldfield 1996: 57): America as the last, best hope for freedom, or in this 
case, of a Christian morality increasingly aligned with a certain interpretation of that 
freedom. This evangelical nationalism also relates to broader apocalyptic discourses 
on the diabolic deviancy of world government as against the sovereignty of individual 
nations. Prefigured in the satanic Illuminati conspiracies of coming global (dis)order, 
this was a discourse that came to the fore in opposition to the 1920 formation of the 
League of Nations, which certain evangelicals had viewed as prefiguring the world 
empire of Antichrist, an ‘apostate deviation from that divine truth which had been 
given once and for all’ (Ruotsila 2008: 188–9).  
This trend of figuring the construction of international legal bodies such as the 
League of Nations and later the EU, NATO, and the UN as preludes to the end 
times— generally compiled under the title of ‘New World Order’ conspiracies—
continues into the present evangelical worldview (Barkun 2013; Fuller 1994; Runions 
2014; Wójcik 1996). While it had long been an element of evangelical-conspiracist 
subculture, discussion around it blossomed after the Cold War when President George 
H. W. Bush used the phrase ‘new world order’ in his speech of September 11, 1990. 
As Barkun (2003: 45) clarifies,  
Fundamentalist millenarians saw President Bush’s uttering of the phrase… 
as a sign that the network of Antichrist forces had advanced so far that 
they could risk speaking about it publicly. To those already habituated to 
thinking about the Antichrist not simply in individual terms but as a 
system that drew in the UN, computers, and the global economy, the 
public invocation of the New World Order could only mean that the days 
of the Tribulation were imminent.  
This religio-political conspiracism can be construed as another element of the broader 
evangelical-capitalist assemblage. While it often demonised the US government and 
                                                
5 I return to Kahn’s formulation of American popular sovereignty in Chapter Seven. 
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the elites of American society, the discourse articulated similar ideological anxieties, 
including a loss of US power. As Mark Fenster relates, believers in coming ‘one-
world’ government often construe it in terms of an intended usurping of ‘traditional 
American sovereignty at the local, state, and national levels’, against which popular 
sovereignty must be reasserted against an already-corrupted federal system (2008: 54-
–69). Like the evangelical right and neoconservatives, these conspiracist subcultures 
construct their anxieties not just around the loss of US sovereignty but a particular US 
sovereignty, that of authentic America. 
One America 
It would be simple to analyse the trajectories analysed in this chapter in terms of a 
twofold desire to continue American supremacy in the geopolitical sphere combined 
with a theopolitics through which evangelicals might use that geopolitical power for 
their salvific goals. However, it is not just a question of American potency, but of the 
potency of one vision of America. This is an ‘American Paradise’, where America is a 
pristine walled enclosure to which only the worthy have access. The loss of ‘superior 
sovereignty’ within the global system, projected by both neoconservatives and the 
evangelical right onto their vision of America at large, provokes their moral panic, 
their messianic pursuits of ‘war, certainty, religion, [and] sexual regulation’ (Runions 
2014: 6). It is not necessarily that America is losing dominance that provokes their 
ire, but rather that it is an-Other America, rather than their America that is ascendant. 
While evangelicals—and neoconservatives who utilised their language—presented 
their struggle as the latest iteration in a timeless conflict between the cosmic forces of 
good and evil (more or less secularised in places, or purely theological and non-
secular in others), such discourses we have seen here are in fact distinctly situated and 
drew (consciously or unconsciously) on the socio-historical and ideological contexts 
of their formulation. The growing culture of conspiracy is another element of this 
assemblage, and analysing this subculture as a component of the broader evangelical-
capitalist assemblage, rather than a ‘lunatic fringe’, might help explain the ease with 
which conspiracy beliefs have been increasingly adopted by more mainstream parts of 
the right (Barkun 2013: 229–31; Warner and Neville-Shepard 2014): they were 
always-already part of the selfsame theopolitical discourse of threatened authenticity. 
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The texts I analyse in the proceeding chapters draw on this context and its 
construction of authenticity, of who possesses and lacks the right to be a citizen of 
paradise. They add to this broader narrative with their own specificities and condition 
it through the demonised enemies they choose: (political) Islam, the politics of gender 
and sexuality, or (techno)science and secular humanism. As the narratives discussed 
going forward rest at the crossroads of civil religion, the legacy of Cold War identity 
politics, and Biblical prophecy, these discourses are not (only) syncretic blends of 
‘religious’ and ‘secular’ ideologies but rather a part of a quasi-continuous genealogy, 
which—while always-already fractured, discontinuous, and complicated—exerts its 
force on the present. From their precarious positions in that present, these discourses 
ask, in Jobian fashion, the ‘key question’ Irving Kristol declared conditioned the age 
in which they find themselves. 
Who owns the future?
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The IS and the Ought 
Political Islam and the Other Globalisation 
In Hell there will be nothing but law. 
— Grant Gilmore (2014: 99) 
In June 2012, five members of the US Congress sent letters to the inspectors general 
of five government departments asking them to investigate the possible infiltration of 
the US government by Islamist radicals, specifically those associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The accusations targeted Huma Abedin, a senior aide to then-Secretary 
of State Hilary Clinton, as well as other White House staffers. When asked to supply 
evidence for their claims, congresswoman Michele Bachmann primarily cited work 
by Frank Gaffney.1 Gaffney, founder of conservative think-tank the Center for 
Security Policy and one of the original signatories for PNAC, had both expressed 
doubts about President Barack Obama’s status as a US citizen and accused parts of 
the government of submitting to Muslim interests. In 2010, his Center had published 
Shariah: The Threat to America (An Exercise in Competitive Analysis—Report of 
Team ‘B’ II), co-authored by Gaffney and others styling themselves ‘Team “B” II’.  
In the report, Team ‘B’ II lays out the claim that Islamic shari’a, or religious 
                                                
1 The event was widely discussed in the press, often dismissively, and compared to a return to 
McCarthyism. See: ‘Bachmann’s Islamist Scare Relaunches McCarthyism’, in USA Today 25/07/2012 
(http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2012-07-25/Bachmann-Huma-Abedin-
letters/56492480/1), ‘McCarthyism Redux’ in The New York Times, 18/07/2012 
(www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/opinions/mccarthyism-redux.html), and ‘Michele Bachmann’s 
Baseless Attack On Huma Abedin’ in The Washington Post, 19/07/2012 
(www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michele-bachmanns-baseless-attack-on-huma-
abedin/2012/07/19/gJQAFhkiwW_story.html). The incident has recently been analysed (albeit briefly) 
by Andrew Burt in American Hysteria (2015: 150, 178–179). 
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law, constitutes an ideological and existential threat to the United States. They declare 
that the US government, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, had 
concentrated its military efforts into combating violent extremists rather than on the 
‘true’ threat of Islamic religious law itself, which, they argue, compels all Muslims 
that follow it to work to undermine Western civilisation from within in a ‘civilization 
jihad’. For Team ‘B’ II, shari’a constituted a ‘totalitarian socio-political doctrine’ 
masquerading as religion, and that followers of shari’a seek to impose a new world 
order: ‘a global totalitarian system cloaked as an Islamic state and called a caliphate’. 
It is impossible in the minds of these Muslims, they continue, for alternative systems 
of governance and law to coexist peacefully with ‘the end-state they seek’ (2010: 6). 
 The report is grandiose in its generalisations, drawing on numerous events and 
quotations to construct a picture of a global conspiracy of devout Muslims working to 
undermine America. It conflates Sunnis and Shi’ites, as well as groups and persons 
with disparate interests and goals, from then-President of Iran Mahmood 
Ahmadinejad to Sayyid Qutb, al-Qaeda, and the Council on American Islamic 
Relations, in order to portray a united front. This includes the claim that all Muslims 
who give religious charity (zakat) knowingly finance terrorism—since shari’a 
dictates that those engaged in jihad are legitimate recipients of such charity (ibid.: 11–
22). The study reduces the nuanced and complex history of Muslim and non-Muslim 
relations to one of strife: ‘In fact,’ it declares, ‘the forces of shariah have been at war 
with non-Muslims for 1400 years and with the United States of America for 200 
years. While the most recent campaign to impose this totalitarian code began in the 
late 20th Century, it is but the latest in a historical record of offensive warfare that 
stretches back to the origins of Islam itself’ (ibid.: 16). 
 I will return to this report in greater detail below. It is, however, exemplary of 
a broader set of texts (openly religious and allegedly secular) that construct narratives 
around a certain figuration of ‘Islam’. Gaffney and his team proclaim that America is 
engaged in an ‘existential conflict’ against a foe that has succeeded in hiding its true 
identity (ibid.: 11), one residing in a global network of conspirators bound together by 
an ideological project antithetical to Western freedom and extending back almost a 
millennium and a half. Indeed, this conspiracy has even gained access to the White 
House, able to manipulate American policy in accordance with its goals. For Team 
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‘B’ II, this conflict is between two ontologically antithetical entities locked in a 
dualistic conflict from which only one will emerge victorious. Other authors—Joel 
Richardson, Pamela Geller, Robert Spencer, and others—utilise similar topoi. They 
too conflate a variety of groups, individuals, and institutions in order to construct a 
demonological ‘Islam’, whose essence is ancient and continuous despite appearances 
of change, and incommensurable to ‘the West’—an equally chimerical figure with an 
inner essence envisioned as equally immutable.  
 This chapter analyses the conflict between these constructed others across four 
sections. The first explores the structural and genealogical similarities and differences 
between Islamophobic and antisemitic discourses as reflective of the construction of 
others to a Christian self.2 Sections two and three build on this by exploring two sides 
of contemporary Islamophobic demonologies. Section two focuses on analysing two 
interrelated conspiracy theories, that of the Muslim Brotherhood infiltration of the US 
and that of President Barack Obama’s ‘secret Muslim identity’, both of which figure 
‘Muslims’ as enemies seeking possession of the Western/American body politic in 
order to twist it to nefarious (un-American) purposes. Section three analyses the 
instrumentalisation of Israel as a symbolic and actual shield against Islam in recent 
apocalyptic texts, which deploy Islamist antisemitism to construct a narrative of 
cosmic warfare in which Israel becomes a proxy for authentic Western selfhood. The 
final section then focuses on the image of the ‘Caliphate’ in the works analysed as a 
competing model of selfhood to a Western/American identity (both of which are 
constructed as monolithic, essential, and incommensurable).3 This ‘Caliphate’ is both 
symbolic and geopolitical, encapsulating the imagined intrinsic unity of the Muslim 
community and the future reality towards which they are constructed as striving. The 
                                                
2 I follow the convention used by David Norman Smith of writing antisemitism and related 
terminology sans hyphen. Nasar Meer notes, in defence of this, that ‘no phenomenon such as Semitism 
has ever existed’, though there is a religious and racial-linguistic genealogy of ‘Semites’ (2013: 395; 
see also Anidjar 2008; Klug 2014). This is not strictly true; however, historically ‘Semitism’ and 
‘antisemitism’ were actually synonymous. As Richard Levy notes, the term ‘Semitism’ was in popular 
usage by the start of the eighteenth century and, while never value-neutral, by mid-century ‘had come 
to signify a body of uniformly negative traits supposedly clinging to Jews’ (2005: 24–5). 
‘Antisemitism’ thus figures a political stance against the idea of Jews constructed by the concept 
‘Semitism’, rather than a negation or opposition to it. 
3 As all the texts I examine were produced before the rise of ISIS, none of them address this movement, 
although the movement conforms broadly to their eschatological hopes and fears regarding a coming 
Caliphate. 
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primary ‘existential conflict’ that emerges is not of order against chaos but of order 
against different order, not self against other but self against an-other self: an 
American Self beleaguered by postmodern morality, globalisation, changing social 
norms and political correctness against an Islamic ‘Other Self’ constructed as unitary, 
strong and totalising—an ‘is’ that is an inverted mirror of what ‘ought’ to be. 
CONSPIRACISM, ANTISEMITISM, AND THE CHIMERA OF ISLAM 
In Warrant for Genocide, Norman Cohn posits that the antisemitic myth of the Jewish 
world conspiracy represents a modern adaptation of an ‘ancient demonological 
tradition’ (1981: 22), a view also adopted by David Norman Smith in his article on 
antisemitic conspiracy theory, ‘The Social Construction of Enemies’ (1996: 204–8). 
Additionally, while not making the connection explicit, Robert Fuller details the 
linking in American and European apocalypticism of the Jews with either Antichrist 
specifically or demons generally (1994: 134–64). As Smith (1996: 224) notes,  
Jews, or any group, can be stigmatized as ‘essentially evil’ on racial, 
religious, or cultural grounds. Hence the fundamental issue is not which 
kind of ‘difference’ is assigned to such a group, but whether this 
difference is regarded as ethical and essential. A group that is not 
‘essentially’ evil would not plot against humanity. Nor would it be 
necessary to annihilate such a people. 
This categorisation of essential evil is one of the ways conspiracy theory fulfils the 
same social function as traditional apocalypticisms. Barkun defines conspiracy belief 
as an attempt ‘to delineate and explain evil’ (2003: 3), often resulting in the creation 
of a worldview dominated by a struggle between dualistic forces. Like providential 
histories, conspiracism emphases a universe governed by design (B.P. Bennett 2007). 
Yet the guiding hand of the architect is predominantly demonic (Wójcik 1997: 141). 
The guiding force behind civilisation is both hidden and evil. Moreover, the siting of 
this satanic hand is predominantly outside of a ‘true’ community of believers, in a 
foreign and barbarian other disguised as ‘upright’ and ‘innocent’ (O'Leary 1995: 6). 
In the preceeding chapter, I elaborated on a particular construction of this ‘true’ 
community. In this and proceeding chapters, I will concentrate on its others; on those 
whose exclusion from this community is both constitutive and (therefore) 
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destabilising of it.  
The Twinned Trees of Antisemitism and Islamophobia 
Identification of Muslims, like Jews, as demonological agents is not new. Beatus of 
Liébana (c.730–c.800) was first to identify the Antichrist as Muslim in the figure of 
Muhammad (Rusconi 2000: 293). Thomas Kidd, charting the representations of Islam 
in American evangelicalism, noting that ‘Mohametan’ religion was a common target 
of Antichrist aspersions from the early colonial period through the nineteenth century, 
featuring alongside Catholicism as a bastion of base luxury and superstition opposed 
to the enlightened reason of Protestantism (2009: 1–18). The demonisation of Islam is 
thus not recent, yet the form this demonological Islam takes in the texts discussed 
below draws on contemporary ideologies and social anxieties that differentiate it from 
the accusations of Beatus or Puritan settlers. This form draws significantly both from 
historical alignments of Jews and Muslims as others to Christianity (Anidjar 2010; 
Goldberg 2006; Meer 2013) and from nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideologies of 
the ‘Jewish conspiracy’, casting their topoi in similar but tellingly distinct ways. 
 In ‘The Limits of Analogy’, Brian Klug examines the analogy between classic 
antisemitism and contemporary Islamophobia in considerable depth. He notes the 
politically charged nature of the claim that Muslims in contemporary Europe have 
adopted a societal status similar to that held by the Jews historically, listing several 
factors, including post-war demographic shifts, changes in post-Cold War geopolitics 
and the enduring Israel-Palestine conflict ( Klug 2014: 443–4; see also Anidjar 2010; 
Goldberg 2006; Meer 2013; Rana 2007). He decides that the analogy holds within 
limits, delineating core similarities and differences between prejudices. Klug lists 
three genealogical similarities. Both Judaism and Islam are religions with ‘a troubled 
relationship to Christianity’ in which they have often occupied the negative side of a 
binary opposition in Christian polemics: ‘Christianity on the side of the angelic—the 
loving, the forbearing, the forgiving—and Judaism and Islam occupying the other 
side: the legalistic, the vengeful, the merciless’ (2014: 452–3). Enlightenment thought 
later assimilated and secularised this narrative, casting the two again on the negative 
side of a binary, this time on the side of unreason, myth, and tyranny against Western 
secular reason, science, and freedom (ibid.: 453). Finally, both were orientalised, with 
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Islam firmly in the East and Judaism as the Eastern interloper and the Jews as ‘the 
Oriental within’ (ibid.: 453–4). This third similarity highlights a key difference 
between the two traditions: the ‘Oriental’ versus the ‘Oriental within’, the distant 
other versus the other over here, (un)seen. The latter plays a key role in the Jewish 
conspiracy, which uses antisemitic tracts like the Protocols in order to construct an 
image of an occult web of Jewish global control (Klug 2014; Linehan 2012; Meer and 
Noorani 2008). While the Muslim was a threat to the borders of a self, the Jew was 
already within that self; as visible self-otherness, the Jew destabilised the self’s 
constructed wholeness. With increased immigration of Muslims into Europe and 
America in the postcolonial period, a dichotomy between Jew and Muslim as internal 
and external other no longer functions, however. This is not to say they have become 
identical, however. Indeed, there remain crucial differences. 
One of the central features of the Jewish conspiracy is that the control is often 
figured as financial. Barkun notes that the European/Christian folk image of the Jew 
as ‘moneylender and economic manipulator’ fitted into a late-nineteenth-century 
political fascination with the historical function of money, one that included 
‘demonizing bankers, hypothesizing outlandish monetary schemes, and imagining 
bizarre financial conspiracies’ (2003: 129–30). Associations of Jewishness with 
capitalism do not have a clear equivalent in Islamophobic discourse. Thomas Linehan 
(2012: 380), in discussing the relationship between antisemitism and Islamophobia in 
Britain specifically, has noted that ‘neither is there an equivalent discourse alleging 
Muslim control and orchestration of international finance, as in the Jewish “hidden 
hand” myth’ (see also Klug 2014: 454; Meer and Noorani 2008: 209). Matthew Carr 
has posited that the concept of ‘Eurabia,’ in which a ‘masochistic and suicidal 
Europe’ submits to Islamic religio-cultural domination, could fill this role by casting 
Muslims as ‘conspiratorial agents of world domination’ (2011: 14). However, Eurabia 
and the Jewish conspiracy differ crucially in that while Jewish hiddenness is often 
central, Eurabia often hinges on its alleged self-evidence—while Muslims might 
conspire in secret, their dominance is seen as obvious, tied to the construction of 
religious buildings, increased immigration, and rising birth-rates (Fekete 2012: 34–
 136 
5).4 
 Linehan’s observations are broadly but not wholly accurate. Alongside overt 
signs of Islamisation (demographics and architecture) in the Eurabia conspiracy is the 
myth of the moderate Muslim: the idea, Liz Fekete clarifies, that ‘Muslims who do 
not signal their Muslimness (for example, by wearing religious clothing) are merely 
posing as modern, progressive and westernised. They are, in fact, camouflaged, and 
this makes them the more dangerous’ (2012: 35).5 This can be considered a version of 
a key component of conspiracism that marks a conspiracy as non-falsifiable; that is, 
that evidence against the conspiracy is itself a product of the conspiracy, intended to 
mislead the unwary and ensure its success (2003: 7). It also, however, gestures to the 
demonologico-political notion of counterfeiture. The existence of moderate Muslims 
here is not evidence of Islam’s diversity but of a strategy of deliberate deception built 
to occlude its essential unity.6 The ‘moderate Muslim’ is a counterfeit Westerner. 
As Fekete notes, the idea of ‘being in camouflage—changing appearance to 
blend in’ was itself central to the Jewish conspiracy (2012: 35), and similar notions of 
illicit infiltration are exemplified by Team ‘B’ II, for whom the Muslim Brotherhood 
is seen as having covert agents at the highest levels of government. The subjugation 
of America under Islamic law is here perceived as being effected subtly and secretly, 
                                                
4 The possible influence of oil revenue and intergovernmental organisations like OPEC are rarely 
mentioned. They emerge sometimes in the more overtly apocalyptic texts, such as Jack Smith’s 2011 
Islam: The Cloak of Antichrist, in which Smith interprets apocalyptic Babylon as Wahhabist Saudi 
Arabia and the ‘wine of her immorality’ on which the world becomes drunk (Rev. 18:3) as Middle 
Eastern oil generally (2011: 218). This is one of few overt references, however—the fixation is mainly 
on shari’a legalism and demographic shifts. 
5 As Saba Mahmood (2006) has elaborated, not only does Islam itself have a long and multifaceted 
tradition of interpretation, the construction of the ‘moderate Muslim’ is, today, itself embedded in 
Western discourses of secularism and in geopolitical strategies of US dominance that attempt to 
promote (financially and discursively) an ‘Islam’ brought in line with Enlightenment hermeneutical 
discourses of reason built in line with a political vision amenable to American interests—religious 
organisations working towards liberatory social goals but critical of American policies and/or 
secularism are deemed ‘even more dangerous than the militant or the fundamentalist’ (ibid.: 334). See 
also Jansen (2011) and Mas (2006). 
6 This idea is featured heavily in all of the texts examined in this chapter, albeit in different ways. For 
Gaffney and associates in Team B II, it is a practical deception born from an ideological mission, and 
belief in shari’a is identified as the ‘fault line’ along which all Muslims must be truly identified lest 
they corrupt the body politic from within, thereby leaving room for really-existing moderates (2010: 7). 
This view is echoed by other authors (Gaubatz and Sperry 2009; Geller and Spencer 2010; McCarthy 
2011; Spencer 2008), while overtly apocalyptic writers often differ, constructing deception as innate to 
Islam itself (Richardson 2009: 151–62). This construction of ‘true’ Islam is, of course, simplistic and 
erroneous, effacing histories of complex textual interpretation and cultural differences (Jansen 2011; 
Mahmood 2006; Mas 2006). 
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an Islamophobic variant of the ‘hidden hand’ myth that reaches its acme in 
conspiracies of President Obama as a secret ‘Muslim terrorist’ (Gotanda 2011: 194–
5), whose ‘Post-American Presidency’ (Geller and Spencer 2010) threatens to destroy 
‘Real America’, forever shattering its uniqueness via the advent of ‘a secularist and 
socialist dystopia along modern Western European lines’ (Schlafly and Neumayr 
2012: 1)—barely one step from a Eurabian nightmare. 
 In the evolution of this ‘Islamic hidden hand’ myth the dissociation of Islam 
from finance and capitalism is illuminating. The absence of this conspiratorial 
connection reveals both differences in the operation of the ‘hidden hand’ myths and 
attributes of the American selfhood constructed as under threat. As I detailed above, 
capitalism and Christianity became two pillars of American identity during the Cold 
War, an ideological identification that carried on through Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ 
into its promised New American Century. Moreover, in the clash-of-civilisations 
narrative that saturates popular Islamophobic rhetoric, capitalism is aligned with the 
West. Rather than a transnational flow of capital as in the Jewish conspiracy, the 
Islamic conspiracy relies on a transnational flow of bodies. Its tools are immigration 
and demographics, ‘political correctness’, and (ultimately) changes to law. Whilst the 
Jewish conspiracy controls with finance, the Muslim conspiracy controls with culture. 
It infiltrates and subverts the systems of democracy and freedom seen as defining ‘the 
West’ until it has total control. For the authors examined below, ‘Islam’ necessitates 
an answer as totalitarian as the system it allegedly heralds. 
The Chimera of ‘Islam’ 
The ‘Islam’ of the Islamic conspiracies outlined below is, at heart, chimerical. It is a 
demonological fantasy with no direct correlative relationship to reality. Smith (1996) 
adopts the concept of chimeria to refer to the mythic fantasies of Jewry that exist in 
antisemitic discourses. He derives the term from the historian Gavin Langmuir, who 
used it in order to differentiate types of prejudice, one derived from lived experience 
or direct contact (‘routine bias’) and another which constructed the other as demonic, 
which he termed ‘chimeria.’ Smith disagrees with many of Langmuir’s claims, but 
finds ideas of chimeria useful in understanding antisemitism. While appearing to draw 
on real Jews or their role in history—‘Jews unquestionably did seem uncanny to 
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medieval Christians,’ he notes, ‘and they did play a distinctive role as money-lenders 
in late medieval Europe. Marx was instrumental in forging the intellectual 
armamentarium of socialism, and the Rothschilds were central figures in early 
modern finance’ (1996: 221)—antisemitism was not about such realities but was a 
projection of a search for ‘aboriginal evil’, the dualistic construction of a 
demonological other that had to be expunged for the continued safety and sanctity of 
the self. It was this notion of cosmic evil embodied in the chimerical figure of the 
‘Jew’ that truly occupied the mind of the antisemite, not ‘the human reality of actual 
Jews’ (ibid.: 215). 
 I wish to apply Smith’s use of chimeria to analyse Islamophobic discourses. 
Smith himself alludes to the potential for ‘“fanatical” Islam’ to become chimerical, 
though at the time of writing he did not believe it had yet occurred: ‘Not until fear of 
“fanatical Islam” is as delusional as Manichaean antisemitism’, he wrote, ‘will it 
qualify as a form of chimeria; and even then it would remain a minor chimeria until it 
captured the imaginations of tens of millions of people’ (ibid.: 225). Given the global 
ascent of Islamophobic paradigms since 9/11, I believe it is now possible, perhaps 
necessary, to recognise fear of ‘fanatical Islam’ as a major chimeria. Even if one were 
to disagree on assigning the label ‘major’, I believe the texts examined below display 
the level of delusion Smith considers requisite for indicating that Islamophobia has 
become chimerical.  
Similar to the Jewish conspiracy, many Islamophobic texts discuss the actions, 
statements and practices of real Muslims. At times these Muslims conform to the 
authors’ Islamophobic narratives in their violence and bigotry, antisemitic language or 
blind allegiance to an apparently merciless god. It is important to realise, as Smith 
does in regards to the ‘Jew’, that the existence of such Muslims does not make the 
‘Muslim’ any less chimerical. Klug discusses this point in relation to the ‘Woolwich 
attack’ of May 2013, in which off-duty British soldier Lee Rigby was murdered by 
Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale (2014: 450). Noting the excessive, fear-
mongering tone of much of the media coverage, he suggests that: 
These descriptions could almost have been lifted from a manual of 
negative stereotypes of Islam. Almost every major trope is there: 
backwardness, callousness, bloodiness, an ethic of revenge, mindless 
worship of a merciless God and so on. Thus the perpetrators were not only 
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Muslim, they were also ‘Muslim’: they acted out the script written into the 
Islamophobic figure of the ‘Muslim’ before the eyes of witnesses. The 
witnesses did not imagine what they saw. The attack really occurred. 
Nonetheless the figure is not real: it is no less fantastic—in the sense of 
being an image projected on to Muslims collectively—for having been 
incarnated on the streets of Woolwich (ibid.) 
The existence of Muslims who fit the narratives of the authors analysed below, do not 
prove their narratives any more than the Rothschilds being central figures in early 
modern finance proves the reality of the Jewish conspiracy. Team ‘B’ II claim that the 
word ‘shariah’ is understood as threatening even to those who do not know what it 
means (2010: 16). Richardson builds a narrative of Islam’s intrinsic demonic nature, 
transforming Muslims into ‘literally transcendental, Luciferian figures of bestiality 
and danger’ (D.N. Smith 1996: 225). Meanwhile, discourses of President Obama’s 
covert Muslimness, a keystone in broader narratives of his unbelonging, indicate a 
situation in which ‘partisan and ideological polarization has extended from policy 
issues to assessments of objective reality’ (Layman, Green and Kalkan 2014: 537). 
These scenarios exist either in spite of or irrespective of reality. They are not about 
Muslims but ‘evil’, about the ‘Muslim’ as demonological sign of evil.  
 Even if Islamophobic demonologies have not yet gained the cultural currency 
of antisemitic demonologies and Islamophobia and antisemitism are not identical 
patterns of prejudice, they possess enough similarities—contemporary and 
genealogical—to make the analogy illuminating. I do not mean that they are fully 
identical and thereby erase the specificities of each, but this lack of direct one-to-one 
correlation does not make analogy useless. In addition to a certain shared history, my 
point is that both antisemitism and Islamophobia are chimerical—demonologies, not 
anthropologies; the Muslims in the narratives below are, to appropriate Smith, ‘social 
representations of people, not people per se.’ While there are socio-cultural and 
historical reasons why this figure is called ‘Muslim’—Klug’s genealogical 
similarities, 9/11 or 7/7, the Global War on Terror—this ‘Muslim’ is a demonological 
fiction, like the Chimera itself it is a ‘fabulous monster’, bits of reality sutured with 
fantasy (D.N. Smith 1996: 220–1). These dismembered parts are disparate data points 
evoked to construct the form of a demonological other, a force of satanic barbarism 
locked in a ceaseless, cosmic war of incommensurable essences with an equally 
immutable—if paradoxically threatened—selfhood. The existence of this other is not 
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dependent on the statements, actions or existence of actual Muslims, much as 
antisemitic conspiracies do not depend on the statements, actions or existence of 
actual Jews. They depend on the monstrous figuration of the ‘Muslim’ as a figure of 
evil, the inassimilable demonic other to an endangered sovereign self. 
THE INASSIMILABLE FOREIGNNESS OF ISLAM 
‘Instinctively,’ Gaffney and his co-authors begin one section of Shariah, ‘even 
Americans who are unfamiliar with the term “shariah” understand that it poses a 
threat’ (Center for Security Policy 2010: 16). The source of this observation is never 
revealed, but the sentence is illustrative of the tone and position adopted by Shariah 
throughout. The text narrates a war between monolithic and incompatible ideological 
systems, ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’, an existential struggle few in the West are even 
aware of (even if they comprehend the threat on an instinctual level). The dominant 
message of the report is that Islam in general, and shari’a specifically, constitutes an 
immediate, profound and heretofore unrecognised ideological threat to the US, its 
Constitution, and its people’s freedoms. ‘America is engaged’, the authors declare, ‘in 
existential conflict with foes that have succeeded brilliantly in concealing their true 
identity and very dangerous capabilities’ (ibid.: 11). The danger America faces is not, 
the report claims, in the weapons of groups like al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah 
(though these are threats) but rather in the innate ideological incompatibility between 
the ideals of Western (mostly American, but also European) democracy and Islam. 
While those living in the West have come (naively) to see Islam as a religion, the 
report asserts, the truth is that Islam is a totalitarian political system, like Nazism and 
Communism. The ‘Muslim supremacists, often called Islamists’ who constitute the 
body of this totalitarian group are attempting—some via terrorism, but others by 
‘stealthier means‘—to institute a totalitarian regime: ‘a global totalitarian system 
cloaked as an Islamic state and called a caliphate’ (ibid.: 6). 
 This synopsis addresses the heart of ‘Oriental within’ Islamophobic discourse: 
the innate incompatibility of ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’, the former’s gradual infiltration 
of the latter, whose naivety leads to its eventual collapse and assimilation. Shariah 
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epitomises the tendencies and topoi of this discourse, reinscribing Islamic sacred 
space as sites of political sedition, terrorist cells metastasised throughout America’s 
body politic. This reinscription ties into specific forms of racial and religious coding 
in the contemporary US. Drawing on the racial coding of Asian Americans, critical 
race theorist Neil Gotanda has analysed the coding of ‘Muslims’ through division into 
either ‘Muslim terrorists’—a radical other who is permanently foreign, inassimilable, 
and subject to ‘disloyalty, espionage, and sabotage’—or ‘good Muslims’—who 
adhere passively to concepts of American secularism by shedding all cultural and 
religious markers of otherness and/or opposition (2011: 191, 194). As discussed 
above, while texts posit the possibility of ‘good Muslims’, there is a tendency to code 
all ‘good Muslims’ as ‘Muslim terrorists’ in disguise, agents of deception waiting to 
strike. In ‘Obama-as-Muslim’ conspiracies, the 44th President operates as an exemplar 
of this tendency, coded first as a covert Muslim and then as covert ‘Muslim terrorist’ 
seeking to destroy America. In Obama conspiracies, his identification as ‘Muslim’ 
serves mainly as shorthand for a broader unbelonging: as sociologists Layman, Green 
and Kalkan have noted, ‘in contemporary politics, there may be no more effective 
way to “de-Americanize” a politician than to suggest that he or she is Muslim’ (2014: 
534–35). ‘Muslim’ is used because it is coded as representing the quintessence of the 
‘UnAmerican’. It is this binary—American/Muslim—that carries through all the texts 
analysed here. 
A Brotherhood of Alterity 
The group Team ‘B’ II identify as guiding the covert Islamification of America, and 
as the centre of all Islamic terrorism and the majority of Muslim organisations in the 
West, is the Muslim Brotherhood (2010: 65). Further, the Brotherhood has succeeded, 
via a campaign of deliberate disinformation that has deceived Western governments 
and large swathes of the public, in placing agents at all levels of the American and 
European political processes (ibid.: 19–20). They clarify as follows:  
Steeped in Islamic doctrine, and already embedded deep inside both the 
United States and our allies, the Brotherhood has become highly skilled in 
exploiting the civil liberties and multicultural proclivities of Western 
societies for the purpose of destroying the latter from within (ibid.: 10).  
This is the ‘stealthier means’ alluded to above, and is referred to throughout the report 
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as either ‘civilization jihad’ or ‘stealth jihad’, a ‘pre-violent’ phase of building the 
Caliphate. Once Islamists have managed to gain enough secular power for themselves 
via this infiltration of Western systems of governance and bureaucracy, non-Muslims 
will be forced to submit to Islam or face execution (ibid.: 46).  
This construction of the Muslim Brotherhood is vast, appearing to include any 
individual or organisation that has at some point been associated or shared 
membership with, grown out of or been ideologically used by the Brotherhood. The 
report lists almost thirty organisations as being either Muslim Brotherhood fronts or 
ideological allies, ranging from Hamas and al-Qaeda to the Council of American 
Islamic Relations and Muslim Students Association (MSA). The MSA, founded 
1962–3 at the University of Illinois, has the dubious honour of being ‘the first Muslim 
Brotherhood entity founded in the United States’, which, while seeming like ‘just 
another moderate Muslim group working on college campuses’ is underpinned by ‘the 
same ideology as defines the Muslim Brotherhood and al Qaida’ (ibid.: 80, 55–91). In 
a pattern running through all the texts examined here, in identifying why America and 
the West generally has been blind to this ‘stealth jihad’, Team ‘B’ II places the root 
cause in a generalised loss of intrinsic values: 
As a nation, we have lost our understanding of America’s founding 
principles and as a result have become increasingly ill-prepared to defend 
the superiority of those principles. This puts us at a distinct disadvantage 
in being able to identify, let alone understand and confront, hostile 
doctrines—both foreign and domestic—that are in conflict with our own. 
The result of this combination of confusion and lassitude is that, in the 
face of shariah’s violent and stealthy jihadist assaults, our peace and 
prosperity are at risk to the point where the core tenets of our nation—and 
ultimately its very existence—are in jeopardy (ibid.: 119). 
Additionally, far from being a new threat, this ‘violent and stealthy’ attack is 
just the latest phase in a history of essential conflict between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’:  
In fact, the forces of shariah have been at war with non-Muslims for 1400 
years and with the United States of America for 200 years. While the most 
recent campaign to impose this totalitarian code began in the late 20th 
Century, it is but the latest in a historical record of offensive warfare that 
stretches back to the origins of Islam itself (ibid.: 16). 
Team B II thereby attempts to build an image of a timeless conflict between opposing 
forces. The report builds its image of this war by drawing on quotations from Islamist 
figures like Maududi, Qutb, al-Banna and the Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as Quranic 
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and hadith narratives and the writings of classical Muslim scholars such as al-Misni, 
ibn Taymiyya, ibn Rushd, ibn Khaldun, al-Shaybani, and others. Through choosing 
excerpts from texts from a range of historic periods and from both Sunni and Shi’a 
Muslims,7 Team B II create the impression of an unbroken continuity of Islamic (or 
Islamist, these being virtually synonymous here) thought (ibid.: 45–51).8 
 The immutable Islam the report opposes is, at heart, chimerical; its relation to 
really-existing Islam or even Islamisms is secondary to its narrative construction of 
essential and existential conflict. The idea of Muslim Brotherhood infiltration fits 
easily into general conspiracist discourses about shadowy networks of conspirators. In 
keeping with my earlier observation that the ‘Islamic conspiracy’ operates through the 
transnational flow of bodies, however, it is enlightening to examine the ways that 
Team ‘B’ II attempt to redefine Muslim space. This redefinition has its origin in their 
initial recategorisation of Islam from religion to totalitarian political system, which 
moves the faith from a religious practice guaranteed freedom of expression under the 
US Constitution to a threat to that Constitution and the ways of being the authors 
associate with it. This recasting of Islam leads to a reinscribing of Muslim sacred 
space as geopolitical space. In this fashion, Team B II reinterpret areas made sacred to 
Islam—mosques, religious centres and schools, Muslim-dominated neighbourhoods, 
and even Muslim homes—as spaces of an alien sovereignty infecting the body politic 
(2010: 55–6). They become sites not of worship, but of sedition.9 
                                                
7 This conflation sits in uneasy collusion with broader tendencies to project sectarian motives (whether 
Sunni/Shi’a or tribal) onto Iraq and other targets of the War on Terror, at least in the media (Peteet 
2008; Visser 2007). Visser notes that while the Bush government was often keen to downplay sectarian 
divisions, the media discourse surrounding post-2003 Iraq often fixated on sectarianism even when 
such interpretations contradicted evidence (2007: 87–91). Team ‘B’ II, however, is often prone to 
downplay sectarianism in favour of presenting a united Islamism threatening to the West: ‘Shi’a’ 
appears just three times in the report, two of which are in the context of historic alliances or doctrinal 
equivalences with Sunnism (2010: 41, 49). 
8 The political composition of the West in this trans-historical conflict is never raised; while this is not 
the focus of the report, its absence in a tale of innate conflict is conspicuous at best. It is worth noting, 
however, that while the narrative constructed by Team ‘B’ II is centrally one of a totalitarian Islam 
against the secular social order of the US rather than Christianity directly, they attempt to draw a direct 
line between Christianity and the doctrines of the Constitution, devoting a section to explaining how 
the ideas of mutual toleration found in that Constitution and its enshrined separation between Church 
and State are rooted in Christian doctrines, exemplified by Jesus’ statements that one should ‘Submit 
yourselves for the Lord's sake to every authority instituted among men‘ (1 Peter 2:13) and ‘Render 
unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s’ (Mark 2:17) (2010: 120). 
9 The logic underlying this division ties into the constitutive divisions of modernity. Gurminder 
Bhambra (2007) explores how the discursive paradigm of modernity relies on notions of rupture and of 
difference defined as temporal and spatial (and spatial-as-temporal). As Bhambra elaborates, one of the 
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Sacred Seditions 
The subsection of Shariah redefining sacred space is brief but central. It opens with 
the following (Center for Security Policy 2010: 55):  
The concept of Sacred Space is a well-developed one in shariah, which 
centuries of commentary have established as authoritative. Indeed, shariah 
is an aggressively territorial system that holds all land on earth has been 
given by Allah to Muslims in perpetuity: Since the world already belongs 
in its entirety to Muslims—whether currently in reality or prospectively—
they are both destined and obligated to dominate it. 
The authors proceed to explain that ‘Sacralizing new or reclaimed territory for Islam 
is an ongoing venture in which migrant and converted Muslim communities in the 
West are constantly engaged…Such Muslims may first sacralize the spaces within 
their own homes and mosques while later generations typically move outward to 
claim an ever expanding share of the public space’ (ibid.) This leads to an 
Islamification of space, spreading from new mosques to apartment buildings and 
entire city blocks, creating ‘a network of Muslim-controlled space’. Further, in ‘many 
cases’ these spaces ‘become not only ghettos where crime flourishes among an 
immigrant population that refuses to assimilate, but actual Sacred Space where 
shariah is practiced in contravention and supersession of local law’ (ibid.: 56). 
Exactly how effectively segregated communities like these manage to play key roles 
in the infiltration of secular institutions in the name of the Caliphate is never clarified. 
 I would stress here that I am not arguing that such ghettoised communities do 
not exist, nor that sacred space is not in a sense always-already political. Rather, I am 
analysing how the existence of such spaces are both conjured and configured within 
the text so that, by its positing of a clear division between religion and politics and 
reconstructing Islam as the latter it reinscribes sacred space as seditious. This relates 
to Gotanda’s observation of the ‘Muslim terrorist’ as permanently foreign and thus 
inassimilable: the Muslim as Muslim is, by definition, too alien for America and it is 
                                                                                                                                      
key concepts to emerge in paradigms of modernity was an idea of the progression of systems of 
knowledge and understanding from the ‘primitive’ (governed by superstition) via the religious and the 
metaphysical to the ‘modern’, coded in terms of scientific rationalism and constituting the ‘universal’ 
foundation of modern politics (ibid.:.34–55). Islam, as religious, is coded as morally superseded by the 
strictures of scientific rationality and modern secularised politics. In a sense, ‘Islam’ here cuts an abject 
figure that adheres partly but not entirely to the political formulations of modernity, which Team ‘B’ II 
attempts to reconcile by moving it from the (private, apolitical) sphere of religion to that of politics. 
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only by shedding all difference that the Muslim becomes assimilable—the only ‘good 
Muslim’ is a ‘not-Muslim.’ For Team ‘B’ II, the existence of Islamic sacred spaces in 
America is viewed as evidence of a seditious political ideology operating in the West 
due to the ignorance or ideological infiltration of the authorities. Islamic sacred space 
does not have a mainly religious function but is the means of achieving the ‘seditious 
goal [of] civilisation jihad’ (ibid.: 74)—of challenging national sovereignties and the 
secular rule of law. 
 Tying back into their primary identification of the roots of this infiltration in a 
general degeneration of Western values, one way the report attempts to construct its 
image of the undermining of American sovereignty is by the conduct of non-Muslims 
within these ‘networks of Muslim space’, such as ‘female journalists who don a 
headscarf for an interview with a Muslim personage and Western political figures 
who do the same thing’ (ibid.: 56). Other targets are general attitudes of ‘political 
correctness’ and cosmopolitan multiculturalism, whose moral-relativising tendencies 
are blamed on philosophies of ‘post-modernism’ which have led to an era of ‘Western 
identity-decline’ (ibid.: 125–7). For Team ‘B’ II, this ‘demonstrates a kind of pre-
emptive submission on the part of non-Muslim Westerners’ (ibid.: 56; see also Geller 
and Spencer 2010; Mattera 2010; McCarthy 2011; Spencer 2008). The report itself 
links this attitude of ‘pre-emptive submission’ to a kind of Islamic reverse-
colonisation of the West, both physical and ideological.  
In the opening segments of chapter seven, the report lays the blame for this 
‘submission’ at Western guilt over the subjugation of the colonial Other. Western 
tolerance of Islam is, according to the report, the latest manifestation of the ‘age-old 
encounter’ between ‘the West and the rest’ which birthed the image of the ‘Noble 
Savage’—defined as a projection of ‘nobility onto the primitive peoples…that 
cancelled out, or at least compensated for, their obvious savagery.’ The Islamist is a 
new incarnation of this ‘Noble Savage’, but with a ‘crucial difference’: it is not noble 
and it is ‘here’: ‘Where the Other of yesteryear used to live vividly imagined, if dimly 
understood, in the Western imagination, the contemporary Other now lives, quite 
literally, in the West itself’ (ibid.: 126–7). The danger is that this other resides 
amongst ‘us’ but we have deluded ourselves by projecting nobility onto their ‘obvious 
savagery.’ As the authors clarify, twentieth-century demographic shifts that have 
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brought the ‘adherents of shariah’ deep into the non-Muslim world are forms of 
colonisation, since the ‘demands’ of this group for ‘cultural accommodation’ (glossed 
as ‘submission’) are in truth ‘the 21st Century echo of the centuries-long subjugation 
of our European ancestors to Islamic conquest and domination’ (ibid.: 127). 
Team ‘B’ II’s Islamophobic demonology is representative of a swathe of 
similar demonologies in America that seek to construct Muslims as vessels of a 
profound theopolitical otherness, often drawing on racist and colonial tropes (though 
few use the ideas of the ‘Noble Savage’ or ‘reverse colonisation’ as brazenly). The 
fallout of events like 9/11 and the 2008 financial meltdown, cannot be understated 
here. For culturally conservative groups like the Tea Party, Donald Pease notes, the 
‘loss of the fantasy of American omnipotence’ was filtered through allegiances to 
military, economic and cultural American Exceptionalism, leading ‘them to interpret 
the economic setbacks and cultural change from the standpoint of the loss of Real 
America’ (2010: 90). Team ‘B’ II identify ‘political correctness’ and ‘moral 
relativism’ as nursemaids to a projected Islamist takeovers, coding such things as 
antithetical to American patriotism and Christian faith, degrading America’s rightful 
place (2010: 125–31; see also Richardson 2009: 160). Such ‘identity-decline’ has left 
America weak, out of touch with its ‘principles’, and allowed antithetical ideologies 
like Islam(ism) to proliferate in the margins.  
 The conspiracy outlined by Team B II builds networks of ‘Muslims’ working 
in collusion to undermine ‘Real America’. Another correlative discourse, however, is 
that which surrounds President Obama, coding him as an otherness that threatens to 
destroy America from the top. Often, this otherness is coded as a covert Muslimness, 
either confessional or cultural, but sometimes takes the form of a religious designation 
as Antichrist or by coding him as generally UnAmerican. All code him as profoundly 
other to an idea of American authenticity that mirrors Team ‘B’ II’s coding of sites of 
Islamic identity as ones of sedition. Much like ‘Muslims’ in general, Pease has noted 
that for far-right groups Obama is figured as the source and symbol of an end to ‘Real 
America’, an internalisation of the discourse of evil externalised in the rhetoric of the 
Global War on Terror (2010: 95). 
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Blood, Faith, and Soil 
Barack Hussein Obama is a practising Christian. Despite this, due to a combination of 
factors from his name or race to his Kenyan father and Indonesian childhood, several 
conspiracy theories regarding an allegedly covert Muslim identity sprung up in the 
years leading to his presidential election, persisting to this day (Layman, Green and 
Kalkan 2014; Pease 2010; R. Williams 2013). The idea of Obama-as-secret-Muslim 
originated in a 2004 press release by one Andy Martin, but only began to circulate 
widely later (Barkun 2013: 184). According to political theorist Danielle Allen, the 
idea only proliferated after 2006, when Martin’s claims resurfaced in an article by 
Vietnam-war veteran Ted Sampley shortly before Obama declared his candidacy for 
the Presidency (in Becker 2012: 163). Sampley’s version included the idea that 
Obama was educated in Wahhabist schools in Indonesia, and that—even if he is, in 
fact Christian—he is seen as Muslim in the Muslim world due to his Muslim paternity 
(Dittmer 2010: 74). Jason Dittmer highlights aspects of this discourse, noting that 
they often hinge on either his genetics or cultural upbringing: ‘We are by nature a 
product of our environment,’ one online discussant proclaimed, ‘Obama attended a 
Muslim school in his early childhood, these are the most important years of influence’ 
(in ibid.: 90). Even if he does not profess Islam, Obama is Muslim (and therefore 
UnAmerican) by parentage and/or upbringing; this comprises his essence, on which 
his professed Americanness rests like a veneer. 
 Despite its lack of veracity, ideas of Obama’s covert Muslim identity managed 
to gain traction in certain conservative circles. In a town-hall-style meeting in 
September 2008, one woman told the Republican candidate John McCain that Obama 
was ‘an Arab.’10 McCain corrected her, to audible boos from the crowd, but this did 
not prevent the ideas from circulating via books, television and radio broadcasts, and 
the Internet. Hartmann and Newmark report that before the 2010 midterms between 
twenty and twenty-five percent of Americans believed Obama to be Muslim (2012). 
Layman, Green and Kalkan report a lower eighteen percent in August 2010, but note 
that this was a substantial rise from the twelve percent it had hovered around between 
                                                
10 Martin, Jonathan and Parnes, Amie, ‘McCain: Obama not an Arab, Crowd Boos’ Politico 
10/10/2008 at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1008/14479.html [accessed 25/11/2014]. 
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March and October 2008 (2014: 535). Some journalists noted that raising doubts 
about Obama’s faith was part of a concerted attempt to question his ‘Americanness’ 
(Beinart 2010; Brooks 2013: 14–16), corroborating Layman, Green and Kalkan’s 
claim that aspersions of Muslimness are tied to attempts at de-Americanisation (2014: 
534–35). This fact is best encapsulated, albeit ironically, in a defence of Obama by 
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who explained to those questioning the 
President’s religious affiliation that ‘the President is not a Muslim, he is a good man’ 
(in Salama 2011: 4). 
 Layman, Green and Kalkan’s observations cut to the heart of the ‘Obama 
conspiracy’: it is less about Obama being Muslim and more about him being ‘other’. 
This broader othering has proliferated through the American political sphere, and only 
magnified after his election in 2008. Martin Parlett, who volunteered for the 2008 
Obama campaign, has noted that rejections of Obama on the basis of race and identity 
became more manifest and mainstream after his election (2014: xi–xii): 
The Tea Party; virulent Birtherism; calls for Obama’s college records; 
suggestions of alternative paternities; Obama’s depiction as Stalin or 
Hitler; calls for the president to return to his ‘native’ Kenya; accusations 
of Islamic extremism, domestic terrorism, communism, fascism, anti-
colonialism, and European socialism; and talk to death panels and re-
education camps became the touchstones of a right-wing conspiracy 
theory of Obama’s non-belonging that pushed him beyond the limits of 
American normalcy. 
Discourses of Obama’s otherness inflect works that do not base themselves overtly 
around any covert sense of identity, but rather try to undermine his legitimacy with 
alleged cultural or political influence or with racially and religiously-coded language. 
These code Obama as not just UnAmerican but UnAmerican in a way that serves to 
weaken America. The preface to Pamela Geller’s The Post-American Presidency, for 
example, opines Obama’s apparent rejection of American Exceptionalism and global 
dominance, and contains a reference to him once being photographed in May 2008 
carrying Fareed Zakaria’s ‘American epitaph’ The Post-American World. She claims 
that Obama seeks to make Zakaria’s ‘wishful thinking’—a world in which rapidly 
industrialising nations like China and India begin competing with America on the 
global scene—a reality (2010: xix).  
The theme of Obama being motivated to bring about the decline of American 
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power is also a central theme of Dinesh D’Souza’s The Roots of Obama’s Rage 
(2010), which claims he is motivated by an ‘anti-colonial’ dream inherited from his 
father to destroy the nation from within. The title’s usage of racially-charged words 
like ‘roots’ and ‘rage’ tie into pre-existing tropes of African-American anger, but also 
directly references Bernard Lewis’ 1990 ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, which put 
forward the post-Cold War idea of the ‘clash of civilisations’ drawn along Judeo-
Christian and Islamic lines (W. Brown 2008: 150). Similar racialised and racist topoi 
are also deployed by David Freddoso in his tellingly-titled Gangster Government 
(2011). As Parlett notes, use of racialised emotions and mentalities such as anger, 
laziness, and stupidity to undermine Obama is common on the political right (2014: 
75–124). At the religious end, apocalyptic language is sometimes used even when the 
texts themselves do not engage with explicit religious apocalypticism. The title of 
David Harsanyi’s Obama’s Four Horsemen (2013) evokes the idea that Obama will 
bring disaster upon America, and Wayne Root’s The Ultimate Obama Survival Guide 
codes itself in the language of post-apocalyptic survival manuals, teaching readers to 
‘Build your wealth. Protect your faith and family’ in order to ‘survive, thrive, and 
prosper’ during ‘Obamageddon’ (2013).  
Others use Antichristic symbolism without championing ideas of Obama’s 
Antichrist status: Phyllis Schlafly and George Neumayr’s No Higher Power (2012) 
and David Limbaugh’s The Great Destroyer (2012) both use the topos of a mortal 
ruler elevating themselves above God and tradition and so bringing ruin on all. In an 
early passage of No Higher Power, Schlafly and Neumayr evoke both the image of 
Antichristic global power and spectre of Marx in the image of the federal government 
(2012: 5): 
Like Marx, Obama views traditional religion as a temporary opiate for the 
poor, confused, and jobless—a drug that will dissipate, he hopes, as the 
federal government assumes more God-like powers, and his new morality 
of abortion, subsidized contraception, and gay marriage gains adherents.  
Obama is a revolutionary, they allege, but of 1789 Paris not 1776 Philadelphia: not of 
the ‘God-fearing American Revolution of our Founding Fathers’ but rather the 
‘starkly anti-religious tradition of the French Revolution’ (ibid.: 6). His revolutionary 
secular worldview has sought to destroy the theological and moral foundations of 
‘Real America’, and created a new world in which ‘Truth is the new hate speech’ 
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(Geller and Spencer 2010: 67). 
The Racial Contract 
It is impossible to ignore the distinctly racial elements of this discourse, both in terms 
of Obama as African-American and as ‘Muslim’, two identities that intersect at the 
site of his unbelonging. Both identities rely on a ‘racial contract’ that scholars like 
Charles Mills (1997) and Ghassan Hage (1998) have argued underlies the broader 
social contract of American biopolitics, a contract which distinguishes between white 
persons who are fully partners in the social contract and non-white ‘sub-persons’ who 
are not but condition white personhood as self-consolidating others. Drawing on this 
prior scholarship, Donald Pease argues that for groups like the Tea Party, Obama’s 
election is translated as the inversion of this racial contract, creating a reality in which 
‘America no longer [needs] white Americans to reproduce its structures of power’ 
(2010: 102). Obama’s contractual sovereignty overturns a racist orthotaxy in 
American biopolitics, giving rise to discourses that attempt to return him to his 
‘proper place’. Birtherism is one such discourse—a conspiracy encompassing the 
state government of Hawaii, the Honolulu press, the government of Kenya and parts 
of the US federal government to cover up the fact that Obama was born in Kenya and 
thus cannot really be President (Parlett 2014: 37–74; Pease 2010: 102–5; Waltman 
and Hass 2011: 109–134). Alongside this racist fantasy of black subordination exists 
the racialisation of the ‘Muslim’, discussed above. The racialised categorisation of 
‘Muslim’ into ‘good Muslim’ and ‘Muslim terrorist’, encodes Obama as a high-
profile variant of the latter, an unassimilable foreignness in the heart of America 
(Gotanda 2011: 194–5). Although mocked as fringe movements, Gotanda observes 
that Birtherism and Obama-as-Muslim conspiracies operate as part of broader 
American discourses about race: ‘The campaign [to paint Obama as either foreign, 
Muslim, or both] is a political exercise using traditional and emergent racial 
subordinations within American racial practices to undermine the authority of the 
leading black politician of the United States’ (ibid.: 195). 
 The racial aspects are present in discourses of Obama’s otherness even when 
overtly minimised. Evangelical identifications of Obama as Antichrist often overlap 
with ‘Muslim’ variants, for example, marking a sense of fear and uncertainty 
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surrounding his breach of the racial contract. Dittmer (2010: 73) analyses this facet of 
the wider discourse as it has proliferated on the Internet. He quotes an e-mail 
‘forward’ that circulated in 2008 and summarises the discursive intersections:  
The anti-Christ will be a man, in his 40s, of MUSLIM descent, who will 
deceive the nations with persuasive language, and have a MASSIVE 
Christ-like appeal…the prophecy says that people will flock to him and he 
will promise false hope and world peace, and when he is in power, will 
destroy everything. Is it OBAMA?  
This message, circulating before Obama even assumed office, emphasises his 
‘UnAmerican’ bloodline as Sampley or Birtherism do, but recasts it in a referentially 
demonic light. Dittmer details the emphasis on both Obama’s race and his connection 
to Islam in discussions of him as the potential Antichrist, focusing on his upbringing, 
mixed-race heritage, and name—a discourse founded in ‘a geopolitical imagination 
that emphasized the fundamental difference between identities’ (ibid.: 90). That these 
attributes are focused on is not coincidental. As I detailed above, a strong millenarian 
thread runs through discourses about America and American Exceptionalism: the idea 
of the ‘redeemer nation’ or ‘city on a hill’ whose light illuminates the darkness of the 
world are intimately tied up with the designation of existential enemies, antichristic 
figures, institutions and communities constructed as antithetical to America’s sacred 
mission. Prominent individuals labelled as potential Antichrists were necessarily 
coded as other—John F. Kennedy due to his Catholicism or Henry Kissinger due to 
his Jewishness, for example (Dittmer 2010; Fuller 1994). Obama is figured as a 
double outsider: as a black man manifesting self-sovereignty he represents the 
inversion of the racial contract and in his cultural (or confessional) ‘Muslimness’ he 
represents an inassimilable invader of the idea of America itself. 
The discourses examined here, both in Team ‘B’ II’s Brotherhood conspiracy 
and in discourses of Obama’s otherness and inauthenticity, relate the infiltration of the 
foreign other into the domestic sphere. However, there is another, related discourse 
which projects the self outward into the geopolitical territory of the other. In far-right 
Islamophobic discourses, this projection is almost always onto the state of Israel, 
which Liz Fekete observes, becomes figured as ‘the epicentre of the fight to defend 
western civilisation’ (2012: 41)—a ‘muscular nation, uncorrupted by European 
decadence (that is, cultural relativism and hatred of its colonial past)’ and thus ideally 
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positioned to defend true western values against the ‘Islamic onslaught’ (ibid.: 33). 
The following section examines this theopolitics of projection through a more literal 
demonology. While Team ‘B’ II’s Brotherhood conspiracy and forms of the Obama 
conspiracy are often not overtly religious demonologies, they operate on the same 
theopolitical structures. They call for a ‘painful, difficult awakening from a dream 
world of sunny universalism and pale indecision into a stark reality of black and 
white, good and evil, win or lose, do or die’ (Center for Security Policy 2010: 130). 
ISRAEL AND THE THEOPOLITICS OF PROJECTION 
Since the Cold War, prophecy writers have pushed the idea of a Muslim Antichrist in 
several forms. In 1993 Philip Goodman released The Assyrian Connection, updated in 
2003. Drawing on Micah 5:5 and Isaiah 10:5, he argues that the Antichrist will be 
from the region of Assyria (Syria and/or Iraq), and that the seventh empire of 
Revelation 17:9–11 was the Ottoman Empire (2003). Shifting the apocalyptic focus to 
Ottoman Turkey is a tactic of several texts, including Joel Richardson’s works (2009; 
2012) and Jack Smith’s 2011 Islam: The Cloak of Antichrist. Smith is unique, 
however, in scrapping the traditional empire model completely and reinterpreting the 
seven heads of the Beast as different Caliphal epochs (2011: 201–2). Some texts do 
not specify nation but speak of an ‘Islamic Realm’, such as Mark Davidson’s Hidden 
in Plain Sight (2012: 33), though these often tread the same ground as Goodman 
without novel insight. Continuing on the path of the Assyrian, Joe VanKoevering’s 
Unveiling the Man of Sin (2007) argues, for reasons never made clear, that the 
Antichrist is Crown Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan. Another work, Walid 
Shoebat’s God’s War on Terror (Shoebat and Richardson 2008) is co-authored with 
Richardson and traces the same arguments with only a few notable additions. 
 Among these, the scenario outlined of Joel Richardson’s theory stands out for 
its novelty, eschatological syncretism, and half-veiled reflections of contemporary 
fears. Despite claiming that his argument is based in analysis of the scriptures rather 
than reading headlines into prophecy, Richardson explicitly frames the value of his 
work through geopolitics and demographics: ‘Islam is the future’, he declares, citing 
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not its place in prophecy but its rapid statistical growth in North America and Europe 
(2009: 3–4). While he cautions not to ‘read our assumptions or modern events into 
Scripture’ (ibid.: 86), regarding interpretations of the Soviet Union as having an 
apocalyptic role, he ends his introduction thus: ‘What Communism was to the 
twentieth century, Islam will be for the next hundred years’ (ibid.: 11). This curious 
dissonance, in which Richardson decries reading present events into prophecy while 
simultaneously doing so, ties into the quest for new enemies in the wake of the Cold 
War discussed in the previous chapter. Additionally, his eschatological synthesis of 
Christian and Islamic texts—a method common among Muslim apocalypticists (D. 
Cook 2005; Filiu 2011) but rare in Christian ones—makes him relatively unique; it 
mimics how ostensibly secular writers like Team ‘B’ II, Geller, and Spencer deploy 
Islamist rhetorics to build their tales of civilisational incompatibility.  
The Disavowed Centre 
Rather than being framed as a metastasis of vile alterity through the ‘Free World’s’ 
body politic, however, Richardson centres his narrative of Muslim evil in the Middle 
East, around Jerusalem and the state of Israel. His reason for this relates to his 
Biblical literalism, presenting the Biblical nations featured in prophecy not as 
symbolic but as referring to the geographical regions indicated in scripture.11 To this 
effect, he both limits the Antichrist’s coming empire to a regional rather than global 
scope, and removes Europe and America almost completely, unusual moves given the 
propensity in modern apocalypticism to identify either the EU or UN as the Babylon 
of Revelation 17–18 (2009: 81; 2012: 33; see also Runions 2014; Ruotsila 2008). 
Richardson’s removal of Euro-America is not the denial of occidental import 
that he initially presents it to be, however. Israel arises to replace it, not as the nation-
state in its complexities and intricacies but as a cypher onto which the absent West is 
projected. For Richardson, what is openly at stake is the future of the world but what 
                                                
11 For example, ‘Babylon’ is not a metaphor for either ancient Rome or symbolic New Roman Empire 
but refers to the nation in which the historic Babylon is found: Iraq. Other apocalyptic nations are 
likewise the explicit geographical locations they historically referred to, even if these are nebulous. 
Richardson is at pains to paint the Biblical nations of Meshech and Tubal as located in modern Turkey, 
but finds this confounded by the nation’s ostensible secularity and historical abolishment of the 
caliphate; his solution is to appeal to a future rise of a radical Islamic ruler within the nation who will 
allow it to fulfil its prophetic purpose (2009: 88). 
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is truly at stake is the future of the West. This is crucial because Richardson openly 
rejects supersessionist theologies, where the Church literally replaces Israel as object 
of God’s love and the agent of his will (2015). Instead of supersession, Richardson 
merges Jews and Christians into a single unity—‘the people of God’ (2012: 6), which 
then battles a demonological Islam. In doing so, Richardson rhetorically appropriates 
Jewish identity and historic suffering into a scenario in which the final choice is only 
ever between Christianity and Islam (2009: 165). Israel, both modern state and 
religious nation, are subsumed into a Christian theopolitics. Using Israel as symbolic 
proxy for the West, however, is not a feature unique to Richardson. As stated above, 
Fekete observed that neoconservatives, counter-jihadists and other members of the 
far-right often code Israel as the last bastion of an uncompromised Western spirit, 
becoming ‘the epicentre of the fight to defend western civilisation’ (2012: 41). Such 
coding creates a dynamic in which Western selfhood is projected onto Israel, whose 
imperviousness against its Muslim foes becomes symbolic of the battle for a ‘Real’ 
West already compromised by anti-colonial, postmodern ‘identity-decline.’ 
Of Richardson’s texts, The Islamic Antichrist (2009) is the more narrative, 
presenting his core ideas. Mideast Beast (2012) is comprised mostly of exegeses of 
certain Bible verses used to expand and support the claims he makes in Antichrist.12 
Both are focused on reading apocalyptic prophecy via a comparison of Christian and 
Islamic eschatologies. He outlines the books’ mission early, writing that Antichrist ‘is 
a call for many to realize the degree to which the future of the Christian church—
indeed, the future of the entire world—and the future of Islam are divinely and 
directly interconnected’ (2009: 3). He then poses his guiding question: ‘How do you 
suppose that Satan has planned to include the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims in his grand 
end-time deception?’ He follows this with two alternatives ‘Did Satan fail to foresee 
and strategize regarding the global spread of Islam [and so make them scripturally 
irrelevant]? Or has Satan included the Muslims of the world in his end-time strategy?’ 
(2009: 11).  
Richardson chooses the latter. Indeed, Islam is ‘the primary vehicle that will 
be used by Satan’ to fulfil prophecies ‘about the future political/religious/military 
                                                
12 The Islamic Antichrist is itself a revision of an earlier text, Antichrist: Islam’s Awaited Messiah 
(2006), republished by conservative media outlet World Net Daily. 
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system of the Antichrist that will overwhelm the entire world just prior to the second 
coming of Jesus’ (2009: 12). Contra apocalypticists who hold that Antichrist will arise 
from doctrines of atheism or secular humanism or misused or unholy technologies 
(2012: 6; see Chapter Six, below), the Antichrist will arise from radical Islam (figured 
here, as elsewhere, as Islam in toto). He advances this idea with two methods: textual 
and socio-political. The first occupies most of both works and constructs Christian 
and Islamic eschatologies as twisted copies of one another, with the Christian account 
being taken as true and the Islamic being a diabolic inversion. The second, which is 
both the capstone of, and a telling divergence from the first, constructs a narrative of 
innate animosity between the Jews as God’s people and Muslims as Satan’s pawns, 
usually hinging on contemporary geopolitics and demographics. Individual Muslims 
are rendered either unwitting pawns or demonic co-conspirators in a cosmic war. The 
influence on modern Islamist antisemitism of European texts like The Protocols and 
Christianity’s own history of antisemitism are mostly effaced and, when the latter is 
raised it is laid at the feet of ‘perverted form’ of Christianity (2009: 116).13 
 The bulk of both Antichrist and Beast comprise Richardson’s deliberation of 
several contextual similarities he pulls out of Christian and Islamic eschatology. Its 
core tenet is that the figures identified by Islam as the Mahdi (the Islamic messiah) 
and (the Muslim version of) Jesus are identical to Christianity’s Antichrist and False 
Prophet, respectively. Conversely, the Dajjal or Islamic Antichrist is none-other than 
the Christian Jesus (2009: 33–50, 61–70, 77–80). Richardson supports this via a 
point-by-point comparison of the eschatological figures. These range from broad 
comparisons, such as the idea that the Mahdi and the Antichrist are simultaneously 
powerful military and spiritual rulers who apparently reign from the city of Jerusalem 
(ibid.: 33–9), to smaller details like the notion that both figures allegedly have a peace 
treaty with the Jews for seven years (ibid.: 28), and that Antichrist will ‘try to change 
the set times and the laws’ (Dan. 7:25).14  
Richardson’s Mahdi-Antichrist connection is not novel (see Davidson 2012; 
                                                
13 For analyses of Muslim antisemitism as complex ‘Islamic-Christian blend’ (Webman 2010: 686), see 
Flores 2005, 2006, Hassan 2009, and Webman 2010, 2012. 
14 Richardson holds that other religious traditions with unique calendars lack universalist aspirations, 
and thus ‘only Islam fits the bill of a system that has its own unique calendar, a week based on its own 
religious history, and a clear system of law that it wishes to impose onto the whole earth’. As such, it 
becomes ‘quite plausible‘ that the reference in Daniel ‘describes a Muslim’ (2009: 48). 
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Shoebat and Richardson 2008; J. Smith 2011), but few others go to his lengths. His 
comparison between Christianity’s False Prophet and the Islamic Jesus is more novel 
but relies on similar points, such as that in Islam the Mahdi and Jesus work together 
against the Dajjal, while the Antichrist and False Prophet form a similar team against 
the forces of God, with the False Prophet enforcing the Antichrist’s policies in much 
the same way the Muslim Jesus assists the Mahdi (2009: 62–4). Richardson augments 
this with the Biblical description of the False Prophet as having ‘two horns like a 
lamb, but [speaking] like a dragon’ (Rev. 13:11), transitioning from this first to the 
idea that the False Prophet will be a dragon-in-sheep’s clothing, seemingly meek and 
mild but hiding a demonic core and then to the idea that he will appear not as a lamb 
but the Lamb—Jesus himself: ‘For many will come in my name, claiming, “I am the 
Christ,” and will deceive many’ (Matt. 24:4–5; Richardson 2009: 68). For 
Richardson, the idea that the Muslim Jesus is both Jesus (the core of Christianity) and 
Muslim (the antithesis of Christianity) is final proof; the fact of two traditions having 
varying interpretations of a single person appears evidence enough that satanic forces 
are involved (2012: iv). If this is not enough to stir his audience, Richardson adds the 
comparison that the ‘Jesus who returns in the Muslim tradition makes Osama bin 
Laden look like a novice’ (2009: 69). While this might seem like low-hanging fruit, it 
sets the stage for Richardson’s instrumentalisation of antisemitism vis-à-vis the 
conflict between Israel and Islamist groups like al-Qaeda. 
The Instrumentalisation of Antisemitism 
While scriptural comparisons occupy the majority of the texts, the crux of Antichrist’s 
narrative of cosmic war comes in the form of a ‘perpetual enmity’ that Richardson 
constructs between Muslims and Jews. He believes that by combining this with his 
exegetical regionalism, it is possible to read end-times prophecies as ‘pointing to the 
modern-day hostile nations that share the same general location as their ancient 
antisemitic counterparts’ (2012: 52). Richardson’s strategy here is similar to Team 
‘B’ II’s, although while they begin the existential conflict with Islam with the birth of 
Islam, Richardson projects his back even further. For Richardson, Islam is in essential 
continuity with the gentile nations that warred with Israel in the narratives of the Old 
Testament, the Moabites, Edomites, and Amalekites that occupied the same land as 
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their modern-day Muslim counterparts (2012: 19). ‘From the day that God showed his 
favor to the Jewish people,’ he writes, ‘Satan has raged against them.’ The Devil’s 
main means in actualising this rage is through ‘great world empires’, a sequence that 
culminates in the ‘beast kingdom’ of Antichrist (2009: 115–16). This kingdom is, like 
for Smith and Goodman, a reborn Ottoman Empire (ibid.: 96). Linking Kemal 
Ataturk’s abolition of the Caliphate to the seventh head of the Beast, Richardson 
writes that the ‘Islamic Caliphate has experienced a temporary or apparent death and 
will revive as the eighth and final empire…The final satanic kingdom is simply a 
revived version of the Islamic Caliphate’ (2012: 155). This empire will kill ‘two-
thirds’ of Israel, and Richardson lays the blame for the atrocities committed at the feet 
of an ‘inhuman, demonic hatred’ for the Jews: the history of the Jews alone is ‘proof 
to the open mind that Satan exists’ and the antisemitism rife in the Middle East proves 
Islam possesses the core characteristic of this Satanic campaign: ‘an unquenchable 
anti-Semitic spirit’ (2009: 116–17).  
 Richardson justifies this claim by reference to hadith and Quranic verses often 
used today to justify Islamic antisemitism, including Surat 2:65, 5:60, and 7:166—in 
which the Jews’ transgressions curse them and transform them into apes and swine—
as well as the hadith that on the day of judgement Jews will hide behind stones and 
trees and those stones and trees will call out to the Muslims to come and kill them 
(2009: 113). These verses are commonly employed in the rhetoric of modern Islamists 
(Landes 2011: 421–66; Tibi 2008: 26–7) and by presenting this textual evidence and 
its Islamist deployment, Richardson crafts an image of Islam that, although having an 
appearance of diversity, difference or division, possesses an unchanging heart that 
persists through time and strives ceaselessly towards its goals—the building of the 
(Antichristian) Caliphate. Additionally, through constructing a continuity of essence 
between Islam and the gentile nations, ‘Islam’—in spirit, if not in letter—is rendered 
antecedent not only to Islam proper but also to both Judaism and Christianity. 
As will be made clear in the proceeding chapters, this temporal hierarchisation 
is common to apocalyptic politics, which often codes new threats as recurrences of 
old, already-defeated foes. For Richardson, however, this temporalisation is also tied 
to American secular order—something made clear in two sections on the Antichrist’s 
reign regarding religious violence and the privatisation of the religious sphere. In the 
 158 
first Richardson discusses the execution of those who refuse to worship Antichrist, 
noting ‘How could someone in today’s world think that God demands the killing of 
other human beings simply because they believe differently?’ (2009: 121). Later, he 
discusses mandatory worship of Antichrist in the ‘beast kingdom’, saying that such a 
thing is shocking because, ‘We in the West with our religious freedom view worship 
as a voluntary act of reverence and love directed toward the one we deem worthy of 
such worship’ (ibid.: 166). Richardson has established that the ‘beast kingdom’ is a 
Caliphate reborn, and thus intends these statements to be interpreted in light of both 
this claim and contemporary Islamist terrorism.  
Richardson here reaffirms his opposition between Islam, which is archaic and 
violent, and Christianity, which is modern and peaceful. Religiously, this manifests in 
Islam as fulfilment of Satan’s desire for self-worship and a continuance of violent 
gentile religion, while Christianity inherits the spirit of Judaism as ‘God’s people’. 
Indeed, while he acknowledges violence perpetuated by Christianity these are situated 
as historical, in a forgotten history replaced by forgiveness and peaceful evangelism 
(ibid.: 121, 140). He therefore mirrors two of antisemitism and Islamophobia’s core 
genealogical similarities, which place Christianity alongside ‘the angelic—the loving, 
the forbearing, the forgiving’ and Judaism and Islam on the other side, ‘the legalistic, 
the vengeful, the merciless’, as well as the Enlightenment’s promotion of ‘reason over 
unreason, science over myth, freedom over tyranny’ (Klug 2014: 453). Transferring 
Judaism onto Christianity’s side does not transform the binary itself, which retains its 
structure, but does allow Richardson to instrumentalise Jewish suffering as a feature 
of his cosmic war. 
 While Islamic eschatology does end in a conversion-or-death choice for non-
Muslims this is often mirrored in Christianity. As Melani McAlister notes regarding 
American evangelicalism, evangelicals ‘generally presumed the mass conversion of 
large numbers of Jews during the tribulation, and the terrible deaths of many 
others…[viewing] all those who had not converted to Christianity as both recalcitrant 
and doomed’ (2005: 175). This view of evangelical support for Israel has been 
critiqued by, among others, Stephen Spector, who has noted that even if it was the 
case in the past such views have waned (2009: 176). Spector does suggest, however, 
that there is a strong idea, especially post-9/11, that radical Islam seeks to conquer the 
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Jews first and the Christians second (ibid.: vii). This mirrors the generalised notion of 
Israel as the bulwark of the West, pointing to a general ‘instrumentality’ (Strozier 
2002: 204) of the Jews in Christian eschatology in which they are treated as abstract 
pawns of salvation rather than people (Halsell 1987: 39).  
This abstraction and instrumentality is something Richardson attempts to mask 
in his work. He often blends Christians and Jews as ‘the people of God’ (2006: 6), 
with Muslims as the main tools of satanic domination (2009: 12). Yet, when the stage 
is set for Armageddon, Judaism vanishes: ‘As Islam grows in the West’, he writes, 
‘people will be forced to face [a] decision. Between the only two real choices, which 
will it be: Christianity or Islam?’ (2009: 165). The idea of Islam and Christianity as 
the ‘real choices’ peeks out of the cracks in the texts. He never considers prophetic 
interpretations or beliefs of contemporary Jews, for example, and while he uses 
Jewish scripture it is always as the Old Testament, as prefiguration of Christianity. 
Christianity is here the symbolic inheritor of Judaism much as Islam is figured as the 
inheritor of the Moabites and Edomites. While the Jews have not been ‘replaced’ by 
Christianity, the resulting scenario is almost more insidious as their identities are 
appropriated, absorbed, and ultimately weaponised in its service. 
While Richardson hinges his vision on ideas of perpetual and essential conflict 
between Jews and Muslims, his championing of the Jews is merely part of the general 
instrumentality of Jews in Christian eschatology at large. This instrumentalisation is 
merged with a general far-right obsession with Israel as bulwark against the Oriental 
without. The formative role of European antisemitism in the creation of modern 
Islamist antisemitism is forgotten in favour of a temporalisation that casts Islam as 
successor to Israel’s ancient enemies and Christianity as its spiritual ally and inheritor. 
The Jews here are, at heart, as virtual as the Muslims: chimerical others orbiting an 
Occidental, Protestant self, not as demoniac opponent but as human shield. 
THE OTHER(’S) GLOBALISATION: ‘ISLAM’ AS ‘OTHER SELF’ 
In this chapter I have traced two ways in which Islam is constructed as radical other to 
‘Real American’ selfhood, although these are different emphases of the same 
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discourse, reliant on similar structures of essentialism and alterity. Following the 
‘Oriental within’ model adapted from antisemitic conspiracism, Obama and Muslim 
Brotherhood conspiracies reinterpret ‘Muslimness’ (whether cultural or confessional) 
as treason, with Muslims and Islamic sacred space cast as seditious cells metastasised 
through America’s body politic. Muslim communities are figured as a demonological 
adversary and infiltrator, a non-America-within-America that finds its quintessence in 
the conspiracies of Obama as an alien presence in the highest office. Meanwhile 
Richardson and others build an older ‘Oriental without’ model but in new semblance, 
merging evangelical eschatology and contemporary geopolitics to instrumentalise the 
Jews and antisemitism in the service of a cosmic war between Judaeo-Christianity as 
‘God’s people’ and Islam as their diabolic mirror. Israel’s specificity is appropriated 
as symbolic proxy of a pure and uncorrupted West that lives vicariously through the 
nation’s actual conflict with its (Muslim) neighbours. 
The Revenge of History 
While their narratives differ, both models rest on a dual foundation of on the one hand 
Islam’s alleged deceptiveness—figured via the difference between moderate and 
extremist Muslims that code the former as a veneer of the latter—and its apparent 
religio-political unity on the other—represented by the Caliphate and embodying the 
abolition of the Euro-American social order. This foundation is refracted through a 
temporalising logic that codes Islam as a relic characterised by unreason, violence, 
tyranny, and deception juxtaposed to a West of reason, peace, freedom, and truth. 
This creates a clear insider/outsider opposition rooted in essentialist and orientalist 
discursive structures. Drawing on Klug’s analysis of antisemitism and Islamophobia, 
the figure of ‘Islam’ becomes positioned as both the ‘Orient’ it occupied historically 
and the ‘Oriental within’ historically embodied in the ‘Jew’ (2014: 453–4). Like the 
antisemitic ‘Jew’, the demonological Muslim constructed here is chimerical; while the 
narratives examined often refer to real Muslims, the Islam they depict is a fantastic 
demonology. This demonology, as this section explores, reveals more about the 
instabilities of a sovereign self than the reality of its other. For Richardson the insider-
outsider dichotomy is embodied in the image of a pure Israel surrounded by an 
Islamic evil seeking to destroy it. In the Obama and Muslim Brotherhood conspiracies 
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the demonological Muslim has already infiltrated the self, an infiltration linked to a 
weakness of self, an erosion of purity through a lack of adherence to core values 
(Biblical ethics, racial hierarchy, normative gender roles). In the first model the 
enemy is at the gates, but the self is still pure and strong, a state to be maintained at all 
costs, while in the second the self has already been compromised and the insurgent 
other must be identified and contained. 
The ideological temporalisation that operates in this self/other-insider/outsider 
binary is central to the contemporary context in which it is deployed. While rooted in 
Orientalist discourses of Enlightenment and Western imperial projects, this 
temporalisation also ties into a rhetorical strategy that became common following 
9/11. The rhetoric codes Islam as an outmoded way of being, an atavism with no true 
place in the horizon of modernity, and was termed by medievalist Bruce Holsinger the 
‘9/11 Premodern’ (2007, 2010). For Holsinger, the ‘9/11 Premodern’ refers to a 
rhetorical strategy adopted both by members of the 2001–2008 Bush government and 
prominent media to ‘medievalise’ Islamism generally and al-Qaeda specifically. It 
constructed a temporalised model of legitimisation where America and its allies 
represented modernity and futurity and Islamist groups represented a resurgent, 
invalidated premodern culture and ideology, filled with ‘contaminating 
premodernities’ that threatened from the borders of Europe. This structure reflects the 
second and third of Klug’s similarities between Islamophobia and antisemitism, 
which placed Islam and Judaism in binary opposition to the secularising force of the 
Enlightenment (2014: 453). Even Richardson, reliant on a narrative of prophecy, 
constructs Islam as prior to Christianity by placing it in continuity with older gentile 
nations like Moab and Edom (2009: 111–17; 2012: 15–33). 
 Holsinger argues that ‘9/11 Premodern’ discourses are based around a 
miscomprehension—one compounded by orientalist ideas of the ‘Muslim sense of 
history’ where ‘events like the Crusades...are as immediate as yesterday’—in which 
they have construed the apocalyptic and medievalistic rhetoric of people like Osama 
bin Laden—‘crusades, locusts, spears, and so on’—as a direct rejection of modernity, 
‘an intricate strategic deployment of the medieval past for a will to inhabit that past’ 
(2010: 108, 114). By this logic a complex terrorist attack involving transnational 
financial networks, flight school, and knowledge of airport security—all modern—is 
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reconstructed as an artefact of a bygone age. This contradiction is summed up in a 
statement issued by Timothy Lynch, Director of the Project for Criminal Justice at the 
Cato Institute, before the Committee on the Judiciary on 4th December 2001 
(Department of Justice 2002: 184–5): 
At the outset, let me say that I agree with those who have said that the 
attacks of September 11th were not just crimes, they were an act of war. 
Our country has been attacked by a technologically sophisticated band of 
barbarians who hold a philosophy that exhibits nothing but contempt for 
human life. This country stands for the exact opposite of what they believe 
in. And I think that these people attacked America because they see our 
country as a symbol for respect for individual rights. 
Usage of the almost wilfully oxymoronic phrase ‘technologically sophisticated band 
of barbarians’ constructs an image of time out of joint with itself: a past reaching for a 
present it does not have the capacity to control, opposed to a West which has already 
emerged from its self-imposed immaturity. This temporalisation inflects the attitudes 
of the authors analysed above on a number of levels, one of the foremost of which is 
that Team ‘B’ II, Richardson, and the others woven throughout this chapter—Geller, 
Spencer, McCarthy, Gaubatz, Sperry—take the rhetoric of radical Islamist groups like 
al-Qaeda at face value. When such groups claim to speak for a true, immutable 
essence of Islam the authors accept it; when Muslim or non-Muslim commentators 
attempt to refute this they are marked as a deceiver or dupe, respectively. 
One might be tempted to situate their logic solely in relation to the non-
falsifiability of conspiracy theories in toto; the authors already believe Islam to be an 
evil working for world domination and so accept evidence that justifies this and reject 
that which does not as an insidious element of that domination (Barkun 2003, 2013). 
However, doing so ignores religio-political and socio-cultural contexts, historic and 
contemporary, which drive the authors to adhere to ideas about the objective facticity 
of Islamist claims about religious authenticity and politico-militaristic capabilities, 
even when these seem contrary to reality. Such contexts derive both from enduring 
Orientalist topoi—which posit an inherent trend towards autocracy and temporally 
code the ‘Orient’ as archaic or atavistic—and from the unstable nature of the truth the 
authors attempt to defend. As this thesis explores, this construction of singular 
sovereign truth is inextricable from its demonological others. The chimerical ‘Islam’ 
figured in the discourses analysed above is one such other, constructed as threat 
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primarily through its figuration as monolithic, totalitarian selfhood, a selfhood which 
is embodied in the image of a demonological Caliphate. 
The Coming Caliphate: Self/Other—Other Self 
Demonological Islam is imagined mainly through the image of the Islamic or Islamist 
State: the Caliphate. The fears of the authors coalesce around it—a unity of political, 
legal, and spiritual authority that ends the privatisation of religion enshrined in the 
modern secular state. Within this Caliphate, devotion to tenets of the faith are implied 
to be slavish, unreasoned; any use of shari’a is literalistic with no space given for 
exegetic interpretation—totalitarian in the truest sense. This Caliphate reflects that 
espoused by Islamist radicals like al-Qaeda, which in Arshin Adib-Moghaddam’s 
words, ‘wages total war against the “West” and “apostate Muslims” in order to create 
a true and absolute genealogy; a mythical tale dotted with heroic figures and 
“authenticated” personalities that would deliver Muslims from their “imperfect” 
existence, from their fallen present’ (2006: 252).  
The authors’ image of the Caliphate derives significantly from the rhetoric of 
Islamist groups like al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. This Caliphate is, 
however, a decidedly modern construct, refracted through ideas of the nation-state 
and (pan-)nationalist ideological paradigms, with its roots in the political theorisations 
of Abu Aa’la Maududi—who appears in several of the texts as representative of ‘true 
Islam.’ Richardson cites him as ‘viewed throughout the Islamic world as one of 
Islam’s greatest scholars’ and specifically quotes him on Islam’s God-given duty to 
achieve world domination and to ‘destroy any government made by man’ (2009: 144). 
Geller and Spencer follow a similar line, stating that ‘Islam traditionally allows for no 
competition’ and juxtaposing Maududi’s vision of Islam’s political project directly to 
the United States constitution (2010: 42–3). Elsewhere, Spencer juxtaposes Islamist 
internationalism with the domestically oriented religious politics of the United States’ 
Christian right, using him as a primary source and noting his influence as 
‘international and lingering’ (2008: 41–4). Jack Smith cites him in order to ‘look at 
the definition of the religion, Islam, as defined by one from within its own ranks’ (J. 
Smith: 151). Team ‘B’ II’s citation is more reserved, focused more on his views about 
women (2010: 33), although his vision of shari’a-based Islamist politics fills the 
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report.15  
Maududi outlined the principles of an Islamic state in a 1948 radio broadcast, 
listed as tawhid (God’s Unity), risalat (prophethood), and khilafat (viceregency). It is 
worth quoting this broadcast in detail due to the ways in which the outlined principles 
are key to the demonological ‘Islam’ presented in the texts examined above. 
Tawhid means only God is the Creator, Sustainer and Master of the 
universe and of all that exists in it, organic and inorganic…This principle 
of the unity of God totally negates the concept of the legal and political 
independence of human beings, individually or collectively. No 
individual, family, class or race can set themselves above God. God alone 
is the Ruler and His commandments are the Law…Now consider the 
Khilafat…Man, according to Islam, is the representative of God on earth, 
His viceregent. That is to say, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by 
God, he is required to exercise his God-given authority in this world 
within the limits prescribed by God. A state that is established in 
accordance with this political theory will in fact be a human caliphate 
under the sovereignty of God and will do God’s will by working within 
the limits prescribed by Him and in accordance with His instructions and 
injunctions (in Liebl 2009: 374). 
This vision of the Caliphate and of Islamic politics more broadly saturates the texts of 
Team ‘B’ II, Richardson, Geller, Smith, and others. As such, their demonological 
Islam is coded primarily through its projected unity and coherence. Diversity becomes 
a façade, a deception, overlaying an essential core that binds all Muslims together in a 
project of global domination.  
Ivan Kalmar notes in relation to the orientalist topos of the ‘oriental despot’ 
that there was a tendency in the Christian West to figure Muslims as ‘slaves, soldiers, 
and terrorists of Allah: fanatical devotees of a remote and terrifying sublime power’ 
(2012: 2). This tendency is mirrored here—the authors’ demonological ‘Muslims’ 
leave little room for nuance, becoming little more than vessels for the perpetuation of 
shari’a. In an interesting twist, however, Kalmar links the topos of the ‘oriental 
despot’ to Christian anxieties about God’s (in)justice and (lack of) care regarding his 
creation—that occidental fear of Islam and its allegedly innate despotic nature 
operated mainly as a way for Western Christianity to externalise the underlying 
anxieties present in its own theology (ibid.: 9–17). Evaluating the merits and pitfalls 
                                                
15 For detailed studies of Maududi’s legacy in the constitution of modern political Islam and the 
development of Islamism as a modern political paradigm, see Adib-Moghaddam 2006 and 2011, 
Hartung 2014, and Özdalga 2009. 
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of this argument is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I am inclined to partly 
agree if not in relation to historical instantiations then regarding the present context. 
That is, in the current context the examined authors’ visions of a totalitarian and 
unitary Islam serve to reflect anxieties of their own theopolitical systems. Primarily, 
this involves an ideological projection onto ‘Islam’ of a totalitarian unity the authors 
themselves covet: Islam(ism) is not (just) other to an American self but is discursively 
constructed as an ‘other self’. 
 All the authors analysed cite weaknesses of their own system as enablers for 
the ‘Islamic onslaught’. Team ‘B’ II write of ‘pre-emptive submission’ to Islam in the 
practices of liberal tolerance, a tolerance that prevents the American people and their 
government from understanding the ‘existential threat’ that it poses. Richardson 
repeats this idea, pleading for ‘the Church’ to recognise Islam’s threat. Meanwhile, 
Geller, Spencer, Schlafly, Neumeyer, and others write of Obama’s alleged destruction 
of American Exceptionalism—his covert Muslim-ness serving as ultimate indicator of 
his anti-American intent. Political correctness and moral relativism are figured as 
nursemaids to the coming Caliphate, antithetical to American patriotism and Christian 
faith and degrading America’s rightful place in the world (Center for Security Policy 
2010: 125–31; Richardson 2009: 160). Such ‘identity-decline’ has left America weak 
and all the texts caution the radical return to the ‘core values’ of America—either of 
Christianity or of a secular Constitution figured as Christian-at-heart—in order to not 
fall prey to the Islamic/Islamist plot. This focus on essential values relates also to the 
focus on Israel as a ‘muscular nation, uncorrupted by European decadence’ (Fekete 
2012: 33). Israel’s position in the midst of an antagonistic Muslim other and the focus 
on unswerving support for its defence on both the political and religious right codes it 
as the last bastion of the ‘true West.’ 
The existential conflict that emerges upon interrogation of these multiple texts 
is that of a ‘Christiano-Secular’ American ipseity—beleaguered by globalisation, 
postmodern morality, shifting social norms and the ever-present spectre of political 
correctness—and an Islamic other self seen as unitary, totalising, omnipresent, strong, 
and yet oddly obscured from a West that seems unaware or unconcerned with the 
erosion of its own alleged authenticity. As I noted above, in the wake of 9/11 and the 
2008 financial crisis, conservative groups wrestled with ‘loss of the fantasy of 
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American omnipotence’—they interpreted ‘the economic setbacks and cultural 
change from the standpoint of the loss of Real America’ (Pease 2010: 90). When 
Kagan and Kristol founded their Project for a New American Century in 1997, 
outlining a new foreign policy based on ‘military strength and moral clarity’ in the 
aftermath of the unipolar moment (Ryan 2010: 88), this was likely not the century 
they envisioned. Instead, America is wracked by the instability of its sovereignty in a 
transnational world of cultural and economic flow, ‘Real America’ is eroded, and 
Islam(ism) is reconfigured as a dark mirror to American Exceptionalism, its Caliphate 
symbolic of a globalisation in which America no longer holds power.  
Criticism of the authors based on their portrayal of Islam as monolithic and 
changeless might in this light be viewed as misguided: the monolithic nature of this 
‘Islam’ is necessary because it represents the authors’ own need for theopolitical unity 
and their fear of alternative systemic possibilities. Their ‘Caliphate’ is a reflection of 
their desire for a unitary foundation of moral absolutes, a return to a mythic age of 
stability and righteousness, but in abject form. Their ‘Islam’ represents a unity the 
authors crave but in a form coded as incommensurably other. They fear it because it 
both is and is not the object of their desires. To appropriate and transfigure Adib-
Moghaddam’s words on al-Qaeda, Team ‘B’ II, Richardson, Geller, Spencer, and the 
others wage an ideological war against Muslims and against inauthentic members of 
their communities ‘in order to create a true and absolute genealogy; a mythical tale 
dotted with heroic figures and “authenticated” personalities that would deliver 
[Christian Americans] from their “imperfect” existence, from their fallen present’ 
(2006: 252). 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
‘Where is the Prince?’ 
The Jezebel Spirit and the Ownership of Absence 
[T]he One depends upon the other; maleness as an 
essential category depends upon a category called not-
maleness. The One is limited and circumscribed by that 
which is named the other. Without the other, the One 
would not know where it stopped and started. The One is 
the static presence known by its differentiation from the 
fluidity, multiplicity, and absence of the other. 
— Helene Tallon Russell (2009: 169) 
‘Where is the Prince?’ A question which is a ritual, and a name: Jezebel, ‘izebel. 
Other etymologies have been proposed for this name, one which has remained always 
ambiguous: ‘unexalted, unhusbanded, or the brother is prince’, even ‘chaste’ (Pippin 
1999: 32). Biblical scholar Mark Smith traces its elements to ’y, ‘where?’ and zebul, 
‘prince’, linking it to Phoenician ritual practice that expressed ‘human concern…over 
Baal’s death, [as] attested [to] in the Ugaritic Baal cycle’ (2002: 67). Gale Yee claims 
that the name is a dual-parody: ’îzěbūl first becoming ‘î-zěbūl (‘No nobility’), before 
zěbūl is then twisted into zebel (‘dung’) (in Thimmes 2009: 79). When the etymology 
is relevant to their designs, the authors whose texts I analyse below employ several 
definitions, sometimes at once, though they prefer ‘unhusbanded’—gesturing towards 
the defiance of patriarchal authority and ‘proper’ sexual cohabitation which they 
associate her with (Benson 2010: 21; Freed 2008: 68; Sampson 2012: 33; Schott 
2013: 1). Yet in the form of the question lies the kernel of an identity that infiltrates 
their figurations of Jezebel, encapsulating yet exceeding them. ‘Where is the Prince?’ 
Jezebel asks. Does this name question the presence of her own ‘false’ gods, whose 
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absence finally condemns her and thus permits the reassertion of ‘legitimate’ 
(masculine, monotheistic) authority? Or does it refer to her husband Ahab, whose 
alleged dominance—his symbolic castration, his absence—by his foreign queen paves 
the way for Jezebel’s reign, and so acts as both a sign of her self-asserted power and 
the lament of her adversaries for the restoration of an absent phallus? Or perhaps like 
the archangel Michael, whose name encodes a rhetorical and negative question in 
rebuke of Satan’s rebellion—Mi-cha-el, ‘Who is like God?’ (Keathley III 1997: 
209)—her name might encode a performative act of similar—if oppositional—
negation, one which attempts to unsettle the theopolitical monologic of divine 
sovereignty as such. ‘Where is the Prince?’ Jezebel asks, calling into question through 
her existence those structures of sovereign indivisibility on which the writers rely and 
which they continually attempt to reinstate. 
 This Jezebel haunts the theopolitics of identity I examined in Chapter Three, 
or at least certain figurations of them. Frequently paired with Babylon (Gardner 2004: 
271–6; LeClaire 2013: 59–72; Schott 2013: 101), which Erin Runions notes has come 
to represent the ‘central fears of U.S. liberal democracy’—‘that sexual, moral, ethnic, 
or political diversity will disrupt national unity or, conversely, that some totalitarian 
system will curtail freedom and force homogeneous unity’ (2014: 3)—Jezebel works 
similarly to embody the terrors of that subset of US culture for whom a ‘Judaeo-
Christian’ morality is necessary for the moral, economic, cultural and militaristic 
health of the nation-state. Identified as a source of ‘obsessive sensuality, unbridled 
witchcraft, hatred of male authority and false teachings in the church and society at 
large’ (Stark 2009: 68), the Jezebel inscribed here exceeds the Biblical character from 
whom her name derives, the Queen Jezebel of I and II Kings, but still carries her 
traces through her discursive construction as triply othered—as woman, as foreigner, 
and as idolater.1 This triple alterity conditions her figuration, translated from the 
                                                
1 The texts I examine below focus on Jezebel’s figurations as woman and idolater rather than as 
foreigner. However, in an American context Jezebel is also irreducibly racialised: the ‘jezebel’ remains 
one of the most pervasive negative stereotypes of African-American women that emerged from 
slavery, perpetuating ‘the perception of African American women as promiscuous and sexually 
permissive’ (D.L. Brown, White-Johnson and Griffin-Fennell 2013: 526). Writing within a cultural 
context in which this depiction endures, the texts analysed make conspicuously little mention of race—
an exception being LeClaire’s, which draws a direct line from South Florida’s alleged tolerance of 
syncretic African diasporic traditions like Voudun and Santeria to its apparent sexual libertinism (2013: 
164). While concentration on the biblical narrative might excuse this partially, their projection of this 
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image of a mortal queen onto that of a demonic spirit—a principality, specifically, 
gesturing again to the site of the absent prince—gifted her name and constructed as a 
(sometimes the) primary metaphysical influence on the modern (Western) world.2  
Even writers who concentrate on another demonological other—Islam or 
secular (Trans)Humanism, for example—devote space to critiquing an apparent decay 
of Western morality for which the changing attitudes to sexuality, gender roles, and 
relations between sexes that ‘Jezebel’ represents serve as a main vehicle, vanguard of 
a demonic campaign to end ‘legitimate’ (divine, masculine, monotheistic) authority. 
This Jezebel thus sits behind the ‘identity-decline’ lamented by the authors examined 
in both the preceding and proceeding chapters. The spiritual warfare discourses 
analysed below therefore form one part of the broader discourse of theopolitical 
identity whose origins I examined in the Chapter Three, juxtaposing the image of an 
authentic American self against a number of competing and ideologically 
incompatible others, domestic and international. Chapter Four focused on ‘Islam’, 
constructed as attempting to overcome this idealised selfhood once it was weakened. 
This chapter focuses on the one constructed as weakening that selfhood so that it can 
be overcome. This ‘one’ is troubled, however, both by actual multiplicity—discourses 
of gender and sexuality are rarely homogeneous—and, unlike demonological Islam, 
in the discursive construction of its alterity, which is founded on an image of fluidity 
and multiplicity. While the authors attempt to reify this threat into specific symbolic 
characters—Jezebel and Babylon, already two—these figures are characterised in the 
texts by an inherent multiplicity that is central to their construction as enemies of 
authentic order.  
                                                                                                                                      
character into a pervasive Jezebel spirit suggests that the omission of race might indicate that issues of 
racial diversity are an unconscious or consciously occluded substrate to broader theopolitical anxieties. 
2 The word rendered ‘principality’ is archon (‘ruler’). It thus lacks the immediate relation to territory 
that the English has. However, the writers use ‘principality’ in all cases rather than the original Greek 
term or an alternative translation. Within spiritual warfare discourses, a principality is a specific high-
ranking type of demon, which is seen as governing over a specific territory. ‘Principality’ thus refers to 
both the discursive territory and its ruler. The projected existence of principalities stems from 
Ephesians 6:12: ‘For we do not wrestle against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against 
powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this age, against spiritual hosts of wickedness in the 
heavenly places.’ This verse is often seen as presenting a call for spiritual warfare in general, joining 
the spiritual and material worlds in a relationship of mutual cross-contamination; the enemy is not only 
one of flesh and blood, but occupies a higher reality, and the corruption of flesh and blood is merely an 
effect; though it holds some shared origin in the psycho-spiritual weakness of the believer, the enemy 
is not the corporeal individual but the oppressive spiritual force that has co-opted them for its diabolic 
purposes (Frangipane 2006: 36, 98; LeClaire 2013: 18; Sampson 2010: 32; 2012: 7; Schott 2013: 92). 
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Jezebel has been a focus of several texts produced in the genre of apocalyptic 
writing termed ‘spiritual warfare’ in the last two decades (for example: Benson 2010; 
J. Clark 1998, 2011; Frangipane 1991, 2006; Freed 2008, 2012; Jackson 2002; 
LeClaire 2013, 2014; Richter 2005; Sampson 2010, 2012; Schott 2013). She has not, 
however, received much concentrated scholarly attention. Richard Bartholomew 
alludes to her in a treatment of the celebrity culture of modern conservative Christian 
writing, but only to differentiate an author as not utilising her (2006: 8). Trudie Stark 
and Hans van Deventer (2009) engage with her in depth, but focus only on two texts, 
the 1994 edition of Francis Frangipane’s The Three Battlegrounds and John Paul 
Jackson’s 2002 Unmasking the Jezebel Spirit. Their focus, moreover, is primarily 
exegetical, exploring whether the authors misread scripture in their translation of 
Queen Jezebel into a demonic principality. The accuracy of their exegesis does not 
concern me, however—whether the Jezebel of I and II Kings should be read as the 
prefiguration of a ‘Jezebel spirit’ is less relevant than that she has been. I am 
interested in exploring how this ‘Jezebel spirit’ is theopolitically used in the religio-
political milieu of contemporary American conservatism. My efforts might thus be 
seen as a companion to Runions’ The Babylon Complex (2014), which takes a similar 
route regarding Babylon. Indeed, Jezebel and Babylon are often conflated, taking 
point from the book of Revelation, which draws both explicit and implicit parallels 
between them (Duff 2001: 91). Yet they are also often figured as a pair of distinct 
demonic powers, operating in collusion towards the same end—comorbid sister 
spirits, or ‘religious running mate[s]’ as Jennifer LeClaire puts it (2013: 59).3 
Regardless of dynamics, the two are viewed as intimately intertwined. They 
share a number of crucial similarities. Like Babylon, who functions as a sign of both 
ungodly diversity and ungodly unity, Jezebel is similarly constructed through both her 
plurality and her attempts at control, attempts seen by the authors as destined for 
failure. As discussed in Chapter Two, demons are constructed as always-already 
doomed by both the structures of prophetic time and by the figuration of God as sole 
agential force of history. They can disrupt and destroy but never create (order). In 
figurations of Jezebel this creative lack adopts a specifically gendered, sexual and 
                                                
3 For direct parallels between Jezebel and Babylon in Revelation, see 2:23 and 17:5, 2:20 and 18:23, 
2:20–22 and 17:1–5, 2:20 and 17:6, 2:22 and 17:16. 
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reproductive form. It is linked narratively to her biblical archetype’s childlessness and 
thematically to the witchcraft with which she is associated, but also politically to the 
authors’ critiques of abortion rights in modern America, which Steve Sampson views 
as ‘attacking the very nature of God, which is life’ (see also LeClaire 2013: 37–8; 
2012: 50; Schott 2013: 93). This connection to abortion is common, foundational and 
yet simultaneously unsettling to narratives of the texts’ considered, because it implies 
that Jezebel’s reproductive irreproducibility may on some level be (at least, to the 
authors) a choice freely made. This exacerbates the writers’ hatred or pity—Landon 
Schott claims the pro-choice movement trades ‘righteousness for a woman’s right to 
choose self-worship’, for example (2013: xvi), while Jennifer LeClaire sombrely 
notes that once ‘the life of an unborn child has been sacrificed, other demons harass 
and even oppress those who have chosen abortion’ (2013: 37)—but it also opens the 
path towards the possibility of a different choosing, a possibility which continually 
haunts their works.4 While the authors emphasise the demonic evil of Jezebel’s 
abortive nature, conflating modern abortion rights with ancient child sacrifice and a 
lack of foundational potential more generally—that is, that Jezebel’s attempts at 
systemic construction are always-already abortive—the notion that Jezebel might not 
abort her offspring is a possibility far more terrifying to them. 
In examining this unstable and destabilising construction of Jezebel, I focus on 
two texts: Landon Schott’s Jezebel: The Witch is Back (2013) and Jennifer LeClaire’s 
The Spiritual Warrior’s Guide to Defeating Jezebel (2013). These are not the only 
texts I could have chosen, and others are drawn on to both corroborate and contest my 
points: Steve Sampson’s thematic duology on Jezebel (2012) and Ahab (2010), and 
LeClaire’s 2014 text on Satan’s Deadly Trio (Jezebel, Religion, and Witchcraft), as 
well as Francis Frangipane’s Three Battlegrounds (2006) and Jezebel Spirit (1991) 
are a few such texts (see also: Benson 2010; J. Clark 1998, 2011; Freed 2008, 2012; 
                                                
4 A counterpoint to this would be that it is simply Jezebel’s nature to abort her children: she cannot 
choose otherwise. Thomas Aquinas, among other theologians—often writing contra Origen, who 
claimed that even the Devil might be saved—concluded that fallen angels only possessed free choice 
before their choosing, after which they were fixed into a system of action (that is, evil) (DM 
Q16.A5/2003: 467–74). As a demonic spirit, Jezebel would be unable to choose otherwise. Yet writers 
like Schott, Sampson and LeClaire are rarely as theologically nuanced as Aquinas; the possibility of 
Jezebel’s choosing otherwise haunts their works, erupting in incredulous statements of the success of 
the secular systems they oppose. 
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Jackson 2002; Richter 2005).5 I selected these specifically as they are exemplars of 
the coding of sexuality and gender in contemporary spiritual warfare discourses, 
diverging and converging in their specificities as they work to weave changing 
attitudes to personal sexuality and women’s liberation into allegedly timeless 
theopolitical narratives of ownership, sovereignty, legitimacy and control.  
The chapter has four main sections. The first introduces spiritual warfare as a 
discourse of physical and ideological territoriality that divides the world into 
kingdoms of light and darkness, a territoriality saturated by a colonial logic of 
property and ownership, where the kingdom of light must colonise that of darkness 
for the good of the world. The second analyses spiritual warfare’s construction of 
‘Jezebel’ as one of the core manifestations of this colonisable darkness, and how this 
figure of Jezebel is seen as operating in the modern United States. Like spiritual 
warfare in general, this figuration often hinges on principles of ownership and 
sovereignty rooted in colonial ideas of property, but also on a gendered metaphysics 
of presence in which ‘woman’ is constructed as absence, counterpart to a masculine 
(divine) presence. In the third section I tie the modern discourses of witchcraft figured 
in narratives of Jezebel to historic discourses of witchcraft, examining its coding as a 
demonic subversion linked to a destabilisation and co-option of existing (patriarchal) 
institutions and practices. Finally, I discuss the relationship constructed between 
Jezebel and Babylon, whose intertwined efforts act to dismantle a system and build a 
counterfeit atop its rubble. By looking at Babylon-Jezebel’s figuration as the ‘lady of 
the kingdoms’ and the cross-contaminating figuration of sexuality and spirituality in 
gendered discourses of spiritual warfare, I examine how Jezebel operates to unmask 
the always-already unstable construction of sovereign indivisibility as such. 
                                                
5 Both Schott and LeClaire are evangelical preachers who run independent private ministries (see 
therev.com and jenniferleclaire.org, respectively). Known as ‘the Rev’, Schott has a particularly strong 
media and youth focus, aimed at propagating Jesus across media channels: one of the three stated goals 
of his ministry is to ‘Make Jesus famous’, and in 2012 he and his wife launched REVtv.com, a 24/7 
online youth and young adult network ‘dedicated to turning the heart of a generation to Jesus through 
Christ centered media’. LeClaire’s focus is more print-oriented and directed at women. A self-styled 
prophet, she is news editor of charismatic magazine Charisma and author of several books, boasting of 
having ‘100,000 follows on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube’ and of having appeared on a number of 
television programmes. Both Schott and LeClaire represent voices in the proliferation of evangelical 
‘media ministries’ in the contemporary digital age and occupy a specific genealogy of spiritual warfare 
discourse as it has developed in the post-Cold War era. Their importance is specifically in their 
typicality within the broader context. 
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THE CONTESTED TERRITORIES OF SPIRITUAL WARFARE 
The term ‘spiritual warfare’ refers to a particular practice of Christian demonology 
that originated in traditions of charismatic renewal, specifically 1950s Pentecostalism, 
but which has now spread into most branches of evangelicalism (Holvast 2009; 
McCloud 2015; Warren 2012).6 E. Janet Warren notes that while warfare imagery has 
long been part of the practice of demonology, the term was popularised in 1970 as the 
title of a book by one Michael Harper, a leader in the British charismatic movement 
(2012: 280). It has since proliferated, blurring between Pentecostalism, 
evangelicalism and charismatic Christianities, and has been employed to refer to a 
number of topics, including ‘missiology, counselling, and women’ (ibid.). Broadly, 
the discourse of spiritual warfare extrapolates from the motif of the ‘divine warrior’ 
into a worldview in which spiritual and material worlds operate as intertwined 
battlefields in a cosmic struggle for the human soul. As Harold Caballeros, a 
Guatemalan pastor and area coordinator for the Spiritual Warfare Network clarified, 
‘The natural is only a reflection of the spiritual, and a connection between them 
always exists’ (1993: 124).7 He later extrapolates, writing that spiritual warfare is 
the conflict between the Kingdom of Light and the kingdom of darkness, 
or Satan’s kingdom. The two kingdoms are competing for the souls and 
spirits of the people who inhabit the earth. This results in an ongoing 
battle involving two realms, the visible realm and the invisible realm. The 
spiritual battle that takes place in the heavenlies, in the invisible realm, is 
initiated in the hearts of people and has its final effect here on earth, in the 
visible realm (ibid. 128).  
In his 1989 Three Battlegrounds, the evangelical preacher Francis Frangipane defines 
the ‘essence of spiritual warfare’ as a battle over ‘who shall define reality: the Word 
of God or the illusions of the present age’ (2006: 106). He expands this with a 
rhetorical question: ‘All spiritual warfare is waged over one essential question: Who 
will control reality on earth, heaven or hell?’ (ibid.: 109). Recalling the Cold War 
theopolitics I examined above, spiritual warfare might be considered an explicitly 
religious corollary to Kristol’s ‘key question’ in our ideological age: ‘who owns the 
                                                
6 The language of spiritual warfare has a long history of use within missionary contexts (see Fuller 
1994: 47; Kent 2004: 107; Kidd 2009). 
7 The Spiritual Warfare Network was later renamed the Apostolic Strategic Prayer Network.  
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future?’ (1983: 263). In spiritual warfare discourses, this is most evident in a concept 
known as ‘spiritual mapping.’ While the formal movement behind this concept 
fractured since the millennium (Holvast 2009), the idea still underlies the logic of 
many contemporary spiritual warfare texts. 
Mapping the Battlefields 
The concept of ‘spiritual mapping’ was developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s in 
the US, and is particularly associated with Fuller Theological Seminary in Pasadena, 
California, whose Professor C. Peter Wagner popularised the term in his 1993 text 
Breaking Strongholds in Your City. As René Holvast notes, spiritual mapping did not 
produce any truly new doctrines but repurposed already-existing concepts from 
Protestant evangelical theology. One of the foremost of these was the ‘ontological and 
personalized reality of the demonic’, developing a latent dualism in order to apply 
theological principles to the structure of society (2009: 295). Spiritual mapping 
emphasised the relation of territory to the demonic, and, as I discussed in the 
Introduction to this thesis, constructed an emphasis on the ‘10/40 Window’—the 
space between the 10th and 40th parallels considered the place where Christianity was 
numerically weakest and was thus the metaphysical stronghold of the ‘last and “very 
powerful” undefeated demons’ (ibid.: xiii).  
Holvast ties spiritual mapping directly into the history of civil religion and the 
impact of the unipolar moment that I elaborated in Chapter Three, bound to the idea 
of America as a saviour nation with a manifest destiny, whose ‘superior’ civilisation 
was to be exported to the rest of the world: within the paradigm of spiritual mapping 
‘the destiny of the Christian version of the US was manifest’ (ibid.: 286). Within the 
US itself, the development of seemingly anti-Christian paradigms of thought in the 
advance of gay and lesbian rights, abortion rights, multireligious and multicultural 
paradigms and the development of a globalisation that fractured US identity as much 
as it expanded it, caused evangelicals to project the idea of a enemy grander and more 
unified than these individual struggles: ‘The threat could not be human—it came from 
behind the scenes, from Satan and his forces’ (ibid.: 289). 
 Spiritual warfare discourse are thus founded on the radical interconnectedness 
of heaven and earth, in which believers’ hearts effect and are affected by changes in 
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the spiritual realm. Closely linked to traditions of apocalypticism, much contemporary 
or ‘Third Wave’ spiritual warfare literature assumes humanity is living in the end-
times, in which ‘Satan has amassed an army of evil spirits that he is using to attack 
and demonize humans in an effort to win their souls for hell’ (McCloud 2013: 170).8 
As such, spiritual warfare is highly territorial, both in terms of real geographical 
territory and of discursive or ideological territory, with non-evangelical lands and 
beliefs being construed as the abode of demonic presences that requires expurgation 
(ibid.). The language used is often highly militaristic. Drawing on popular texts, 
Warren (2012: 280) lists the following examples: 
Frank and Ida Mae Hammond proclaim that ‘spiritual warfare’ involves 
weapons of the blood of Jesus and the word of God. Mark Bubeck 
believes Ephesians is ‘the Christian’s handbook on spiritual warfare 
against the devil and his kingdom’. This battle involves ‘hand-to-hand 
combat’ and forces of evil operate like a military organization. George 
Mallone advises Christians to choose weapons wisely, prepare for battle, 
wear appropriate armor, and have a battle plan. Timothy Warner refers to 
the ‘Christian offensive’, ‘Christian defensive’, and ‘ultimate weapon’. C. 
Peter Wagner uses the term ‘strategic-level spiritual warfare’ to discuss 
battles with territorial spirits (as opposed to ‘ground-level’ warfare, which 
involves deliverance of individuals). 
Although these are not the texts I focus on, the language is familiar. LeClaire talks of 
‘a season when kings go to war…If you do not go to war when you are called to go to 
war, then you are out of God’s will and you open the door for the enemy’ (2013: 96). 
Sampson says that we must ‘equip ourselves with new resolve’ lest we become 
‘emasculated and weakened’ (2012: 187). Schott compares one with an ‘Ahab’ spirit 
to an ‘arms dealer that enables [Jezebel’s] wars’ and laments that ‘If men of God 
would take their rightful authority in their churches, workplaces, and families…her 
tyranny would come to an end’ (2013: 90). Immediately noticeable is the alignment of 
warfare with masculinity, which I examine further below. Here, I want to focus on the 
overall structures of spiritual warfare, its associated questions of allegiance, and its 
                                                
8 The term ‘Third Wave’ was coined in 1988 by C. Peter Wagner, to differentiate what he and his 
colleagues saw as a new evangelical movement from its two ‘earlier’ waves—the birth of 
Pentecostalism at the turn of the twentieth century and the subsequent charismatic revival of the 1960s 
and early 1970s (Holvast 2009). McCloud notes that while ‘Third Wave’ beliefs have received little 
attention from scholars, they infiltrate and inform a wide range of evangelical practices, including Pat 
Robertson’s 2010 claim that the Haitian earthquake was caused by a pact the nation’s founders made 
with Satan, former vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s videotaped deliverance prayer by an 
African exorcist, and broader missionary strategies in the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa and Asia 
(2013: 169). 
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embeddedness in ideological frameworks of ownership reflective of the ‘evangelical-
capitalist resonance machine’ (Connolly 2008) I explored above. 
The Site of Ownership 
While the contemporary paradigm of spiritual warfare dates back to the fifties, more 
recent texts produced during and since the rise of spiritual mapping often encode 
discourses of ownership and property that echo the syncretisation of capitalism and 
(Protestant) Christianity. As the Cold War drew to a close and spiritual mapping first 
began to coalesce, Francis Frangipane published his bestselling Three Battlegrounds 
(2006), in which he encapsulates this particular theopolitical fusion: ‘This author does 
not believe that a Christian can be possessed,’ he writes, ‘for possession implies 
ownership. If one has given his life to Christ, he has become the property of the Son 
of God and is, in truth, purchased by Christ’ (ibid.: 29).  
Yet, while Frangipane does not believe Christians can be possessed, he 
clarifies that ‘Christians can be oppressed by demons, which can occupy 
unregenerated thought systems, especially if those thoughts are defended by self-
deception or false doctrines’ (ibid.). These systems are the province of darkness and 
‘Satan has a legal access, given to him by God, to dwell in the domain of darkness’ 
(ibid.: 14). He can traffic in any area of darkness, including that within the hearts of 
believers. This darkness is both moral and literal. It is constituted by an absence, but 
‘its cause is not simply the absence of light; it is the absence of God, who is light’ 
(ibid.). Here, Frangipane sets up a schema that will become familiar. The believer, 
who has given themselves to Christ, is already owned, and so can only be troubled but 
never owned by demons; meanwhile, Satan has only ‘legal access’ to domains 
situated in or constituted by ‘darkness’. This darkness is an absence waiting to be 
filled: Satan has access, never ownership, because only God is capable of ownership. 
Thus, darkness is little merely unclaimed wilderness awaiting mastery, one in which 
demons dwell but over which they cannot claim true purchase—an ideological 
territorialisation that extends past the theological realm to the geopolitical one, 
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predominantly the global south or ‘developing world’ that has yet to be conquered in 
God’s name (McCloud 2013: 169).9 
 While the colonial logic of missionary work in spiritual warfare is noteworthy, 
for Frangipane and many later authors the home front is often the most crucial. Those 
spiritual warriors who focus on the spirit of Jezebel—John Paul Jackson (2002), 
Landon Schott (2013), Jennifer LeClaire (2013, 2014), Steve Sampson (2010, 2012), 
Don Richter (2005), Sandie Freed (2008, 2012), and others—the primary spiritual 
battleground is America itself. This introduces a difference in emphasis within 
spiritual warfare—while missionary work can be viewed as an expansion of God’s 
territory into the dark places of the world (i.e. the ‘10/40 Window’), the presence of 
‘unregenerated thought systems’ in home territory represents an encroachment onto 
God’s own property. This is noticeable in the emphasis placed by writers on the 
Church, which, Sampson writes, is ‘the ultimate prize the kingdom of darkness 
focuses on for destruction’ (2012: 50), and in their conflation of the integrity of the 
Body of the Church with that of the human body. Made apparent in the conflation of 
sexual purity with spiritual purity, extrapolated through the Jezebel narrative, this 
double-B/body ties into identifications of the foremost of ‘unregenerated thought 
systems’—the shifting cultural attitudes to gender and sexuality viewed as both cause 
and symptom of a broader drift from (true, Christian) religion toward godless, 
hedonistic secularism.  
This focus on the body conflating spiritual and sexual purity encodes an 
insidious logic of property. LeClaire (2013: 30, 160) and Schott (2013: 102) both cite 
I Corinthians 6:18 as evidence for their claims: ‘Flee sexual immorality. Every sin 
that a man does is outside the body, but he who commits sexual immorality sins 
                                                
9 One might link this to the confluence of Pentecostal Christianities and the global market that has been 
noted by certain scholars. Simon Coleman, for example, has argued that ‘Pentecostal Christians create 
a global culture which creates a multidimensional, yet culturally specific, sense of reaching out into an 
unbounded realm of action and identity,’ one whose global spread is augmented by mass 
communications, global travel, and conferences (2000: 6). Discussing the relationship between 
Pentecostalism and development, Päivi Hasu notes that ‘Pentecostal Christianity embeds neoliberalism 
particularly well’ due to a confluence of values, such as an emphasis on social mobility based on merit 
or a ‘code of conduct’ that prevents people falling into poverty, and more generally by offering ‘moral 
and spiritual explanations about how modernity, the global market economy and the structural 
adjustment programmes’ affect individuals and groups, as well as providing ‘new ways for followers to 
act in situations where they increasingly feel powerless and frustrated’ (2012: 70). While worth bearing 
in mind, there are significant differences between spiritual warfare doctrines aimed at and within the 
‘developing world’ and those aimed at the US itself. 
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against his own body’. Schott continues this citation through verses nineteen and 
twenty: ‘Don’t you realise that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit, who lives 
in you and was given to you by God? You do not belong to yourself, for God bought 
you with a high price. So you must honor God with your body’ (2013: 102). Tying 
this focus on the body into spiritual warfare’s narratives of ownership and darkness, it 
is not merely that homosexuality and other ‘sexual sins’ are constructed as defiling 
the image of God in the human, but that God has already paid the price for your body 
and thus already owns it. Your body is not yours, and so you have no actual right to 
do with it as you will.10 This is why Schott categorises the pro-choice movement as 
having ‘traded righteousness for a woman’s right to choose self-worship’ (2013: xvi). 
Ownership and determination of self are constructed as idolatry, a worshipping of the 
human and of human artifice rather than of the true Creator. Any belief a person 
might hold about their rights to their own flesh and blood is little more than an 
illusion, a false concept of the ownership of a darkness that is nothing but the absence 
of light, of a God who is light. At best, it is a legal access that can, and ultimately will 
be rescinded. 
 How specifically does the demonic figure of Jezebel fit into this interplay of 
(self-)ownership and absence, and why is it she that becomes the focus of the authors’ 
ire? Jezebel’s role in this discourse often hinges on the interplay of two intertwining 
aspects of her character. One is gender, or rather her apparent overturning of divinely 
given gender norms and hierarchies. The second is idolatry and witchcraft, which tie 
into her relationship to Babylon and to concepts of (il)legitimate hierarchy and 
control. The following two sections focus on these aspects of her figuration, 
respectively. 
                                                
10 Considering the historical connections of the ‘Jezebel’ to African-American slavery, female sexuality 
and sexual exploitation in U.S. history, in which the projection of the biblical archetype served to 
explain ‘the slave owners’ sexual attraction to and sexual abuse of African American women’ by 
constructing them as ‘promiscuous and sexually permissive’ (D.L. Brown, White-Johnson and Griffin-
Fennell 2013: 526), it is difficult not to see an underlying logic of racialised master-slave relations 
operating here. 
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WOMAN, FOREIGNER, IDOLATER: JEZEBEL’S TRIPLE ALTERITY 
In the spiritual battlefield of gender and sexuality Jezebel is one of the most recurring 
images of the enemy. Latter parts of Frangipane’s Battlegrounds are devoted to her, 
and he later wrote a whole book dedicated to her, The Jezebel Spirit (1991). In case 
there might have been confusion about what this spirit represents, Frangipane makes 
it clear: ‘When we speak of Jezebel, we are identifying the source in our society of 
obsessive sensuality, unbridled witchcraft, and hatred for male authority’ (2006: 123). 
He clarifies that, while the demonic spirit of Jezebel is technically genderless, ‘it is 
important to note that Jezebel is more attracted to the uniqueness of the female psyche 
in its sophisticated ability to manipulate without physical force’ (ibid.). Other authors 
contest this, holding that the spirit affects men and women equally—indeed, most are 
at pains to stress the genderlessness of the Jezebel Spirit. However, as John Paul 
Jackson notes in his foreword to Schott’s text, the spirit often leaves men ‘weakened 
and emasculated’ by its presence (Schott 2013: xi). Of the authors I focus on, Schott 
emphasises the genderlessness of the Jezebel spirit but still uses female pronouns to 
refer to her, while LeClaire is more nebulous, referring to the Jezebel spirit mostly as 
‘it’, but also glossing it as a ‘goddess’ and equating the spirit with the Phoenician 
goddess Ashtoreth whom Jezebel worshipped (2013: 24); ultimately, she never truly 
disputes its female gender identification, merely its ‘biological’ sex. 
Genderless Spirit and Spirit of Genderlessness 
The Jezebel spirit’s stressed genderlessness is neither coincidental nor a mere appeal 
to the non-biological (and thus de facto unsexed) nature of demonic spirits. Rarely do 
authors feel the need to stress the genderless nature of demons who appear male 
(Satan being a quintessential example). On the surface it might initially seem that the 
authors are attempting to make their work more appealing to women by declaring the 
non-womanhood of a spiritual being that bears a woman’s name. This may be part of 
it. Yet, as I shall show, the primary function of the spirit of Jezebel in the narratives 
constructed by the authors is through its disruption and overturning of traditional 
gender roles and performances. ‘Jezebel’ is not merely a ‘genderless’ spirit, but to a 
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certain extent a spirit of genderlessness itself; that is, of the overturning of gender as 
an essential, binary, innate and (importantly) divinely-granted aspect of being. This 
overturning includes not just a rise in ‘dominant’ women and the alleged 
‘emasculation of men in our society’ (Schott 2013: xv) but also discourses of gay and 
lesbian rights and the increasing normalisation in parts of the West of the practice of 
sex before marriage (LeClaire 2013: 37–40), as well as other practices the authors 
define as sexually immoral. Whilst the inclusion of witchcraft by Frangipane, 
something belaboured by Schott, among a cavalcade of specifically sexual sins might 
seem strange, the connection between sexual immorality and religious idolatry is a 
recurrent theme in both the Bible and the texts here. Idolatry is often equated with 
adultery, specifically with a wife’s betrayal of her husband’s legitimate authority: the 
Church, God’s Bride, must remain steadfast and loyal to him (LeClaire 2013: 27–44; 
Schott 2013: 1–9). I return to this image of the bride below. Moreover, the connection 
between sexual immorality and idolatry links the spiritual Jezebel consciously to the 
Biblical character from which its name is taken: Queen Jezebel, whose triple alterity 
(woman, foreigner, idolater) are crucial to her narrative function. 
The story of Queen Jezebel is told in I and II Kings. Steve Sampson gives a 
brief narrative of her life as the daughter of the high priest of Baal, Ethbaal, who 
comes to Israel as the bride of the king, Ahab, and ultimately corrupts God’s people to 
worship of her own, false, deities. He concludes his tale with an explanation of the 
connection between Jezebel the woman and Jezebel the spirit, stating that ‘young 
Jezebel was raised under two pagan deities [Ashtoreth and Baal]. She became a 
wicked and rebellious queen who usurped the rulership of Israel…Because of the 
control she exercised and the tactics she used to exert illegitimate and wicked control’ 
her name has become synonymous with the spirit (2012: 20). LeClaire puts it more 
succinctly with: ‘Queen Jezebel so personified the spirit of Jezebel that this is what 
we call it’ (2013: 20). For the authors concerned, Jezebel’s worship and veneration of 
other (false) gods is intrinsically linked to her overturning of the traditional roles of 
womanhood and patriarchal authority and to the proliferation of unsanctified sexual 
practices—what Sampson calls her ‘thirty-year reign of iniquity’ (2012: 21). Schott 
connects polytheism to sexual license openly: ‘Through the worship of Baal’, he 
writes, ‘came the god Dagon, for Baal was the son of Dagon. Baal, Dagon, Ashtoreth, 
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and Molech combined for the erotic acts of perverted heterosexual relations, 
homosexual activity, violent sexual acts, body piercing (including genitals), body 
cutting, and an infatuation with blood…prostitution, and ceremonial orgies’ (2013: 4). 
Sexual deviance and the displacement of divine, masculine, monotheistic authority 
are here conflated as part and parcel of the activity of the same demonic power. 
Using the story of Queen Jezebel, quintessential embodiment of the demonic 
spirit, as the ground of their texts, the authors tie a narrative of gender and sexuality to 
one of the legitimacy of authority, authority that is ultimately God’s but is vested in 
those mortal men (and they are men) who obey his godly laws. Queen Jezebel is an 
idolater and thus also an adulterer, one who rejects legitimacy and venerates lies and 
deceit. She turns her Israelite husband Ahab also to idolatry, away from worship of 
the true God, and supplants God’s authority—traditional, male, monotheistic, and 
legitimate—with her own—foreign, female, polytheistic, and illegitimate. Ultimately 
in the narrative, Queen Jezebel is given over to a gruesome death, defenestrated and 
trampled under hoof at the behest of the prophet Jehu, her body later torn apart and 
devoured by dogs (II Kings 9:30–37). The servants of the true God emerge victorious, 
just as—due to the preordained structure of apocalyptic time and the repetition of 
prophetic moments—the spiritual warrior-authors assure themselves of their victory 
over the spirit to which they give her name (LeClaire 2013: 16; Schott 2013: xv), 
even if some of them, such as Sampson, express bewilderment over how those they 
identify as working for this spirit seem to go from strength to strength (2012: 39). 
The Absence of (Hetero)Normativity 
In this narrative of the reinstatement of godly patriarchal power, however, true 
authority does not really belong to Ahab, Jezebel’s Israelite husband, but to God. 
Indeed, Steve Sampson details in Discerning and Defeating the Ahab Spirit (2010) 
that Ahab becomes if not equally then at least partially culpable for Jezebel’s sins: by 
surrendering to her will, Ahab abdicates his divinely-ordained role—as ruler, man, 
and man-as-ruler. His passivity, his inability to perform the active, masculine gender 
role God intended, condemns him too. This ‘Ahab spirit’, however, is merely a 
supplement to Jezebel, the illegitimate passivity that permits her illegitimate activity: 
‘men she had stripped of their manhood and authority…[those who] have become 
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eunuchs—slaves—to this demonic force’ (Sampson 2012: 42). As the spirit that 
actively creates and maintains the disruption of the institutions of patriarchal 
monotheism, it is Jezebel who bears the brunt of their wrath. Schott (2013: 1) even 
ties her operations to the very meaning of Jezebel’s name, although as a Biblical 
literalist he does not question whether this name might have been altered or given 
wholesale to the character posthumously: 
When Ahab, the reigning king of Israel, married Jezebel he directly 
aligned God’s people with God’s enemy. It is remarkable that anyone 
would enter into a marriage or an alliance with a woman whose name 
means without dwelling or cohabitation, unmarried, uncommitted or 
unhusbanded. Jezebel will not submit. The word unhusbanded means, to 
refuse to live in a peaceful cohabitation. 
As this brief sketch begins to make clear, from the outset those spiritual 
warfare texts which emphasise Jezebel as their primary opponent set themselves into 
a narrative in which the performances of gender are intimately tied to ideas of 
rulership, sovereignty, territory, of who rules and has the right to rule—both in the 
household and the nation. To overturn this structure is to cast the world into chaos. 
Though their emphases differ by degrees, the authors considered here cast the Jezebel 
spirit as one of the primary demonic actors at work in the modern world, if not the 
primary one. Much like the spiritual warriors examined in the following chapter, the 
struggle against this modern enemy is also one against an ancient, timeless opponent, 
and it involves the repetition of an ancient history. For the authors discussed in 
Chapter Six this period is the Days of Noah, whereas for Frangipane, LeClaire, 
Schott, and others it is the days of Elijah and (ultimately) of Jehu. And as the 
etymology of Jezebel’s name is brought forth as an indicator of her nature, so too is 
Jehu’s. Sampson glosses it as meaning ‘Jehovah is He’ (2012: 40). The prophet is 
thereby cast in the role of the uncompromising husband (God) returned to discipline 
his unruly bride (Israel/the Church) and re-exert a patriarchal authority that had 
become weak and emasculated under Jezebel’s iniquitous reign. 
This cycle—the degrading of legitimate male authority and its reinstatement—
is viewed by the authors as recurring in multiple narratives in the Bible, each time 
attributed to the machinations of the Jezebel spirit: ‘Jezebel’s footprint appears many 
times in Scripture, and many times in history’, writes Mark Chironna in his foreword 
to Confronting Jezebel (Sampson 2012: 8). Sampson identifies the Jezebel spirit not 
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merely in Queen Jezebel herself but in the biblical personages of Herodias, Korah, 
and Absalom (2012: 44–5, 93–100). Schott lists Delilah, Saul, Haman, Sanballat, and 
the Pharisees (2013: 71–82). LeClaire focuses on Nimrod’s wife, Semiramis, and 
links Jezebel broadly to Babylon, the ‘Lady of Kingdoms’, weaving a narrative in 
which this pair of demonic powers work in collusion to undermine and usurp God’s 
authority (2013: 59–72). Schott also describes this partnership in his discussion of the 
Jezebel Spirit at work in modern sexuality (2013: 101). I return to it fully in section 
four. In all the texts, however, these Biblical characters are interwoven with anecdotes 
about individuals which the authors have encountered in life and believe are under the 
thrall of the Jezebel spirit. It is through this trans-historical overview that the authors 
transform the figure of the foreign queen into that of a demonic principality working 
from the spiritual realm, translating a contemporary ideological conflict into a 
timeless battle of good and evil. Echoing Caballeros and many Third Wave authors, 
Sampson (2012: 29) sketches this conflict’s eschatological horizon: 
The spiritual world, with its opposing forces of good and evil, is a world 
that is in one sense more real and relevant than the natural realm we live 
in. The kingdom of darkness is waging all-out war against the Kingdom of 
God, and the Bible tells us that as spirit beings, we are caught in a struggle 
between these two realms…In these last days of the Church, the thrust of 
the enemy is mighty as he tries to establish strongholds in people’s minds 
and seduce our world to come under the control of Jezebel and other evil 
principalities and powers. 
These ‘last days of the Church’ are the contemporary era, and this era is a repetition 
of the era of Jezebel and Elijah. ‘Through technology,’ Sampson writes, ‘the devil and 
his forces have access to the masses, and as in the days of Elijah, the majority submits 
and serves Baal’ (ibid.: 31). This repetition of time is a repetition of ancient conflict: 
‘Jezebel came against Elijah in his day,’ claims Schott, ‘and her spirit comes against 
those of us who carry the spirit and heart of Elijah in this day’ (2013: 73). But as the 
forces of God triumphed then, so today that stage is being set for Jezebel to be thrown 
down: ‘as it was in the days of Elijah, so it is today that…God is whispering that 
Jezebel must come down’ (Chironna in Sampson 2012: 10). According to Schott, this 
is ‘the end when God pours His Spirit out onto His people’ (2013: 73). For the authors 
considered here, the structure of apocalyptic time assures ultimate victory. Jezebel 
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will always be cast down from her window: it may be a question of ‘when’, but this 
‘when’ is always ‘soon’. 
Jezebel’s Tools 
The eschatological place of technology is a recurrent theme in apocalyptic discourses, 
though the technologies themselves vary with the era and the authors’ chosen other. 
For these authors, the technologies focused on are television, film, the internet, music, 
and fashion; the main media of popular culture through which images and messages 
can be disseminated to the public and which are filled, according to Sampson, with 
‘violence, filthiness, sexual unwholesomeness and disrespect for authority’ (2012: 
52). Much of their ire is concentrated on the pornography industry. Sampson calls it 
‘Jezebel’s most effective arena’ (ibid.), while Schott includes it as the climax of a list 
that includes Hollywood (which has ‘spread [Jezebel’s] perversions and sexuality 
across the world’), secularist professors and academics (‘who hate God and love to try 
and disprove Him’), and abortion rights (which ‘has traded righteousness for a 
woman’s right to choose self-worship’), perhaps intended as an escalating itinerary of 
corruptions. He remarks that pornography ‘prepares individuals to destroy their 
marriages’ (2013: xv, 101–11).  
Pornography comes up frequently in LeClaire’s text as well, tied to idolatry: 
‘porneia…means “illicit sexual intercourse.” It is also a metaphor for the worship of 
idols’, she notes. Then: ‘Christians are serving the idol of pornography. And the Spirit 
of Jezebel is pushing it’ (2013: 41–2). Moreover, this idol is often invoked in relation 
to other media forms: LeClaire makes reference to ‘semi-pornographic broadcasts that 
air on prime-time television’ (2013: 101). She never clarifies what she means by 
‘semi-pornographic’, but it is likely related to a statement made by Schott in which he 
compares watching films that contain nudity to an individual stripping off their 
clothes in front of you or your spouse (2013: 103). Ire is also directed at works that 
contain no nudity, however. As part of a diatribe against modern media, Sampson 
refers explicitly to ‘sitcoms that undermine the family and male authority, which are 
largely written by homosexuals…who have found acceptance from those with a far-
left agenda’ (2012: 52). Hollywood is (perhaps obviously) named as a bastion of the 
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Jezebel Spirit, as are (perhaps surprisingly) talk shows, ‘which more and more exalt 
unrighteous thinking’ (ibid.). No examples are presented. 
 Outside the media, the discourse of gay and lesbian rights is taken as a central 
form of Jezebel’s demonic campaign to usurp the place of God, though the discourse 
is viewed as closely tied to the media. ‘Homosexuality has driven its agenda into the 
heart of society’, Schott writes, ‘and we are watching God’s institution of marriage 
trampled at the feet of “tolerance and equality”’ (2013: xvi). Jezebel ‘is an advocate 
for homosexuality’, he informs his readers later: it is ‘part of her religion.’ Why? 
Because it undermines God’s commandment that men and women reproduce (ibid.: 
108). The legal battle in contemporary America to cast anti-gay and lesbian rhetoric 
as hate speech is also a tool of Jezebel (ibid.).11 Schott includes as part of his tirade 
against gay and lesbian rights the pithy if not unterrifying statement that ‘Pride is the 
enemy of God’, with all intended meanings (ibid.: 107), and LeClaire is just as 
vehement in her assignation of the acceptance of gay, lesbian and transgender 
individuals as a main vehicle of the Jezebel spirit in working towards the attempted 
usurpation of the Kingdom of God by that of darkness (2013: 82, 164). In the middle 
of an exegesis of Paul’s letter to the Romans regarding the proliferation of sexual 
immorality, she writes the following:  
Although Jezebel’s influence is not limited to homosexual activity—any 
form of sexual immorality will do—the Jezebel deception is what causes 
gay, lesbian, bi-sexual and transgender people to believe that they can 
willfully embrace abominations—never declaring war on the temptation—
and still enter the Kingdom of heaven’ (ibid.: 82).  
We see here the return of the Church-centred discourse of demonic counter-
colonisation I touched on above, in which infiltration of Christian structures (here, 
soteriology) is figured as one of the foremost strategies of the demonic other. 
LeClaire holds that while to a certain degree sin is sin, sexual sins are more serious 
than others (ibid.: 101), an attitude manifesting throughout her text as she labours the 
connection between sex and idolatry in both scripture and the modern world. In one of 
the few sections that (obliquely) touches on race, she discusses South Florida and 
through juxtaposition links the state’s high percentage of gay, lesbian and bisexual 
                                                
11 LeClaire is eager to inform her readers that ‘Legalism is also a doctrine of demons’ (2013: 50). This 
alignment is an important part of its historic genealogy, and is a trait I analysed in the preceding 
chapter in the context of demonological figurations of Islam. 
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citizens (second, she claims, only to California) to the diversity of religious practices, 
notably ‘Santeria from Cuba, voodoo from Haiti and Rastafari from Jamaica—and 
God knows what other devils from various other parts of the world’ (ibid.: 164). 
South Florida is, for LeClaire, a region deeply in thrall to the Jezebel spirit, where 
diversity of religious and sexual practices reign supreme. Jezebel here is the foreigner, 
who brings her false gods from ‘various other parts of the world’, though exactly 
where only ‘God knows’. The faiths LeClaire selects also draw an unstated but clear 
link to African-American communities and thereby to the figuration of ‘the jezebel’ 
as one of most pernicious and enduring stereotypes of African-American women as 
sexually permissive and promiscuous (Brown, White-Johnson and Griffin-Fennell 
2013: 526). Emerging from the legacy of slavery, the jezebel ‘is perceived as 
seductive, manipulative, and unable to control her sexual drives’, a construction that 
operated historically to justify her enslavement and sexual violation by white slave-
owners (Townsend et al. 2010: 274). 
 Given the existence of this stereotype, race is rarely if ever mentioned by any 
of the writers. However, ideas of manipulation—from Jezebel’s manipulation of Ahab 
to her manipulation of Israelite faith, casting it into idolatry and sexual immorality, 
are central. Indeed, while the three aspects of Jezebel’s alterity—woman, foreigner, 
and idolater—are the central threads that inform and wend their way through all the 
texts they are not the main topic. This is reserved for issues of control, domination 
and manipulation: these areas are at the heart of what the writers term ‘witchcraft’, 
and are tied to the concept of rebellion. ‘It’s very important for you to understand that 
witchcraft is simply about controlling the will of another person’, writes Schott, 
adding: ‘A rebellious person will directly or indirectly try to control others’ (2013: 
37). LeClaire asks the reader ‘How do we see Jezebel manifesting?’ and answers: 
‘The Bible talks about rebellion as the sin of witchcraft’ (2013: 164). Sampson tells us 
that ‘Witchcraft definitely involves manipulation. Jezebel control is behavior that 
operates through a person to control others by the use of manipulative, domineering 
and intimidating tactics’ (2012: 25). Just in case the readers might suspect that he is 
just writing an anti-bullying tract, however, he clarifies later on that ‘[a]s understood 
from a biblical perspective, witchcraft is anything that usurps the authority and 
influence of the Holy Spirit in a person’s life’ (ibid.: 53), and later adds that 
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‘Witchcraft is nothing more than illegitimately controlling the will of another’ (ibid.: 
113). In the next section, I consider this discourse of witchcraft as it ties into historic 
formulations of witchcraft I explored in Chapter One. 
WITCHCRAFT, POWER, AND (IL)LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 
The significant portions of the texts dedicated to the subject of control and domination 
are intriguing because they shed a different light on the themes listed above, though as 
I will show Jezebel’s triple alterity is still central. Schott devotes a chapter to listing 
the negative traits of people bearing Jezebel’s spirit: jealousy, charm, hate, savvy, 
slyness, lack of consideration for others, cunning, being calculating and strife-
causing, having a domineering and mean-spirited personality that refuses to back 
down and is eager to lord expertise over others, among various other traits (2013: 37–
50). Other authors contain similar lists, if not as comprehensive. Their books are 
littered with personal anecdotes, narrating tales of domineering and abusive persons 
and how such behaviour leads to destructive effects in communities and interpersonal 
relationships. These narratives are varied, such as a tale of a ‘Pastor Charles’, a 
domineering pastor who ruled his flock with an iron fist (Sampson 2012: 157–9), a 
‘Kathryn’, the leader of a prayer team whose jealousy led her to sabotage and 
undermine others (Schott 2013: 11–12), or of ‘Rick’ and ‘Sammy’, a drug-addict and 
alcoholic whose sins were tolerated and ignored, causing them to spiral deeper into 
damaging habits (LeClaire 2013: 58, 118–19). In the latter, LeClaire makes clear that 
the Jezebel spirit was not only in ‘Rick’ and ‘Sammy’ but also in the congregation 
that ignored them in order to focus upon itself (ibid.). In addition to the contemporary 
tales are the scriptural examples listed earlier: Herodias, Korah, and Absalom 
(Sampson 2012: 44–5, 93–100), Delilah, Saul, Haman, Sanballat, and the Pharisees 
(Schott 2013: 71–82). All are seen as individuals in acts of rebellion—witchcraft—
that lead to the promotion of discord in place of unity. 
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A Practice of Spiritual Subversion 
It is in the triple identification of control with witchcraft with rebellion that it 
becomes easier to discern the underlying demonological/ideological structures that 
run through these and other spiritual warfare texts. In all the examples the authors 
present where the individuals found some kind of redemption, the solution was to be 
found in dedicating themselves to God and the Holy Spirit. Recall that Sampson’s 
definition of the art of witchcraft is the act of illegitimately controlling the will of 
another person (Sampson 2012: 113), thus leaving room open for concepts of 
legitimate hierarchy, of a right order of things. In the minds of the authors, it appears 
that the abuse meted out by Jezebel is to some extent secondary to the disruption and 
discord it sows; it is at least an effect, not a cause of that discord.  
The same mentality is detectable in their various objections to the media and 
‘deviant’ sexualities: the problem is less the ‘sins’ themselves, but the disruption of 
the divinely-ordained status quo, the telic order or orthotaxy, which these sins cause 
and are caused by. While there is thematic unity in the works—the Jezebel spirit is 
always one that promotes disruption of divine order—one cannot help but feel that the 
phenomena the authors discuss are, in reality, distinct. The modern fight for gay and 
lesbian rights and the actions of an abusive and domineering preacher who kowtows 
his flock through fear of damnation do not, on the surface, seem to have much linking 
them. (Perhaps apart from the very formation and maintenance of the restrictive and 
god-given status quo that the authors writing contra both of these seem so keen to 
uphold.) It would be easy to ascribe this to a flaw inherent in dualistic thinking, where 
all evil and all good are assigned to distinctive and mutually exclusive spheres. This 
may be true, but it is not the whole truth. The topic requires deeper examination, 
because it ties closely into the ways in which the Jezebel spirit has been constructed 
and to the underlying logic of gendered spiritual warfare discourses which map onto 
the broader demonological structure which this thesis is examining. 
Discourses of witchcraft as demonological practice are historically tied to 
ideas of spiritual, sexual, and political subversion or excess, as I have touched on in 
previous chapters. The iconic description of the black mass, taken from the 1437 
Errores Gazariorum, lays this out explicitly:  
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After having sworn and promised these things, the poor seduced person 
adores the presiding devil by giving homage to him, and as a sign of 
homage he kisses the devil, appearing in human or in another form…on 
the buttocks or anus, giving to him as tribute one of his own limbs after 
death. After which all the members of that pestiferous sect celebrate the 
admittance of the new heretic, eating whatever is around them, especially 
murdered children, roasted or boiled. When this most wicked feast is 
completed, after they have danced as much as they desired, the presiding 
devil then cries, while extinguishing the light, ‘mestlet, mestlet!’  After 
they hear his voice, immediately they join together carnally, one man with 
one woman, or one man with one man, and sometimes father with 
daughter, son with mother, brother with sister…scarcely observing the 
natural order (in Bailey 2003: 1). 
Almond notes in his discussion of the black mass that the initiate would accede to 
certain duties as part of his or her initiation, including killing as many children under 
the age of three as possible, and using black magic to impede sexual intercourse in 
every marriage whenever possible (2014: 98). Both Russell (1972: 238) and Velasco 
(2011: 64) translate ‘meslet, mestlet’ as ‘get in there and mix it up’, presaging the 
orgiastic ritual. Notably, lesbian sexuality is absent from the description, but Sherry 
Velasco notes that accusations of lesbianism accompanied at times that of witchcraft, 
establishing the ‘conceptual link between sexual deviance and spiritual deviance’, in 
which both ‘were perceived as deliberate and willful challenges to the natural order 
established by God and nature’ (2011: 64). These claims can be expanded here to the 
black mass, in which disruption of the ‘natural order’ of sexuality serves as the climax 
of the heretical ritual. Regardless, we perceive the satanic pseudosacrament of the 
black mass and the duties allegedly given to initiates the same obsessions of sexual 
order, religious purity and inheritance (in the alleged child sacrifice and dedication to 
impeding sexual intercourse in marriage) that are the fixations of Schott, LeClaire, 
Sampson, and others. 
Alain Boureau (2006) discusses the mechanisms of the black mass explicitly 
through the lens of a demonic co-opting of the divine order and describes the arising 
and attempted solution of a demonic contradiction in orthodox writings on witchcraft: 
it became clear to certain commentators that the heretics partaking in such Satanic 
sacraments drew their power not from God or God’s power vested in an object (like 
Moses’ brazen serpent), but from Satan. However, Satan lacked creative potentiality, 
seemingly creating a contradiction. The solution constructed, Boureau narrates, was 
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that Satan’s ubiquity and power over the material world allowed him to subvert the 
Christian sacramental rites and direct them to unintended and ungodly ends. Lacking 
creative capacity, Satan ‘needed to redirect a significant Christian structure, [such as] 
baptism’ (ibid.: 62). Through this appropriation and corruption, the Devil was capable 
of influencing the world in a more universal sense. As detailed in Chapter One, 
witchcraft became a form of heretical contagion, a contagion that was transmitted by 
the witch as vector of postulated ‘heretical networks’ of enemies to Christian order. 
Christendom America Must Be Defended 
This historical discourse of witchcraft parallels the modern discourse of witchcraft 
constructed by the authors as a core facet of the Jezebel spirit. This is not to say that 
the writers draw directly on this earlier discourse, but that they are positioned in a 
demonologico-political genealogy that can shed substantial light on the contemporary 
discourse. In the figure of Jezebel ‘sexual deviance and spiritual deviance’ are again 
conceptually linked, and bound up with a theopolitical strategy of demonic 
insurgency into a territory the conceptual unity of which is seen as paramount. Here, 
however, the theopolitical homogeneity of the United States replaces that of medieval 
Christendom, and the indivisibility of its sovereignty is equally illusory and (thus) 
prescriptive. This ties into the theopolitics of identity I examined above, in which the 
messianic structures of American civil religion help to produce the image of a walled 
enclosure, an American Paradise, whose manifest destiny makes it the driving force 
of a theologico-geopolitical soteriology. The ‘culture wars’ in which this subset of 
spiritual warfare discourse can be located relied on the differentiation of an authentic 
citizen (heterosexual, capitalist, religious, white and male) from the horrors of radical 
alterity, one conservative writers and commentators saw as increasingly manifest in 
America itself. As I touched on above, the sexual and gender politics of the culture 
wars were of particular import, with much discourse centred on threats to the ‘nuclear 
family’ as a prime conveyance of cultural unity. As Norman Podhoretz wrote against 
gay rights: 
My position on gay rights has to do with my fear of the rise and spread of 
tendencies in this society and in this culture which undermine in a very 
drastic way the possibility of maintaining the family as the key institution 
of our society, and of raising our children and our grandchildren in a 
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context which makes it possible for them to live and take their place in the 
natural chain of the generations (in Dershowitz 1991: 202–3). 
Podhoretz here touches on the same emphasis on family dynamics as Schott, 
LeClaire, and others. The ‘natural chain of the generations’ speaks to the notion of 
legacy and inheritance that the writers contrast with Jezebel’s childlessness and 
abortive qualities. This logic is tied to the same concepts of idolatrous child sacrifice 
as that deployed in the description of the black mass. ‘Some theologians’, LeClaire 
notes, though she names no names, ‘connect abortion today to the bloodthirsty god of 
Molek, indicating that an unwanted pregnancy that ends with the child’s death is, 
arguably, a sacrifice to this demon’ (2013: 37). Schott links it directly to Jezebel, 
writing that ‘Queen Jezebel worshipped the false god, Baal, which included child 
sacrifice. This included the murder of the unborn (abortion) and newborn babies. 
When female prostitutes of Baal were impregnated during religious “services,” they 
would sacrifice these conceived children to Baal’ (2013: 93). ‘There is no inheritance 
for an aborted child’, he adds (ibid.), and then ties ideas about inheritance or legacy 
into the broader role of the Church as, in the words of Sampson, ‘the ultimate prize 
the kingdom of darkness focuses on’ (2012: 50). Satan lacks creative power and must 
therefore appropriate the prevailing structures of Christianity itself. 
Jezebel’s witchcraft is assigned to her partly on the basis of her triple alterity. 
While the authors figure witchcraft through the lens of quasi-mystical control 
resulting from a dominant personality, it is primarily the assertion of an illegitimate 
order—female, polytheistic, foreign—over a legitimate one—male, monotheistic, and 
native. (In the biblical narrative this ‘nativeness’ is Israelite, for our authors it is 
American; both, of course, originate outside the realities they carve out as their own.) 
The methods of the ‘witchcraft’ in these texts, abhorrent as they are, are second to its 
goal: the disruption and dislocation of ‘proper’, telic order. This disruption is never 
figured as stemming from something internal to the Church or its teachings, but is 
projected out onto an external force or system that comes from without. This external 
system is one of illegitimate authority, an order that is different or of difference, 
which is figured as radically destabilised and unable to set roots. LeClaire equates this 
with ‘the spirit of the world’ in contrast to and in conflict with the spirit of God (2013: 
60), and for all the authors the reassertion of a telic order of correct Christian doctrine 
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and practice is figured as the only way to restore balance and curb the deviancy and 
abusive control of those in thrall to Jezebel. 
However, in keeping with her opposition to a unitary, masculine order, Jezebel 
does not work alone. She is one of main forces of this heterotaxic structure, but she is 
not the only one. One of her main partners is, according to LeClaire, Babylon, another 
antagonistic biblical force coded as female. While, for LeClaire, Babylon’s exact 
position on the demonological hierarchy is ambiguous, her connection to Jezebel is 
clear (ibid. 61). She devotes considerable space to this partnership, enumerating the 
ways these spirits work in collusion to undermine the authentic structures of society—
of America as, to quote Pat Buchanan, godfather of the modern culture wars, ‘God’s 
country’ (1992: n.p.). 
JEZEBEL-BABYLON: ABSENT, MULTIPLE 
LeClaire’s vision of the conflict between God and the Jezebel-Babylon duumvirate 
betrays a certain underlying structure to the gendered spiritual warfare discourse that I 
am examining here. This is the conflation of absence and multiplicity in opposition to 
a unitary, present centre. That such a distinction is heavily gendered is something that 
calls for (a certain kind of) psychoanalytic critique. The authors’ focus on Ahab’s 
submissiveness and Jezebel’s dominance as the quintessential figurations of improper 
gendered social relations evoke clear comparisons to heteronormative sexual 
relations, in which a ‘passive’ feminine receives an ‘active’ masculine, and in which 
woman is coded as ‘lack’ and historically comprehended as ‘man inverted’ (Balsam 
2012: 177). The unacknowledged but underlying logic of the racialised jezebel, the 
colonial impetus and post-colonial terror of spiritual warfare, and indeed, the 
alignment of darkness and a certain physicality similarly beckon for a 
postcolonial/psychoanalytic examination, in which Freud’s ‘dark continent’ of female 
sexuality meets that of the 10/40 Window into which the missionary logic of salvation 
must penetrate (see Khanna 2003).  
Moreover perhaps, the way that Jezebel and Babylon’s figurations as sexually 
and religiously plural are coded within the texts as absence, nothing, or void evokes a 
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clear, if perhaps crude, comparison to Luce Irigaray’s This Sex Which Is Not One, in 
which she analyses woman’s sexual organ(s) as encoded by a similar paradigm of 
conflated plurality and absence in an order centred on the ‘noble phallic organ’ (1985: 
23, 24–33). The accuracy of this specific example or the desirability of 
psychoanalytic readings generally notwithstanding, Helene Tallon Russell has noted 
that Irigaray’s analysis helps in unveiling a ‘disturbing correspondence’ between 
psychoanalytic formulations of woman as the privation of maleness and Augustine’s 
definition of sin and evil as privation of good: ‘Evil does not have ontological status 
in and of itself,’ she notes, ‘but only derivative status from the good it corrupts…Evil 
is the privation of good. Movement toward God or the One is good. Movement away 
from God or away from the One is sin.’ This formulation of privation is mirrored in 
psychoanalytic figurations of woman: she is defined by her lack of the male organ, 
constituted by envy for it. She ‘desires only to be desired’. She ‘is defined…as a lack 
of the phallus, as a privation of the phallus, as a subject which is not one, as a 
privation of the One, as a privation of the good, as evil’ (2009: 171–2). In this 
reading, Irigaray’s multiplicity of the feminine corresponds to Augustine’s conception 
of sin as ‘the multiformity of the divided will’ (ibid.: 172). Irrespective of the overall 
accuracy of Irigaray’s reading of gendered Western cultural norms, it is true that 
Jezebel’s multiplicity is figured as an absence, both sexually and spiritually: her many 
gods are no God at all and her proliferation of sexual practices are an absence of a 
‘true’—(hetero)normative—sexuality.  
In the context of Jezebel-Babylonian cohabitation, the alignment sketched by 
Russell between psychoanalytic femininity and Augustinian evil carries some weight. 
‘Where is the Prince?’ Jezebel asks, marking the lack of that guarantor of truth—the 
sovereign male—that is the condition of her possibility. That this discourse is both 
overtly gendered and covertly raced marks the site where a formerly-invisible given—
the concept of the sovereign as white, male, heterosexual—is made visible and 
radically destabilised through that very exposure. Jezebel exposes the always-already 
dependent nature of sovereignty, tied to those processes of modern globalisation that 
bring to light the inherent instability of the bounded nation-state (here, the United 
States), which is always-already porous and perforated, reliant on the recognition of 
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its peers, and thereby unveils the prescriptive rather than descriptive nature of 
theopolitical sovereignty as such. 
The Mistress of Kingdoms 
The ways that Jezebel embodies the absence of authentic sovereignty and authentic 
masculinity/femininity ties into broader figurations of territoriality. As I discussed in 
depth in Chapter Two, the indivisibility of sovereignty is fundamentally a prescriptive 
illusion rather than a reality: political sovereignty as figured in the concept of the self-
contained, self-regulating nation-state has always been compromised by mechanisms 
such as trade and migration (Baranger 2010; Elden 2009; Koskenniemi 2010; Krasner 
1999, 2010). It has also always been compromised discursively by its relationship to 
its own limits—spatially in its literal or figurative borders and temporally in its 
emergence and differentiation from that which preceded it—and thus the dependent 
relationship of the centre on the periphery for its façade of cohesion. Sovereignty is 
always decided from the place of some demon. 
 One might be inclined to posit this demon here as Jezebel (or Babylon) but 
this is only part of the truth. While she does indeed operate as the self-consolidating 
other to the centre—foreign, polytheistic woman to native, monotheistic man—the 
specifics of her figuration compliment and complicate this simple designation. As I 
noted in the first section, spiritual warfare is highly territorial, attributing national and 
ideological spaces to kingdoms of light or of darkness depending on the socio-
political dominance (or lack) of specific cultural, political and religious structures, 
physical and discursive. Within figurations of the Jezebel-Babylon alliance, such 
territoriality is a prominent attribute, and its underlying logic is made clearest in 
LeClaire’s figuration of Babylon as ‘Lady of the Kingdoms’, a symbolic reference to 
the city drawn from Isaiah 47:5: ‘Sit in silence, and go into darkness, O daughter of 
the Chaldeans; For you shall no longer be called, The Lady of Kingdoms.’12 LeClaire 
(2013: 59, 64) informs us that this 
                                                
12 The word translated by LeClaire and the KJV as ‘lady’ is gĕberet, translated by Gary Smith in The 
New American Commentary on Isaiah 40–66 as ‘Honorable Queen’ (2009: 303). It is translated as 
‘Queen’ (NIV, ISV), ‘Mistress’ (ESV, ASV), or ‘lady’ (KJV, ERV), depending on Bible edition, and 
Goldingay and Payne note that elsewhere it is used generally to refer to a female head of household, 
often in opposition to šiphāh (‘servant’) (2006: 99). The verse is viewed as depicting God’s 
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Lady of the Kingdoms is Babylon, religious running mate of Jezebel. Part 
of Jezebel’s end time purpose is to seduce people to worship the Lady of 
the Kingdoms instead of the King of kings…Babylon is the worldwide 
religious, political and economic system personified in the book of 
Revelation as Mystery Babylon. I believe that Jezebel is a principality and 
Mystery Babylon is the world’s system through which it 
works…Babylon’s system woos people with its many benefits, such as a 
one-world religion that promises fewer wars (and rumors of wars) and 
prosperity. We see this edging into the Body of Christ today through 
universalism, New Age doctrine, humanism and a prosperity gospel. 
Babylon is full of idolatry and immorality because its systems were 
birthed through Jezebel. 
There are several attributes operating in this description. Foremost among these is the 
juxtaposition of the ‘Lady of the Kingdoms’ to the ‘King of kings.’ Another is that 
Babylon is birthed through Jezebel, a spiritual daughter as well as systemic partner; 
yet within the discourse of spiritual warfare Jezebel cannot bear children, reproduce 
or even produce, and yet Babylon is figured as her progeny. Third is Babylon’s 
figuration as a symbol of unity, of a ‘one world religion’ that promises prosperity and 
an end to war, and the manner in which several belief systems and practices 
(‘universalism, New Age, humanism, and a prosperity gospel’) are coded as reflecting 
this false unity. 
These latter points relate to the duality of the first: the opposition between a 
‘Lady of the Kingdoms’ and a ‘King of kings’ encodes the conflict between a female 
multiplicity/absence and a male unity/presence, for while God is the sovereign who is 
sovereign over other, lesser, sovereignties, Babylon is affiliated not in relation to 
kings but their territories. While one is a unity of difference founded on the presence 
of a centre, the other is based on the lack of that very centre. While Babylon is often 
figured as symbolic of an ungodly unity (Runions 2014) in even LeClaire’s text it is 
made clear that unity is of God and that demonic forces like Babylon and Jezebel are 
aligned with division and differentiation. She writes that ‘unity is the goal. Jezebel 
                                                                                                                                      
punishment of Babylon’s arrogance, condemning her to a future irrelevance in which her vassals no 
longer honour her (G.V. Smith 2009: 303). Goldingay and Payne note that it is ‘suggestive that the 
states’ under Babylon’s control are referred to clearly as ‘kingdoms’ (mamlākôt) rather than merely 
‘ammîm (‘peoples, ethnic groups’) or gôyim (‘foreign nations’), implying that they might be ‘sovereign 
states that controlled their own destinies… ruled by a king or queen of their own’ but which had been 
reduced to the function of a sîphāh beneath a gĕberet (2006: 99–100). It is, of course, notable that 
LeClaire utilises the translation ‘lady’ rather than ‘Queen’, a term that conveys a reduced sense of 
authority, although the fact she does not use ‘Mistress’ is surprising, given the negative modern 
connotations of the term. 
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opposes this by tossing people to and fro with its doctrines, trickery, craftiness and 
deceitful plotting’ (2013: 139). Sampson corroborates this characterisation by 
declaring that ‘God puts a high premium on unity and hates division’, tying it to a 
narrative of ancient and essential antagonism between God and Satan: ‘Starting with 
his rebellion, Lucifer has always striven to bring division’ (2012: 97). Yet Babylon is 
also aligned with a ‘one-world religion that promises fewer wars…and prosperity’ 
(besides Christianity itself, presumably).  
It would initially seem difficult to align this striving for the division of 
peoples, characteristic of the demonic, with global unification. However, this points 
toward one of spiritual warfare’s primary fears, one brought to the fore by LeClaire’s 
treatment of the story of the Tower of Babel (Gen, 11:1–9), which she sees as 
prototype of Babylon as the systemic partner of Jezebel. The final conflict is not unity 
against division but rather between one unity founded on an indivisible sovereign 
centre and another that reveals this centre as always-already illusory. LeClaire 
narrates Nimrod’s act in building the tower as an act of rebellion against God, citing 
first-century Jewish historian, Josephus: ‘[Nimrod] said he would be revenged on 
God, if he should have a mind to drown the world again; for that he would build a 
tower too high for the waters to be able to reach’ (in LeClaire 2013: 66). In order to 
tie this tale of Babelian rebellion back into her broader Jezebel narrative, however, 
she proceeds to bring up Nimrod’s wife, Semiramis, as the first embodiment of the 
Jezebel spirit, and informs her readers that Semiramis was the originator of immoral 
pagan practices and that all world religions ultimately stem from the cult she founded: 
‘Babylon is called the Mother of Harlots, which means she births other religions’ 
(2013: 66). LeClaire constructs an aetiology of all immorality and idolatry and binds 
it all into the dual personalities of Jezebel and Babylon: ‘Jezebel…wants the whole 
world to worship its gods. This spirit wants everyone to worship the harlot Babylon, 
which is a counterfeit of the Bride of Christ’ (ibid.:70).13  
                                                
13 There is an undercurrent of quasi-incestuous lesbianism that permeates this discussion, one that 
relates directly to the conflation of sexual and spiritual deviancy, but which is never acknowledged or 
discussed by LeClaire. While some authors (for example, Derry 2007: 24) explicitly discuss Jezebel or 
Babylon as the Bride of Satan, this is absent in LeClaire’s text. Indeed, the way in which she figures 
Babylon as the worldly system through which Jezebel works, much as God operates through the earthly 
institution that is his Bride, the Church, a reading of Babylon as the Bride of Jezebel would naturally 
follow. 
 197 
Absence the Body 
LeClaire conveniently omits God’s punishment for the construction of the tower: the 
division of humanity into many languages by God on account of what they might 
accomplish united (Genesis 11:9). This omission illustrates far more than her 
narrative: for LeClaire, but also for Schott, Sampson, Frangipane, and others, it has 
never been about a generalised unity but of a specific kind of unity—one that restores 
the structure of the Church, the Bride of Christ, over that of the counterfeit Bride, 
Babylon, and of Jezebel who stands beside her in collusion and cohabitation. While 
the authors may attempt, even admirably, to discuss abusive control and manipulation 
by individuals in positions of power, the language they deploy to discuss this 
‘witchcraft’ and the way they weave their narratives of abuse throughout their 
diatribes on homosexuality and the modern media betrays their core concern: 
maintenance of telic order, a divinely-ordained status quo in which the unity of the 
impermeable centre is maintained at all costs. Sampson almost makes this explicit in 
writing on the placement of individuals within the Church, although his language 
clothes it in the rhetoric of divine ordination: 
All believers have a grace, an anointing, to operate in the segment of the 
Body [of Christ] to which they are called. It is a place for them where 
flowing in the Holy Spirit will produce life and fruit for the Kingdom. 
When we desire to be something other than what God has called us to be, 
however, we enter into pride and selfishness (2012: 103). 
The message is clear: God has given us all a place. To be in that station augments the 
unity of the Kingdom, but to attempt to strive for another place places one in the 
hands of the Lady of Kingdoms, and leads to the disruption of the Kingdom, of 
authentic sovereignty, unity and order: of—to quote the US Pledge of Allegiance— 
‘one Nation under God.’ 
 This strategy of disruption is connected discursively to gender and sexuality, 
in which disruption of heteronormativity ripples through the greater system of telic 
order. As such, much of the focus of the authors circles around the image of the body: 
this body is at once the physical body of the (un)believer and the Body of the Church. 
It is also the social body, both in the sense of the collective body of a community and 
the individual body within that community. The integrity of the b/Body and the 
integrity between bodies here constitute the fulcrum of theopolitical contestation. 
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While much of this is linked to ideas of the human as imago Dei: as humanity was 
made in God’s image, defilement of the human body is seen as an affront to the deity 
whose form it bears. As noted earlier, however, it is also linked to a theologic of 
property stemming from the authors’ readings of I Corinthians, in which God is 
constructed as having ownership of a person’s body due to the price paid on the Cross 
(LeClaire 2013: 30; Schott 2013: 102).14 Bodily autonomy is figured here as idolatry, 
a worshipping of the human and of human artifice rather than the Creator. Earlier, I 
noted that given the raced nature of ‘the jezebel’ in the US, this particular logic 
carries in it an insidious undercurrent of African-American slavery, one that is 
difficult to ignore given the manner in which Jezebel and Babylon symbolise the 
spread of sexual, racial, and religious difference. 
 In accordance with the authors’ fixation on abortion and concepts of 
endurance and continuity, figurations of this difference often shift beyond a logic of 
ownership or property and tie themselves to the logic of (re)production I touched on 
above. Schott’s objection to homosexuality was framed according to the argument 
that it disrupts and violates God’s commandment that men and women reproduce 
(2013: 105). He extends this lack of sexual reproduction to a lack of cultural 
production as such: ‘Homosexuals cannot produce,’ he writes, ‘they cannot 
reproduce, and they cannot bear fruit’ (ibid.: 106). The ability to conceive children is 
here transferred to the generalised capacity to create, the absence of which tied to 
Queen Jezebel’s own childless state, and to the nature of the demonic noted in relation 
to discourses of demonological witchcraft: demons cannot create. A body that has 
been corrupted by Jezebel forfeits its capacity for creation—specifically, the capacity 
for the creation of an authentic, legitimate and (thus) enduring system. It forfeits, in 
the minds of the authors, its right to the future: ‘The spirit of Jezebel brings a spirit of 
death to natural families and spiritual families. It destroys the fruit of churches. It 
aborts the relationship between pastors and their spiritual children and destroys the 
future of churches and the legacy that God intends for His people’ (ibid.: 93).  
                                                
14 ‘Flee sexual immorality. Every sin that a man does is outside the body, but he who commits sexual 
immorality sins against his own body. Don’t you realise that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit, 
who lives in you and was given to you by God? You do not belong to yourself, for God bought you 
with a high price. So you must honour God with your body’ (I Cor. 6:18–20). 
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The elision from the ‘natural’ to the ‘spiritual’ family here creates a continuity 
between a male-headed heterosexual family unit (construed as the symbol and vessel 
of cultural continuity as such) and the concept of the Church as a similar unit, headed 
by God as the spiritual archetype of this heteronormative structure, just as the 
integrity of the human body becomes metonym for the Body of Christ that is the 
Church. This Body of Christ is also the Bride of Christ, placed in stark juxtaposition 
with the counterfeit bride of Babylon (LeClaire 2013: 70). This concept of the double-
body—body/Body—to refer to the physical flesh that is a temple to the Holy Spirit 
and the institution via which salvation is proffered augments the authors’ narrative 
correlation between idolatry and sexual sins (LeClaire 2013: 29–30, 102, 133; 
Sampson 2012: 45–6, 96–8, 190; Schott 2013: 51–60, 101–12). Sampson (2012: 107) 
stresses the importance of maintaining the proper place of this double-body, and later 
expands on this, writing on those in thrall to Jezebel that  
People with a Jezebel spirit divide a church body…Such people have no 
heart to bring unity or healing and no heart to honor a leader’s position or 
authority. Those with such a spirit have a “religious” ambition to seek a 
place God has not granted them. That is dangerous territory. 
LeClaire clarifies the consequences of entering this territory: ‘When one part of the 
Body suffers, every part suffers’ (2013: 133). Bodily integrity is compromised and the 
b/Body becomes sick. Such integrity is, expectedly, bound to the abstinence from 
‘sexual sins’:  
This spiritual cancer called sexual immortality is metastasizing across the 
many parts of the Body today…Paul warned the church at Corinth—and 
the Church at large—not to keep company with sexually immoral 
people…He exhorted us that the body is not for sexual immorality but for 
the Lord…He warned us to flee sexual immorality, which is a sin against 
one’s own body…And Jude reminds us of Sodom and Gomorrah, whose 
inhabitants gave themselves over to sexual immorality and will suffer the 
vengeance of eternal fire (ibid.: 30). 
The purity of the human body and of the family body become metonyms for the 
purity of the Church and the unity of the Kingdom; the unity of an integral self which 
is set against the division and counterfeit unity embodied by the incursion of the 
foreign pagan woman, Jezebel, and her partner Babylon. Sexual sins—including not 
only the homosexuality and pre-marital intercourse that represent the most common 
targets, but also body piercing and other practices—corrupt the body: the partaking of 
one’s body in such sexual sins causes, in the words of Schott, ‘a rift in their 
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relationship with God’ (2013: 105), with consequences both lethal and damnatory. It 
transforms the temple to the Holy Spirit into an idolatrous temple to the self. Idolatry 
of the body leads to idolatry in the Body. The wages of this sin is the eternal fire that 
swallowed Sodom and Gomorrah. 
Her Counterfeit Bride 
There are, however, complications to this tale of unity and division, corruption and 
judgement. I have noted above that the authors’ attempts to portray this conflict as 
one of unity against division belie a fear of an alter-unity, one external to the Body of 
Christ: the core concern is not of the maintenance of unity but of the maintenance of a 
specific kind of unity in which everyone stays in the places assigned to them and the 
monological status quo endures. The same is true here: it is not just about the integrity 
of the Body but the placing of that body into its proper cosmological position: beneath 
the oversight of the patriarchal authority of God, of Scripture, and of the legitimate 
authority of the god-graced ruler: a patriarchal, heteronormative, telic order of being. 
An orthotaxy.  
LeClaire’s characterisation of Babylon as the systemic partner through whom 
Jezebel works augments and subverts this ideology: it portrays the very model of 
alter-unity that the authors’ oppose. Babylon is Lady of Kingdoms, a figure that in 
LeClaire’s text deserts its original, biblical context and becomes transfigured into an 
image of an unstable and counterfeit unity based on a foundation of worldliness and 
multiplicity: a ‘unity’ that is not monological but pluralistic. Babylon is not a Queen 
of a Kingdom, which is to say a singular dominion, but neither is she a monarch of 
monarchs like God, King of Kings—a higher authority above and beyond mortal 
authorities. She is gĕberet mamlākôt, mistress of kingdoms, unifier of a plethora of 
disparate territories that remain forever differentiated and divided, disruptions in a 
theopolitical monologic of telic sovereign order. Babylon, for LeClaire, is the world 
system; the Satanic—which is to say oppositional, adversarial, other—system birthed 
by the ‘spirit of the world’. Perhaps accordingly, she is not a Queen of Kings, the 
authentic figures of sovereign unity, but of the bounded, worldly territories which that 
sovereignty is meant to rule but which here have been radically displaced by the 
subversive strategies of Babylon and Jezebel. 
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Like the idolatry that is one of Jezebel’s core aspects, this Babelian plurality is 
figured as absence. For the authors concerned, an absence of singular sovereign 
authority, a King of kings, is transfigured into a generalised absence that becomes the 
condition of reality as such. As Jezebel is a principality whose existence marks the 
absent prince, the Lady of Kingdoms unites disparate alterities without fully 
hierarchising differences and subsuming them fully under a singular monarch: there is 
hierarchy here, yes, but it is unstable, shifting, multiple. Yet for LeClaire, Schott and 
others, absolute unity—of the body, the family, the Church—is constructed as the sole 
possible foundation for cultural continuity, and therefore from the fluidity of her 
gender to the subversiveness of her witchcraft Jezebel’s multiplicity is coded as an 
emptiness. This multiplicity-as-absence belies the very logic by which Jezebel is 
excluded: she unsettles sovereign indivisibility by exposing it to be the very absence 
that it projects. 
As LeClaire holds, Babylon is the ‘worldwide religious, political and 
economic system’ through which Jezebel works (2013: 63). Her counterfeit Bride. 
Runions notes that this figuration of Babylon, which is heavily reliant on the account 
of Josephus that LeClaire draws from, relates directly to the seeming loss of US 
sovereignty and control in the global economic systems that it itself helped birth with 
the unipolar moment. Within this framework of instability, the narrative of the Tower 
of Babel as birthplace and blueprint of the Babylon system becomes a symbol of the 
need for the reassertion of a patriarchal, divine authority: 
[T]he story of the Tower of Babel is used in the early twenty-first century 
in ways that continue to bear the marks of Josephus’ retelling…the 
addition of Nimrod (racialised over time), the fear of collectivity and 
equality as tyrannical and self-indulgent, the reaffirmation of social 
hierarchy passed down through families, and the insistence of the 
theocratic higher power of God in ordering social relations and the 
structures of governance. These arguments are put to work in a time when 
subjectivity and politics are shaped by access to global markets no longer 
controlled by sovereign centers within nation-states…faith in God hides 
the fact that the United States is no longer a secure locus of power (2014: 
83–4). 
This retelling of Babel ‘attempts to grasp after sovereignty, even as it crumbles away’ 
(ibid.: 85). However, as I discuss in Chapters Two and Three, the indivisibility of 
sovereignty is theopolitically prescriptive more than it has ever been purely 
descriptive. The processes of globalisation, often seen as undermining the sovereignty 
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of nation-states through transnational networks of cultural and economic flow, just 
exacerbate an ever-present but occluded instability in sovereignty’s structure: the 
illusory nature of its indivisibility.  
Globalisation highlights the porosity of borders and makes this illusion 
increasingly untenable. The discourses of spiritual warfare examined here, birthed in 
the United States but with global theo-colonial aspirations, are themselves products of 
the very Babelian processes they try to combat, tied to the imbrication of Pentecostal, 
charismatic and evangelical dualisms in the mechanisms of global capitalism and the 
processes of their cultural localisation (S. Coleman 2000; Freeman 2012; Hasu 2012). 
The spatial dualism that sustains spiritual warfare as a global paradigm, in which the 
world is divided into opposing realms of God and Devil, Light and Darkness, is itself 
always-already fractured and disparate, ‘basically universal’ yet ‘simultaneously 
particular in that each society…produces its own form of it’ (Deininger 2013: 58). Its 
two realms are fluid and cross-contaminating—transnational networks of spiritual 
flow that mean that as soon as the Kingdom tries to export its truth it finds its borders 
blurred, penetrated by the demonic other—by Jezebel, by Babylon, and, in the words 
of LeClaire, ‘God knows what other devils from various other parts of the world’ 
(2013: 164). 
Mestlet, Mestlet 
‘Where is the Prince?’ Jezebel asks. Her figuration and her name gesture towards the 
sovereign’s founding illusion. The question is rhetorical. The Prince—whole, solitary, 
enduring—was always-already absent. There was only ever difference and messy 
multiplicity, a religious, racial, sexual plurality which coalesced itself into ever-
unstable hierarchies of being(s). This is the latent possibility seen by those authors 
whose texts I have analysed here. It is troubling, disrupting assurances of eventual, 
preordained, and apocalyptic victory. As Frangipane wrote in 1989, in a sentiment 
found throughout other texts: ‘The lie of the enemy appears most powerfully when 
men believe that this world, as it is, is the only world we can live in. The truth is, of 
course, that God is establishing His kingdom and, ultimately, every other reality will 
submit to and be ruled by that kingdom!’ (2006: 110). But as Sampson says, letting 
uncharacteristic concern infiltrate his cautionary-yet-triumphant tale: ‘Something that 
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has always troubled me, however, is the way that those who yield to a Jezebel spirit 
seem to get away with it in the here and now. I have never understood that, yet I do 
believe that God in His mercy gives a person time to repent’ (2012: 39). Sampson 
finds it strange that the Sovereign allows this rival system to endure. Why does the 
Sovereign tolerate rebellion? It must be a part of his plan. After all, he owns 
everyone. The belief that one might own oneself, might direct one’s own destiny, is 
just a false idol, a temporary legal access that will be rescinded. It is ownership of a 
darkness without light, without a God who is light: an ownership of absence and an 
absence of ownership. 
 The lights go out. 
 Mestlet, Mestlet.
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CHAPTER SIX  
(P)Redestinations 
(Trans)Humanism and the Origins of Emergence 
The imago Dei is an image that creates an event of 
sudden or gradual emergence or revelation. One cannot 
plan in advance what will show itself. 
— Claudia Welz (2011: 88) 
‘[N]ever forget when you hear people boast of our progress in enlightenment,’ 
Charles Baudelaire has a preacher exclaim in his 1869 short story ‘The Generous 
Gambler’, ‘that one of the devil’s best ruses is to persuade you that he does not exist!’ 
(1970: 61). Drawing on the cultural legacy of Satan as seductive, corruptive deceiver, 
Baudelaire’s preacher highlights that within a paradigm of good and evil the latter 
flourishes precisely through relative invisibility, and cautions against ‘naively 
labelling a progressive world to be free of (and over) evil’ (Heit 2011: 4). 
 There is a manner in which the history of the post-Enlightenment West has 
been a history of the Devil’s gradual disappearance. Seen as mostly indefensible by 
mainstream theologies bearing the brunt of Enlightenment critique, demonology was 
‘conclusively discredited’ (Lincoln 2009: 45) and faded from mainstream religious 
praxis to find niches on the religious fringe in apocalyptic beliefs and occulture, and 
in literature and popular culture. Christopher Partridge noted in 2004 that even if ‘the 
concept of a unifying, personified source of evil still exists in Western Christian 
theology,’ ideas of ‘swarming hordes of demons’ had generally been abandoned 
(2004: 171). By early 2015, the Anglican Church had agreed to remove references to 
Satan from its baptismal rite in favour of less-personified references to ‘sin’ and 
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‘evil’. The Bishop of Truro, Timothy Thornton, defended the decision by stating that 
‘references to the devil were likely to be misunderstood in today’s culture’: they were 
‘unhelpful’, making services ‘complex and inaccessible’.1 Any personification had 
ceased to be desirable. 
For the writers whose works I analyse below, as above, Satan’s vanishing act 
from Western theology and post-Enlightenment secular society indicates something 
quite different: that the projects of secular modernity are themselves fundamentally 
demonic. This demonisation of modernity is touched on in Baudelaire’s tale. As the 
Devil informs its narrator over drinks and cigars, he ‘did not think it beneath him to 
inspire the pen, the speech, and the conscience of pedagogues, and that he almost 
invariably attended in person, although invisible, all academic assemblies’ (1970: 62). 
Indeed, ‘no one was more interested in the suppression of superstition than himself’ 
(ibid.: 61). As I have already discussed, alignments of Satan with modernity and 
emancipatory politics was a feature of Romantic and symbolic Satanisms. Giosuè 
Carducci coded him as the avenging force of reason in A Satana, while Baudelaire’s 
Litanies de Satan ends with a prayer in which the branches of the Tree of Knowledge 
spread over Satan’s brow like a new Temple. Anarchist thinker Mikhail Bakunin 
encapsulated this symbolic Satan in God and the State, by describing him as ‘the first 
freethinker and the emancipator of worlds. He makes man ashamed of his bestial 
ignorance and obedience; he emancipates him, stamps upon his brow the seal of 
liberty and humanity, in urging him to disobey and eat of the fruit of knowledge’ 
(1970: 10). 
I cite these statements to gesture to a certain discursive formation that the 
milieu I examine below identifies and draws upon. This formation is bound to the 
complex relation between the secular and the religious in secular modernity. As 
sociologist of religion José Casanova has noted, the secular and the religious are 
mutually constituted. While ‘the secular’ is increasingly seen in the West as reality 
tout court to which religion is superstructural and superfluous, the idea of the secular 
originates in Christian theology—as part of a binary opposition that divides the world 
                                                
1 ‘Sin but no devil: Church of England debates its baptismal liturgy’ Church Today, 12/02/2015, at 
http://www.christiantoday.com/article/no.sin.no.devil.church.of.england.debates.its.baptismal.liturgy/4
8013.htm [accessed 08/03/2015). 
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into sacred and profane realms (2011). To summarise Charles Taylor, the West is 
secular because, rather than in spite, of its religious heritage (2007: 791–2). Ideas of 
secularisation (related, but not identical, to ‘the secular’ and ‘secularism’), in which 
humanity is constructed as shedding the marks of religiosity, moving from belief to 
unbelief and from ‘irrational or metaphysical religion’ to scientific rationality, thus 
takes part in a culturally-specific movement of ideological reversal. In the words of 
Talal Asad: ‘[whilst] “the secular” was a part of theological discourse…[later] “the 
religious” is constituted by secular political and scientific discourses, so that 
“religion” itself as a historical category and as a universal globalized concept emerges 
as a construction of Western secular modernity’ (2003: 192). 
The impact of this genealogy on Western modernity is a matter of debate. For 
Jean-Luc Nancy, this relation points to the question of how ‘the West may be 
Christian in its depths’ (2008: 34), while Asad argues that while Christian 
mythological narratives like that of redemption may have galvanised and assisted the 
formation of social projects of secular modernity, it does not necessarily follow that 
these projects are ‘essentially Christian’. Indeed, for Asad, these projects embody a 
distinctive politics (democratic, anticlerical), a different morality focused mainly on 
the sacredness of the individual conscience and rights, and a regard for suffering as 
something ‘subjective and accidental’—to be medically treated, as corrective 
punishment or as ‘the unfinished business of universal empowerment’ (2003: 61–2). 
Collectively, these features mean that the agent of worldly redemption must also be 
worldly, and discourses are therefore often focused on the individual as both redeemer 
and the darkness in need of redemption. 
The genealogical relationship between secularism and Christianity and the 
processes by which the former-other of a theological binary reverses that binary and 
ultimately subsumes its parent as simply an attribute of itself, are foundational to the 
narratives woven by the writers whose texts I examine. These writers concentrate on 
filtering what they name as the ideologies of secular humanism, and transhumanism 
specifically, through evangelical demonology.2 By doing so, they recall the contrast 
                                                
2 I use the term ‘transhuman’ here rather than the sometimes-preferred ‘posthuman’, although these 
terms are fairly interchangeable, because it is the term commonly employed in both the scholarship and 
by the apocalyptic writers. Additionally, in the view of Michael Burdett, ‘the term transhumanism 
better describes its relation to humanity. “Post” tends to allude to something just after the human and 
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of ‘sensuous and corrupt with ideal and pure’ that has historically been mapped onto 
distinctions between secular time and eternity, in which the secular became associated 
more with the fallen than the merely created (Calhoun 2012: 342). In their narratives, 
the secularisation of Western society becomes a process of the diabolisation of both 
humanity and (through them) all creation. The Enlightenment emancipatory project of 
the redemption of this-worldly beings by this-worldly forces—central to transhuman 
soteriologies—are herein opposed to a more ‘traditional’ evangelical apocalypticism 
that tries to (re)assert an original (pure) model of humanity as made in God’s image 
and achieving perfection by following God’s will; that is, by adherence to a structure 
of reality constructed as orthotaxic. 
I explore these narratives over three sections. The first lays out features of 
transhumanism as resting both inside and outside a broader genealogy of the Christian 
apocalyptic appropriation of technology and proceeds to define the milieu of the 
evangelical writers who oppose it. The second then analyses a dominant scenario 
narrated by texts produced in this milieu, which invokes the prophetic structure of 
apocalyptic time in order to transpose the modern threat of transhumanist philosophy 
back into the biblical narrative of the ‘days of Noah’ and integrate it into a pre-
existing eschatological framework. In the third section, I explore transhumanism’s 
own roots in theological ideas of dominion and the instauration of prelapsarian 
perfection, circling around the recurrent image of the imago Dei as guarantor of 
human (self-)sovereignty, and reveal how transhumanist soteriologies inherit and/or 
usurp this divine semblance. Transhumanism is ultimately revealed as threatening to 
the milieu I analyse because it resembles—as semblance, as spectre—the Christianity 
it disavows. 
                                                                                                                                      
doesn’t necessarily provide orientation as to how it relates to the human except that it has moved on 
from it…[Transhumanism] provides more content as to how this movement relates to the human: It is 
transcending it’ (2015: 3–4). Contra Burdett’s point, ‘posthuman’ might usefully draw on other 
complex and multifaceted figurations of the prefix as in postmodernism, postcolonialism, and 
postsecularism, drawing attention to the simultaneous distancing from and reliance on ideas of ‘the 
human’. 
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TECHNOLOGIES OF THE END 
The Christian eschatological figuration of technology has taken multiple forms, 
oscillating between hope and despair in accordance with the cultural permutations of 
the period. Today, mass communication methods like the Internet are often used to 
promulgate apocalyptic and other fringe religiosities to a global audience, as in the 
‘media ministries’ of Schott and LeClaire examined above (see also Landes 2011: 
391–466; Wojcik 1997: 148–208), but innovations have often been figured beyond 
simply enabling proselytisation. In 1855, the railroad and the telegraph were seen as 
preparatory steps for building a New Zion via their unificatory potential (Boyer 1992: 
228). Later, in the 1930s, eschatological interpreters found air travel and television in 
the pages of scripture, with the ‘cloud’ of Ezekiel 38:16 connoting an aerial bombing, 
parachutes, and (in the 50s) ICBMs, meanwhile television offered a convenient 
explanation as to how Christ’s second advent might be watched by the whole world 
(ibid.: 106–7).  
During the Cold War, the spectre of the bomb haunted the era’s eschatologies 
(Boyer 1992: 115–51; O’Leary 1994: 134–71; 2000: 392–426; Wojcik 1997: 37–51). 
Its influence was broad and sweeping, as Daniel Wojcik (1997: 33) relates: 
From the beginning of the atomic age prophecy believers searched the 
Bible for possible allusions to nuclear conflagration and found persuasive 
evidence for the inevitability of nuclear apocalypse. References to fiery 
destruction in the Book of Revelation, for example, suggested atomic 
warfare—an allusion to ‘hail and fire mixed with blood’ which burns a 
third of the land and trees and ‘all green grass’ sounded like nuclear war 
(Rev. 8:7); an allusion to scorching heat and malignant sores might 
describe the aftermath of atomic radiation (Rev. 16:2–8)…Convinced that 
nuclear weapons were the means by which ancient prophecies of ‘fire and 
brimstone’ raining down from the heavens would be realized, prophecy 
believers from various traditions embraced the development of nuclear 
weapons as a portent indicating that humanity had accelerated its 
progression toward an apocalypse that was inevitable. 
Viewed with both hope and dread by religious apocalypticists, the nuclear bomb fell 
somewhat out of fashion as geopolitical forces brought the Cold War to a close. The 
apocalyptic ecstasies witnessed in Hal Lindsey’s Late, Great Planet Earth gave way 
to more cautionary messages, like Pat Robertson’s 1985 remarks that nuclear war was 
no longer expected as part of the divine plan: ‘God doesn’t want to incinerate the 
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world’, he stated, and Armageddon was an act of God that had ‘nothing to do with 
human abilities whatsoever’ (in Boyer 1992: 138).  
The representations of technologies I deal with here are similar yet markedly 
different to the ones listed here. These emerging ‘transhuman’ technologies—
bioengineering, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and others—fundamentally 
alter the parameters of technologically-induced apocalypse by shifting the locus of 
eschatological transformation from the world to humanity itself. While the bomb was 
seen as (maybe) within God’s plan for earthly destruction and recreation, these 
transhuman technologies present the potential for a new eschatology often, if not 
always, construed as antithetical to God’s own. The exegetical methods utilised by the 
authors examined below are the same, yet while they attempt to integrate this new 
eschatology into their own, this (trans)humanist alter-apocalypse threatens to reshape 
the human into something that might even exceed the predestinations of scripture. 
What is discursively constructed as at stake is the imago Dei itself as the ground of 
human authenticity, sovereignty, and perfectibility, and of the telic order of creation. 
Authentic Fakery 
Broadly, ‘transhumanism’ refers to a (group of) philosophical paradigm(s) advocating 
the use of technology for the fundamental alteration of the human condition. As 
Braden Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz argue, in many ways transhumanism can be seen 
as simply the latest manifestation of the ‘technological optimism’ prevalent in the 
West that emerged from the Enlightenment advocacy of reason for human betterment 
(2011: 7). Transhumanism is comprehensive in its goals, advocating beyond the use 
of technology for health and longevity to encompass the enhancement of intelligence, 
creativity and emotional capabilities, the conscious manipulation of the genetic 
attributes of one’s offspring and the evolution of the human (and other) species, and 
the cybernetic networking of multiple minds, up to and including the transcendence of 
bodily existence itself (ibid.: 8).  
There is a highly religious flavour to many of these goals, which has been 
remarked on. Celia Deane-Drummond (2011), Michael Burdett (2011, 2015), Hava 
Tirosh-Samuelson (2015), and Joseph Wolyniak (2015) note how transhumanism 
rests on theological foundations. Brent Waters terms it ‘a late modern religious 
 210 
response to the finite and mortal constraints of human existence’ (2011: 164), while 
Allenby and Sarewitz remark that one need not analyse its language too deeply ‘to 
recognize an agenda for human betterment that in other contexts marks the domain of 
faith and spiritual practice…Immortality, perfectibility, dominion, transcendence’ 
(2011: 17–18). Ronald Cole-Turner draws explicit parallels between the language of 
technological enhancement and the theological notion of glorification by and through 
God (2011a: 5), while Tirosh-Samuelson (2015: 165) clarifies the apocalyptic logic 
underlying much transhuman quasi-religiosity when she writes that the 
techno-scientific eschaton imbues human-made technology with salvific 
value: the Kingdom of God will be realised on earth through technology, 
thereby making salvation both imminent and immanent. In the 
trans/posthumanist vision, to achieve what humans have always wanted—
immortality—humans must take control of evolution, directing it toward 
the eschatological, posthuman end. 
Responding to this religious impulse identified in transhumanism, manifested 
most clearly in its yearning for transcendence, Robert Geraci (2012: 586) has adopted 
the term ‘authentic fake’ from the work of David Chidester: ‘Authentic fakes are 
fraudulent practices that do real religious work’, he relates,  
they provide access to transcendence, promote the creation and 
maintenance of communities, establish morality, and guide human 
activity…These ‘frauds’ are not lies or scams; they are dishonest only in 
that they are not expected…to be sacred, yet accomplish the same ends.  
Regardless of broader utility, hinging on what might be considered an essentialist and 
reductive definition of what is and is not ‘religion,’ the paradox of the ‘authentic fake’ 
is useful for analysing transhumanism in comparison with and contrast to a competing 
system of apocalyptic eschatology that deems it illegitimate yet is constantly haunted 
by the possibility of its authenticity. For those analysed below, transhumanism’s 
potential legitimacy as artifice or counterfeit of ‘true religion’ underlies their 
apocalyptic dread, problematising their teleological narratives. 
As earlier technological innovations were met with a range of hope and 
despair, religious responses to transhumanism have been similarly varied. As James 
Hughes describes, in the contemporary era believers from many religious traditions 
‘selectively [appropriate] transhumanist ideas and technologies as fulfilling more 
traditional soteriological goals and eschatological visions’ (2014: xiii). While at times 
such appropriations ‘are completely hostile, as when conspiracy-minded apocalyptic 
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groups add transhumanists to their lists of Satan’s minions in their End-Times 
scenarios,’ for many there are transhumanist aspirations, like radical longevity or 
cognitive enhancement, which are ‘theologically unobjectionable.’ However, a line is 
still often drawn at ‘uploading minds, or interference in “natural” reproduction, or 
inheritable genetic enhancement’ (ibid.: xiii–xiv). Critical engagements outside open 
antagonism cover a range of topics and hinge on underlying issues of justice as often 
as those of nature; Cole-Turner (2011b: 194) and Peters (2011: 70–1), for example, 
note how transhumanist desires are enmeshed in systems of capitalist inequality and 
the global division of labour. 
It is on the side of the ‘completely hostile’ that the texts I analyse fall. Such 
responses have often been excluded from scholarly discussions, perhaps for good 
reason. There is a difference between religious critics of transhumanism like Brent 
Waters and propheticians like Noah Hutchings. The former analyses transhumanism 
and Christianity as ‘contending salvific religions’, offering similar but oppositional 
soteriologies, in which ‘both agree that death is the final enemy [but] transhumanists 
conquer this foe by achieving the immortality of endless time, whereas Christians are 
resurrected into eternity, where there is no time’ (Waters 2011: 164). The latter writes 
that ‘the devil was behind some wicked transhuman business in Noah’s day and he 
has never changed his lie or evil ways since. He is behind the transhuman science in 
my day [too]’ (Hutchings 2011: 251). However, on a substantive as opposed to 
rhetorical or tonal level, these criticisms are not especially disparate; more vociferous 
opposition like that of Hutchings in a sense just magnifies and clarifies the ideological 
gulf identified by scholars like Waters. It sheds light on a dynamic between religious 
and secular time, a dynamic closely bound to ideas of divine power and human 
autonomy.  
Theologically framed, the secular is the temporal space of fallen creation. The 
saeculum—that ‘world of men and time’, of ‘time as the vehicle of sin and tragedy as 
well as the medium of redemption’ (Markus 1988: xxii, 10)—finds its apocalyptic 
conclusion in Christ’s Second Advent (Schiffman 2011: 109). Drawing on Waters’ 
description of transhumanism as attempting to conquer death by making life extend 
indefinitely, it is possible to code transhuman apocalypticisms as an infinitisation of 
the saeculum in opposition to its eschatological erasure in eternity. As a becoming-
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transcendent of fallen time, transhuman eschatologies readily lend themselves to 
incorporation in more ‘traditional’ apocalypticisms as a ‘doctrine of demons’ (I Tim. 
4:1), in which they become reconfigured as one form of an anthropo-demonic project 
of wresting control of the world and time from the hand of the divine sovereign—a 
project which the proponent of demonological transhumanism Carl Teichrib labels the 
‘Religion of Man’ (2011: 299). This religion is opposed to ‘true’ religion, venerating 
artifice over authenticity. However, in transhumanism artifice as artifice is coded as 
containing salvific potentiality, offering a fully immanent soteriology: an authentic 
fake whose (im)possible authenticity destabilises their constructions of orthotaxy. 
Transhumanism and its Demon(ologist)s 
Figurations of demonological transhumanism are not monolithic. Neither are they the 
products of a specific movement, an organisation or set of organisations operating 
under certain fixed principles. Rather, they are produced by a milieu of networked 
individuals connected via the Internet and radio talkshows, shared publications, and 
other media, who self-identify as conservative Christians and are united mainly by an 
identification of transhumanism as demonically-influenced and (therefore) ancient. 
They are broadly part of the same spiritual warfare discourse I examined in the 
preceding chapter, drawing on a similar discourse of warfare imagery, territoriality, 
and the concept of ideological and territorial strongholds that must be breached for the 
good of the world. While the authors I examined there focused on ‘Jezebel’ and 
cultural attitudes to gender roles and sexualities, those here focus their attentions on 
(trans)humanism and emerging technologies. One of the milieu’s most outspoken and 
prolific members, Thomas Horn, describes the technologies which concern him and 
the other authors in the milieu as synthetic biology, patenting of new lifeforms, 
human cloning, redefinition of humans and human rights, nanotechnology and 
cybernetics, transhuman eugenics, and germ-line engineering. He then adds but does 
not describe ‘immortalism, postgenderism, cryonics, designer babies, neurohacking, 
and mind-uploading’ (2011a: 11–20). 
In some ways the milieu could be identified more broadly as anti-scientific or 
anti-humanist, seeing a demonic hand in the explosive advance of science in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Indeed, Thomas and his wife Nita Horn 
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posit a continuity of technologies from ‘the creation of the ouija board…to online 
pornography’ as phases in the machinations of a demonic spirit (2010: x). As with the 
transformation of Queen Jezebel into a demonic principality or the need to narrate 
Islam as one half of an eternal clash of civilisations, the positing of transhumanism as 
the culmination of an age-old process of demonic artifice is key to this paradigm. 
Despite similarities in mission, however, the milieu is eclectic and varied in 
membership. It includes, among many others, Chuck Missler, an evangelical preacher 
whose prophecy interpretations draw heavily on ufology and New Age ideas (2004, 
2011; Missler and Eastman 1997), Gary Stearman, co-ordinator and host of Prophecy 
in the News and Skywatch TV, internet-based networks that amalgamate the tracts of 
other individuals in the milieu and offer them a ‘public’ platform, the aforementioned 
Noah Hutchings, who writes on the historicity of Atlantis and prophetic importance of 
the Giza pyramids (2010; 2011; Hutchings, Glaze and Spargimino 2011), and 
Douglas Woodward, a former corporate executive who writes on the end-times role of 
the United States (2011; 2013; 2014).3  
Within this milieu, the works of Thomas Horn come to the fore through his 
capacity for assimilating the milieu’s technologically oriented fears into something 
resembling coherency and systematicity. CEO of Defender, a conservative Christian 
publishing group through which many of the milieu’s works are put out, Horn is one 
of the milieu’s most prominent members. It would, however, be a misnomer to call 
him its leader; the milieu is radically decentralised, coalescing around confluences of 
evangelical apocalypticism, New Age mysticism, ufology, and general conspiracist 
ideas of New World Order, and lacks a formal hierarchy. He has, however, styled 
himself ‘one of the most (if not the most) publically-recognized Christian critics of 
transhumanism with a belief in prophecy’ (2011a: 3). Hyperbole aside, he is at least 
known beyond the milieu. In 2006, sociologist and bioethicist James Hughes 
interviewed him on his Changesurfer Radio, and Horn was ‘invited’ by Calvin 
                                                
3 Others include: Sharon Gilbert, co-host of Christian internet podcast View from the Bunker, is 
primarily concerned with pandemics, including the recent Ebola scare as a sign of the Fourth Horseman 
of the Apocalypse (2014). Carl Teichrib, the editor of Forcing Change, a monthly online journal that 
deals with ‘challenges to our worldview’, mainly in the form of conservative Christian criticisms of 
climate science and aspirations for one world government. Douglas Hamp author of several books, 
including Corrupting the Image (2011), which aligns with the Horns’ notion of genetic engineering 
being used to disrupt God’s image in humanity, and The First Six Days (2008), which critiques 
attempts to synthesise the Genesis narrative with modern theories of evolution. 
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Mercer to submit a paper to the Transhumanism and Religion Consultation for the 
2011 AAR Conference (the paper was not accepted).4 Within the milieu itself Horn’s 
presence looms large. He was discussed in over a dozen articles on conservative 
conspiracist hub site World Net Daily between 2008 and 2013, and all of his works 
are sold in its store. Horn has also been interviewed on Christian and conspiracist 
radio and television talk shows like The 700 Club, The Harvest Show, Coast to Coast 
AM, and Stearman’s Prophecy in the News. I have chosen to focus on Horn not only 
due to his prominence in the milieu but also the volume of his output and its general 
thematic coherence. 
While all Horn’s works occupy the evangelical discourse of Third Wave 
spiritual warfare, they have appeared mainly in two interwoven trajectories, dealing 
with America and transhumanism, respectively. The first is found in Spiritual 
Warfare (1998), Apollyon Rising 2012 (2009), its updated re-release Zenith 2016 
(2013), and the edited collection Blood on the Altar (2014b). The second begins, 
arguably, in Gods That Walk Among Us (Horn and Jones 1999), and comes to the fore 
with the (fictional) Ahriman Gate (Horn and Horn 2005) and the later (non-fictional) 
Nephilim Stargates (2007), Forbidden Gates (Horn and Horn 2010), and the edited 
Pandemonium’s Engine (2011b).5 It would be a mistake to truly separate these paths, 
and the ways they relate to one another, as well as how his early works figure into 
later ones, is interesting to chart. While in his introduction to Terry Cook’s Beast 
Tech (T.L. Cook and Horn 2013) Horn charts his concern over end-times 
technological fears back to 1990, Horn’s Spiritual Warfare is as original as its title—a 
typical work of nineties spiritual warfare focusing, like the works of Frangipane 
(1991) or Jackson (2002), on pornography, homosexuality, and abortion, with no 
                                                
4 This is as reported by Horn (2011a: 3). It is ambiguous exactly what Horn considers an invitation, but 
since Mercer sent the Call for Papers for the Consultation it is possible that Horn simply received it due 
to being on a transhumanism and religion mailing list. It is notable that while in the 2011 text he notes 
that he has not heard back regarding the acceptance and rejection of the paper, he reproduces the paper 
wholesale—including this note—on his website in 2012, months after the AAR (‘Earth’s Earliest 
Ages’ at http://www.raidersnewsupdate.com/pember4.htm). 
5 Two other works co-authored with Cris Putnam, Petrus Romanus: The Final Pope is Here (2012), 
and Exo-Vaticana (2013), rest between and outside these poles, adding to Horn’s narrative in a 
different fashion by focusing on an anti-Catholic rather than anti-humanist narrative, while its 
overarching tale of extra-dimensional demonic beings is similar. 
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technoscientific emphasis.6 His 1999 book with Donald Jones targets New Age and 
neo-Pagan spiritualities and attempts to read pagan mythologies through Christian 
demonology. While both impact Horn’s later oeuvre, his focus on technology truly 
emerges in Ahriman, the scenario of which entails the use of emerging technologies to 
resurrect the nephilim, half-human, half-fallen angel beings taken from Genesis 6 and 
I Enoch. This account was subsequently de-fictionalised in Stargates and has featured 
prominently in all his works since. Apollyon combines this technoscientific focus with 
the New Age and Kulturkampf-emphases of his early works, crafting a scenario in 
which America is a demonological vessel, founded by anti-Christian deists to 
generate a New Atlantis that culminates in the (re)creation of the Antichrist. In 
casting America as always-already demonic, Horn is distinct from those authors 
analysed in earlier chapters. I will unpick this aspect later, as it relates closely to his 
broader fixations on origination and predestination. 
While Horn’s books all contribute to his narrative, I draw primarily on 
Forbidden Gates (Horn and Horn 2010), which I believe is the most ‘complete’ work 
on ‘transhumanism’, and Zenith 2016 (2013), his updated narrative of America’s 
Antichristic origins and destiny. I supplement these with the essays collated in 
Pandemonium’s Engine (2011) and Blood on the Altar (2014), which combine work 
by Horn and others in the milieu. Through analysing these texts, I focus on exploring 
two interwoven threads in Horn’s works that partake in a complex theopolitics of 
prophetic temporality. The first is the projection of modern technoscience back into 
the biblical narrative of Noah, creating a scenario in which transhumanism is both 
ancient and already-vanquished. The second is Horn’s narrative of America as 
                                                
6 There is, however, a pointer to Horn’s later engagement with ufology and other New Age concerns. 
At one point, Horn explores six possibilities for the origins of demons ‘offered by modern religious 
authorities’ (1998: 55). These include them being (1) a psychological projection, (2) spirits of a pre-
Adamic race, (3) other-worldly beings, (4) biblical nephilim, (5) ghosts of the evil dead, or (6) fallen 
angels. Horn deliberately shies away from identifying one as true, merely marking demons as a 
‘mysterious and militant’ force that has operated throughout history (ibid. 65), however while most of 
the sections begin with phrases like ‘Those who believe…’, the third (other-worldly creatures) starts 
with ‘Consider these facts’ and then lists a number of ancient alien tropes, like the alleged impossibility 
of humans building the Giza pyramids, culminating with ‘Sufficient historical evidence does exist to 
suggest an invasion of earth by heavenly creatures thousands of years ago’ (ibid. 56, 58). This suggests 
that the seeds of his later work are there from the beginning, even if the focus on transhumanism was 
not. Much of this section of Spiritual Warfare is reproduced in the later Forbidden Gates, but option 
one (psychological projections) has shifted to last place, and a new ‘several of the above’ option is 
included (Horn and Horn 2010: 23–32). 
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product of a Satanist-Masonic conspiracy for global rule. The logic that underlies both 
narratives is crystallised in the image of the imago. This imago is broader than 
(though inextricable from) the Christian imago Dei, and relates to the discursive 
inseparability of origin and telos in Horn’s oeuvre. 
AS THE DAYS OF NOAH WILL HAVE BEEN 
Imago. Scripturally it translates the Hebrew tselem, which denotes several things, not 
only Adam’s resemblance to God but also Seth’s to his father Adam, as well as 
statues as graven likenesses (Moore 2010: 205; Welz 2011:76). Etymologically, it 
relates to ideas of divine election, as of a king by his patron deity (Moritz 2011: 328–
9), and genealogically has been used accordingly to mark humanity’s uniqueness and 
place over the rest of creation (Schuele 2011; Welz 2011). Yet tselem has also been 
used to describe a certain transience to human life, notably in Psalms 39:6 where it 
becomes rendered as ‘phantom’ (NIV), ‘shadow’ (ISV), or ‘vain show’ (NKJV)—as 
‘(mere) semblance’ (Moore 2010: 205). Therefore, while ordinarily stable in its 
manifestations as flesh or stone, the imago bears within it a spectrality that unsettles 
it. Claudia Welz suggests that the imago cannot, or perhaps should not, be reduced to 
an icon or idol since it requires its relationality to the deity it approximates: its 
(dis)similarity must be preserved in order to not become self-referential, to not serve 
human apotheosis (2011: 86). The danger of this self-referentiality is one authors like 
Horn are acutely aware of. 
This Biblical imago, already polyvalent, saturates the discourse I analyse here. 
In English, however, the word also refers to an insect’s final metamorphosis—
something bequeathed to science by eighteenth-century naturalist Carl Linnaeus, who 
like a ‘second Adam’ gave God’s creatures new their genus-species names, 
infamously placing humans among primates (Corbey 2005: 44–7). This other 
meaning of imago, so-called ‘because the insect, having thrown off its mask, becomes 
a perfect image of its species’ (Rennie and Wood 1869: 20), is also relevant here. The 
idea that something’s ‘genetic’ essence—imago in the first, biblical sense—
conditions its ultimate image of perfection—imago in the latter, entomological, 
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sense—is an idea that infiltrates and occupies all Horn’s works, although it takes 
subtly different forms. For Horn, as I will show, imago determines imago; essential 
origin determines telic metamorphosis. More than this it destines it, predestines it, 
even (p)redestines it. This last construction points to a seemingly paradoxical pattern 
of inverse causation—that telic metamorphosis (p)redetermines essential origin—
which relies on and subverts an apocalyptic/prophetic structure of time, in which 
everything new is (or must be) ancient, archaic, and already-over(come). 
Semblances of Futures Past 
‘[T]he science of human enhancement and transhumanism,’ write the Horns, ‘is 
unwittingly playing into the hands of powerful supernaturalism toward a Luciferian 
endgame—something “it” tried once before, and which “it” was prophesized to 
attempt again just before the end of time’ (2010: 151). The ‘endgame’ the authors are 
referring to in this passage relates to the scientific creation of a synthetically-produced 
lifeform which the Horns and their associated writers believe paves the way for the 
creation of the Antichrist. This pattern of inscribing contemporary phenomena as the 
latest iteration of an ancient enemy is a recurrent pattern in the texts examined, from 
the ‘Jezebel spirit’ to demoniac Caliphates. The Horns and associated authors utilise a 
similar strategy to those analysed above, recasting a modern adversary as an old one 
reborn. But while technology generally has a history of apocalyptic appropriation, 
transhuman technologies would appear to be undeniably new.  
The Horns circumvent this in two ways. First they construct transhumanism as 
the latest resurgence of the ‘religion of man’—an anthropocentric pseudo-religion that 
exalts artifice over authenticity and lead to the creation of wrath-inducing edifices like 
the Tower of Babel. Second, they proceed to construct a narrative in which the exact 
technologies they are ideologically combatting, rather than just the ideas behind them, 
are also ancient. To do so, the Horns turn to the Biblical narrative of the Deluge and 
the events that precipitated it. As others used the tale of Jezebel’s sexually licentious 
and religiously polytheist ‘reign of iniquity’ to frame modern-day woes, the Horns 
appropriate the story of the nephilim, offspring of the ‘sons of god’ and the ‘daughters 
of man’ who walked the earth in the days of Noah. They adapt this from Genesis 6:1–
12, which is worth quoting at length: 
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Now it came to pass when men began to multiply on the face of the earth, 
and daughters were born to them, that the sons of God saw the daughters 
of men, that they were beautiful; and they took wives for themselves of all 
whom they chose. 
And the LORD said, ‘My Spirit shall not strive with man forever, for he is 
indeed flesh; yet his days shall be one hundred and twenty years.’ There 
were giants [nephilim] on the earth in those days, and also afterward, when 
the sons of God came in to the daughters of men and they bore children to 
them. Those were the mighty men who were of old, men of renown. 
Then the LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and 
that every intent of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. 
And the LORD was sorry that He had made man on the earth, and He was 
grieved in His heart. So the Lord said, ‘I will destroy man whom I have 
created from the face of the earth, both man and beast, creeping thing and 
birds of the air, for I am sorry that I have made them.’ But Noah found 
grace in the eyes of the Lord. 
This is the genealogy of Noah. Noah was a just man, perfect in his 
generations. Noah walked with God. And Noah begot three sons: Shem, 
Ham, and Japheth. 
The earth also was corrupt before God, and the earth was filled with 
violence. So God looked upon the earth, and indeed it was corrupt; for all 
flesh had corrupted their way on the earth. 
The Horns focus on three aspects of this narrative: Noah’s condition of perfection 
relative to his generation, the corruption and eradication of ‘all flesh,’ and the creation 
of the nephilim (giants) as human-angelic hybrids. They interweave this biblical tale 
with the detailed narrative found in the quasi-apocryphal I Enoch.7 I Enoch 1–36 
relays the narrative of the fall of the ‘sons of god’, named the Watchers and led by the 
angel Semihaza, in considerable detail. These details are less relevant than the reasons 
provided for the Watchers’ punishment, however. The work describes the Watchers as 
those ‘who have left the high heaven, the holy eternal place, and have defiled 
themselves with women’ (Horn and Horn 2010: 180). God then declares that these 
corrupted angels will obtain neither peace nor remission of sins, but shall watch the 
violence of their offspring multiply. The Horns cite the canonical book of Jude (1:6) 
in support of this: ‘And the angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own 
habitation, He hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgement 
of the great day’ (2010: 181). As was present in other figurations of demonological 
evil as deviation, the main sin of the Watchers is desertion of their proper station and 
                                                
7 I Enoch is technically canonical for parts of the Ethiopian Church, as well as the Beta Israel. 
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sexual-spiritual contamination (ibid.). Their originary transgression has considerable 
ramifications, however, ultimately distorting the entire order of creation, expanding 
until ‘all flesh’ is rendered corrupt and requires eradication. All but Noah, whose 
unique perfection grants him reprieve. Unlike traditional readings of the narrative, 
however, for the Horns this perfection is not just moral but biological: ‘his physical 
makeup—his DNA—had not been contaminated by Nephilim descent, as apparently 
the rest of the world had become’ (Horn 2011a: 43). 
 The conflation of biological and moral purity is closely linked to the milieu’s 
construction of transhumanism. As Gary Stearman (2011: 133–4) writes, God created 
‘human beings in precisely the way He wanted’ and modification is thus ‘blasphemy’. 
He continues:  
Those who study prophecy have come to understand that something like 
this happened once before, during the days of antediluvian man. The 
Flood of Noah was nothing more or less than the global condemnation of 
this sort of evil experimentation. 
For the milieu, transhumanistic technoscience is not just akin to this demonic 
intervention, but identical, oriented towards a similar deviation of human essence. 
Drawing on 1 Enoch, the Horns relate how the renegade Watchers taught humanity 
divine knowledge, giving them technologies they should not have had: metalwork, 
military tactics, dyeing, cosmetics, sorcery, astronomy, and herbalism. They also turn 
to another apocryphal work of more dubious provenance and status, Jasher, for further 
explication: after being given the secrets of heaven, ‘the sons of men [began] the 
mixture of animals of one species with another, in order therewith to provoke the 
Lord’ (Jasher 4:18).8  
The Horns interpret this line to mean that the Watchers taught humanity 
genetic engineering. As Thomas Horn writes, this phrase ‘cannot mean Watchers had 
taught men standard hybridisation, as this would not have “provoked the Lord.” God 
made like animals of different breeds capable of reproducing…It would [thus] not 
                                                
8 The history of the text today known as the book of Jasher is nebulous. While it is referred to on two 
occasions in the Hebrew Bible (Joshua 10:13 and II Samuel 1:18), their relationship to those we have 
today is debatable. Indeed, Arthur Chiel notes that this nebulosity lent itself to a rise of 
‘pseudoepigraphical identifications and imitations’, and proceeds to analyse two: an eleventh-century 
text in fluent Biblical Hebrew (which became a seventeenth-century bestseller, with six reprints across 
Europe between 1628 and 1815) and a later 1757 text in English entirely unrelated to the former 
(1977). Much like his usage of First Enoch, Horn does not justify his use of Jasher as a main source for 
his narrative. 
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have “provoked the Lord” for this type of animal breeding to have taken place, as 
God, Himself, made the animals able to do this’ (2011a: 41–2; see also Horn and 
Horn 2010: 183). Other authors, like Hamp and McTernan, echo this. Using more 
canonical sources, both craft their objections via Genesis 1:24: ‘And God said, Let the 
earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast 
of the earth after his kind: and it was so.’ Hamp decries genetic tampering because 
even if ‘the percentage of [one creature in another] is only 1/70,000th’ the creature is 
no longer ‘completely according to its own kind’, and ‘mixing two different kinds 
violates God’s principle and will ultimately end poorly’ (2011: 236). McTernan’s 
argument is more anthropocentric, hinging specifically on the imago Dei and arguing 
that genetic tampering in humans, especially the introduction of animal DNA, 
destroys this and makes humanity something other (2011). Putnam reiterates this 
point, implicitly linking transhuman augmentation to murder by noting that ‘the 
prohibition of murder in Genesis 9:6 is based on the fact that the human was created 
in God’s image. It seems reasonable to extend that to include posthuman alteration’ 
(2011: 202). The writers herein weave a narrative that hinges on a core essence, 
(demonic) deviation from which is equated to death and ontological absence. 
A Sovereign Simulacrum 
The idea that technoscientific tampering distorts or destroys the imago Dei is a core 
feature of the narratives of both the Horns and other writers in the milieu (J.M. 
Bennett 2011; T.L. Cook and Horn 2013; Gilbert 2011; D. Hamp 2011; Horn 2011a; 
Horn and Horn 2010; Hutchings 2011; McTernan 2011; Missler 2011; Putnam 2011; 
Stearman 2011; Teichrib 2011). Through the creation of creatures ‘outside of their 
own kind’, the Horns fear demons will be able to assert greater control over humans 
and human society, a control for which the culmination comes in a scenario Horn first 
posits in Apollyon, in which the Watchers’ original corruption of biological purity was 
intended to manufacture a body unlike the ‘kinds’ of being God made: a combination 
of human, animal, and plant genetics in a new being where the spirit God breathed 
into humanity and other lifeforms cannot dwell, and into which the Watchers would 
be able to incarnate their own spirits (2010: 185; see also Gilbert 2011). The modern 
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(re)creation of hybrid lifeforms via transhuman technologies is linked both to the days 
of Noah and the forthcoming end-times struggle (Horn and Horn 2010: 186): 
[A]s interbreeding begins between transgenic animals, genetically 
modified humans, and species as God made them, the altered DNA will 
quickly migrate into the natural environment…perhaps [this] has been the 
whole idea of the end-times…to create a generation of genetically altered 
‘fit extensions’ for the resurrection of underworld Nephilim hordes in 
preparation for Armageddon.  
Since such transhumans would actually be ‘part “beast”’, Horn subsequently posits 
this development as a fulfilment of Revelation 13:16–17, the ‘Mark of the Beast’. He 
writes elsewhere (2011a: 52–3):  
No longer ‘entirely human’ would also mean…that the individual could 
no longer be ‘saved’ or go to heaven, explaining why the book of 
Revelation says ‘whosoever receiveth the mark’ is damned forever while 
also explaining why the Nephilim similarly could not be redeemed.  
The Antichrist forms the crux of this process as actual or symbolic representation of 
the diabolisation of humanity broadly, a recreation of the nephilim as the ‘reunion of 
demons with humans’ (ibid.). That this diabolisation is a bestialisation—a recreation 
of humanity as beast—gestures to the relation of the beast to the sovereign I examined 
earlier, and to a fixation on evolutionary theory, which already symbolically enacts 
this.9 It also points to the relation of ‘substance’ to what lies beneath it. As David 
Goldberg writes (2006: 348), ideas of substance always rely on 
changing conceptions of sub-stance or sub-standing, of sub-being or non-
being. Being comes to know itself only through what it takes itself not to 
be, to non-being…Human being is delineated in contrast to, in repulsion 
from, the creaturely or beastly that is taken always as the threat to ‘us’, to 
our well-being. The beastly is identified invariably to underscore the 
condition of human being, and by extension of being human.  
This relationship figures distinctly in the Horns’ nephilim narrative. The angels are 
first demonised by their cohabitation-contamination with/by human women (initiated 
by their descent from a proper ontological position). This contagion spreads through a 
destruction of substance—angel merges with human merges with animal merges with 
plant, until nothing is as it should be, until nothing is—just counterfeit creatures in a 
                                                
9 Transhumanism is often linked to evolutionary theory by the milieu. McTernan, for example, laments 
that evolution ‘detaches man from his Creator and being created in God’s image and likeness…Man is 
now a free agents to tamper with his DNA under the guise of advancing evolution’ (2011: 268), while 
Hamp laments that the teaching of evolution removes God, and ‘With God removed, we can 
understand how mixing two different kinds of animals in order to “evolve” to a new level raises very 
few flags…After all, they say we came from animals’ (2011: 238). 
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counterfeit creation that must thus be exposed, swept away, begun anew. For the 
milieu, this counterfeit threatens (again) to efface an original, using contemporary 
technoscience to destabilising its ontological borders, calling its essence into question.  
The (im)possible persistence of this simulacrum of being is a point of tension 
for the milieu. While authors like those examined in earlier chapters were also fixated 
on the demonic as a force of boundary transgression, the fixation on transgression in 
the works analysed here is quite different. The most notable area of differentiation is 
that authors fixated on ‘Jezebel’ or ‘Islam’ were often focused on freeing individuals 
and institutions from them, restoring them to a pristine, originary condition. For the 
Horns and associated writers, the transhumanist transgression is more permanent: by 
transgressing the boundaries of the human, transhumanism has the ability to create 
vessels for demonic habitation, changing humans irrevocably by surgically removing 
the imago Dei and replacing it with a diabolic simulacrum. It is not that they lack the 
same concern with originary purity, quite the opposite, but that there is a clearer point 
of no return. Once this threshold is crossed humanity is diabolised—it is transformed 
and made demonic. In an etymological sense it is ‘thrown across’ (diaballein, ‘to 
throw across’), passing over a divide on the way to something radically other.  
For the Horns and others, this diabolisation alters the essence of humanity—
removing the ability of the soul to dwell in this new flesh and opening that space for a 
diabolic other—and through this changes humanity’s destiny. Hutchings (2011: 252) 
elaborates on this point, connecting it directly to broader issues of sovereignty and 
territory: 
In a kingdom, there must be a territory, citizens, and a king. God made 
Adam and Eve to begin a human race to inhabit and rule over the earth 
just as the angels were to rule and serve with Him in the Kingdom of 
Heaven. But Satan... rebelled to exalt his own appointed authority over the 
Kingdom of God. The text and reasons seem to dictate that when he failed 
to make Adam and Eve his own servants to rule over this planet, he sent 
his own angels to transform mankind into beings that would do his own 
will rather than complete the mission given to them by the Creator. 
Though Hutchings does not make it clear, one can infer that it is not humans that 
rightly rule Earth but rather the imago Dei which they embody that operates as the 
ground of sovereign right: as God rules the Kingdom of Heaven, those made in His 
image rule the earthly, and the aim of the demonic other seems to be to replace this 
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image and thereby irreparably modify humanity’s (divine) mission. The monologic of 
sovereignty is clear here in a number of ways, from the penetration of the sovereign 
territory by an unwanted outsider to the fragmentation of the ‘kingdom’ through the 
corruption of the monarch. The logic used also relies on a topos I examined above—
the demonic inability to create, and its attempt to generate change by means of the co-
option and corruption of already-existing structures. Hutchings refer to this topos 
directly by writing that ‘Satan cannot create; therefore, he attempts to transform what 
God has created into something that he can use to exalt himself above God’ (2011: 
252). In discourses of ‘transhumanism’, the structure the demonic seems set on co-
opting is ‘the human’ itself, as conceptual and substantive lynchpin of God’s creation. 
By fundamentally altering the guarantor of human sovereign right—the imago Dei—
the demonic is able to radically transform the kingdom of earth into something that is 
fundamentally demoniac. It creates a counterfeit world, but a counterfeit for which the 
original has already been erased. 
The Crucible 
The ideological fulcrum of this takeover takes place in what the milieu’s authors call 
the ‘religion of man’, and the construction of this enemy reveals several related issues 
in constructions of demoniac (trans)humanism. Much like ‘Jezebel’ or ‘Islam,’ the 
‘religion of man’ provides an apparently unified, transhistorical enemy for the writers. 
However, this construction of the unified enemy also draws on the theopolitical 
genealogy of human and demonic shared experience of postlapsarian exile—the idea 
that ‘no one is more similar to us than the devil, for no one but the devil shares our 
outcast condition’ (Maggi 2001: 1). As opposition to a true religion based on heaven, 
the ‘religion of man’ is often coded by the writers through models of tangibility and 
worldliness, recalling the ideological thread of the saeculum I noted earlier (Calhoun 
2012: 342). Carl Teichrib notes this tangibility when he writes that ‘False religion—
the abandonment of the true Yahweh for an alternative—is frequently accompanied 
by a tangible edifice or system’ (2011: 301), while in 1999 Thomas Horn identified 
New Age spiritualities as demonic by their apparent desire to ‘unify the masses of the 
world under a single religious umbrella, and, at the macro level, harmonically 
converge the world’s energies with the power of Gaia’ (Horn and Jones 1999: 170).  
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For Teichrib, Horn, and others, the foremost model of this counterfeit system 
is Babel. Unlike Jennifer LeClaire, however, the writers here do not obscure parts of 
the narrative to craft a simple narrative of divine unity and demonic division. Instead, 
Babel is representative of a united humanity operating under Luciferian guidance for 
Antichristic ends: ‘the construction of a tower-city [is] representative of Man’s power 
via a unified objective’, Teichrib writes (2011: 301). It is worth noting that Nimrod, 
the king traditionally held responsible for Babel, is sometimes identified as a 
hybridised nephilim, his post-diluvian position (and descent from Noah) requiring a 
narrative of continued demonic interference in earthly matters (Horn and Horn 2010: 
192–7; see also J.M. Bennett 2011; Horn and Putnam 2012; Lake 2014).10 Indeed, 
Horn’s narrative in Zenith reinscribes Nimrod as the Egyptian god Osiris, whose 
dismemberment and reassembly/resurrection is reinscribed as a recoding of the Babel 
narrative, dismemberment symbolising the scattering of peoples and languages and 
resurrection prophesying the eschatological reunification of (post)humanity (2013: 
324–332). 
For Horn, the locus of this eschatological reunion is America—in many ways 
the America demonised in earlier chapters, eroded by multiculturalism and changing 
social attitudes to sexuality and gender, where even Christianity is contaminated 
(Horn 2013, 2014a). Yet Horn differs from those other writers in that he does not 
appeal to an essence of America that has been eroded. Instead, America is constructed 
as a demonic vessel and these changing cultural attitudes are not a deviation from 
America’s essence but its fulfilment. This might seem strange, however it operates 
within a discursive trend originating from the importing of New World Order (NWO) 
conspiracies into evangelical eschatologies (Barkun 2010: 129–32), conspiracies that 
Horn wholly integrates into his apocalyptic scenario. As I shall show, Horn’s use of 
these conspiracies compliments and subverts the underlying logic of origin and telos 
that permeates his writings. 
As Michael Barkun elaborates, the NWO operates as a unifying aspect in an 
increasingly diverse conspiracist subculture, which at heart claims that ‘both past and 
                                                
10 Part of this association likely stems from Josephus’ account used by Jennifer LeClaire, which I 
discussed briefly in Chapter Five: ‘[Nimrod] said he would be revenged on God, if he should have a 
mind to drown the world again; for that he would build a tower too high for the waters to be able to 
reach’ (in LeClaire 2013: 66). 
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present events must be understood as the outcome of efforts by an immensely 
powerful but secret group to seize control of the world’ (2003: 39). As I noted in 
Chapter Three, American civil religion has resulted in a broader cultural discourse of 
America as an engine of redemptive power, a saviour nation. America, however, has 
no formal place in scripture, granting it an undecidability. Barkun (2010: 131) argues 
that NWO conspiracies represent a significant shift in US apocalyptic discourse by 
giving vehicle to pre-existing eschatologically-tinged mutterings about ‘declining 
moral standards’ and approaching judgement:  
Where previous doom-and-gloom scenarios concerning the United States 
emerged organically out of religious ideas, the New World Order 
constituted a comprehensive theory of political evil that was now grafted 
onto religious conceptions. In doing so, it turned the millennial role of 
America upside-down.  
This new eschatological America is a nation ruled by demonic forces whose salvation 
can only come by divine intervention. These evil forces  
control major institutions…public and private: corporations, universities, 
media, and government agencies. Their operatives have infiltrated the 
corridors of power. They are in constant communication with counterparts 
in other regions of the world…[and] await only a signal to make the final 
open grab for total power (ibid.). 
Horn’s tale is fairly typical of NWO-oriented conspiracisms about America, 
although he tinges this with his emphasis on nephilim resurrection. For Horn, 
America is a product of Masonic occultism (2013: 41–59) and engineered to create a 
‘New Atlantis’, a process that entered its final stage after the events of 9/11: 
Symbolically, the Twin Towers in New York (as pillars) echoed the 
Masonic archetype where…[pillars] represented passageways, beyond 
which one could travel to reclaim what Masons believe was lost in 
Atlantis…Accordingly, if before 9/11 leaders of truly dark powers 
determined that the ascendency for the New Atlantis had arrived, occult 
magical tradition suggests they might have triggered an event surrounding 
a mega-ritual-offering…powerful enough to move their invisible empire 
beyond the pillars in New York…by igniting global changes accompanied 
with appropriate symbolism within the context of ultranational alchemical 
transformation (ibid.: 64–5). 
Horn draws the image of the New Atlantis from the works of Francis Bacon. Bacon is 
an important ideological figure within transhumanism, and Horn’s deployment of him 
is not accidental. For Horn, entering the gates to this New Atlantis symbolises 
‘movement past the limitations of existing scholarship into the area of unlimited 
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scientific and anomalous knowledge’ (ibid.: 63). Moreover, it represents the coming 
culmination of the Satanist-Masonic purpose for which America was founded. Horn 
lists a ‘Rosicrucian-Masonic brotherhood [that] was involved in the American and 
French revolutions’ (possibly the Illuminati) and the fact that as many as forty-four of 
the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence were Freemasons as proofs of 
this origin. Moving from these quasi-historical elements to note that occult symbols 
coded into the architecture of Washington, DC, create a ‘talisman-like layout’ of 
streets, government buildings and ‘Masonic monuments’ to form an ‘electric-type 
grid’ that ‘pulsates’ with Luciferian power ‘twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week’ (ibid.: 113). Horn draws these disparate elements together, concluding that: 
According to the symbolism in Washington, D.C., the secret destiny of 
America includes future national and global subservience to the god of 
Freemasonry, a deity most Americans would not imagine when reciting 
the pledge of allegiance to ‘one nation under god.’ In fact, the idea by 
some that the United States was established as a monotheistic ‘Christian 
nation’…is a puzzling conclusion when reflected against the deistic beliefs 
of so many of the founding fathers…and the countless pagan icons that 
dominate the symbols, statues, buildings and seals carefully drafted under 
official government auspices (ibid.: 119–20). 
This passage portrays a resurgence of the relationship of origin to destiny that 
permeated Horn’s nephilim narrative. While Horn’s inscription of American NWO as 
the terminus of a grand historical conspiracy is common in NWO conspiracies 
(Barkun 2013; Fenster 2008; Knight 2003), in Horn’s paradigm it also fits into an 
ideological fixation with genetic predestination. He does not attempt to address how 
the complex history of Christianity in the US fits into his narrative of its ultimate 
demonic purposes, focusing on (what he reads as) the occult and esoteric symbolism 
encoded into the founding of the nation and (thus) determining its ‘secret destiny’. 
This destiny is reached with the transhuman (re)creation of the nephilim, beginning 
with the Antichrist (2013: 193–209).11  
                                                
11 Horn’s eschatologically oriented comparative mythology is too complex to explain fully, but hinges 
on a conflation of the Egyptian gods Osiris and Horus, the Greek god Apollo, and the Bablyonian king 
Nimrod, as well as a linguistic elision whereby ‘Apollo’ becomes ‘Apollyon’, angel of the abyss from 
Revelation 9:11. There is an ancient folk etymology that supports the last: both Aeschylus and 
Euripides trace Apollo’s name to the same root as Apollyon, apollymi/apollyō, and Homer’s Iliad 
portrays him as a frightening god who sends ‘deadly pestilence’ (Broek 1999: 74–7), an association 
mimicked by the figure in Revelation, a king of abyssal locusts. With the exception of Horus’ with 
Apollo, which traces to Herodotus (Mikalson 2003: 181), Horn’s other associations are more specious. 
His rationale is that the Osiris myth is ‘a “devil’s view” of history, where the perspectives and 
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Origins of Emergency 
Imago determines imago, irrespective of hitches on the road to metamorphosis. The 
mask is shed; the perfect image emerges. America’s becoming a modern-day bastion 
of the ‘religion of man’ is coded as merely the fulfilment of a course set at the 
moment of its birth as a nation. It could never have become otherwise. This is a 
crucial point; it relates to the ways that demonological transhumanism is figured in 
the texts of the milieu. For Horn, the imago (Dei) of humanity guarantees its essence 
and path to perfectibility in God; however, transhuman techno-science is coded as 
capable of retroactively altering this essential origin—it effaces the imago Dei that 
humanity embodies, replaces it with something other and blurs the division between 
nature and artifice at an ontological level. It (p)redestines humanity by forever 
removing the possibility of (the milieu’s model of) Christian soteriology. Yet rather 
than removing the possibility of salvation, transhumanism constructs an alternative 
soteriology based on technological transformation, one that eschews an eternity 
beyond time in favour of an immortality of endless time (Waters 2011: 164). It offers 
authentic fake salvation for authentic fake humanity. The effacement of the imago Dei 
that has apparently long been the goal of the ‘religion of man’ is ultimately a 
discourse of human (and demonic, human as demonic) autonomy and sovereignty, of 
the impossible possibility of a (p)redestination that tries to wipe the slate clean and 
write anew. 
 Like an imperfect palimpsest, however, this discourse cannot completely 
efface its original scription. This cuts to the heart of what makes transhumanism so 
terrifying to Horn and others in the milieu. It relates to what Brent Waters gestured to 
by calling it and Christianity ‘contending salvific religions’, seeking to conquer 
finitude in different, even opposing, ways (2011: 163–6), and via this to a genealogy 
of secular (trans)humanism in the Christianity it disavows. If, to paraphrase Charles 
Taylor, the West is secular because it was—and continues to be, albeit in irreducibly 
altered fashion—religious (2007: 791–2), then it might be fair to posit that it is 
                                                                                                                                      
roles…are reversed’ (2011). Set in this reading is merged with the Biblical Seth, third and sole 
surviving child of Adam and Eve, and his slaying of Osiris is constructed as referring to Genesis 3:15, 
when God tells the serpent (Satan) that he ‘will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between 
thy seed and her seed’. Osiris/Horus is configured as one of the anthropo-demonic nephilim as the 
serpent’s seed, whereas Set(h) is a descendent of true humanity (Horn 2011, 2013). 
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transhumanist because it was—and continues to be, in irreducibly altered fashion—
Christian. Maybe even, as Nancy posited, ‘Christian in its depths’ (2008: 34). 
 (HUMAN) NATURE AND THE INSTAURATION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
In ‘Pandemonium and “Her” Children’, Horn links transhumanism to Gnosticism, 
writing that one can easily recognise in the former ‘the ancient origin of its heresy as 
the incarnation of Gnosticism and its disdain for the human body as basically an evil 
design that is far inferior to what we can make it’ (2011a: 61). While this is a 
reductionist view, my purpose here is not to defend or refute the historicity of Horn’s 
understanding of Gnosticism; much like the projection of modern technoscience onto 
the days of Noah or evolutionary theory onto ancient Egyptian religion (Horn and 
Jones 1999: 42), he uses the linkage to code transhumanism as something ancient. 
The connection drawn to Gnosticism is not random, however. Waters notes that 
transhumanist philosophies draw on the legacy of particular Christian heresies: they 
echo ‘a Manichean disdain of a corrupt, if not evil, material body from which the soul 
must be rescued’ and a ‘Pelagian reiteration of the ability of humans to will 
themselves to perfection’ (2011: 171). That Horn chooses Gnosticism specifically 
might also go beyond its popular alignments with body hatred and point to the way 
that—to use Jeffrey Kripal’s opening to The Serpent’s Gift—it was the Sethian 
Gnostics who ‘could not help noticing just who in the story [of Eden] was graciously 
bestowing knowledge (the serpent) and who was jealously and rather pettily trying to 
prevent it (God)’ (2007: 1). 
While Horn’s scenarios are fanciful, his identification of transhumanism as not 
fully modern has some grounding, although not (just) the one he selects. As discussed 
above, a number of scholars of religion and transhumanism have noted the latter’s 
underlying theologic. Rather than being a modern variant of Gnosticism’s alleged 
hatred for physicality, however, transhumanism’s genealogy is more complicated. 
Among other theologemes, it has roots in the binary mind/body and how this binary 
relates to divisions between culture and nature and ideas of dominion over the latter 
as integral to humanity’s return to Edenic perfection. This genealogy is of particular 
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importance to how demonological transhumanism is coded as threatening in the 
scenarios of Horn and his associates. 
The Slow March (Back) to Paradise 
Several scholars, including Deane-Drummond (2011), Burdett (2011, 2015), and 
Andrea Nightingale (2011), have tied discourses of transhumanism to a secularisation 
of theopolitical ideas of dominion over nature. In the context of transhumanism, 
Deane-Drummond and Nightingale link dominion to the opposition between mind 
and body in Western thought, extending genealogically to Neo-Platonic influence on 
Augustine. As Deane-Drummond writes, this influence is well documented—the 
feature most relevant to discourses of transhumanity, however, is the privileging of 
human reason as the crucial point of human differentiation from other animals. 
Augustine projected this binary onto the Genesis narrative, in which the imago Dei 
became reconfigured as the ‘rational substance’ of (hu)man(ity): ‘Thus’, the 
theologian relates in his unfinished On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, ‘“Let us 
make man in our image and likeness” is correctly understood according to what is 
within man and is his principle part, that is, according to the mind. For the whole of 
man should be assessed from that which holds the principle place in man and which 
distinguishes him from beasts’ (in Deane-Drummond 2011: 120).12  
Deane-Drummond argues that modern transhumanisms are secularisations of 
this conceptual framework, assuming that mental activity is the ‘prime source of 
happiness’ and failing to assume any good-in-itself for bodily existence as such, and 
which thus ‘still [hope] for salvation through human mental aspirations’ (2011: 122). 
As transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom (a popular target of Horn) writes, ‘It is 
not our human shape or the details of our current human biology that define what is 
valuable about us, but rather our aspirations and ideals, our experiences, and the kinds 
of lives we lead’ (2014: 2). This view is echoed by other prominent transhumanists 
like Ray Kurzweil and Hans Moravec, who hold that the true locus of the person is in 
                                                
12 The legacy of this Augustinian dualism has been debated. Charles Taylor (1989) places it firmly on 
the trajectory from Plato to Descartes, but Michael Hanby (2003) argues that Cartesian dualism is 
mainly influenced by Stoicism, and suggests Augustine’s focus on doxology invalidates considering 
him ‘proto-Cartesian’. Irrespective of direct, clear lines of influence, this dualism sits in a genealogy 
that privileges mind over body as the locus of human uniqueness and/as its relation to the divine. 
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the mind, comprised of information, and the body a prosthetic which contains it: if the 
mind can be accurately preserved without the body, then, in Moravec’s words, ‘I am 
preserved. The rest is mere jelly’ (Kurzweil 2000, 2005; 1988: 117). The locus of 
humanity is not in our embodiment but in our psychical manifestations. 
 In both religious and transhuman apocalypticisms of this type, hope for 
psychical salvation from imperfect embodiment manifests in patterns of sovereign 
ownership. This ownership manifests as a quasi-postmillennial utopianism that places 
humans in the role of perfecting nature by the application of reason. In the Christian 
version, this reason is marred by humanity’s exilic state but ultimately reflects the 
semblance of the imago Dei. Human rule over nature, dominion, is coded as a route to 
salvation and features in several works by the milieu (Horn 2011a; Horn and Horn 
2010: 163; Hutchings 2011; Putnam 2011). Regarding transhumanism, Burdett traces 
dominion via the works of Renaissance thinker Francis Bacon (1561–1626) (2015: 
12–18; see also Wolyniak 2015).  
Bacon acts as a kind of symbolic founder for transhumanism. Bostrom, author 
of one of the few comprehensive histories of the movement, links transhumanism to 
the ‘rational humanism’ of the Enlightenment that he identifies with the works of 
Bacon, notably the Novum Organum (Wolyniak 2015: 55); James Hughes links it to 
the utopianism of Bacon’s New Atlantis, writing that it was Enlightenment thinkers 
who transformed religious ‘millennial aspirations and proposed achieving a radically 
transfigured body and society through science and technology’ (2012: 759). As I 
related above, Horn sees the transhuman future of contemporary America as a 
fulfilment of Bacon’s New Atlantis (2013: 59–73), while Teichrib, writing on the 
flourishing of the ‘religion of man’, notes that ‘Extraordinary individuals like Francis 
Bacon, Baruch de Spinoza, and Thomas Hobbes pushed old boundaries, setting in 
motion and propelling the Age of Reason. Enlightenment thus birthed secularism, 
humanistic rationality, higher criticism, and contemporary science’ (2011: 302). 
As Wolyniak argues, the transhumanist Bacon is heralded ‘as a forebear, 
foreseer, and fighter for the method that potentiates technoscientific capacity’. He 
‘effectuates the transhumanist movement in its modern form—and perhaps enlivens it 
still’ (2015: 58). While some (like Hughes) acknowledge a religious substrate, this is 
usually ignored in favour of Bacon’s technoscientific legacy. Todd Daly notes that 
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this interpretation often rests on a reductionist reading of Christianity as disinterested 
in life extension, in contrast to which Bacon’s explorations of human aging were 
often explicitly tied to a desire to return to prelapsarian perfection (2011: 134).13 
Burdett also notes that, although often linked to secularisation, the utopic and even 
technological aspects of Bacon’s works, particularly the Instauratio Magna, have 
deep theological underpinnings (2015: 12–18). Charles Whitney, for example, notes 
the theologically-charged nature of the term instauratio, a word not commonly used 
in Bacon’s time but which is used in the Vulgate to refer to the rebuilding of the 
Temple after Babylonian captivity. Furthermore, via Augustine’s influence it came to 
signify ‘the new covenant’ and in the context of the individual ‘the instauration of the 
new man…signified by the resurrection’ (1989: 379). Instauration thus refers to ‘a 
divine action of restoration’ (Matthews 2008: 52), and what is restored are the human 
faculties lost in the event of the Fall. As Bacon himself wrote (in Burdett 2015: 13): 
[Innocence and dominion] can be repaired even in this life to some extent, 
the former by religion and faith, the latter by the arts and sciences. For the 
Curse did not make the creation an utter and irrevocable outlaw. In virtue 
of the sentence ‘In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread’, man, by 
manifold labours… compels the creation, in time and in part, to provide 
him with bread, that is to serve the purposes of human life. 
Burdett interprets this passage by noting that the Fall brought ‘alienation from 
God and a marred relation with Creation’, and that while the first could only be 
healed by supernatural or ecclesiastic means, the second was in humanity’s active 
potential to fix (2015: 13). Peter Harrison (2007: 158) corroborates this reading, 
noting that although innocence could only be restored by grace, dominion ‘made 
possible by Adamic knowledge’ was a ‘natural capacity’ within humanity’s reach, an 
idea with long ideological reach: the idea of this  
struggle to recover, through effort and industry in the present life, 
capacities that were once part of the natural endowment of human beings 
was integral to the Protestant vision of the earthly vocation. This vision 
informed seventeenth-century English projects to recover the dominion 
over nature that had been lost as a consequence of Adam’s sin.  
Sovereignty over nature was thus a core aspect of a greater project to restore 
humanity to prelapsarian wholeness (Burdett 2015: 13). While often astute in 
                                                
13 Additionally, as noted by Mercer and Maher life extension is often one of the least objected-to 
aspects of posthumanist philosophy from religious quarters (2014: xiv), though it often gets murkier 
when the methods involved are genetic tampering (see also Maher 2008) 
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comparing Christianity and transhumanism, Waters misses the ways that 
transhumanist beliefs regarding mastery of nature grows from not just heretical but 
also orthodox Christianities, and that in some ways the seeming opposition to the 
imago Dei found in transhumanist philosophy might actually be its discursive 
continuation and fulfilment—a possibility utilised by ‘techno-enthusiastic’ Christian 
thinkers like Ted Peters (2011: 64) and Stephen Garner (2011: 92–6). 
Dark Mirrors 
The transhumanist instauration adopts a particular semblance in contrast to its 
theological progenitor, adopting a ‘fully’ secularised form that shifts the position of 
humanity from that of quasi-outsider perfecting fallen nature to part of the nature that 
needs perfecting—albeit still by human artifice. To use Bacon’s terms, there is now 
only dominion rather than innocence, or rather innocence has been integrated as one 
aspect of dominion. This relates to the emergence of Western secularisation from 
Christianity itself, in which it recodes suffering and other theological concepts so that 
the agents of this-worldly redemption must also be this-worldly. 
Working in this apparent paradox, some more ‘technoenthusiastic’ Christian 
appropriations of transhuman ideologies have drawn on the theological paradigm of 
the ‘created co-creator’ developed by Philip Hefner and inspired by Donna Haraway’s 
1985 theorisation of the cyborg as a creature ‘simultaneously animal and machine, 
[populating] worlds ambiguously natural and crafted,’ a creatureliness which imposes 
itself onto us all as ‘chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and 
organism’ (1993: 272). In this model, human agency is reconfigured as God’s will, 
designed ‘to birth the future that is most wholesome for the nature that has birthed us’ 
conceived in cultural and ecological terms (Hefner 1993: 27). By this logic, the imago 
Dei grants us a capacity or even duty for creation (Lebacqz 2011: 57), in which the 
human adopts a hybridity as nexus of biology, culture and, spirituality (Garner 2011: 
93). Some transhumanist Christians, like Ted Peters, even gesture to predestination by 
(re)configuring the imago Dei as ‘a divine draw toward future reality’—as omniscient 
and extra-temporal, God creates ‘from the future’ and humanity is drawn inexorably 
to the eschatological fulfilment it has always-already been (2000: 147).  
The Horns resort to a similarly eschatological patterns, albeit in radically 
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different form. As with other spiritual warriors, they rely on the prophetic structure of 
time to foreclose on the territories (persons and places) occupied by the demonic. 
While for those like Peters the eschatological horizon acts as a sort of retroactive 
justification for technoscientific enhancement (albeit within limits), the Horns and 
associates use the same horizon to condemn it, marking it as inimical to God’s plan. 
They do not make these assessments purely in a void, however. Much as the rhetoric 
used by the Bush Government in the early days of the War on Terror was critiqued for 
mirroring and unintentionally justifying al-Qaeda’s own narratives of cosmic war 
(Adib-Moghaddam 2006: 77), the anti-religious rhetoric used by some transhumanists 
plays into narratives like the Horns’. Examples include Kurzweil’s categorisation of 
religion as ‘deathist rationalization’ that sees death as a good (2005: 372) or 
Moravec’s dramatic exhortation that ‘As humanism freed us from the chains of 
superstition, let transhumanism free us from our biological chains’ (1988: 44). Not to 
mention Max More’s ‘In Praise of the Devil’, published in his magazine Extropy, 
which ends with an exhortation fitting directly into currents of symbolic Satanism: 
‘Join me, join Lucifer, and join Extropy in fighting God and his entropic forces with 
our minds, our wills and our courage. God’s army is strong, but they are backed by 
ignorance, fear and cowardice. Reality is fundamentally on our side. Forward into the 
light!’ (1991: n.p.). 
Although genealogical similarities exist between tranhumanism and Western 
Christianities, there are also a number of ideological incompatibilities that I believe 
the vociferous oppositions of Hutchings or Horn draw out more clearly than milder 
critiques or attempts at assimilation. Moreover, I hold that the complex relationship 
between these incompatibilities and their shared genealogy indicates why it is 
transhumanism those like Horn finds so threatening. Waters noted competing 
soteriologies of temporality: transhumanism ‘seeks immortality’, Christianity ‘awaits 
eternity’ (2011: 172). Earlier, I linked this problematic to broader issues of the secular 
and secularisation in that transhumanism represented an infinitisation of the saeculum 
itself rather than its eschatological erasure. While for thinkers like Nancy the secular’s 
theological foundations asked us to reflect on the intrinsically Christian character of 
the West and for Asad it asked us to question the way secular ideologies grew from 
theological seeds, for those like Horn the subsuming of the ‘religious’ into the 
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‘secular’ becomes encoded in a theological and (moreover) eschatological model of 
history. It (re)inscribes secularisation as diabolisation, as becoming-diabolos. 
The genealogical relationship between secular transhumanism and Christian 
theologies results in a movement of literalisation by Horn and associates that relates 
discursively to the milieu’s fixation on ufology. Christopher Partridge, for example, 
examines the modern discourse of malevolent extra-terrestrials in light of historical 
Christian demonological discourses and notes crucial similarities, observing that the 
aliens are often construed as trans-dimensional entities that are threatening to human’s 
physical and spiritual health (2004: 180). While benevolent aliens in ufology often 
draw on Theosophical traditions, 
the malevolent alien…owes much to the history of Christian demonology. 
The alien as technological demon is popular because it seems plausible, 
seems plausible because it seems familiar, and seems familiar because it 
has been constructed from Western demonology (ibid.: 173).  
For the Horns and others, this relationship is literalised in one of two ways: modern 
aliens are traditional demons or traditional demons were always-already aliens, 
although they usually gravitate towards the former (Horn 1998: 55–65; Horn and 
Horn 2010: 23–32). This same pattern of literalisation is present in interpretations of 
secularism and transhumanism: their genealogical relationship to, and growing 
prominence (in the West) over, traditional Christianity is read as a demonological co-
option of the structures of society, the rise of a cultural form founded on the demonic 
precepts of worldliness and artifice and guided by a hidden satanic hand.  
Accordingly, transhumanism is (re)configured as a resurgence of the ‘religion 
of man’—that ancient schema of anthropo-demonic championing of artifice over 
essence—and its soteriologies are (re)configured as the becoming-transcendent of 
fallen time, infinitising the saeculum in a manner that negates (a need for) eternity. Its 
language and relationship to temporality marks it as threatening to the Horns and 
others in the milieu. The language is familiar. It seems to speak the same tongue—
‘Immortality, perfectibility, dominion, transcendence’ (Allenby and Sarewitz 2011: 
17)—but the words do not seem to mean what they should. The meanings have 
shifted, like society has shifted, becoming other. This gives it an uncanniness 
reminiscent of the figurations of ‘Islam’ I analysed above, which also appear to mimic 
the orthotaxy desired by the writers. Unlike that ‘Islam’, however, transhumanism is 
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inescapably Western and in significant ways inescapably Christian. Not an imposition 
from ‘outside’—as in demonological ‘Islam’ or ‘Jezebel’—the transhumanist 
‘religion of man’ emerges from within the West via the secularisation of its 
theological structures. By doing so, demonic transhumanism complicates orthotaxic 
concepts of inevitable teleology by using the same base concepts for different (but 
similar, so similar) ends—an end of all flesh as culmination, not termination. 
The True False Dawn 
Transhumanism is threatening to apocalypticists like Horn because it resembles—as 
semblance, as spectre—the Christianity it disavows. It is an ‘authentic fake’ that both 
is and is not the imago of the imago Dei. This undecidability haunts both the 
narratives of Horn, in which it represents the transient pseudo-triumph of a demonic 
other within the saeculum, and the narratives of transhumanists like Kurzweil or 
Moravec, who hold it to be humanity’s ascent beyond archaic, religiously-determined 
models of the human in favour of deciding, sovereignly, its own destiny. The division 
between these poles is not one of ‘either/or’ but rather rests in an interstice between 
‘both/and’ and ‘neither/nor’, an interstice for which transhumanism’s genealogy, and 
the genealogy of the secular that it transfigures, is the fulcrum. The problem faced by 
the Horns and other members of the milieu, however, is that an apparently immutable 
imago, the imago Dei that set in place the limits of and path to human perfectibility 
through the fulfilling of God’s will, has suddenly seemingly become mutable. Yet if 
transhumanist soteriologies can be viewed as emerging from the discursive legacy of 
the imago Dei, then imago has still determined imago. The mask has been shed, but 
the perfected image that emerged was not the one that was anticipated. As an imago 
of humanity’s (in)evitable future, transhumanism marks the idol that we, therefore, 
will always-already have been. 
Horn and his associates encode this new imago like that of a butterfly: 
transient, easily broken on the wheel—as, they reassure themselves, it has been 
before, in the days of Noah, of Nimrod, and others. In the theologic of prophetic time, 
this old-new imago will always-already have died. But as I argue above, the 
familiarity they feel when looking at this emergent transhuman imago may be closer 
than the old heresies they choose to see in its form (though such heresies are also an 
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orthodoxy’s unwanted children). Evangelicals like the Horns might be reacting to a 
competing model of soteriology, but this alter-soteriology is not (solely) the one they 
perceive it to be. To summarise, appropriating Partridge and applying his words to the 
milieu, transhumanism as technoscientific soteriology is terrifying to them because it 
seems plausible, seems plausible because it seems familiar, and seems familiar 
because it has been constructed from Western Christian discourses of salvation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
The Counterfeit Gods 
Sovereignty and its Demonologies—Imitations and Iterations 
‘O you contemptible race, hunted from heaven,’ 
So [the angel] began, on that horrific threshold, 
‘Why does this insolence persist in you? 
Why are you so recalcitrant to that will 
Which cannot ever fail of its objective, 
And which has more than once increased your pains? 
What use to run your head against the fates?’ 
— Inferno (IX.90–6) 
Once more, the demons come, once more. This repetition repeats across the texts 
examined above. Islamist extremism repeats gentile antagonism to Israel in Exodus, 
opposing the legitimacy of God’s chosen nation, Israeli or American. The increasing 
normality of non-normative gender roles and sexualities recreates the idolatrous 
orgies of Jezebel. Advances in technoscience and (trans)humanist philosophy are just 
the return of humanity’s need for idolatrous self-deification—itself a repetition of 
angelic dissent. These repetitions are opposed by yet other repetitions—of Israel, of 
Elijah and Jehu, of Noah—culminating with the effacing fulfilment of an eschaton 
when, as Giorgio Agamben notes, ‘repetition is no longer’ (2005b: 77). 
 This repetition is tied to a politicisation of typological exegesis that saturates 
the texts I have explored. As discussed previously, typological structures rely on the 
assumption of a sovereign God operating in history. As Sidney Greidanus clarifies, 
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typology discovers ‘specific analogies along the axis of God’s acts in redemptive 
history’ and without the foundation of God’s sovereign direction of the historical 
process cannot exist (1999: 249). It reveals, in the words of Georges A. Barrois, a 
‘sphere of divine economy in which man and the cosmos progress under the guidance 
of God towards eternal salvation’ (in ibid.: 255). ‘Old Testament’ persons and events 
become typoi of New Testament counterparts, who become not (only) a repetition but 
the advent of an archetype-yet-to-be. Kathleen Biddick (2013) argued, however, that 
typology used a logic of supersession in order to efface the (insolent) persistence of 
those typoi: it historicises in order to efface the continuation of a past that has 
supposedly been overcome, but which refuses to be over. 
 The persistence of this superseded past deconstructs the typological structures 
deployed by the authors analysed above. They interpellate present patterns into the 
biblical record, but the causality sometimes seems askew—for there is no need for 
Elijah or Jehu without Jezebel, no need for Noah without the Nephilim. God might be 
coded as history’s sole agent, but his redemptive actions seem too reactive, even 
reactionary. The demon—to cite Michael Hoelzl’s words on the Antichrist in modern 
messianisms—‘is the central and organizing space in the metaphysical matrix’ of their 
theopolitical thought (2010: 108). This dilemma is most clear in the writings of Horn 
and his associates, wherein it often seems as if Satan truly holds the reins of history, 
necessitating divine intervention. However, it is visible in the other texts I have 
analysed, which lament the turning of history from its proper course. They puzzle 
over perceived divergences, rationalise and refute them, but these deviations return to 
haunt them. The demon is always-already defeated, its subjectivity fixed from the 
moment of its subjection, yet it persists in its insolence, continues to run its head 
against the fates. As William Franke (1996: 126) notes, the question of Inferno’s 
celestial messenger with which I opened, 
[brings] out the hermeneutical structures of historical existence, since it 
verbally crystallizes and throws into relief the end, the terminus, as the 
source and focus of historical being and envisages the potentiality for 
completion, that is, for being-a-whole, as the foundation for authentic 
temporal existence. 
Structurally denied the potential for completion, the demon cannot possess authentic 
existence. Yet its insolence in the face of inevitability persists. The angel asks why, 
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but does not await answers. The authors surveyed above similarly do not wait. Their 
question is rhetorical. It reasons back from a foregone conclusion: the demon cannot 
create, and so it cannot sustain life, produce or reproduce, pass on a legacy, and thus 
cannot found its own legitimate, sovereign order. But the world started to change, to 
seemingly become other to teleological expectation. Suddenly, the spiritual warriors 
found themselves waiting, in the remains of a nation ‘that can only be saved by divine 
intervention’ (Barkun 2010: 131). 
What is to be made of this typology of demons, this counterfeit competitor to 
the orthotaxy of history? This concluding chapter addresses this question over two 
sections. The first explores the core characteristics of the case studies of previous 
chapters as they relate to shifting conceptions of the locus of ‘true’ sovereignty—from 
God to state to people as embodiment of the popular sovereign of American civil 
religion. The second builds on this analysis, drawing on de Certeau’s analysis of the 
‘“diabolical” crisis’ as culturally-determined irruption of alterity and Jacques 
Derrida’s treatments of ipseity and the structure of iterability related to a theopolitics 
of prophetic time and the deferral of eschatological sovereign presence. I ultimately 
focus on the inherent instability of a sovereignty that codes itself as indivisible, yet 
which divides itself always-already from its inception. By examining this 
(in)divisibility, I then analyse how its supposed counterfeiting by its demonological 
other(s) constitutes another—albeit unintended, diabolic, and thus abjected—iteration 
of its sovereign claims to the future. 
ROGUE LEVIATHANS: ORTHOTAXY AND ITS HETEROLOGIES 
As briefly noted in Chapter Two, in 1589 the German Jesuit bishop Peter Binsfeld 
(c.1540–1603) produced his Treatise on Confessions by Evildoers and Witches. In this 
work, Binsfeld crafted a list of seven major devils, each correlated to a deadly sin. 
Some, such as Lucifer’s alignment with Pride or Mammon’s with Avarice are self-
evident; others are less so, like Asmodeus’ with Lechery or Belphegor’s with Sloth. 
The devil he aligned with Envy was Leviathan (Hume and Drury 2013: 105). It is, of 
course, unlikely that Hobbes was aware of this more esoteric sense of the term when 
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between 1642 and 1651 he chose it to refer to his vision of the political state. Kim Ian 
Parker analyses Hobbes’ use of this ‘dreadful name’ as appropriate: the leviathan ‘is 
an artificial being who represents the state because of its “stature and strength”…the 
unity of its members…and, importantly, its function as the “King of the Proud”’ 
(2007: 430). The appellation is fitting: ‘Nothing on earth is his equal’ (Job 41:33). Yet 
as Isaiah makes clear, at time’s end leviathan will meet one more than its equal: ‘In 
that day the LORD with His severe sword, great and strong, will punish Leviathan the 
fleeing serpent, Leviathan that twisted serpent; and He will slay the reptile that is in 
the sea’ (27:1). 
While Hobbes’s main reasoning may have come from Job, the eschatological 
intimation of Isaiah exerts influence. As argued in Chapter Two, the divine mimicry 
of the sovereign state was to extend to judgement day, when it would be superseded 
by the God it imitated. The state was a ‘mortal god’ serving beneath and in support of 
an ‘immortal God’ (Martinich 1992: 336) until the time when such viceregency would 
no longer be necessary and the terrestrial state could be effaced and replaced by a 
heavenly antitype for which it is both derivative and antecedent (Almond 2009: 49–
50). For Derrida, Hobbes and other early theorists of sovereignty established the 
‘possibility of a Christian foundation of politics’ based upon a (theo)logic of social 
covenant and theopolitical viceregency, of the human sovereign as lieutenant of the 
divine (2009: 52–3); a steward whose purpose was to replicate in the saeculum the 
functions of God as the sovereign guarantor of security and wellspring of meaning. 
The purpose of the leviathan-as-state was therefore to act out the will of the divine 
sovereign via a process of earthly imitation. I analysed this above, with regards to the 
earliest theories of political sovereignty in the writings of Bodin, for whom the 
sovereign prince was God’s Lieutenant and ‘earthly image’ (1992: 46) and demonic 
witchcraft served as an act of ‘divine and human treason’ against Divine Majesty, the 
ultimate other that, as Satanic, was beyond the possibility of religious tolerance 
(1995: 200, 206). 
The (Anti)Christic Imitation 
Whether Hobbes knew the demonological meaning of ‘leviathan’ stemming from 
Binsfeld is almost impossible to discern—at least no clear chain of transmission 
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exists. Yet the relationship holds in an abstract sense. The boundary separating 
righteous imitation from counterfeit can be an unstable one, and in many ways, the 
dividing line is one constituted by envy. As Teresa Brennan argues in her critique of 
capitalism, Exhausting Modernity, ‘whether envy is a necessary corollary of imitation 
is questionable. Imitation can also be accompanied by envy’s opposite: admiration. 
We might say that imitation can be gauged envious where the original is denied’ 
(2000: 160). The theoretical transition of the leviathan from admiration—as in 
Bodin—to envy—as in the critiques of American society examined in Chapters Four 
through Six—is a complex one, passing through the mechanisms of Enlightenment 
secularisation and the rationalist critique that provoked mainline Christianity’s 
gradual marginalisation of demonology (Lincoln 2009: 45).  
Yet as the Devil of Baudelaire’s ‘The Generous Gambler’ remarks, nobody 
was as interested in disproving superstition than he (1970: 62); the disappearance of 
demons from mainstream theological discourse led to their flourishing on the 
religious fringe and counter-cultural appropriation as a symbol of rebellion and liberty 
(Boss 1991; Faxneld 2014; Schock 2003). In being discredited the demon became 
polyvalent. Its relation to sovereignty also changed. It retained the symbolic legacy of 
early modern witchcraft in its relationship to decadent excess and the sexual-spiritual-
political subversion of ‘proper’ order, but the legacy of a post-Miltonic appropriation 
of Satan as ‘archetypal embodiment of rebellion’ (Luijk 2013: 45) granted it a new 
relation to personal sovereignty and autonomy. Running from ‘Romantic Satanism’ 
via Bakunin and Blavatsky to the present, this paradigm reinscribes humanity’s Fall 
as a political or spiritual injunction of human freedom, gained via the acquisition of 
knowledge (Faxneld 2012, 2013a). Using ‘symbolic Satanism’ to challenge ‘God-
given’ societal structures, this intellectual trajectory appropriated the very fears of 
absolutists like Bodin and Hobbes, translating them into an emancipatory politics. If 
the nature of evil in spiritual warfare is, as Graham Russell Smith asserted, wilful 
deviation from ‘God’s rule’ (2011: 346), then for the symbolic Satanists this rule was 
‘analogous to that of the despotic and arbitrary authority [they] felt was ruling…in 
accordance with prescription and precedent’ (Faxneld 2013a: 530–1). 
The journey of the demonic’s relationship to sovereignty does not, however, 
end with Satan’s ubiquitous invisibility. The writers examined in preceding chapters 
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occupy another transition in this genealogy. For them, the leviathan has gone rogue—
in response, they orient themselves to the restoration of a once and future Kingdom, 
an orthotaxy for which the end is the one they anticipate and desire. Appleby notes 
that those we term fundamentalists are at root ‘reactive and selective’—two facets 
that reinforce and condition one another—and that they react (in part, if not in whole) 
to a perceived marginalisation of religion (2011: 230). That is, of ‘true’ religion, of 
‘their’ religion. The react to the societies in which they live and those they perceive as 
leading it along its path toward perdition—‘nationalist political leaders, scientific and 
cultural elites…modern bureaucracies and institutions, and competing religious or 
ethnic groups that find public space under the banner of pluralism’ (ibid.). In trying to 
shift the leviathan back from envy towards admiration, they ‘are drawn to power and 
defined in large part by their attempt to acquire it’ (ibid.: 244). However, they are 
enmeshed in the processes, institutions, and practices of the structures they oppose. 
Indeed, they are constituted by them. Like the demons they fight, these holy warriors, 
spiritual and otherwise, are caught within the totality of a system they cannot escape. 
Thus, fearing the loss of the sacred, they appropriate the very structures seen to 
threaten it—‘sometimes awkwardly, sometimes shrewdly, but consistently erosive of 
[the] premodern “traditional” religious sensibilities’ they long to restore (ibid.). 
 For such reactionaries the nation has become demonic—even irredeemably so. 
But this does not mean that the demonic has achieved sovereignty, far from it. Rather, 
the locus of (true, legitimate) sovereignty has changed. It is not (just) the nation-state 
that serves as God’s lieutenant, as for Bodin and Hobbes, but the popular sovereign—
specifically, the autonomous individual of modern (neo)liberalism, reified through the 
crucible of the Cold War, whose atomistic existence, severed from history and 
society, operates as the new ‘earthly image’ of Divine Majesty. As the locus of ‘true’ 
sovereignty shifts from profaned state to imago-bearing believer, society becomes 
increasingly seen as demonic—not only the secularised society of the Western nation-
state but (also) the general concept of ‘society’ as that which surrounds the sovereign 
self, contravening its indivisibility by mechanisms of history, culture, and materiality. 
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Selfhood (In)Divisible 
In American Possessions, Sean McCloud argues that contemporary ‘Third Wave’ 
spiritual warfare discourses are inextricably tied to the cultural logic of neoliberalism, 
creating a framework where the ‘free-willed, autonomous individual…completely 
unfettered by its history and social locations’ (2015: 107) is opposed to demonic 
forces that represent precisely those things—‘history, materiality, and the social’ 
(ibid.: 113). For McCloud, Third Wave evangelicalism is characterised by a logic of 
possession, commercial and spiritual. As previously noted, demons are territorial, 
haunting objects, bodies, places and nations from which they must be removed. They 
are attracted by and gain access via sins, present and historic. Such sins, which run 
from physical or emotional abuse to murder to loving attachment to heirlooms or 
childhood toys, open spaces for demonic habitation, creating ‘spatial limbos’ in which 
‘the sins of history materialize in the form of demons’ (ibid.: 21, 51).  
Yet while they attempt to wrestle with problems of historical violence and 
social structures, spiritual warfare discourses eschew structural critique in favour of a 
neoliberalistic individualisation of problems: ‘social sources, institutions, and forces 
that might be implicated in misfortune and injustice are ignored’ in favour of a literal 
demonization of such issues—‘the Third Wave imaginary conjures demons—
summoned by the sins of individuals or groups—to explain social problems’ (ibid.: 
62). These demons are bound to familial ties and traumatic events, and must be healed 
by therapeutic exorcisms which are personal rather than societal—financial hardship, 
material deprivation and chronic sickness, for example, are caused by ‘generational 
curses’ rather than social inequality or similar structural issues (ibid.: 82). Spiritual 
warfare wrestles with the past while in many ways disavowing it—history and society 
haunt the person, but the solution is a personal journey of repentance rather than any 
systemic change. Similarly, it is the individual who sins, even if they are compelled to 
do so by (demonically inspired) biological drives or inherited legacies. By 
simultaneously encoding both a rhetoric of individual choice and one of demonic 
drives and the pervading forces of history and familial legacy, McCloud argues, such 
ideologies construct ‘theologies of desire and action’ which fit broader thematic 
patterns in contemporary American discourses as vacillating between ‘autonomous 
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free-will individualism and external compulsion.’ In these discourses, the demonic is 
representative of a ‘return of the repressed, in that the forces ignored and denied in the 
neoliberal imaginary reappear, demanding recognition that they continue to possess 
the late-modern human agent’ (ibid.: 95). 
 Although McCloud does not focus on apocalyptic conspiracies, they might be 
considered a quintessential form of the logic operating here, in which society becomes 
figured as intrinsically demonic in opposition to the sovereignty of the individual. 
This logic has been at work in all three of the case studies examined in this thesis, 
albeit in different ways. The figurations of ‘Jezebel’ examined in Chapter Five are the 
closest to those analysed by McCloud, in which the individual and ‘natural family’ 
(and Church as spiritual family, naturalised by proxy) are opposed to demonic societal 
structures (media, globalisation, civil rights, etc.) that threaten to undermine their 
unity.1 Figurations of ‘Islam’ built on this model as a construction of a projection of 
demoniac unity—this ‘Islam’ infiltrates the spaces in American authenticity left by 
‘Jezebel’. This figuration operated on two levels, juxtaposing both American national 
integrity to the competing unity of a coming Caliphate and that of the autonomous 
citizen against the totalitarian legalism of ‘shari’a’, seen as effacing individuality and 
freedom: an apocalyptic literalisation of US legal scholar Grant Gilmore’s adage that 
‘In Hell there will be nothing but law’ (2014: 99). In the transhumanistic conspiracies 
of Thomas Horn and his associates, the apocalypse ends in the literal erasure of the 
sovereign self as the imago Dei is replaced by a diabolic simulacrum—the sovereign 
abdicates, shedding the (divine) source of its autonomy in order to become radically 
other, for which—to quote Horn quoting C.S. Lewis—‘far from being the heirs of 
power, will be of all men most subject to the dead hand of the great planners and 
conditioners and will themselves exercise least power upon the future’ (2011a: 8). 
Deviations from an orthotaxy conceptualised as the essential ground of ‘true’ (that is, 
Christian, capitalist, heteronormative) identity is conceived as forfeiture of the future. 
As forces of darkness without light—without a God, who is light—these competing 
                                                
1 Jezebel herself appears once in McCloud’s work in the context of Alice Patterson, a Third Wave 
figure who gained notoriety for her involvement in Rick Perry’s 2011 ‘prayer rally’, designed to garner 
support for his (ultimately failed) candidacy for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination. In her 
2010 work Bridging the Racial and Political Divide, Patterson identifies Jezebel as the demonic force 
operating through the Democratic Party due to its support of slavery in the 1800s, affirmation of 
abortion rights and current support for ‘sexual perversions’ (LGBT civil rights) (McCloud 2015: 32–3). 
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systems of being are seen as lacking not just a right to the territory of the future, but 
as being structurally incapable of possessing it. 
 Whereas for theorists of sovereignty like Bodin witchcraft undermined God’s 
majesty and thus constituted a form of demoniac treason against the conceptual 
integrity of a social order founded upon it, in contemporary spiritual warfare and 
other conspiracist discourses it is that very social order that has become demonic—
but demonic in opposition to the integrity of the sovereign individual as new bearer of 
God’s earthly image. As demons of the absolutist state manifested in the rogue 
subjectivities of ‘witches’ who through their irreligiosity denied the indivisible 
authority of the sovereign, demons of the autonomous individual manifest in the 
forces of a society beyond his (or her, although the formulation of this subject is 
peculiarly masculine) subjectivity: history (personal, familial, national), culture, 
‘artificial’ social structures (civil rights, social security), etcetera. Sovereign God 
segues into sovereign monarch and monological state that segues into sovereign 
individual—although such a succession is itself a repetition that alters the very ipseity 
that supposedly grounds sovereignty as indivisible. Each time its demons emerge in 
the faults lacing its illusory indivisibility. The demonic thereby acts to expose the 
contradictions in the sovereign’s construction of intrinsic unity, and thus must be 
excluded from it. It is the very mechanisms of this exclusion which reveal the 
sovereign’s dependency on—its constitution by and through—its demonic other. 
Popular Sovereignty and its Demons 
In the discourses examined in Chapters Four through Six, two interwoven oppositions 
between sovereignty and the demonic become apparent: the demonic as other to the 
sovereign individual, and the demonic as other to the sovereign nation-state, though in 
reality these are closer to refractions of the same discourse than distinct phenomena, 
reliant as they are upon an always-unstable construction of the authentic America(n). 
Constructions of an authentic American citizen condition and are conditioned by the 
construction of an authentic America broadly—of an orthotaxic configuration of the 
nation and what it is believed to represent. Entwined in the theologic of civil religion, 
this construction often hinges on ideas of the ‘popular sovereign’—the hypostasised 
construct of ‘We, the People’ as democratic, sovereign author of America. 
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 The theorist of sovereignty Paul Kahn has posited the notion of the ‘popular 
sovereign’ as trans-generational collective subject of America’s political imaginary, 
constituting the ground of the American self-construction of its identity (2007, 2011, 
2012, 2014). This idea of the popular sovereign is, for Kahn, bound to ideas of the 
(American) Revolution and the Constitution it produced, figured as the relationship of 
sovereignty to law: ‘Revolution is the moment of sovereign presence; law is the 
remnant of a now withdrawn sovereign’ (2014: 353). I touched on Kahn briefly in 
Chapter Three, and it is time to consider his theorisation in more depth. For Kahn, 
when American law is enacted it is enacted in the name of the popular sovereign, of 
the imagined community of ‘We the People’ inaugurated by the Revolution. Thus, 
when something is declared ‘unconstitutional’, he argues, the declarer invokes the 
popular sovereign as transtemporal, omnipresent author of America: things deemed 
‘unconstitutional’ are things that go against the will of the sovereign (people) (2011: 
9–10; 2012: 35). Going further, Kahn links American exceptionalism to the 
Schmittian exception as defining characteristic of sovereignty: the exception—the 
(idea of the) Revolution—is viewed as the fundamental ground of American identity, 
one which returns repeatedly in the mechanisms of civil religion; as such, in a sense 
‘the entirety of American political experience is lived within the exception—or at 
least within the shadow of the exception’ (2011: 11).  
Kahn argues that one of the constitutive elements of this exceptional 
sovereignty is the readiness with which America identifies enemies and figures the 
struggle against such enemies through a language of sacrifice—sacrifice, for Kahn, 
grounds political order by substituting the chaotic and ‘meaningless’ violence of the 
state of nature and reconfiguring death as a sublime sacrifice for (political) order. 
Citizens sacrifice themselves for the idea of political community, of the popular 
sovereign, against the image of an enemy that threatens it:  
Americans continue to imagine a world in which there are potential 
enemies and thus one in which politics can turn to life-threatening 
violence…the world’s most powerful nation lives with a belief in the 
insecurity of its own existence…The identification of the enemy is not 
grounded in a difference in policy but rather in the perception of an 
existential threat (ibid.: 10–11). 
 There are issues with Kahn’s thesis. Setting aside criticisms of its applicability 
as a broader theory of sovereignty and the constitution of the political imaginary 
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(Barshack 2012; Bassok 2012; Stevens 2013), it often seems to rests on essentialist 
and homogenising foundations that appeal to a universal experience of US political 
and national identification. Kahn purports to offer not a prescriptive but a descriptive 
account of the political imaginary, but links this descriptive account to the Revolution 
with little attempt to wrestle with ways in which the current construction of popular 
sovereignty might be at least partially a product of more recent social discourses like 
neoliberalism or Cold War geopolitics. As Jason Stevens notes, it is unlikely that the 
American political imaginary is quite as ‘hegemonic or perennial’ as Kahn claims 
(2011a: n.p.). Stevens has critiqued Kahn for his selective appropriation of history, 
noting that while traditions of political and religious dissent were tied to appeals to 
divine authority against the perceived illegitimacy of existing structures, Kahn 
reinscribes these moments as instantiations of transtemporal sovereign presence to 
support his thesis that ‘the trans-temporal, collective subject of the revolutionary 
sovereign, instantiated in every citizen, is a secularization of the mystical body of 
Christ, which the Protestant Reformation…had already transferred from the king and 
the sacraments to the inwardness of believers contemplating the scripture’ (2011b: 
n.p.). Kahn argues that it is impossible to understand American politics without taking 
into account its own self-imagining via civil religion (2011: 12; 2014: 354–5) but we 
might ask whose self-imagining this might be. By his own admission, the stable 
figuration of ‘We, the People’ necessitates the creation of enemies, enemies that are 
both threats to its unity and the mechanism by which that unity is discursively 
maintained. As I have shown throughout this thesis, sovereignty’s demonic other is as 
often located internally to the kingdom as it is externally. 
Despite or perhaps because of its essentialist and homogenising underpinnings 
Kahn’s thesis is useful for illuminating the mechanisms of the (neo)conservative 
‘evangelical-capitalist resonance machine’ (Connolly 2008) I explored above, 
particularly in the context of spiritual warfare and other political apocalypticisms. 
Essentialist constructions of sovereign presence instantiated through the processes of 
civil religion are exceptionally strong in these discourses. As I have shown, the 
identification of an enemy is foundational to them despite differences in this enemy’s 
identity. ‘We, the People’ necessitates ‘They, (not) the People.’ The legitimacy of (a 
certain construction of) the ‘popular sovereign’ is opposed to a plurality of competing 
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identities, and while ‘Islam’, ‘Jezebel’, and ‘Transhumanism’ address disparate 
permutations of a fear of the failure of a once and future kingdom, they all address 
this fear. Kahn links sovereignty to a volitional decision for exception, which he sees 
as theologically manifested in the miracle: ‘theology begins only with faith in the 
miraculous: the sovereign decision for creation. The miracle is the exception’ (2011: 
32–3). He holds that belief in this miracle of exception is what makes America 
resistant, even hostile, to the strictures of international law, and to images of the post-
sovereign EU described by neoconservative Robert Kagan (2004), a perhaps-idealised 
image of Europe that Kahn utilises on occasion (2011: 11, 16, 55, 141; 2012: 35). 
This hostility is more noticeable in the figurations of ‘Islam’ I analysed in Chapter 
Four, which reduce Islam to shari’a envisioned as totalitarian legalism. This apparent 
erasure of an authentic subject capable of autonomous action is present in the other 
case studies also, from its literal erasure in demoniac transhumanism to its steady 
erosion by globalisation and sexual-spiritual fluidity in figurations of Jezebel. In all, 
the sovereign individual, and a popular sovereign that is the collective embodiment of 
that sovereignty, is opposed to a demonic other seen as trying to erode its legitimacy, 
authenticity, and, ultimately, its Being.  
This demonic other is often figured as America, or more accurately as having 
co-opted America, diverting it from its original purity for a demoniac purpose. In such 
constructions, America is reconfigured as having become unconstitutional: while 
many (if not all) demonic threats originate beyond it, they have already transfigured 
the contours of the society they have penetrated, granted access by a weakening of the 
structures of truth and authenticity and further eroding them via the proliferation of 
alternative ways of thinking, being, and believing. Shaped and reshaped by the 
mechanisms of the evangelical-capitalist resonance machine, the popular sovereign 
opposes the rogue leviathan of a diabolised society. For the writers examined in this 
thesis, America has betrayed its ‘authentic’ core and must therefore be reconstituted 
in accordance with the sovereign act that birthed it by those who bear the sovereign’s 
image—that is, by ‘We, the People’. If—as Kahn believes—the quintessence of the 
sovereign is the ‘act of creation’, then the demonic’s inability to create is inextricably 
tied to its incapacity for sovereignty. The miraculous intervention of the popular 
sovereign—which is to say the ‘authentic’ and ‘legitimate’ orthotaxic construction of 
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‘We, the People’, the ‘real’ people who are not those other people—is required to slay 
the rogue leviathan, whose deviation from orthotaxy annuls its right to any future.  
However, the reassertion of this sovereignty is tied to a structure of repetition, 
transfiguring it into a spectral counterfeit that haunts attempts at the advent of any 
sovereign presence premised on a monologic of ipseity. 
A DEVIL IS HAUNTING HEAVEN: IPSEITY, ITERABILITY, IRRUPTION 
In Alfred de Vigny’s 1824 poem Éloa, the angels inform the titular heroine of the one 
who fell. They describe both his original glory, as the most beautiful and radiant of 
angels, who carried God’s love to all places, and his current wretchedness, lost and 
alone, unable to speak the tongue of Heaven anymore. They conclude their narrative 
by stating the potency of his absence: ‘Le ciel qu'il habita se trouble à sa mémoire, 
Nul Ange n'osera vous conter son histoire, Aucun Saint n'oserait dire une fois son 
nom’ (1834: 67–8).2 Heaven is troubled by his memory; no angel dares recount his 
(hi)story, nor any saint speak his name. While invoked as a cautionary tale for the 
naïve Éloa that any angel might fall, the narrative indicates something broader than 
merely the role the Devil plays in that of the poem. Satan’s absence haunts Heaven. It 
presents as a void about which no one speaks but around which everything revolves. 
There is an absence in Heaven that threatens the possibility of return, or perhaps just 
of descent. It marks an alterity, a possibility of reversal or revenance—of what might 
be construed as the heterology or heterotaxy that orthotaxy is constituted by. 
The Hauntological Demonic 
Derrida’s notion of ‘hauntology’ is useful in understanding the relationship of the 
demon to the orthotaxy it infiltrates and enframes. A Francophone play on ‘ontology’, 
hauntology referred in Specters of Marx to the way in which the spectre of Marx, and 
communism generally, occupied the disavowed foundations of capitalism’s post-Cold 
War triumphalism. Derrida (1994: 64–5) writes: 
                                                
2 ‘Heaven, where he lived, is troubled by his memory, No Angel will dare recount his story, No Saint 
would dare to speak his name again’ (my translation). 
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this triumphant conjuration [of capitalist hegemony] is striving in truth to 
disavow, and therefore to hide from, the fact that never, never in history, 
has the horizon of the thing whose survival is being celebrated (namely, 
all the old models of the capitalist and liberal world) been as dark, 
threatening, and threatened. And never more ‘historic,’ by which we mean 
inscribed in an absolutely novel moment of a process that is nonetheless 
subject to a law of iterability.  
The triumph was always-already haunted by something that threatened to return; the 
‘end of history’ was never more historical than at the moment of its declaration. 
Nicole Anderson argues that, for Derrida, hauntology ‘makes impossible and possible 
a metaphysics of ontology that structures inheritance along linear coordinates in time 
and space, cause and effect, which in turn (in)forms the presence of the subject’, that 
is, ‘the haunting of non-being within being, absence within presence, outside within 
inside, and vice versa’ (2012: 91, 99). 
 The demonic sketches out a hauntological relationship to the order it opposes. 
Forbidden the creative sovereign act—the miracle, the revolution—it occupies the 
space where sovereign presence has receded, appropriates its tools, and infiltrates the 
fractures in its unity. As its own disavowed ontos, the demonic haunts sovereignty 
and the linear structures of inheritance and ownership it is constructed as 
guaranteeing. The exact form this takes differs with the transfiguration of the 
sovereign and so with the specific conjuration of its demons. For Bodin, but also for 
Landon Schott and Jennifer LeClaire and the others who write on the nefarious impact 
of Jezebel, it comes in the form of a demonic witchcraft that distorts the gendered 
social order founded on an indivisible, masculine majesty. The normative hierarchy of 
gender thereby forms the bedrock of orthotaxy as such. As Rebecca Wilkin remarks 
of Bodin’s Demon-Mania, ‘Rule by women leads to the annihilation of the state, 
while women’s knowledge of the occult heralds the decadence of the moral universe’ 
(2008: 74–5). This foundational distortion of heternormativity works in several ways 
as the ground for other distortions: the totalitarian ipseity of ‘Islam’ infiltrates via the 
cracks Jezebel leaves in orthotaxy’s walls, while it is debates about what is ‘natural’ 
or ‘proper’ to ‘human nature’ that lead to ‘Transhumanism’s’ questioning of the 
naturalness of ‘the human’ itself.  
These are not identical to fears of Jezebel, however. While Jezebel figured an 
erosion of the normative by fluidity and disruption these other others in many ways 
 252 
are figured as constructing competing normativities. ‘Islam’ figures an uncanny self, 
an orthotaxy so (un)like the one authors like Richardson covet: Kingdom Come not as 
Christendom but Caliphate. This uncanniness reconfigures historic demonisations of 
competing monotheisms, not solely Islam but Judaism as well, and Cold War fears of 
totalitarianism and of a One World Order for which the One World is no longer theirs: 
an-Other(‘s) globalisation. ‘Jezebel’ weakens structures of orthotaxy, whereas ‘Islam’ 
threatens to usurp them. Meanwhile, ‘Transhumanism’ makes the structures of 
orthotaxy itself always-already other. By reconfiguring the serpent’s gift of the 
saeculum as the totality of existence, it figures an oppositional position to ‘Islam’: the 
latter creates a world in which there is nothing but law, the former one in which there 
is no law—or more specifically no (longer a) sovereign as transcendent, stable, and 
indivisible ground of meaning which creates the law and subsequently recedes, 
leaving us with the shadow of its image and promise of its return. The sovereign 
annuls itself (sovereignly): the semblance is reconfigured as an idol, and reality 
(p)redestined into only immanence. Responding to these constructions of the other, 
proponents of orthotaxy wage—to again appropriate and transfigure Arshin Adib-
Moghaddam’s summation of the ideological structures of al-Qaeda—‘total war’, both 
spiritual and political, against external and internal others, ‘in order to create a true 
and absolute genealogy; a mythical tale dotted with heroic figures and “authenticated” 
personalities that would deliver [America] from [its] “imperfect” existence, from [its] 
fallen present’ (2006: 252). 
That Which Comes (Once, Once Again) 
The void left at the heart of Heaven marks the trace of dissent, and promises a return. 
This phantasmatic return is crucial. It conditions both orthotaxy and its categorisation 
of its others, rendering them intelligible and legible, (re)inscribable. According to the 
logic of prophetic time on which many authors analysed in this thesis rely, everything 
new is old. Civil rights and gender politics are the return of a Jezebel spirit, Islamism 
a repetition of the perpetual enmity between gentiles and Jews—and the Christians 
who are their successors and erstwhile defenders—while transhumanism is merely the 
resurgence of the ‘religion of man’, that travels unchanged from Babel via Gnosticism 
to the Enlightenment and beyond. These demons are hauntological as communism 
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was to the liberal capitalist order that ostensibly vanquished it—they are defeated yet 
threaten to return, troubling theopolitical and eschatological narratives of orthotaxic 
triumph and unbroken inheritance, problematising its sovereign claim to the territory 
of the future. The authors analysed in this thesis wait for a second coming—of Christ, 
America, the popular sovereign; that is, of orthotaxy—but the advent they receive is 
not the one they anticipated. What returns is not the unitary and unifying power of the 
Sovereign but the spectre of its thought-defeated Adversary. 
 Writing about the ‘“diabolical” crisis’ in Europe in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, Michel de Certeau posited the demonic as one face of an other 
that infiltrates and accelerates the mutation of the society in which it irrupts. Whether 
the irruption signals something truly new or the return of something ancient is, for de 
Certeau, impossible for the historian to truly know: its alterity is provided with ‘forms 
of expression prepared in advance’, yet these forms cannot fully contain this alterity 
(or perhaps its excess is an attribute of the figure it adopts) (2000: 1). Irrespective of 
whether it is old or new or—as the demon is ‘the sphinx of a truth mixed with lies’ 
(ibid.: 148)—some irreducible hybrid of both, its irruption provokes a discourse of 
social anxiety that rejects ‘both the limits of a present and the real condition of its 
future’ (ibid.: 1).  
De Certeau held this diabolical visage was a product of a religious society—
‘In societies that either are not, or have ceased to be, religious, they assume other 
faces’—and that it marked  
fault lines within a religious civilization, perhaps the last that could be 
expressed by means of the religious apparatus—the last rifts before a new 
beginning. They appear to signal an end that cannot yet be spoken—hence 
their eschatological character. They also betray an uncertainty before the 
future, the very expression of which becomes an object of panic and 
repression. (ibid.: 2). 
The significance of this ‘“diabolical” crisis’ for de Certeau was that it signalled the 
confrontation in a society between destabilised old certainties and emerging forms of 
knowledge and being (ibid.). The demonic irruption figured a discursive hybridisation 
that encoded both the uncertainties of crumbling ideologies and those of ideologies 
still becoming stable. And while ‘a crisis’ sufficed ‘for them to rise up’ from beneath 
the quotidian permutations of the political and social imaginary, this other always 
circulates, unseen (ibid.: 1). Thus, while the demonic is most visible in times of crisis 
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when the logic of orthotaxy is most overtly threatened, they are not the sole locus of 
its manifestation. The demonic is constant and relentless in its oppositions, even and 
perhaps especially when invisible. While de Certeau is discussing a general structure 
of the irruption of alterity—one which here, if not always, adopts diabolic 
semblance—his observations are useful for figuring the demonic’s relation to 
sovereign orders broadly. There were (historic, ideological) reasons this other adopted 
diabolic form. There are similar reasons in modern America. 
McCloud invokes de Certeau’s analysis in his exploration of demonological 
discourses in Third Wave evangelicalism, noting especially how such evangelicalisms 
are hybridised with the very cultural forms they oppose (2015: 88): 
Satan’s tools for world domination surround them on all sides: other 
people’s religions, multiculturalism, liberal politics, and many forms of 
popular culture. On the other hand, some of the Third Wave’s political and 
cultural dispositions—the promotion of laissez-faire forms of capitalism 
as ‘biblical,’ theological attacks on what little is left of the welfare state, 
and the utilization of therapeutic discourse—seem to embrace some of the 
most dominant themes of the era. The Third Wave both complements and 
contests some dominant contemporary notions of agency, structure, 
history, and conceptions of the individual…the battles with demons 
described in deliverance manuals register the movement’s attraction and 
repulsion toward the late-modern social formation from which it was born. 
For McCloud, the demonological discourse in contemporary America serves much the 
same purpose as it does in de Certeau’s historiography: a ritualised performance of 
cultural contestation. McCloud does not, however, look at broader philosophical 
quandaries of the other or the theopolitical genealogy of demonology’s relationship to 
what I have termed orthotaxy: constructions of sovereign, telic order (social, political, 
religious) that must be reinforced and reinscribed. He sees how the Third Wave 
imaginary is hopelessly entwined in the coils of the very leviathan it wishes to slay 
but not how the demonic’s destabilisation of the certainties of sovereign order is 
inextricable from the theologico-political notion of sovereignty itself. The relationship 
figured between spiritual warfare and the society it disavows is just an iteration of a 
genealogical relationship that returns and mutates according to the alterations of 
sovereignty itself, as it divides itself via the mechanisms of translating its discursive 
prescriptions of indivisibility. 
 Sovereignty and its demonologies transform throughout their genealogy. It is 
not just the demonic that persists in its insolence, running its head against the fates, 
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but also the sovereignty from which it is inseparable. This relates to the structure of 
what Derrida termed iterability, and specifically iterability’s relationship to ipseity. 
For Derrida, as I discussed in Chapter Two, sovereignty rests upon ipseity: ‘Before 
any sovereignty of the state, of the nation-state, of the monarch, or, in democracy, of 
the people, ipseity names a principle of legitimate sovereignty, the accredited or 
recognised supremacy of a power or a force’ (2004: 11–12). It marks the principle of 
the self-same—the recognition of those like oneself—and so the power, authority and 
proprietary possession that comes with the codification of that one-self. This principle 
is reflected throughout this thesis: orthotaxies are posited on the basis of an indivisible 
logic of identity and reified through exclusionary demonologies. This ipseity, 
however, is made (im)possible by its iterability—its need for reinscription that 
renders it always-already other to its-self. Iterability refers to the necessary condition 
of the singular event that requires a repetition that makes it always other to itself—as 
the signature as hallmark of identity only achieves this hallmark on the basis that it 
can be reinscribed at another time or place. Because of this logic, iterability inscribes 
itself as the condition of the origin: it is only by later (re)inscription that a moment of 
origin acquires authenticity and identity. ‘Iterability makes it so that the origin must 
repeat itself originally, must alter itself to count as origin, that is to say, to preserve 
itself’ (2002a: 277–8). Joseph Kronick summarises iterability as an ‘alterity of 
repetition’ predicated on a ‘suppression of difference that makes identity possible and 
impossible in any absolute sense’—an ‘originary violence, a violence necessary to the 
constitution, or institution, of any transcendental or natural category’ (1999: 38). 
In the relationship of sovereign orthotaxy to its demonic other, this ‘alterity of 
repetition’ is visible in two different but interconnected patterns. First and most 
obvious is the way theopolitical sovereignty itself has repeated across its genealogy, 
passing from God to king to state to citizen. In each of these it ostensibly repeats the 
same structure, grounding an (in)divisibility of power and authenticity that grounds 
the theopolitical order, but it is irreducibly altered with each transition. The leviathan 
always-already encoded a relationship of envy; its imitation compromised the integral 
indivisible unity of the thing it imitated (the sovereign god) by the very positing of its 
imitability. This first structure of sovereignty’s iterability, which makes the leviathan 
rogue a priori, feeds into a second manifestations of repetition and othering: the 
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demonic counterfeit itself. Manifesting as counter-claims to sovereign orthotaxy’s 
ownership of the future, this counterfeit of orthotaxy sketches alternative orders: 
‘Jezebel’, ‘Islam’, ‘Transhumanism’—figurations of other systems, structures, and 
ways of being that orthotaxy continually denies legitimacy to and (it claims) 
continually defeats, but which nonetheless return to haunt it. 
The Counterfeit Gods 
Sovereignty’s demonic other encodes its iterability, gesturing to a crisis of prophetic 
eschatology broadly. The prophetic eschatology performed by the authors analysed in 
this thesis is bound to a politicisation of typology, the model of exegesis in which past 
events become a figure of future ones, as Jerusalem’s temple (pre)figures the New 
Jerusalem in which God’s presence will be constant and eternal and Adam prefigures 
Christ. Typology entails a repetition of past events which gives them their ‘true 
meaning’, a state that endures until an eschaton ‘when repetition is no longer’ 
(Agamben 2005b: 77). However, through its reliance on this structure, the politics of 
prophetic time become inextricable from a broader logic of iterability—each event 
reinscribes a past event and prefigures a future one, overtly different yet essentially 
identical. However, in the texts explored in this thesis, it is not only the redemptive 
events that return—as in traditional typology (Greidanus 1999: 242), but also their 
others. Each demonic irruption is the repetition of something that preceded it and was 
thwarted—Queen Jezebel, the gentile nations, the nephilim. But each iteration of the 
demonic other posits a counter-claim to orthotaxy’s own (re)iteration of its 
ownership, reiterating the dissent that inaugurated the fall. Such counter-claims are 
seen as counterfeits by and of the orthotaxy they oppose, but what truly separates a 
counterfeit from its original? 
Derrida challenges a distinction between original and simulacrum generally by 
the theorised structure of iterability, but addresses the distinction directly in relation to 
the counterfeit as part of a discussion on the (im)possibility of the gift in Given Time. 
A counterfeit, Derrida posits, is not merely something which is false but a falsity able 
to masquerade convincingly as a truth, something which destabilises discourse about 
‘truth’ since one cannot be certain if one is dealing with a truth or just its simulacrum 
(1992: 170). O’Connor elaborates that ‘ideas of authenticity and inauthenticity are 
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founded on the notion that there is an original which belongs to an order that is sacred 
and inviolable. The inauthentic is a copy which is only a pale imitation of the true.’ 
But, he explains, for Derrida ‘there is no original exempt from subjection to further 
demarcations and delimitations’—nothing is purely ‘original’ or counterfeit, since to 
an extent they need one another: ‘for a counterfeit to be a counterfeit requires 
imitation of an “original”’ (2010: 88–9), but that original is only posited as origin 
retroactively. As such, there is, to an extent, only the simulacrum or simulacrum of 
the simulacrum, a phantasm which must be recognised ‘as having the power, at least 
the power and the possibility—without any controlling certitude, without any possible 
assurance—of producing, engendering, giving’ (Derrida 1992: 161). 
Derrida concludes Given Time by positing that there ‘is no nature, only effects 
of nature: denaturation or naturalization. Nature, the meaning of nature, is 
reconstituted after the fact on the basis of a simulacrum…that it is thought to cause’ 
(ibid.: 170). I am tempted to say the same of sovereignty. If the earthly sovereign was 
constituted as an essential imitation of the heavenly, then—irrespective of envy or 
admiration—it was only ever a counterfeit god. The sovereign individual, lynchpin of 
the evangelical-capitalist resonance machine, would also be a counterfeit, even a 
counterfeit of a counterfeit. Even God, the (in)divisible origin of the structures of 
authenticity reified and reasserted through sovereignty’s history, is only projected 
back from the earthly inscription of his semblance and his will, from the signature of 
the unity that supposedly guarantees him but which compromises him from the start. 
The counterfeit becomes the origin it always-already was, and is counterfeited in turn. 
And so orthotaxy tries to return with the sameness it never was and cannot ever be. It 
segues into a semblance of its other, into a pseudomonarchia of demons for which the 
pseudos has lost all meaning. There were only (n)ever counterfeit gods, only (n)ever 
heterotaxies, and so there was and is no sovereignty, no ‘originary’ sovereignty whose 
indivisibility comes down to us in unbroken continuity or can be reclaimed through a 
process of restoration, only the effects (after- and fore-, destined and redestined, once 
and once again) of a political imaginary—paths toward or against illusions of 
(in)divisibility that compete and collude, reiterate and reinscribe each other on the 
basis of simulacra of simulacra. 
But in the midst of this pandemonium, a question remains. 
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CODA  
Owning the Future 
 
Who owns the future? What does it mean to own sovereignly and without contestation 
this place, this property, named ‘the future’? When Irving Kristol argued, from the 
ideological depths of the Cold War, that this was ‘the key question’ of the era (1983: 
256), he understood any answer would be contested territory. As Michael Williams 
writes, for the neoconservatives ‘ideology’ was ‘the ground upon which modern 
politics [was] fought’, and modernity is an epoch ‘in which all political programmes 
and positions must cast their arguments and conduct their struggles’ in terms of the 
‘battle of ideas and the mutable direction of political culture’ (2007: 95).  
Kristol’s question laid bare the stakes of the conflicts in which America was 
embroiled, domestically and internationally. He and his associates felt the necessity of 
(re)asserting those discursive structures they believed comprised the America they 
desired against those they despised. The spiritual warfare and related apocalyptic 
discourses I have analysed utilise a similar strategy, dividing the world into kingdoms 
of light and darkness, God and Satan, which vie for epistemic control. Predicated on a 
disavowal of the agential capacity and ‘property’ rights of the systems they oppose, 
they deny their adversaries a potential for creation that discursively robs them of 
systemic permanence premised on a logic of (re)production. This typological 
theopolitics is founded on a logic of sovereign ipseity, an indivisible monologic of the 
one-self that posits a single indivisible source of authenticity, ‘proper’ organisation of 
the social body, and teleological end to the historical process—three faces of what I 
have termed ‘orthotaxy’. This orthotaxy is, however, complicated and contested by 
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the demonologies it relies on and that constitute it, specifically on the demonologies’ 
relationship to the sovereignty they deny and are denied.  
FRAGILE CERTAINTIES 
Michel de Certeau wrote that ‘The need for certainty is also the admission of the fear 
of losing it’ (2000: 113). The trinity of demonic others I explore in this thesis—
‘Jezebel’, ‘Islam’, ‘Transhumanism’, three that are themselves multiple—each 
illustrate a different form of this unstated but ever-present admission. Each sketches 
out the framework of an alternative order that is denied on the basis of its alleged 
unsustainability—an unsustainability based not on analysis of the structural faults of 
the system in question, but posited a priori upon its deviation from the telic order of a 
history ‘in which man and the cosmos progress under the guidance of God towards 
eternal salvation’ (Barrois in Greidanus 1999: 255). Even in the discourses that 
exclude them, however, these heterotaxies operate through subtle contestations—
structurally denied the ability to create, they infiltrate the fault lines in the structures 
they contest, revealing flaws or repurposing them for unintended ends. While this co-
opting is coded as corruption, it can be considered part of the instability inaugurated 
by those structures’ own iterability. Sovereignty was always more prescriptive than 
descriptive, and as it repeated and translated itself from context to context the illusion 
of its descriptiveness became harder to maintain and its prescriptiveness more open to 
contestation. The ‘counterfeit orders’ posited by spiritual warfare and apocalypticisms 
are, in many ways, simply refractions of its orthotaxic structures, structures that are 
themselves no less ‘counterfeits’ to an originary truth always constructed a posteriori.  
When Kristol posed his ‘key question’ for the epoch, he knew the answer was 
not a foregone conclusion. But neoconservatives like Kristol also believed it would 
ultimately be answered. The Kirkpatrick Doctrine supported authoritarian regimes in 
order to forestall the immutable totality of the communist state, and Fukuyama 
proclaimed the end of history when it fell. However, the ‘key question’ of our epoch 
is perhaps best understood as a performative act of negation. It opens up the site of 
contestability. The ideological politics of inevitability was called into question by a 
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resurgence of political religion, most notably Islamism, in which ‘9/11’ marked the 
symbolic (if far from literal) reignition of history (Tibi 2014). While this clash can be 
seen as merely the reinsciption of the clash of orthotaxies, it illustrates the always-
precarious nature of any political eschaton. Indeed, the Global War on Terror maybe 
best revealed (and continues to reveal) the crisis of orthotaxy and persistent insolence 
of its demonic others. In Michael Drake’s summation, the war discursively emerged 
as ‘structurally unbounded, war without end, an infinite deferral of the model of 
absolute victory drawn from national military thought now redeployed in “pre-
emptive defence” on a global scale against potential threats’. The deployment of such 
warfare paradigms produced similar effects mechanically as it did discursively, 
‘collaterally [producing] new forces of revenge, resentment, solidarity and resistance 
which see the USA as their primary enemy’ (2007: 23).  
While some held the war’s reification of its phantasmatic object (‘terror’) was 
a conceptual (not just tactical) error (ibid.: 20), I believe it to be one of the exemplars 
of the problematic of orthotaxy. Marc Redfield noted that in its designation of an 
absolute foe, ‘Its religious character is irreducible’ (2009: 56), and its apocalyptic 
character has been highlighted often (Buc 2015; McLaren 2003; Mills-Knutsen 2010; 
Northcott 2004). However, it is not (solely) its eschatological character but the 
infinite deferral of that eschatology that really defines it. It reifies an enemy (‘the 
terrorist’) and attempts to contain it in geographical and geopolitical territories it 
always exceeds (‘states that harbour…’), and thereby reveals the fissures in its 
political imaginary. In reasserting the supremacy of a particular nation over the others 
of not just a nation but of the concept of the nation itself, the War on Terror wages 
war on the realisation of its own (im)possible victory and against the terror of its own 
insecurity. 
Orthotaxy constructs itself as immutable precisely because of its mutability, 
and stakes an uncontestable claim to the territory of the future precisely because of its 
contestability. It holds itself omnipotent but its omnipotence is always-already broken 
and brokered from the beginning. It constructs demons as self-consolidating others 
but these others are also the tools of its own self-contestation, highlighting disavowed 
fractures in its ipseity: the porosity of its borders, contestability of its rulership, and 
evitability of its ends—among a legion of others figured in other texts at other times 
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and in other terms. Like the angel in the Inferno, orthotaxy speaks questions but does 
not await answers. But what might the demons respond, if permitted to speak and be 
heard? Maybe, since they are inextricable from processes of mimesis and repetition, 
they might reply with a question of their own. Maybe even the key question, a 
question that is key or the key—of a kingdom, heavenly or other. The most dangerous 
question for any angel, for even angels can be tempted to descent. 
‘Who owns the future?’ 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Following the 2015 British General Election, an election where all major parties built 
platforms on opposition to immigration and in which electorate opposition to politics-
as-usual adopted nationalistic form, the US-centred concerns of this thesis reflect the 
patterns of demonisation sweeping Europe—Islamophobia and xenophobia, virulent 
and violent classism, an erosion of human liberty veiled in rhetoric of its celebration. 
This politics of fear often lacks the explicitly theological teleology of the discourses 
examined in this thesis but replaces it with a semblance, economic or völkisch, no less 
monological in conceptuality or terminal in orientation. It replicates theological 
structures in other fashions. Individuals are severed from a society in which they live, 
the darkness of which can be banished by the luminosity of privatisation. Borders are 
etched more indelibly. Sovereignty reasserts itself in processes predicated on a denial 
as internalised as externalised. It subsists by not questioning the illusion of its being. 
The politics of demonology are so rich, under-examined and timely that there 
are many paths one might tread from here. Closer attention paid to the manifestation 
of such demonologies on the ground is perhaps the necessary complement to the more 
theoretical analysis I have conducted, addressing how the demonological structures of 
subjectivity, oppression and resistance operate in the individual lives of both believers 
in a system and those it excludes. The genealogy of sovereignty and its demonic other 
must also be interrogated further. While I sketch the main features of this genealogy, I 
have concentrated on it primarily in the context of a certain constellation of American 
evangelical Protestant conservatism, and the complexities and specificities of its 
 262 
figuration must be explored in each historical milieu it arises in—although Philippe 
Buc (2015) and Per Faxneld (2014) go some way to addressing this. Similarly, it is 
necessary to explore its forms in other types of Christianity—American or other, 
evangelical or other—as well as in different but genealogically-Abrahamic 
religiosities. 
These are practical directions that must be conducted with critical awareness 
of linguistic, historical and (in the present) ethnographic considerations. But there are 
also theologico-philosophical questions. Drawing on historic alignments of demons 
with fallen humanity, what becomes of this relationship when placed in the context of 
(post-)secular theory and analysed as symbolic of both humanity’s highest aspirations 
for liberty and the abyssal excesses of that freedom? Simona Forti (2015) explores 
this partially through her paradigm of ‘mediocre demons’; however, her emphasis on 
radical evil leads her to under-examine the demon’s emancipatory appropriations. The 
personalisation of societal processes in conspiracisms (apocalyptic or otherwise) also 
bears examination, and has thus far been explored solely through the opposition 
between individuals and society (Fenster 2008), as a delegitimising paradigm that 
masks the operation of elites (deHaven-Smith 2013), or as the ascription of agency to 
accident (Aaronovitch 2011), but not as a potential individualisation of hegemony or 
discursive structures as viewed in Foucauldian terms. That is, that conspiracism might 
be a refraction of hegemony through a neoliberal ideological lens for which individual 
agency is the sine qua non of the political imaginary. Finally, it is crucial to explore 
how demonologies might mutate in political systems where sovereignty is disavowed, 
especially those attempting to move towards more legalistic paradigms. I suspect that, 
like Nietzsche’s deceased God, sovereignty’s shadow will linger beyond its presence, 
and post-sovereign paradigms will create new but no less exclusionary demonologies, 
based on other structures of normalisation and destination and their own arrangements 
of orthotaxy. But if so, then, with persistent insolence, its demons will continue to run 
their heads against the fates—once and once again.
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